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Constitutional Review: Supreme Court,

1976-77 Term
By MICHAEL P. LEHMANN* AND MARY C. EKLUND**
Equal Protection
In the following sections, eight cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court during its 1976-77 term will be analyzed. These cases
represent the more important equal protection decisions disposed of, in
whole or in part, on constitutional grounds. 1 Consideration of these rulings
will be divided into five parts. The first section analyzes two major genderbased discrimination cases, Craigv. Boren2 and Califano v. Goldfarb.3The
second section considers classifications based on race and reviews two of
the Court's more important decisions during the term, Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation4 and United
Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh v. Carey.5 The third and fourth
sections examine, respectively, challenges to laws classifying on the basis
* A.B., 1974, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1977, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. Member, California Bar.
** Member, third-year class.
1. Other decisions include: Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (upheld compensation program and interdistrict remedy to redress the effects of past segregation); Connor v.
Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (legislative reapportionment plan held not to embody equitable
discretion necessary to meet the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (felony murder provision of federal enclave statute held not to
discriminate against Indians); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S.
259 (1977) (laws requiring separate majority approval for changes in county government upheld
against equal protection challenge); Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S.
73 (1977) (exclusion of Kansas Delawares from distribution of funds to redress treaty violation
upheld against equal protection challenge); Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1976) (vacated
state judgment finding constitutional a law incorporating a gender-based discrimination in
determining the age of majority); Knebel v. Hein, 429 U.S. 288 (1976) (upheld law disallowing
deduction for travel expenses in connection with a job training program against an equal
protection challenge); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (social security law alleged to
discriminate against divorced wives held not to constitute a denial of equal protection).
2. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
3. 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
4. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
5. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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of illegitimacy, Trimble v. Gordon6 and Fiallo v. Bell,' and alienage,
Nyquist v. Mauclet.8 The final section is devoted to a discussion of Maher
v. Roe, 9 a transitional decision involving an alleged infringement of the
fundamental rights of a distinct class of persons. As noted, the Supreme
Court has decided other equal protection cases during this term, a few of
which will be mentioned and analyzed. 10 But the opinions adverted to are
the most important and provide a useful basis on which to analyze the type
of review the Court is currently willing to accord equal protection claims in
a variety of contexts.
6. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
7. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
8. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
9. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
10. Most particularly, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438
(1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
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A. Gender-based Classifications
1. "Substantial" Relation to "Important" Governmental Interests
In Craig v. Boren,I the Supreme Court held that to withstand an equal
protection challenge, gender-based classifications must both serve "important" governmental objectives and be "substantially related" to the
achievement of those objectives. 2 In doing so, the Court once again refused
to subject gender-based discrimination to strict scrutiny, as had been urged
by a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson.3 The majority of the
Court in Craig did elect, however, to engage in a more critical examination
of a gender-based classification than is normally utilized when fundamental
rights and suspect classes are not present. Perhaps the most interesting parts
of the opinion are the separate concurrences of Justices Powell and Stevens
and the dissent of Justice Rehnquist, which openly discuss the appropriate
standard of review in suits alleging gender-based discrimination.
Craig, a male born on September 25, 1953, and Whitener, a licensed
beer vendor, alleged that an Oklahoma statute 4 prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to
females under the age of eighteen constituted discrimination on the basis of
1. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For some useful discussions of the standard of review in equal
protection cases decided by the Burger Court, see generally Forum: Equal Protectionand the
Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONsr. L.Q. 645 (1975); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,
Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a ChangingCourt: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
2. 429 U.S. at 197.
3. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court invalidated 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1970)
(amended 1973) and 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(C) (1970), which provided that spouses of male
members of the uniformed services are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters
allowances and medical and dental benefits, but that spouses of female members are not
dependents unless they are in fact dependent for over one-half their support. Justices Brennan,
Douglas, White and Marshall found that classifications based on sex are inherently suspect. 411
U.S. at 682. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, finding an "invidious discrimination"
in the statute. Id. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, finding a denial of due process,, but deeming it
unnecessary to decide in that case whether or not sex is a suspect classification. Id. at 691-92
(Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J.).
4. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 241,245 (West 1958 & Supp. 1977). Section 241 reads: "It
shall be unlawful for any person who holds a license to sell and dispense beer. . . to sell, barter
or give to any minor any beverage containing more than one-half of one per cent of alcohol
measured by volume and not more than three and two-tenths (3.2) per cent of alcohol measured
by weight." Section 245 reads: "A 'minor', for the purposes of [section] . . . 241 . . . is
defined as a female under the age of eighteen (18) years, and a male under the age of twenty-one
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gender, which resulted in a violation of the rights guaranteed by the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to males between eighteen
and twenty-one years of age. 5 Recognizing that Reed v. Reed 6 and later
cases had established the precept that classification by gender must substantially further important governmental interests, the three-judge district court
found that the Fourteenth Amendment denied to the states "the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute

into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective
of that statute." 7 Having enunciated this standard, however, the three-judge
court concluded that the state had met its burden of proving that the genderbased classification incorporated in the challenged enactment was justified.
In doing so, it relied on the state's statistical evidence showing that males
between eighteen and twenty-one were more likely to be the subjects of
8
drunk driving arrests and also more likely to suffer traffic injuries. According to Circuit Judge Holloway, who wrote the opinion for the court, these
statistics demonstrated that the gender-based discrimination was substantially related to the achievement of the important governmental objective of
traffic safety in Oklahoma. 9 Consequently, the three-judge court dismissed
(21) years." Oklahoma, in the statute governing capacity to contract, originally fixed the age of
majority for males at 21, whereas for females it was 18. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 13 (West
1972). It also fixed the age of criminal responsibility for males at 16 and for females at 18. 1970
Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 226, § 2 (repealed 1972). This latter provision was held to be a denial of
equal protection. Lamb v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18, 20 (10th Cir. 1972). Consequently, the age of 18
was fixed as marking the commencement of criminal responsibility and civil majority for
members of both sexes. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1977) (criminal
responsibility); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 13 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977) (civil majority). The
3.2% beer differentiation was codified as an exception to the gender-free classification. See
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (West Supp. 1977).

5. 429 U.S. at 192.
6. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed invalidated a provision of the Idaho probate code that gave
preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class apply for appointment as administrator of a decendent's estate. The Court found the law arbitrary, in that it bore
no rational relationship to any legitimate state objective. Id. at 76.
7. Walker v. Hall, 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 1975), rer"d sub nom. Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
8. Id.at 1311.
9. Id. at 1313. The evidence consisted of eight exhibits: (1) an extract of data compiled
by the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation based on figures culled from 194 local police
departments showing that 427 males aged 18-20 were arrested for drunk driving vis-h-vis 24
females; (2) statistics from the Oklahoma City Police Department showing that 82% of 18 year
olds, 98% of 19 year olds, 94% of 20 year olds and.96% of 21 year olds arrested for driving under
the influence were males; (3) a random roadside survey of drivers in Oklahoma City indicating
that 84% of males under 20 (vis-a-vis 77% of such females) liked beer, that 16.5% of the males
(vis-?i-vis 11.4% of the females) had consumed at least two alcoholic beverages within the past
two hours and that 14.6% of the males (vis-h-vis 11.5% of the females) had blood alcohol
concentrations in excess of .01%; (4) and (5) statistics that the greatest number of traffic
fatalities in the state were among the class of males aged 18-20; (6) an FBI report showing a
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the action.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling in a seven-totwo decision.' 1 The majority opinion was authored by Justice Brennan and
joined by Justices White, Marshall, Powell and Stevens. After first addressing the preliminary issue of standing, 12 the Court initiated its discussion of
the merits by noting that "previous cases establish that classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substannationwide increase of 96% in drunk driving arrests between 1969 and 1972; (7) a Minnesota
survey showing that Oklahoma statistics corresponded to those of other states; (8) a report by
the Joint Conference on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism detailing the point that traffic accidents
involving drivers under 18 increase threefold after such drivers imbibe one or two alcoholic
drinks, thus increasing their blood alcohol content to between .01 and .04%. Id. at 1309-10.
10. Id. at 1314.
11. 429 U.S. at 190.
12. Id. at 192-97. The issue was raised because Craig reached the age of 21 after the Court
noted probable jurisdiction. Thus, the problem was reduced to one of whether Whitener, the
vendor, could rely upon the objections of males between 18 and 21 to establish her claim of
unconstitutionality. Justice Brennan characterized the Court's decisional limitations on a litigant's assertion of jus tertii, or standing to assert the constitutional claims of those not before
the Court, as the result of a "salutary 'rule of self-restraint' designed to minimize unwarranted
intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions are ill-defined and
speculative." 429 U.S. at 193. Because the lower court had already decided the equal protection
challenge and the parties had sought an authoritative constitutional determination, he argued
that to forego consideration of the merits at this point would impermissibly foster "repetitive
and time-consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence." Id. at 193-94. The
majority found that, in any event, the vendor had suffered sufficient injury in fact from the
operation of the statutory provisions to satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing;
hence, she had established "independently" her claim to assert jus tertii in that the enforcement of the challenged restriction against her would result indirectly in a violation of her own
rights. Id. at 194.
Chief Justice Burger disagreed with the conclusion that Whitener had alleged facts sufficient to establish jus tertii standing; in his view, the majority had simply created a new and
undesirable exception to the rule that a litigant may assert only the violation of his own rights.
Id. at 215-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). It is certainly true that the majority opinion did not deal
specifically with whether or not the three traditional criteria for jus tertii existed in this case,
namely, the presence of some substantial relationship between the claimant and the third
parties, the impossibility of the rightholders' asserting their own constitutional rights and the
need to avoid the dilution of the rights of third parties that would result were the assertion of jus
tertiiprecluded. See Note, Standingto Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. Rev. 423,
425 (1974). Although Justice Brennan's majority opinion did cite the leading case on this
subject, 429 U.S. at 193 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953)), he failed to
engage in the detailed analysis undertaken in Barrows;to the extent that he was willing to base
a finding of jus tertii standing on a relatively cursory overview of the facts in question and
without considering the relationship between Craig and Whitener, his opinion is innovative.
Indeed, the majority elected to place greater emphasis on the thesis that Whitener had jus tertii
standing because she had suffered an independent injury in fact ensuring "concrete adverseness." 429 U.S. at 194 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). After Craig,the new test
for jus tertii standing may well be the traditional "injury-in-fact" requirement coupled with no
more than an assertion that the rights of third parties would be unjustifiably diluted were
standing denied. If this characterization is accurate, Craig may well be a significant departure
from precedent, as the Chief Justice suggests.
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tially related to achievement of those objectives." 13 Justice Brennan briefly
reviewed the significant cases since Reed v. Reed, 14 emphasizing the
inaccuracy of gender as a "proxy for other, more germane bases of classification" 15 and the inadequacy of administrative convenience as a justification for gender-based classifications. 16 On the basis of these prior rulings, he
concluded that the difference between males and females with respect to the
purchase of 3.2% beer did not warrant the age differential drawn by the
statute.17 Like the opinion of the three-judge district court, the majority
opinion in Craigdeemed Reed to be controlling; however, Justice Brennan,
unlike Judge Holloway, found that the state of Oklahoma simply had not
met its burden of proof. Assuming arguendo that there was a legitimate state
interest in traffic safety, the majority found that the statistical evidence
offered in support of the discrimination being challenged was far too
insubstantial in light of Reed to support a connection between gender and
drunk driving. 8 Thus, Justice Brennan dismissed the probative value of the
statistical disparity between. 18% female arrests for drunken driving and 2%
male arrests for the same offense (among those between eighteen and
twenty-one years of age) on the theory that:
While such a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly
can form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying
device. Certainly if maleness is to serve as a proxy for drinking
and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly
tenuous "fit." Indeed, prior cases have consistently rejected the
use of sex as a decision-making factor even though the statutes in
question certainly rested on far more predictive empirical relationships than this. 19
In making such a broad-based assertion, the majority issued a warning that
any attempt to justify gender-based differentiations by resort to statistical
13. 429 U.S. at 197.

14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See note 6 supra.
15. 429 U.S. at 198. The Court pointed out that it had rejected archaic and overbroad

generalizations concerning the positions of servicewomen, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 689 n.23 (1973), and working women, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975).

429 U.S. at 198. It distinguished cases upholding the use of gender-based classifications,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (federal law entitling male nasal officers to only nine
years' active service before mandatory discharge for lack of promotion, while giving women
thirteen years) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida statute granting $500 tax
exemption to widows but not to widowers), by pointing to the laudatory purposes of those laws

in that they remedied disadvantages suffered by women. Oklahoma could not and did not make
any similar claim. 429 U.S. at 198 n.6. See generally Erickson, Kahn, Ballard,and Wiesenfeld:
A New EqualProtection Test in "Reverse" Sex DiscriminationCases?42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1

(1975).
16.
Illinois,
17.
18.
19.

429 U.S. at 198 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v.
405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
429 U.S. at 200.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 201-02.
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analysis is a "dubious" business that is in tension with the "normative
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause."20
The Court also rejected Oklahoma's assertion that the Twenty-first
Amendment could be relied upon to support the constitutionality of the
statute. Noting that there is considerable doubt as to the effect of this
21
amendment on constitutional provisions other than the commerce clause,
the Court held that it had never recognized sufficient force in the amendment
to defeat an otherwise established claim of discrimination in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that reliance on
that amendment could not save invidious gender-based discrimination from
invalidation. 2 2 In a footnote to this portion of the opinion, 23 the Court
disapproved the 1948 decision of Goesaert v. Cleary,24 which had dictated
the use of the minimum rationality standard in gender-based discrimination
cases prior to the Reed decision, insofar as the standard was inconsistent
with its current holding.
Of the four separate concurrences, three dealt with the issue of equal
protection.25 Justice Stewart found that the disparity created by the statutes,
"without even a colorably valid justification or explanation,'"26 amounted to
total irrationality and thus constituted an invidious discrimination under the
doctrine of Reed.2 7 Justice Powell, while agreeing with the Court's opinion
in general, and particularly with its reliance on Reed, expressed concern as
20. Id. at 204. The Court also pointed to shortcomings within the statistical samples
themselves. Thus, (1) under social stereotypes, males might be more likely to be arrested than
females, who would probably be escorted home, id. at 202 n. 14; (2) the Oklahoma statistics,
"gathered under a regime where the age-differential law in question has been in effect, are
lacking in controls necessary for appraisal of the actual effectiveness of the male 3.2% beer
prohibition," id.; (3) the Oklahoma samples failed to measure the dangerousness of 3.2% beer
in relation to other types of alcoholic beverages, id. at 203; and (4) many of the studies related
to traffic fatalities in general and did not deal with the age-sex differentials involved in Craig,
id.
21. 429 U.S. at 206 (citing P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING,

CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975) ("Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-first
Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment where the sale or the use of liquor is concerned."))
22. 429 U.S. at 207.
23. Id. at 210 n.23.
24. 335 U.S. 464 (1948). Goesaert upheld a Michigan law forbiddinig females, except the
wife or daughter of a male bar owner, to act as bartenders. The Court therein said: "Since the
line [the legislators] have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the
suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male
bartenders to try to monopolize [their] calling." Id. at 467.
25. Justice Blackmun concurred except for the discussion of the Twenty-first Amendment, although he agreed it did not save the statute in question. 429 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).
26. Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. Id.
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to the appropriate standard of review and the majority's treatment of the
relevance of the statistical evidence. Finding Justice Brennan's reading of
the Reed case unnecessarily broad in its implications, he recognized with
unusual candor that the "relatively deferential" rationality standard of
review "takes on a sharper focus" when the Court is addressing genderbased classifications. 28 While he acknowledged that a more critical examination was being undertaken in such cases, however, he indicated that he
would not endorse or welcome the creation of any additional tiers to equal
protection analysis, but rather would simply hold that the classification
incorporated in the Oklahoma statute, given the rather weak statistical
justification advanced for it by the state, did not bear a fair and substantial
29
relation to the asserted governmental objective of traffic safety.
Justice Stevens' concurrence also attempted to grapple with the appropriate level of review. For him, "what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion."30 Justice Stevens found the Oklahoma classification
objectionable primarily because it was based on an accident of birth,
because it was a remnant of the discredited practice of discriminating against
adolescent males, and because it ignored the fact that the generally greater
weight of males enables them to consume more alcohol without suffering a
concomitant loss in driving ability. 31 Reiterating the view that the legislative
history failed to indicate the actual purpose or motivation for the classification, 32 he found that in operation it had only a minimal effect on access to,
but not consumption of, a "not very intoxicating beverage" and that the
empirical data only accentuated the unfairness of "visiting the sins of the
2% on the [other] 98%."33
In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger recognized that the majority opinion made gender-based classifications "disfavored" rather than "suspect";34 it was his contention, however, that no greater scrutiny than the
rationality standard could be justified "[w]ithout an independent constitutional basis supporting the right asserted or disfavoring the classification
adopted. . . . ,,3 He argued that the majority had no right to strike down a
36
law as unconstitutional merely because that law was unwise.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
.36.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.

210-11 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
212 (Stevens, J., concurring).
212-13.
213 n.5.
213-14.
217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist also found the majority's opinion objectionable on
two grounds. First, he found no precedent justifying an "elevated" level of
scrutiny "like that invoked in cases dealing with discrimination against
females" when men challenge a gender-based statute that treats them less
favorably than women, except when the statute impairs an important personal interest protected by the Constitution. 37 "[T]he Court's reliance on...
previous sex-discrimination cases is ill-founded [because it] treats gender
classification as a talisman which-without regard to the rights involved or
the persons affected-calls into effect a heavier burden of judicial review. 8 Second, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the majority's thesis that
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives "comes39
out of thin air," in that no previous cases had adopted such a standard.
While Justice Rehnquist regarded this as a laudable retreat from the opinion
of the plurality in Frontierov. Richardson,4°which had argued that gender based classifications should be subject to strict scrutiny, he advocated
application of the rational basis test, which does not demand mathematical
41
precision in the accommodation of interests achieved by the legislature.
Under such a test,
[t]he rationality of a statutory classification for equal protection
purposes does not depend upon the statistical "fit" between the
class and the trait sought to be singled out. It turns on whether
there may be a sufficiently higher incidence of the trait within the
included class than in the excluded class to justify different treatment. 42
Based on the clear differences between the drinking and driving habits of
young men and women elucidated in the evidence, Justice Rehnquist would
have upheld the challenged statute.43
Craig v. Boren is more important for what it portends in equal protec37. Id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). But cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (both containing broad generalities to the

effect that the same equal protection test applies, regardless of the sex being discriminated
against).
38.
39.
40.
41.

429 U.S. at 220.
Id.
411 U.S. 677 (1973). See note 3 supra.
429 U.S. at 221-22. Under that test, the Constitution:

is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
42. 429 U.S. at 225-26.

43. Id. at 226.
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tion analysis than for the relatively minor dispute it resolves. Only a
plurality of the Court supports the most recent formulation of the standard of
review applicable to gender-based classifications. In terms of the standard of
scrutiny to be applied in cases involving gender-based discrimination, the
Court's opinion appears superficially to apply Reed in an automatic fashion.
Justice Brennan argues that Reed is controlling and cites that case for the
proposition that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."4 Consequently, the majority's disposition of the equal protection claim in Craig is premised on the thesis that the evidence introduced by
the state of Oklahoma failed "to satisfy Reed's requirement that the genderbased difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory
objective." 4 5 But, as Justice Rehnquist points out, the exact language of
Reed does not directly support such a broad conclusion. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion in that case cited a 1920 ruling of the Court to the effect
that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.' "6 Reed never mandated a judicial inquiry into whether or
not a discriminatory classification incorporated within a statute in fact
substantially furthers the achievement of the objective that the statute was
enacted to implement. Indeed, the Court in Reed never considered whether
the challenged enactment in that case, an Idaho law giving preference to
men for appointment as the administrator of a decedent's estate, bore a
substantial relationship to the achievement of the stated legislative objective, which was to reduce the workload of probate courts by eliminating one
type of contest. Rather, it focused upon whether or not the classification in
47
and of itself was so arbitrary as to deny equal protection of the laws.
Craig's restatement of Reed may add something new; it may impose a
requirement not only that the classification itself is rational, but also that the
classification is shown to be a device that consistently effectuates the
underlying legislative purpose in enacting the statute.
44. Id. at 197.
45. Id. at 204.
46. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), quoted in Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71, 76 (1971). Royster Guano held that a state law which taxes all the income of local

corporations derived from business done both within and without the state, while exempting
entirely the income derived from outside the state by local corporations which do no local
business, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
47. See 404 U.S. at 76-77. The Court noted that "The crucial question, ..
is whether
[the statute] advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal
Protection Clause." The Court found that it did not because "mandatory preference" of either
sex merely to eliminate such hearings was an "arbitrary" and thereby "forbidden" legislative
choice. Id.
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An even more interesting problem raised by the majority opinion is the
use of statistics to justify, or to attempt to justify, gender-based discriminations. The state of Oklahoma does not maintain records of legislative
debates; all the statistics and declarations of legislative purpose introduced
in this case were generated by the state attorney general's office for use at
trial. 48 Justice Brennan left open the question of whether or not such
evidence will suffice to establish legislative purpose. After reviewing the
various exhibits introduced by the state, he indicated that
[i]t is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state
officials to be well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. But this merely illustrates that proving broad
sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and
one that inevitably is in tension with the49normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause.
One interpretation of this statement is that the exhibits introduced by
the state's attorney general were simply unpersuasive. The Court could be
saying that it will decline to acknowledge the credibility of statistical
findings where the samplings are too small, where the structure of the
sampling is such that it produces results that are inherently distorted, or
where the correlations sought to be demonstrated are themselves illogical. If
this characterization is accurate, then Craig merely stands for the proposition that defendants in an equal protection case are required to use reliable,
unbiased sampling techniques. But another interpretation is possible. Justice
Brennan could be saying that the state cannot justify an invidious genderbased classification by reference to statistics alone; resort to such evidence
is simply an inadequate means of meeting its burden of proof. Indeed, such
a broad-based conclusion might seem to be compelled by the language
referring to the "dubious business" of statistical analysis in this context and
its conflict with the "normative philosophy" of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But the problem inherent in such an expansive interpretation is that it might
foreclose the only means a state has for justifying discriminatory treatment.
Without recourse to statistical analysis, a state may actually be denied the
opportunity to mount any defense to an equal protection challenge, especially if, as in the case of Oklahoma, legislative history is unavailable.
Certainly the Court has relied on statistical information in prior equal
protection cases;5" therefore, the second interpretation of the language in
Craig would yield an anomaly. For these reasons, the first interpretation of
Justice Brennan's dictum about statistical analysis would seem to be the
preferable one.
Another important aspect of the majority opinion in Craig is its
48. 429 U.S. at 199-200 n.7.

49. Id. at 204.
50. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana,
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treatment of the Twenty-first Amendment. In a 1936 decision, the Court had
said that "[a] classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment
cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." 5 1 In light of such a
rationale, legitimate questions could be raised about the extent of the limits
the equal protection clause places on the ability of a state to regulate the sale
of alcoholic beverages. The Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis52 did
establish that state liquor regulatory schemes cannot work invidious discriminations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 3 But in the same
term that Moose Lodge was decided, the Court also stated in Californiav.
LaRue54 that "wide latitude as to choice of means to accomplish a permissible end must be accorded to the state agency that is itself the repository of
the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment." 5 5 Accordingly, it
ruled that a state could prohibit live sexual entertainment in bars even
though some of the acts prohibited would not be obscene as defined by the
Supreme Court. 56 Justice Brennan in Craig, however, settled all doubts on
the subject; following the lead of decisions rendered by lower courts, 57 he
419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 nn.4&5 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 n.23 (1973).
51. State Bd. v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936). This case held that under the
Twenty-first Amendment a state may exact a license fee for the privilege of importing beer
from another state. For a similar holding, see Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401,
404 (1938). Both of these cases involved restrictions on the importation of intoxicants, one
regulatory area in which the state's powers under the Twenty-first Amendment are decisive.
See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964). Moreover,
economic regulation such as this has traditionally received less strict review. See Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,47-48,50-51 (1966). Thus, the Young's Market
case is distinguishable on its facts. Moreover, the Court in Craigremarked with reference to the
quoted language of Young's Market: "The Twenty-first Amendment does not recognize, even
indirectly, classifications based on gender. And, as the accompanying text demonstrates, that
statement has not been relied upon in recent cases that have considered Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state liquor regulation." 429 U.S. at 207 n.21.
52. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
53. See id. at 178-79. In that case, the Court held that a Penns lvania Liquor Control
Board regulation invoked by a private club practicing racial discrimination under its bylaws
constituted state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
54. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). LaRue held that the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes states to
control the manner and circumstances in which liquor is dispensed and thus empowers the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control to prohibit live sexual entertainment in
bars. In doing so, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge. Id. at 118-19. It also
distinguished Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971), which held that the
Twenty-first Amendment did not qualify the due process rights of one publicized by the state as
an excessive drinker without any prior hearing. See 409 U.S. at 115. The Craig Court mentioned LaRue, but ignored the broad assertions regarding state power made in the latter case.
See 429 U.S. at 207.
55. 409 U.S. at 116.
56. See id. at 117-18.
57. See White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730,737 (7th Cir. 1975); Women's Liberation Union v.
Israel, 512 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1975); Daugherty v. Daley, 370 F. Supp. 338, 340 (N.D. Ill.
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concluded that the power delegated to the states under the Twenty-first
Amendment is thoroughly circumscribed by the guarantees of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58 This is a minor point, but
in light of the confusion engendered in this area by prior rulings, it is an
illuminating one.
Perhaps the crucial feature of Craig, however, is that it upheld the
discrimination claim of individuals who are not part of a discrete and insular
minority that has historically lacked economic or political power and representation. This may be attributed to the fact that the challenged statute was
not defended or perceived as one that was designed to remedy disadvantageous conditions or to compensate for previous deprivations of just such a
group. 59 The Court has, in the past, rejected a male's complaint of unconstitutional gender-based discrimination because it perceived a remedial or
"benign" purpose behind the legislative classification that favored females
in a traditionally hostile setting. 6° In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 61 a case
involving a challenge to a provision of the Social Security Act denying
survivors' benefits to widowers with dependent children, but not to widows,
the Court rejected a "benign purpose" rationale and upheld for the first time
a claim of gender discrimination by a male claimant. In that case, however,
the Court based its finding on the fact that the classification had a negative
impact on the claimant's wife. The statute in Wiesenfeld "clearly" operated
"to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a
result of their employment.' '62 In reaching this result, the Court examined
and primarily relied upon the effect of the statute on a female rather than on
a male. 63 The Craig decision stands alone in upholding a claim of genderbased discrimination by men on no other grounds than the lack of "fit"
between the disadvantageous classification and the state's objective rather
than the negative impact of that classification on women or their families.
1974); Seidenberg v. McSorley's Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593, 605-06 (S.D.N.Y.

1970).
58. 429 U.S. at 209-10.
59. See note 15 supra.
60. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974). See note 15 supra.
61. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The statute involved in Weinberger was 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970

& Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977), which grants survivors' benefits under the Social Security
Act based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father both to his widow and the couple's
minor children, but grants benefits based on the earnings of a deceased wife and mother only to
the couple's minor children and not to the widower.
62. 420 U.S. at 645.

63. See id. The Court pointed out that a wife "not only failed to receive for her family the
same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was
deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which
benefits would be paid to others." Id.
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As such, it represents a minor but nevertheless intriguing departure in the
equal protection analysis normally accorded a subclass of gender-based
discrimination claims.
2. Benign Remedial Purposes in Fact
The Court's second significant opinion on gender-based discrimination
was also marked by a sharp division among the justices. In Califano v.
Goldfarb, 4 the Court expressly relied on the doctrine set forth in its prior
decision of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld65 to invalidate an invidious classification created by the Social Security Act. 66
The Act provided that a widow was entitled to receive survivor's
benefits based on the earnings of her deceased husband, regardless of
dependency, 67 but under section 402(f)(1)(D), benefits were payable to the
widower of a deceased wife only upon proof that he had been receiving at
least half of his support from her. 68 Leon Goldfarb filed suit in federal
district court, alleging that the rejection of his application for widower's
benefits because of his inability to show that he had depended on his
deceased spouse for half of his support constituted a denial of equal protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 69 The district

court declared section 402(f)(1)(D) unconstitutional, relying primarily on
70
the authority of Wiesenfeld.

64. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
65. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
66. 430 U.S. at 204. The Court stated:
The gender-based distinction drawn by [42 U.S.C.] § 402(f)(1)(D) [(1970)1-burdening
a widower but not a widow with the task of proving dependency upon the deceased
spouse-presents an equal protection question indistinguishable from that decided in
Weinberger v. -Wiesenfeld. . . . That decision and the decision of Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), plainly require affirmance of the judgment of the
District Court.
Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
68. Id. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970) (repealed 1977).
69. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This section provides, in pertinent part, that "No person shall
. ..be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ." The Court has
construed this section to provide a similar guarantee to equal protection of the federal laws as
that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment regarding state laws. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, §
I provides: "No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." For cases construing the Fifth Amendment similarly to the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Schneider v. Rusk,
377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See generally Karst, The
Fifth Amendment's Guaranteeof Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 541 (1977).
70. Goldfarb v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975),
aff'd sub nom. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). In a per curiam opinion, that court
stated: "[Mrs. Goldfarb] paid taxes at the same rate as men and there is not the slightest
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In a plurality opinion again written by Justice Brennan and joined by
Justices White, Marshall and Powell, the Court affirmed the judgment.71
Finding the equal protection question "indistinguishable" from that decided
in Wiesenfeld, 72 Justice Brennan said that the statutory classification
operated to deprive women wage-earners, who were required to pay social
security taxes, of an equivalent scope of protection for their families that
similarly situated men received as a result of their employment. 73 Such an

inequity was unconstitutional when supported by no more substantial justifications than "old notions," such as "assumptions as to dependency,"
which were more consistent with traditional social "role-typing" than with
contemporary reality. 74
The plurality rejected any attempt to focus the analysis "upon whether

[the] surviving widower was unconstitutionally discriminated against by

75
burdening him but not a surviving widow with proof of dependency."
Justice Brennan found Wiesenfeld dispositive on this issue, in that the
majority in that decision held that benefits must be distributed on classifications that are based on something other than gender. In doing so, he
reaffirmed the Court's earlier position that the social security system was
designed to protect the familial unit (as opposed to a specific widow or
widower) from the economic consequences of old age, disability and
death. 76 The plurality also rejected arguments based on the need for judicial

scintilla of support for the proposition that working women are less concerned about their
spouses' welfare in old age than are men. The government has failed to justify this genderbased discrimination." 396 F. Supp. at 309.
71. 430 U.S. at 202.
72. Id. at 204. In response to the dissent's argument that this overstated the relevance of
Wiesenfeld and Frontiero, see notes 88 and 97 and accompanying text supra, Justice Brennan
noted in a footnote to the opinion:
It is sufficient to answer that the principal propositions argued by appellant and in the
dissent-namely, the focus on discrimination between surviving, rather than insured,
spouses; the reliance on Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); the argument that the
presumption of female dependence is empirically supportable; and the emphasis on
the special deference due to classifications in the Social Security Act-were all
asserted and rejected in one or both of those cases as justifications for statutes
substantially similar in effect to § 402(f)(1)(D).
430 U.S. at 204 n.4.
73. 430 U.S. at 206 (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)). The Court
also noted that similarly to the plaintiff in Wiesenfeld, Mrs. Goldfarb was deprived of a portion
of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to
others. 430 U.S. at 206.
74. Id. at 207 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
75. 430 U.S. at 207.
76. Id. at 208-09. In support of this argument, Justice Brennan quoted from a House
report that emphasized that the purpose of the amendments, which for the first time extended
the benefits beyond the covered wage-earner himself, was to more adequately protect the
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deference to Congressional allocation of noncontractual benefits under a
social welfare program, 77 and on a perceived Congressional intent to remedy
the arguably greater social welfare needs of widows under a theory of
benign discrimination.78 As to the first argument, Justice Brennan cited
Craig v. Boren79 and Wiesenfeld for the proposition that benefits which
directly relate to years worked and amounts earned must be distributed
solely on the basis of those gender-based classifications that serve and

substantially relate to the achievement of important governmental objectives. 80 As to the second argument, he noted that inquiry into the actual
purposes underlying the differentiation of treatment in section 402(f)(1)(D)
proved that dependency, not need, was the criterion for inclusion in that
section's named beneficiaries: 81 "Congress chose to award benefits, not to
widowers who could prove that they are needy, but to those who could
prove that they had been dependent on their wives for more than one-half of
their support." ' 82 Therefore, the arguably greater social welfare needs of
family as a unit. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1939), quoted at 430 U.S. at
209 n.6.
77. Id. at 210-12.
78. Id. at 212-17.
79. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see notes 1-63 and accompanying
text supra.
80. 430 U.S. at 210, 212. Justice Brennan noted that while Congress has wide latitude to
create classifications that allocate benefits under a social welfare program. Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 776-77 (1975); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1960), Wiesenfeld had
rejected the argument that the non-contractual nature of such interests sanctions differential
protection for covered employees which is solely gender-based. Id. at 211-12. He also noted
that justifications that suffice for non-gender-based classifications in the social welfare area do
not necessarily justify gender-based discriminations. Utilizing Salfi as an example of discrimination which was not based on gender but which was designed merely to weed out collusive
marriages, the plurality noted that the rationales of administrative convenience and certainty of
result, which were sufficient to sustain the classification in Salfi, had been found inadequate
justifications for gender-based classifications. Id. at 211 n.9 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971)).
81. 430 U.S. at 212-13.
82. Id. at 213. The plurality thus concluded that "[o]n the face of the statute, dependency,
not need, is the criterion for inclusion." Id. The Court also reviewed the general scheme of the
federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program (OASDI), 42 U.S.C. §§
401-431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976 & 1977), as well as the legislative history of §
402(f)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970) (repealed 1977). As to the general scheme of
OASDI, the Court noted that it is intended to insure covered wage earners and their families
against the economic and social impact on the family normally entailed by loss of the wage
earner's income due to retirement, disability or death. Benefits were thus paid only to members
of the family of the insured wage earner, not to those in the general population "whowere in
need of economic assistance. In this regard, the Court pointed out that need was not a
requirement for inclusion in any beneficiary category, see 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1970 & Supp. V
1975) (amended 1977), and that need was intended to be irrelevant to the right to receive
benefits, although it has been a factor in determining the amounts of those benefits. See H.R.
REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935). Finally, the Court observed that dependency is a
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widows were not the reason for the legislative distinction; rather, it was "an
intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled
with a presumption that wives are usually dependent." 8 3 This presumption
of dependency was one of those archaic notions that simply could not be
relied upon to justify a gender-based discrimination. 84
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He found that neither the
administrative convenience rationale nor the policy of benign discrimination
was an acceptable justification for the differential treatment in this case,
primarily because the actual legislative purpose indicated that neither was
the intended rationale. 85 Thus, he concluded: "[Tihis discrimination. . . is
merely the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about
prerequisite to qualification for benefits for every family member other than a wife or widow.
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(h)(1)(B) (1970) (parents' benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (1970) (children's benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (1970) (repealed 1977) (husbands' benefits); 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(f)(1)(D) (1970) (repealed 1977) (widowers' benefits). The Court concluded: "Thus the
overall statutory scheme makes actual dependency the general basis of eligibility for OASDI
benefits, and the statute, in omitting that requirement for wives and widows, reflects only a
presumption that they are ordinarily dependent." 430 U.S. at 214. As to the legislative history
of § 402(f)(1)(D), it too refuted appellant's argument regarding benign discrimination. Wives'
and widows' benefits were first provided when coverage was extended to other family members
in 1939, in lieu of lump-sum payments to the estate. See Social Security Act Amendments of
1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1364-66. The plurality found, however, that there was no "indication
whatever in any of the legislative history that Congress gave any attention to the specific case
of nondependent widows, and found that they were in need of benefits despite their lack of
dependency, in order to compensate them for disadvantages caused by sex discrimination." 430
U.S. at 214-15 & n.16 (citing H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1939); H.R. Doc. No.
110, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1939); 84 CONG. REC. 8827 (1939) (remarks of Sen. Harrison); Final
Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security, Hearings on the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 30
(1939)). Survivors' and old-age benefits were not extended until 1950, see Social Security Act
Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, § 101, 64 Stat. 485, but the legislative history of this provision
also demonstrates that the purpose of the amendment was "'tlo equalize the protectiongiven
to the dependents of women and men,'" ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY LEGISLATION, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 38
(1949) (emphasis in original), not to create a differential treatment for the benefit of nondependent wives. 430 U.S. at 216.
83. 430 U.S. at 217. The Court reiterated that this presented "precisely the situation faced
in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld," in that the only "conceivable" justification for writing the
presumption of wives' dependency into the statute was the assumption that it "would save the
Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all widows, rather than to require
proof of dependency of both sexes." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 219-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Administrative convenience as
a rationale was rejected because the cost of additional payments to widows who are not within
the described purpose of the statute amounted to $750 million a year, far in excess of any
possible administrative savings. Benign discrimination as a rationale was rejected because
Justice Stevens was unwilling to presume that Congress would seek to offset prior disfavored
treatment .by benefitting those widows who were sufficiently successful in the job market to
become nondependent on their husbands; such women constituted a class least likely to need
the advantage Congress purportedly intended to confer. Id.
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females. . . '[D]ue process requires that there be a legitimate basis for
presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve [the] interest' put
forward by the government as its justification."86
Justice Rehnquist dissented in a lengthy opinion in which the Chief
Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined. He argued that social
insurance statutes should not automatically be subjected to the heightened
levels of scrutiny required by the equal protection clause in other types of
cases. s7 Justice Rehnquist distinguished Wiesenfeld by pointing out that the
statutory provision in that case flatly denied surviving widowers the opportunity to obtain benefits regardless of need and that later decisions had
evinced a refusal to extend uncritically "into the field of social security law
constitutional proscriptions against distinctions based on illegitimacy and
irrebuttable presumptions which had originated in other areas of the law." 8 8
Because of the amending process, which expands benefits over a period of
time, the dissenters said that it is difficult to find a carefully conceived plan
for payment of benefits in the mosaic of social security legislation; therefore, administrative convenience was deemed to bear a much more vital
relation to the overall legislative design because of Congress' concern for
certainty in determination of entitlement to benefits and in promptness of
payment. 89 The dissent's review of the legislation amending the Social
Security Act yielded two conclusions: first, that persons qualifying for
spousal benefits have more substantial needs once their spouse dies, and
second, that widows are more likely to be without adequate means of
support than widowers. 90 Moreover, the dissent found that the classification
contained in section 402(f)(1)(D) made it easier for aged widows to obtain
86. Id. at 221.

87. Id. at 225 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Blackmun, JJ.). He argued:

[C]ases requiring heightened levels of scrutiny for particular classifications under the
Equal Protection Clause, which have originated in areas of the law outside of the field
of social'insurance legislation, [should] not be uncritically carried over into that field
[although this does] not mean that the phrase "social insurance" is some sort of magic
phrase which automatically mutes the requirements of the equal protection component

of the Fifth Amendment.
Id.
88. 430 U.S. at 229 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749 (1975)).
89. 430 U.S. at 225. Justice Rehnquist noted that because Congress has continually
increased the benefits paid under the Act and expanded the pool of eligible recipients, the
resultant statutory scheme evinced certain predictable traits: (I) benefits were extended in a
piecemeal fashion so that the classes of beneficiaries under the Act necessarily cannot "mirror
the abstract definition of equality of need," id. at 230, and (2) there exists "the balance
between a desire that payments correlate with degree of need and a recognition that precise

correlation is unattainable given the administrative realities of the situation," id.
90. Id. at 234-35.
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benefits, and thus in no way perpetuated or exacerbated the economic
disadvantage of women that had led the Court to adopt a test of heightened
scrutiny in cases of gender-based discrimination in the first place. 91 In sum,
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the classification scarcely constituted "invidious" discrimination but was rather a rationally justified "overinclu92
sion," premised on the concept of administrative convenience.
Goldfarb expressly affirmed the standard of review enunciated in
Craig v. Boren,93 albeit by an even smaller plurality. Two of the justices
who had agreed with the judgment in Craig joined Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Goldfarb.94 The reason for this unexpected volte-face would
appear to be the fact that this case arose in the context of a constitutional
challenge to "social insurance" legislation, a context which may trigger a
differing standard of equal protection analysis. To understand this distinct
analysis fully, it is necessary to look beyond the plurality opinion of Justice
Brennan and scrutinize in detail the views expressed by the other five
members of the Court, namely, Justice Stevens, who concurred in the
judgment, and Justice Rehnquist and his three fellow dissenters. In examining these opinions, the true significance of the Goldfarb case becomes
apparent.
Justice Rehnquist alleged that the plurality had placed undue reliance
on the decision in Wiesenfeld, arguing that the precedential value of that
1975 ruling had been undermined by two later cases, Weinberger v. Salfi95
and Mathews v. Lucas.96 Justice Rehnquist thus asserted that "[w]hile the
holding of Wiesenfeld is not inconsistent with Salfi or Lucas, its reasoning
is not in complete harmony with the recognition in those cases of the special
characteristics of social insurance plans.'"I In order to determine the validity of this proposition, it is necessary to scrutinize these two cases with care.
Salfi involved a challenge to sections 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) of the Social
Security Act, which denied insurance benefits to surviving wives and
stepchildren who had had their respective relationships to a deceased wageearner for less than nine months prior to his death. 98 In an opinion written by
91. Id. at 242.
92. Id.

93. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See notes 13 and 16 and accompanying text supra.
94. The two were Justices Blackmun and Stewart.
95. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
96. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
97. 430 U.S. at 229 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., and Stewart and
Blackmun, JJ.).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (Supp. V 1975) provides in full:

(c) Wife.
The term "widow" (except when used in section 402(i) of this title) means the
surviving wife of an individual, but only if (1) she is the mother of his son or daughter,
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Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions
in 1975. Conversely, the three-judge district court below had ruled that
because these statutory sections incorporated a conclusive, unchallengeable
assumption that a certain class of "widows" and "stepchildren" did not
meet the statutory definitions of those terms, they created "irrebuttable
presumptions" that violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 99 The Surpeme Court disagreed. It noted that in 1970, in Dandridge
v. Williams,100 it had upheld Maryland welfare legislation against a challenge premised upon the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, in doing so, had said that such laws would be deemed constitutional if it were shown that they were "rationally based and free from
invidious discrimination." 10 1 A year later, in Richardson v. Belcher,"~
which involved an attack against certain double recovery offset provisions
of the Social Security Act, 103 the test of Dandridge was extended to Fifth
Amendment claims against the federal government: "If the goals sought are
(2) she legally adopted his son or daughter while she was married to him and while such
son or daughter was under the age of eighteen, (3) he legally adopted her son or
daughter while she was married to him and while such son or daughter was under the
age of eighteen, (4) she was married to him at the time both of them legally adopted a
child under the age of eighteen, (5) she was married to him for a period of not less than
nine months immediately prior to the day on which he died, or (6) in the month prior to
the month of her marriage to him (A) she was entitled to, or on application therefor and
attainment of age 62 in such prior month would have been entitled to, benefits under
subsection (b), (e), or (h) of section 402 of this title, (B) she had attained age eighteen
and was entitled to, or on application therefor would have been entitled to, benefits
under subsection (d) of such section (subject, however, to section 402(s) of this title),
or (C) she was entitled to, or upon application therefor and attainment of the required
age (if any) would have been entitled to, a widow's, child's (after attainment of age
18), or parent's insurance annuity under section 231a of Title 45.
42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. V 1975) provides in part:
(e) Child.
The term "child" means (I) the child or legally adopted child of an individual, (2)
a stepchild who has been such stepchild for not less than one year immediately
preceeding the day on which application for child's insurance benefits is filed or (if the
insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months immediately preceding the
day on which such individual died ...
99. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 749
(1975).
100. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The Court here held that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V 1975)), which provided that Social Security funds
shall be disbursed through a state Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) plan, was
not infringed by a Maryland law placing a ceiling of $250 per month on all AFDC grants,
regardless of the size of the recipient family and its actual need.
101. 397 U.S. at 487.
102. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
103. The Court here upheld 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977),
which required a reduction in social security benefits to reflect workmen's compensation
payments.
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legitimate, and the classification adopted is rationally related to the achievement of those goals, then the action of Congress is not so arbitrary as to
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." 10 4 Both of these
decisions antedated the three later rulings of the Court regarding irrebuttable
presumptions, which the three-judge district court had relied upon in Salfi. 10 5 Justice Rehnquist asserted, however, that the district court had incorrectly identified which of the five prior rulings constituted binding precedent
in the Salfi case. 106 His analysis consisted of several interrelated arguments.
First, he noted that while sections 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) created presumptions, these were in no sense irrebuttable: "[A]ppellees are completely free
to present evidence that they meet the specified requirements; failing in this
effort, their only constitutional claim is that the test they cannot meet is not
so rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective that it can be used to
deprive them of benefits available to those who do satisfy that test." 10 7
Second, he argued that under the district court's analysis, judges would be
forced to ascertain the purpose underlying the enactment of a challenged
classification and then determine whether or not that purpose could best be
served by a flat durational cut-off requirement or by individualized determinations. This was said to constitute "a degree of judicial involvement in the
legislative function which we have eschewed except in the most unusual
circumstances, and which is quite unlike the judicial role mandated by
Dandridge [and] Belcher . . . as well as by a host of cases arising from
legislative efforts to regulate private business enterprises." 10 8 Third, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the government had argued that sections 416(c)(5) and
(e)(2) were prophylactic in nature because they promulgated classifications
similar to those utilized by private insurers to assure that payments were
made only upon the occurrence of events the risk of which was covered by
the insurance program.1 °9 In Salfi, the legislative history revealed a
congressional intent to preclude a certain type of abuse, namely, "[t]he
danger of persons entering a marriage relationship not to enjoy its traditional
104. 404 U.S. at 84.
105. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (school board
regulations requiring pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave commencing at least four
months before the expected birth held invalid); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452 (1973) (law
requiring nonresidents enrolled in state university to pay higher tuition fees and which presumed nonresidency on the basis of one's legal address held invalid); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (law denying a hearing on parental fitness to an unwed father when such a
hearing was granted to all other parents whose custody of their children was challinged held
invalid), cited in Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S.
749 (1975).
106. 422 U.S. at 770-72.
107. Id. at 772.
108. Id. at 773.
109. Id. at 776.
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benefits, but instead to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated early death of the wage earner . . "..110 The Court believed
that individualized determinations could not effectively deter such abuses
because both marital intent and knowledge of life expectancy could not be
determined with any reliability and because the very possibility of an
individual hearing could encourage such abuses.1 11 The Court accordingly
concluded that "Congress, its concern having been reasonably aroused by
the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired to avoid, could
rationally have concluded . . .that the expense and other difficulties of
individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylac112
tic rule."
Mathews v. Lucas1 13 involved a challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1),
which limited survivors' benefits to the "dependent" children of deceased
wage-earners.1 14 A dependent child was defined as one who was either (a)
legitimate, (b) capable of inheriting personal property from the decedent
under applicable state intestacy laws or (c) illegitimate, but either the
product of a purported marriage entered into in good faith, or acknowledged
by the decedent in writing, or established as the child of the decedent by a
judicial decree or support order.1 15 In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision in 1976. Relying on prior
cases that involved claims of discrimination against illegitimates, 116 Justice
Blackmun initially pointed out that the strict scrutiny standard of review was
not mandated in this case. 117 He then cited Salfi for the conclusion that
110. Id. at 777. See H.R. REP. No. 2526, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946); S.REP. No. 1862,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 56 (1967).

111. 422 U.S. at 782-83.
112. Id. at 777.
113. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970) provides in part:

Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title). . . of an individual who
dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had not
attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of 22...

and
(C)

was dependent upon such individual-

(ii)

if such individual has died, at the time of such death, .

shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the first
month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance
benefits . ...
115. 427 U.S. at 499-500 and nn. 2 & 3 (quoting portions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3),
416(h)(1)(B), 416(h)(2)(A)-(B), 416(h)(3) (1970)).
116. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631-34 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,

406 U.S. 164, 173, 175-76 (1972).
117. 427 U.S. at 506.
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section 402(d)(1) incorporated a presumption of dependency which, although inexact, was justified because it effectively precluded the administrative burden and expense that would have been engendered by a system of
individualized determinations. 118 Thus, the Court concluded that the appellees must necessarily show that the classification contained in the challenged
enactment bore no substantial relationship to the status the enactment sought
to define. According to Justice Blackmun, this burden was not met. "[T]he
statute does not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates
without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations. The
presumption of dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant indication of the likelihood of actual dependency."' 19 While the Court
admitted that it was not necessarily true that the children of a defective
marriage live with their parents, or that an order of support issued by a court
is in fact being obeyed, or that a dependent relationship exists between an
adult and one whom he acknowledges in writing to be his offspring, it
nevertheless concluded that its function was to accept the "practical judgment" and "empirical calculation" of Congress in these matters. 120 Justice
Blackmun thus found that "[w]e cannot say that these expectations are
unfounded, or so indiscriminate as to render the statute's classification
12
baseless." 1
As noted, Justice Rehnquist in Goldfarb claimed not only that Salfi
and Lucas conflicted with Wiesenfeld, but also that they mandated a result
contrary to that reached by Justice Brennan concerning the validity of
section 402(f)(1)(D). These claims are specious because the cases are
thoroughly distinguishable.122 Salfi involved a statutory provision that did
not contain an invidious gender-based discrimination. While the appellees in
Salfi were women and stepchildren, the identical nine month requirement
123
was imposed on widowers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(f) and 416(g).
As the Court in Salfi noted:
118. Id. at 509 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975)).
119. 427 U.S. at 513.

120. Id.at 515.
121. Id.at 516.
122. Salfi and Goldfarb are, however, similar in one respect. The Court in Salfi noted that
the presumptions of sections 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) were not irrebuttable because one affected by
them could always adduce evidence by which he or she could remove himself or herself from
the disabled class. The same is true of the statute involved in Goldfarb, in which a widower was
given a full opportunity to prove partial dependency upon his deceased spouse. Contrast these
cases with Wiesenfeld, in which the Court noted that under section 402(g), "Stephen Wiesenfeld was not given the opportunity to show, as may well have been the case, that he was
dependent upon his wife for his support, or that, had his wife lived, she would have remained at
work while he took over care of the child." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975).
This is a point on which Goldfarb may be distinguished from Wiesenfeld, but only the
dissenters appear to have noticed it.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977); id.§ 416(g) (Supp. V 1975).
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Large numbers of people are eligible for these [social insurance]
programs and are potentially subject to inquiry as to the validity of
their relationships to wage earners. These people include not only
the classes which appellees represent, but also claimants in other
programs for which the Social
24 Security Act imposes duration-ofrelationship requirements.
Thus, in Salfi the government did not discriminate between men and
women, but rather among subclasses of women (i.e., those who were
married to a deceased wage-earner for nine months or more and those who
were not). In contrast, the statutory provisions in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb
did discriminate between men and women. In the former case, section
402(g) of the Social Security Act denied benefits to surviving widowers with
dependent children, but not to widows; in the latter case, section
402(f)(1)(D) imposed a proof-of-support burden only upon widowers. Thus,
the Court's decision in Salfi simply did not involve issues arising from
gender-based discrimination, which is undoubtedly why the district court in
that case applied the "irrebuttable presumption" analysis to the statutory
provision in question. Nor is that the only differentiating factor. The government in Salfi defended sections 416(c)(5) and (e)(2) on the ground that the
classifications therein were prophylactic, designed to curb specified abuses.
The Court in that case also focused on this point and emphasized the fact
that individualized determinations would not be as efficacious in deterring
such abuses. Thus, Salfi appears to be limited to situations involving
prophylactic laws. The statutes in Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb do not fit within
that rubric; they were not designed solely to ensure that the government paid
only those benefits arising from the risks it obliged itself to insure. In both
those cases, the United States offered in its defense the contention that the
classifications in question merely took into account a "well-known" empirical fact: women are more likely than men to have been dependent upon
their deceased spouses. This asserted justification is in no sense prophylactic
because it is not aimed at curbing any perceived abuse. Arguably, then, the
logic of Salfi was inapplicable to both the Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb
cases. 125
124. 422 U.S. at 781-82.
125. A recent ruling, however, suggests that the logic of Salfi may be extended generally.
Califano v. Jobst, 98 S. Ct. 95 (1977), involved a challenge to 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(D), (d)(5)

(1970 & Supp. V 1975), which provide that marriage will not terminate the disability benefits
received by the child of a deceased wage-earner if the child marries a person who is also entited
to such benefits. Jobst married a woman who did not fit within that classification, but who was
herself permanently disabled; he claimed that the classifications in question violated the Fifth

Amendment. An unanimous Court rejected this contention, relying primarily on Salft. Justice
Stevens' opinion stated that the statute did no more than link dependency with marital status;
presumably, a married person would be less likely to be dependent on his parents for support

than one who is unmarried. Thus, the Court relied on Salfl for the conclusion that "[t]here is no
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Similar difficulties exist with Justice Rehnquist's citation to Lucas.
That case also did not involve discrimination between discrete classes of
persons (i.e., between illegitimate -and legitimate children). Some subcategories of illegitimates were benefitted by the challenged enactment,
while others were not. This stands in stark contrast to Wiesenfeld and
Goldfarb, where the questioned provisions did provide sharply different
treatment for men as a unitary class as opposed to women as a unitary class.
But there is an even more crucial difference. Lucas involved discrimination
on the basis of legitimacy rather than gender, and this distinction was
deemed decisive. Thus, in Lucas Justice Blackmun cautioned:
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations [between a
defining classification and the status sought to be defined] must be
question about the power of Congress to legislate on the basis of such factual assumptions.
General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of
efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in
some individual cases." 98 S. Ct. at 99. Wiesenfeld was distinguished on the ground that that
case involved "an unthinking response to stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally
disadvantaged group." Id. Jobst, like Salfi, involved no gender-based discrimination claim;
indeed, Justice Stevens pointed out that the marriage rule applied in many contexts, to disabled
beneficiaries as well as parents, children, widows, widowers and divorced wives. Id. at 100
n. 12. But Jobst seemingly involves something other than a prophylactic rule; there was no
evidence cited by the Court that Congress drew the challenged classification in order to prevent
a perceived abuse; indeed, the district court in Jobst made a point of distinguishing other cases
where prophylactic provisions of the Social Security Act were at issue. See Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909, 913-14 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 95 (1977) (citing Stanley v.
Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 793, 802 (W.D. Mo. 1973)). Jobst thus
suggests that the rule of Salfi may extend beyond the specific factual setting of that case.
Justice Stevens also stated:
Even if we were to sustain his attack, and even though we recognize the unusual
hardship that the general rule has inflicted upon him, it would not necessarily follow
that Mr. Jobst is entitled to benefits. Cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 [1975]
.; Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 [1977].
. . .For the vice in the statute stems
from the exception created by the 1958 Amendment; that vice could be cured either by
invalidating the entire exception or by enlarging it. Since the choice involves legislation having a nationwide impact, the equities of Mr. Jobst's case would not
control. . . .If we were to enlarge the exception, it would be necessary to fashion
some new test of need, dependency or disability. Although the District Court only
granted relief for persons marrying a "totally disabled" spouse, its rationale would
equally apply to any marriage of a secondary beneficiary to a needy nonbeneficiary.
98 S. Ct. at 100-01 n. 14 (citations omitted). This footnote suggests that in social insurance cases
where an unjustifiable inequity is proven, the Court may still withhold relief on the grounds that
the difficulty inherent in fashioning a suitable remedy is not outweighed by the adverse effects,
which are narrowly circumscribed. If this characterization is accurate, Jobst has announced a
new doctrine. The only authority cited by the Court was Stanton, which invalidated a Utah law
denying support payments by divorced parties to female children who reached 18 years of age
while allowing such payments to male children up to the age of 21. In that litigation, however,
the Court remanded the case to the Utah judiciary solely to determine an issue of state law, i.e.,
whether "any unconstitutional inequality between males and females is to be remedied by
treating males as adults at age 18, rather than by withholding the privileges of adulthood from.
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supported at least by a showing that the Government's dollar
"lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is returned by a dollar
"saved" in administrative expense avoided. Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S., [677,] 689 [1973] (plurality opinion). Under the
standard of review appropriate here, however, the materiality of
the relation between the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be "scientifically substantiated." James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972),
quoting Roth
v. UnitedStates , 354 U.S. 476, 501 (1957) (opinion of
26
Harlan, J.)1

Lucas, then, applied a mild standard of review, a standard that was said to
be typified by the James case. James involved a claim of wealth-based
discrimination against a Kansas recoupment law denying indigent criminal
defendants the exemption for personal necessities accorded civil judgment
debtors. In contrast, Justice Blackmun also referred in Lucas to a "stricter
standard" of review and cited as an example the Frontiero case, which
involved gender-based discrimination and which was relied upon extensively by both the majority opinion in Wiesenfeld and Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Goldfarb. Thus, it is specious to assert, as Justice Rehnquist
does, that the deferential stance of Lucas should be applied in Goldfarb
when the majority in Lucas admitted that it was not implementing the
stricter standard of review appropriate in cases, such as Goldfarb, that
127
involve sex-based discrimination.
Once one clears away some of the confusion wrought by Justice
Rehnquist's ill-advised citations to Salfi and Lucas, one can then appreciate
the gravamen of his dissent. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Goldfarb
found that the only conceivable justification for the classification contained
in section 402(f)(1)(D) was the broad, unverified assumption "that it would
save the Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all
' 128
widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes."
While the plurality rejected this assumption as a means of justifying the
unequal treatment accorded widowers, Justice Rehnquist and his three
fellow dissenters not only contended that such an assumption was a "reawomen until they reach 21." 421 U.S. at 17-18. Thus, what occurred in Stanton bears little
resemblance to what was discussed in note 14 of Jobst, and the latter case may well signify the
beginning of increased judicial restraint in the context of social insurance legislation, a restraint
that is exercised by all nine justices.
126. 427 U.S. at 509-10.
127. A third point should be noted. Lucas itself distinguished Wiesenfeld by pointing out
that section 402(d)(1) did not effect a conclusive denial of benefits to all illegitimates, as the
statute involved in the latter case did with respect to all widowers, because an illegitimate could
always attempt to adduce evidence that would allow him to qualify as a dependent (e.g., by

proving the existence of a support decree or a written acknowledgement). Of course, the statute
in Goldfarb, like that in Lucas, also effected no conclusive denial, see note 122 supra; one
cannot then rely to any great extent on this distinction.
128. 430 U.S. at 217.
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sonable surrogate" for proof of actual dependency, but also argued that
because the challenged enactment favored women at the expense of men, it
constituted an example of "benign" discrimination that had been heretofore
30
29
permitted in cases like Kahn v. Shevin' and Schlesinger v. Ballard.1
Thus, between the plurality opinion and the dissent in Goldfarb eight
of the justices divided evenly on the reasonableness of the classification.
The decisive vote in this case was that of Justice Stevens, who concurred in
the judgment of the plurality, but who also agreed with many of the points
raised by the dissent. First, he accepted the dissent's view that the constitutional question raised by the appellee required the Court to focus on the
appellee's claim for benefits rather than on his deceased wife's tax obligation. 131 In so doing, Justice Stevens explicitly rejected Justice Brennan's
argument "that the statutory classification. . . should be regarded from the
perspective of the prospective beneficiary and not from that of the covered
wage earner," 132 a thesis that had been borrowed directly from Wiesenfeld. 133 Second, Justice Stevens agreed with the dissent that the classification incorporated in section 402(f)(1)(D) was benign rather than invidious. 1 34 Third, he accepted the dissent's thesis that the classification in
question could be justified by reference to the rationales of administrative
convenience and the need to cushion the adverse financial impact suffered
by widows. 135 Nevertheless, he rejected both rationales on the facts of this
case. As to the first, Justice Stevens claimed that administrative convenience rests on the presumption that the cost of providing benefits to nondependent widows is justified by eliminating the burden of requiring those
who are dependent to establish that fact. 136 Relevant statistics indicated that
ten percent of all women receiving benefits are in fact nondependent and
that Congress was thus needlessly expending as much as $750 million
dollars per year. 137 Justice Stevens found it inconceivable that the adminis129. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Kahn upheld a Florida statute granting a $500 property tax

exemption to widows but not to widowers.
130. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). Ballard upheld a federal law entitling a male naval officer to only
nine years' active service before mandatory discharge for lack of promotion, while allowing
women thirteen years.
131. 430 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Id. at 207.
133. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975).

134. 430 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). He pointed out that the
classification used herein did not imply that males are inferior to females, did not condemn a
large class on the basis of a unrepresentative few and did not add to the burdens of an already
disadvantaged, discrete minority. Id.
135. 430 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
136. Id.

137. Id. at 220 & n.5.
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trative savings, if any, could match that sum.138 Nor could he accept the
argument that section 402(f)(1)(D) was "the product of a conscious purpose
to redress the 'legacy of economic discrimination' against females." 13 9 The
women benefitted by the law were those least affected by that legacy, i.e.,
widows who were financially self-sufficient. Therefore, he concluded that
the challenged enactment was no more than "the accidental byproduct of a
traditional way of thinking about females"" and was consequently invalid

on the basis of the Court's prior holding in Wiesenfeld. While Justice
Stevens thus purports to accept the dissent's theses, he would require a far
more rigorous corroboration of a given justification for unequal treatment
under the facts of each case. 141
138. Id.
139. Id. at 221.
140. Id. at 223.
141. The fragile precedent set by the Court's plurality view in Goldfarb was further
undermined by Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam), a subsequent decision
rendered during the term. That case also involved a gender-based equal protection challenge to
a provision of the Social Security Act. Will Webster sought review of § 215 of the Act, under
which old-age insurance benefits are computed on the basis of the u age-earner's "average
monthly wage" earned during his "benefit computation years," which are the "elapsed years,"
reduced by five, during which the covered wages were highest. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). Until 1972, see 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1970), as amended by Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 104, 86 Stat. 1340. "Elapsed years" were partially
determined by reference to the sex of the wage earner. Section 215(b)(3) prescribed that the
number of such years for a male wage-earner would be three higher than the number for an
otherwise similarly situated female wage-earner. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (1970) (amended 1972).
Accordingly, a female wage earner could exclude from the computation of her "average monthly wage" three more lower earning years than a similarly situated male
wage earner could exclude. This would result in a slightly higher "average monthly
wage" and a correspondingly higher level of monthly old-age benefits for the retired
female wage earner.
430 U.S. at 315-16. The lower court accordingly held that the statutory scheme violated the
equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Webster v.
Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 413 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The Supreme
Court reversed in a per curiam opinion. 430 U.S. 313 (1977). In a very brief discussion, the
Court initially cited Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), noting that the appropriate standard of
review was whether the "classifications by gender [served] important government objectives
and [were substantially related to achievement of those objectives." 430 U.S. at 316-17
(quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). While recognizing that under Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the "mere recitation" of a benign purpose will not foreclose
inquiry into the actual purposes of a statute, 430 U.S. at 317 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)), the Court reiterated the point that "[rI]eduction of the disparity
in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women has been recognized as such an important governmental objective." 430 U.S. at
317 (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)). It
also acknowledged that it had previously rejected such a rationale when the classifications in
fact penalized women wage-earners or when the "statutory structure and its legislative history
revealed that the classification was not enacted as compensation for past discrimination," 430
U.S. at 317 (citing both Goldfarb and Wiesenfeld as authority for these propositions). Id. As to
the first assertion, the Court noted those sections of the Goldfarb opinion regarding the reduced
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Nevertheless, Justice Stevens' statements indicate that five justices
have now rejected a significant aspect of the Wiesenfeld analysis. In that
protection accorded female wage-earner's families by the operation of the statutory classification. See 430 U.S. at 208-09. In this case, however, the Court asserted that the statutory scheme
was "more analogous" to those upheld in Kahn and Ballard than to those struck down in
Wiesenfeld and Goldfarb. 430 U.S. at 317.
The more favorable treatment. . . here was not a result of "archaic and overbroad
generalizations" about women, Schlesinger v.Ballard . . . , or of "the role-typing
society has long imposed" upon women, Stanton v. Stanton . . . , such as casual

assumptions that women are "the weaker sex" or are more likely to be child-rearers or
dependents. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb . . .; Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld. .

.

.Rather,

"the only discernible purpose of [the more favorable treatment is] the permissible one
of redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women." Califano v.
Goldfarb ....
Id.(citations omitted).
The Court based its conclusion on the alleged effect and legislative history of this particular
section. It argued that the statute operated to compensate women for past economic discrimination by allowing them to eliminate additional low-earning years from the calculation of their
retirement benefits, id.at 318 (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353-54 & nn. 4-6 (1974)),
and that the legislative history reflected a concern for more favorable treatment of female
wage-earners. 430 U.S. at 318. Citing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Goldfarb, the
Court concluded that the legislative history was "clear" that the differing treatment was not
"'the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females', Califano v. Goldfarb, [430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)], but rather was deliberately
enacted to compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women." 430 U.S. at
320. By basing its conclusion on the alleged effect and legislative history of the challenged
section, the Webster Court followed Justice Stevens' Goldfarb analysis but reached a different
conclusion on the facts. Whether the conflicting results are merited, however, is questionable.
It should be noted initially that Webster's emphasis on the direct operation of the statute is
unique. While the Court has, on prior occasions, recognized the remedial effects of a statutory
discrimination in favor of women, it has not utilized such an effect to justify the gender-based
discrimination. In Goldfarb, for example, the statute clearly operated in favor of widows and
could be interpreted as effectuating compensation for past limitations on employment opportunities. The Court rejected such a "recitation" of benign purpose, without more. 430 U.S. at
212-17. In contrast, in Webster the Court found that the differential treatment was "deliberately" enacted in 1956, in lieu of the statute's previously equal standards, to compensate for past
employment discrimination. 430 U.S. at 320. The history cited, however, did not include any
direct assertions as to legislative purpose. In an earlier examination of the same section,
dissenting Judge McMillen of the northern district of Illinois had observed:
The majority . . .assumes that the purpose of this differential in benefits is to
compensate females for the lower wages which they had previously earned. There is
no evidence in the record, however, that these conditions have existed or that they
have existed in all levels or types of employment covered by the Social Security Act.
Equally importantly, there is no evidence in the record that Congress adopted the
distinction in order to compensate for past discrimination.
Polelle v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 386 F. Supp. 443, 448 (N.D. Ill.
1974)
(McMillen, J.,dissenting).
Another inconsistency surfaces in the Webster opinion. In response to Webster's assertion
that the 1972 amendment constituted an admission by Congress that its previous policy was
invidiously discriminatory, the Court noted, in part, that
[the] elimination of the more favorable benefit computation for women wage earners,
even in the remedial context, is wholly consistent with those reforms, which require
equal treatment of men and women in preference to the attitudes of "romantic
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case, the Court dismissed a claim that because social security benefits were

not compensation for work done, Congress was not obligated to provide
such benefits on equal terms to male and female wage-earners. 142 In doing
143
so, the Court declined to extend its 1960 ruling in Flemming v. Nestor.
That decision, which involved a challenge to a provision of the Social
Security Act curtailing benefit payments to resident aliens who underwent
deportation, 144 had held that the interest of an employee covered by the Act

in future benefits was "noncontractual" in nature."14 The Court in Wiesenfeld had remarked that the noncontractual nature of a specified interest is not
a sufficient basis upon which the government "can sanction differential
protection for covered employees which is solely gender based." 146 Because
the statutory right to benefits under the Act was related to years worked and
amount earned, rather than to beneficiaries' needs, the Court held that such
benefits must be distributed according to classifications that do not "without
sufficient justification" differentiate solely on the basis of sex.147 In
contrast, Justice Rehnquist argued in Goldfarb that "social insurance differs
paternalism" that have contributed to the "long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
430 U.S. at 320. Why the Court failed to apply a similar analysis to the pre-1972 statutory
formula is unclear. One could at the very least argue that, while the statute was intended to
compensate for past discrimination, it also reflected an attitude of "romantic paternalism."
Recognition of the confusion engendered by the Webster opinion is reflected in the separate
opinion of Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in the per curiam judgment and was joined by
Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist. 430 U.S. at 321 (Burger, C.J., concurring, joined by
Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.). He noted that he found it "somewhat difficult to
distinguish the Social Security provision upheld here from that struck down so recently in
[Goldfarb]." Id. While the Chief Justice found some merit in the per curiam opinion, he
questioned "whether certainty in the law is promoted by hinging the validity of important
statutory schemes on whether five Justices view them to be more akin to the 'offensive'
provisions struck down in [Wiesenfeld and Frontiero] or more like the 'benign' provisions
upheld in [Ballardand Kahn]." Id. The Chief Justice thus concurred in the judgment on the
basis of the rationale urged by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
at 224-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Blackmun, JJ.), in
which he had joined. 430 U.S. at 321. By reasserting the dissenting rationale of Goldfarb, the
Webster concurrence re-emphasizes the Court's growing recognition of the "special characteristics," see 430 U.S. at 225 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and
Blackmun, JJ.), of social insurance plans, particularly with respect to the sufficiency of benign
discrimination as a justification for gender-based classifications within the context of such
legislation.
142. 420 U.S. at 646-47.
143. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1958) (amended 1960).
145. 363 U.S. at 609-10.
146. 420 U.S. at 646.
147. Id. at 647. In a subsequent decision this term the Court affirmed another aspect of the
Flemming decision. In Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), the Court specifically held that
under Flemming, old-age benefit payments are not constitutionally immunized against alterations resulting from statutory amendment. Id. at 321. For a discussion of the Webster decision,
see note 141 supra.
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from compensation for work done."

148

He relied on Flemming for the

proposition that because a claim to Social Security benefits is noncontractual
in nature, "the contributions of the deceased spouse cannot be regarded as
creating any sort of contractual entitlement on the part of either the deceased
wife or the surviving husband."1 49 Justice Stevens concurred with this view.
He noted that the deceased wife "had no contractual right to receive benefits
or to control their payment; moreover, the payments are not a form of
compensation for her services." 150 Thus, the limitation of Flemming, which
Wiesenfeld had seemingly consigned to oblivion, seems to have reappeared
in this area of the law and may well prove to be a severe constraint upon
future constitutional challenges to provisions of the Social Security Act.
Moreover, Goldfarb suggests that a working majority of the Court will
accept either benign discrimination or administrative convenience as a
sufficient justification for gender-based classifications, at least within the
context of social insurance programs. Only Justice Stevens appears to insist
that such a justification be factual rather than hypothetical.151 While accept-

ance of benign discrimination is not an innovation, a majority espousal of
the rationale of administrative convenience is unique, at least in cases

involving sex-based equal protection claims. Thus, in the context of social
insurance legislation, a majority of the Court could, in a future case, uphold
a gender-based classification if it represented a reasonable empirical judgment or assumption that (in fact) served administrative convenience in the
allocation of benefits. Such a realignment may very well dismantle the

plurality holding in Frontierov. Richardson,152 at least insofar as that case
has been interpreted to imply that a mere invocation of the slogan "adminis53
trative convenience" will not justify invidious sex-based discrimination. 1
148. 430 U.S. at 241 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and
Blackmun, JJ.).
149. Id. at 240. Justice Rehnquist argued in this regard that:
[w]hile there is no basis for assessing the propriety of a given allocation of funds
within a social insurance program apart from an identifiable legislative purpose, a
compensatory scheme may be evaluated under the principle of equal pay for equal
work done. This case is therefore unlike Frontiero. . . . [H]ere, . . . the benefit
payments to survivors are neither contractual nor compensatory for work done, and
. ..there is thus no comparative basis for evaluating the propriety of a given benefit
apart from the legislative purpose.
Id. at 241.
150. 430 U.S. at 217 (Stevens, J.,concurring in the judgment). For this reason, he added,
the case was not controlled by Frontiero.Id. at n.1. Justice Stevens' rationale was that all
workers, male and female, at the same salary level pay the same tax whether married or single,
old or young, or the head of a large or small family. "The benefits which may ultimately
become payable to them or to a wide variety of beneficiaries. . . vary enormously, but such
variations do not convert a uniform tax obligation into an unequal one." Id. at 218.
151. Id. at 219-24 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
152. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
153. See id. at 690-91.
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This conclusion may, however, be premature. As noted in Lucas, 5 4 Frontiero required the government to demonstrate that every dollar lost to an

overincluded benefit recipient is returned by a dollar saved in administrative
expense avoided. The four dissenters in Goldfarb found no need for such a
stringent evidentiary burden; 155 but Justice Stevens, while asserting that
Frontiero did not apply to this case, nevertheless appeared to demand such
an exacting showing on the part of the government. 15 6 If so, then the central
principle of Frontiero may still be alive and well.
B. Invidious Racial Discrimination: Impact vs. Purpose
1. Housing
In Village of Arlington Heights v. MetropolitanHousingDevelopment
Corporation,157 the Court reaffirmed its recent decision in Washington v.
Davis158 and clarified some of the questions raised by that opinion. Davis
had held that disproportionate racial impact alone would not cause an
official action to be deemed unconstitutional but that additional proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose would be necessary to show a
violation of equal protection. 5 9 Arlington Heights established that such
purpose need not be the "dominant" or "primary" one,' 6° but that determining whether it was a "motivating factor" demanded a "sensitive"
1 61
inquiry into the available circumstantial and direct evidence of motive.
154. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509-10 (1976).
155. 430 U.S. at 238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, CJ., and Stewart and
Blackmun, JJ.)
156. 430 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
157. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). For a previous consideration of this case, one which reached
somewhat different conclusions than those expressed here, see Note, The Village of Arlington
Heights: EqualProtectionin the SuburbanZone, 4 HASnNGS CONST. L.Q. 361 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
158. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Davis involved a claim that certain testing procedures utilized by
the District of Columbia police force violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
solely because they had a racially disproportionate impact. See generally Comment, Washington v. Davis: Reassessing the Bars to Employment Discrimination,43 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 747
(1977).
159. 426 U.S. at 242. The court of appeals in Davis applied the doctrine that constitutional
claims of racial discrimination could be judged by standards identical to those used in cases
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970 & Supp. V
1975) which do not require scrutiny of intent or purpose. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956,
959 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In the context of employment discrimination, a number of other courts
reached similar conclusions. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir.
1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners,
458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 737 (N.D. Ohio
1975); Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126, 143 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
The Court in Davis explicitly disapproved of all these decisions. See 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
160. 429 U.S. at 265.
161. Id. at 266.
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The Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, a non-profit
developer, sought to build racially-integrated, low- and moderate-income
housing within the Village of Arlington Heights, a Chicago suburb. The
contract to purchase the land was contingent upon the purchaser having the
land rezoned from a single family to multiple family classification. The
petition for rezoning, which was accompanied by supporting materials
indicating the need for racially-integrated housing developments, was denied by the Village Board on the basis of the recommendation of its Plan
Commission. This recommendation was formulated after public hearings
during which it was alleged that: (1) the requested rezoning would reduce
neighborhood property values and (2) the reclassification sought would
usually be issued only to serve as a buffer between single-family developments and commercial/industrial land uses, and no such latter uses existed
in the areas contiguous to Arlington Heights. 162 As a result of the Board's
denial of a petition, the developer and some potential occupants brought suit
for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging, inter alia, that the refusal of
the Board was racially discriminatory and thus violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.163
The district court held that the rezoning denial was not motivated by racial
discrimination but rather by a desire to protect property values and to
maintain the integrity of the Village's zoning plan. 1" The Seventh Circuit
reversed; it accepted the lower court's assessment of motivation but held
that the "ultimate effect" of the rezoning denial was racially discriminatory
165
because it would disproportionately affect blacks.
162. For the underlying facts of this case, see id. at 255-58.
163. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Court remanded the case for
further consideration of the statutory claim. 429 U.S. at 271. On remand, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Village had a statutory obligation to refrain from zoning policies that effectively
foreclosed construction of any low-cost housing within its boundaries. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977). The court
looked solely to the effect of the official action in question. Id. at 1294.
164. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208,211
(N.D. Ill. 1974).

165. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,414 (7th
Cir. 1975). See also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (no discriminatory purpose in zoning case need be shown in
order to allege a claim under the Fair Housing Act of 1968; only a prima facie case of
discriminatory effect need be demonstrated); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc.

v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799, 811 (5th Cir. 1974) (prima facie case under Title VIII
could only be rebutted by showing necessity of promoting a substantial governmental interest);
Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (in case alleging both constitutional and statutory violations arising

from municipal interference with construction of low-income housing, held, effect of, not
purpose underlying, such interference would be decisive); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d

1037, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1970) (denial of building permit clearly motivated by racial bias
enjoined); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organizations v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court of
appeals in an opinion by Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist. In considering the merits,166 the
Court reiterated the substance of its holding in Davis to the effect that
"official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in
a racially disproportionate impact." 167 The Court then offered a less than
exhaustive summary of the proper subjects for its judicial inquiry to determine whether an invidious purpose was a factor motivating an official
decision, including the existence of a clear pattern of discriminatory official
action preceding the decision, the historical background of the decision, the
specific sequence of events leading up to the decision, departures from the
normal procedural and substantive sequence of decisionmaking and the
legislative or administrative history underlying the challenged decision.16
291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970) (if the effect of a referendum abrogating a permit to construct federallyfinanced low- and moderate-income housing is discriminatory, "a substantial constitutional
question" is presented; no Title VIII claim was involved) (dictum); Ybarra v. Town of Los
Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742, 751 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974) (constitutional
challenge to local zoning ordinance could be rebutted by showing that said ordinance "was not
arbitrary and unreasonable in purpose or effect"). As these cases demonstrate, the state of the
law prior to Arlington Heights was somewhat unsettled. But the Seventh Circuit definitely
appeared to adopt the statutory standard enunciated in Black Jack, although its holding is
supported independently by cases like Lackawanna, Union City and Ybarra.
166. The Court first determined that the plaintiffs had standing by relying on its decision in
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). It held that the developer had standing because he had
shown an injury to himself" 'likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.' "429 U.S. at 262
(quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). It also
concluded that one of the black plaintiffs had standing, basing its conclusion on a similar
rationale. 429 U.S. at 264.
167. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
168. Id. at 266-68. It could be argued that three of the five varieties of evidence cited by the
Court are, for all practical purposes, often indistinguishable from one another. See Equal
Protection,supra note 157, at 372-73. Thus, one might suggest that because Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268 (1939), was cited in support of both the "clear pattern" and "historical background"
classifications, the same facts may suffice to make out a claim under either category. But the
level of inquiry in each is, in fact, crucially different. In the "clear pattern" classification, the
Court concerns itself solely with impact, not with purpose. "Historical background," however,
was said to be most useful "if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes." 429 U.S. at 267. Thus, in the "clear pattern" cases, an ordinance enforced so as to
deny 200 of 200 applications filed by Chinese to operate laundries, but only I of 80 applications
filed by whites, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 359 (1886), or a gerrymandering plan
restructuring the electoral district of Tuskegee, Alabama, so that a twenty-eight-sided figure
that left all but four blacks outside city limits was created, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960), are examples of situations where the Court focused on effect and inferred a discriminatory purpose from that effect, without any further showing. However, in the "historical
background" cases like Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336
U.S. 933 (1949) (invalidated Alabama constitutional provision that required enfranchisement of
only those who could explain any article of the United States Constitution, as a result of which
only 104 nonwhites in a county that was 36% black were registered as voters; the district court
took into account racially discriminatory comments made in state bar journals and campaign
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After reviewing the record in this case, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof as to discriminatory
literature of the Democratic party that the amendment was designed to exclude blacks from
voting and thus counteract the effect of a recent Supreme Court decision), or Griffin v. County
School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (after desegregation order by a court,
county closed all public schools and began granting indirect benefits and tax relief to segregationist private schools), the Court reverses its approach and focuses not on the effect of
official action, because that effect is not extreme enough, but rather on the purpose underlying
that action. Thus, at least in theory, the two categories are highly distinguishable.
What, then, of the dual citation by the Court in Arlington Heights to Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268, 271 (1939). That case involved an Oklahoma voter registration law. In Guinn v.
United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Court had held that an Oklahoma law imposing a literacy
test on all voters except those eligible to cast a ballot on January 1, 1866 (and their lineal
descendants) was unconstitutional. A year after Guinn, the Oklahoma legislature enacted a
statute automatically enfranchising all those who had voted in the 1914 general election and
gave all others twelve days (from April 30 to May 11, 1916) to register. 307 U.S. at 371. The
Court said "[t]he practical effect of the 1916 legislation was to accord to the members of the
negro race who had been discriminated against in the outlawed registration system of 1914, not
more than 12 days within which to reassert constitutional rights which this Court found in the
Guinn case to have been improperly taken from them." Id. at 276. Therefore, it was said that
"the narrow basis of the supplemental registration, the very brief normal period of relief for the
persons and purposes in question, the practical difficulties, of which the record in this case
gives glimpses, inevitable in the administration of such strict registration provisions, leave no
escape from the conclusion that the means chosen as substitutes for the invalidated 'grandfather clause' were themselves invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. at 277. Lane is,
like Schnell, a "historical background" case; indeed, the fact pattern in both is similar. But it
does not really fit within the "clear pattern" classification. Unlike Yick Wo, no showing of
discriminatory enforcement was made or required; the Court assumed a discriminatory effect
because the 1916 law reinstated indirectly the 1914 system, which had previously been deemed
invalid. Thus, the Court in Arlington Heights appears simply to have misidentified the true
nature of Lane within the context of its own typology.
It could also be argued that the classification of "historical background" appears to
overlap considerably with the category of "specific sequence of events." But in fact there is
less overlap than is superficially apparent. The former category seems to refer to events outside
the decisionmaking process which cause that process to be initiated (e.g., the Court's desegregation order in Griffin, which was based on the ruling in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955); the decision of Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), which preceded Schnell),
whereas the latter category seems to refer to situations where an official decision is inconsistent
with previous decisions or prior policy and that inconsistency can only be explained by
reference to a discriminatory purpose (see, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(California constitutional amendment granting a person the full discretion to refuse to sell or
lease to another, which nullified prior legislation prohibiting discrimination in housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park
land shortly after learning of plaintiffs' plans to build low-income housing); Progress Dev.
Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land
for a park upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were building would be sold under a marketing
plan designed to assure integration)). Thus the "sequence of events" category differs from the
"historical background" classification in that although both require scrutiny of matters extrinsic to the decisionmaklng process, the former alone directs judicial focus upon whether or not a
given decision comports with past practices. Therefore, there is a significant basis for distinction between the two.
Finally, it might be argued that the Court's citation to Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
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purpose and that this foreclosed further constitutional inquiry, notwithstand1 69
ing the discriminatory "ultimate effect" found by the court of appeals
However, the claim concerning the Fair Housing Act was remanded to the
0
Seventh Circuit for further consideration. 17
As noted in an earlier analysis of this case,171 the Court effectively
reformulated the purpose requirement of equal protection analysis, which
had originally been derived from the distinction between de facto and de jure

segregation. By phrasing it in terms of the consideration of a "motivating
factor," the Court would appear to require determination of motive as well
as purpose. This reformulation, however, may not be significant; the majority opinion in Arlington Heights appears to treat the terms "motive" and
"purpose" as alternative ways of expressing one essential concept: why a
decisionmaker made a particular choice. 172 Thus, whether the subject of
U.S. 233 (1936), in connection with its discussion of "sequence of events" is anomalous
because the only sequence specifically mentioned in that case consisted of the eighteenth
century Stamp Acts and the adoption of the First Amendment, subjects which should more
properly be considered under the rubric of "historical background." As a matter of fact,
however, this historical discussion in Grosfean had nothing to do with u hether the challenged
official conduct was invidiously motivated. The Court engaged in its historical exegesis in order
to ascertain if the First Amendment permitted a newspaper to seek enjoinment of the collection
of a state license tax:
A determination of the question whether the tax is valid in respect of the point
now under review, requires an examination of the history and circumstances which
antedated and attended the adoption of the abridgement clause of the First Amendment, since that clause expresses one of those "fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions". . and, as such,
is embodied in the concept "due process of law" . . . and, therefore, protected
against hostile state invasion by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 245 (citations omitted). In fact, the Court apparently did not intend to refer to this section
of Grosjeanat all in Arlington Heights. What it did refer to was the statement in that case that
"[The tax] is bad, because in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a
deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to
which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." Id. at 250 (emphasis
added). Thus, this language talks about the unspecified history of the Louisiana act, not the
history underlying the First Amendment. Viewed in this way, the Court's citation in Arlington
Heights to Grosjean does not seem anomalous at all.
169. Id. at 270-71. Concurring and dissenting in part, Justice Marshall, who was joined by
Justice Brennan, argued that the entire case should be remanded for reconsideration in light of
Davis. Id. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan,
J.). Justice White dissented and would also have vacated the judgment below for reconsideration of the statutory issue and, if necessary, the constitutional question in light of Davis. Id. at
272-73 (White, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority for reassessing the evidence and for
the unnecessary listing of evidentiary sources and subjects of proper inquiry. Id. at 273.
170. Id. at 271. See note 163 supra.
171. See EqualProtection, supra note 157, at 374-75. According to Keyes v. Denver School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), "the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and socalled de facto segregation. . . is purpose or intent to segregate." Id. at 208.
172. This assertion may be corroborated by a glance at Arlington Heights and its predecessors. Thus, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the Court refused to scrutinize the
legislative motive underlying the closifg of a municipal swimming pool alleged to have been
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judicial inquiry is denominated either "purpose" or "motive," the factors
appropriate for consideration are the same and they each require examination of extrinsic evidence. Thus, the Court reaffirmed its view, announced
as long ago as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,173 that when a "clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state
174
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face,"
175
such evidence may suffice to show an invidious discriminatory purpose.
caused by sentiments of racial discrimination and, in doing so, it noted that "[i]t is true there is
language in some of our cases interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which
may suggest that the motive or purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality ...
But the focus in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the motivation
which led the States to behave as they did." Id. at 225. Accord, Wright v. Council of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1972). Similarly, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the
Court evinced an identical reluctance to scrutinize purpose by saying, "[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter." Id. at 383. In support of this statement, it
cited language in McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904): "The decisions of this court
from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain
the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused
the power to be exerted." Thus, all these cases referred to "motive" and "purpose" as
alternative means of expressing the same idea. This lexicographical imprecision recurs in
Arlington Heights, where Palmer, Wright and O'Brien are said to adopt a position contrary to
the one that "[piroof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause." 429 U.S. at 265. Similarly, four years earlier, the Court had
referred to Palmeras dealing with the elusive "search for legislative purpose," even though the
case had used the terms of both "purpose" and "motive." McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263,
276-77 (1973). Again, all this emphasizes the point that the Court is not engaging in an effort to
differentiate the meanings of the words "intent," "purpose" and "motive," although at least
one justice has elsewhere contended that such a distinction is necessary. See Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 782-83 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This failure to distinguish the
meanings of words was also true in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). There, in stating
that the judiciary had a duty to scrutinize legislative purpose in equal protection claims, the
Court cited in support of this contention Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973)
("mhe differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
. . . is purpose or intent to segregate"), 426 U.S. at 240, and distinguished Palmer and Wright,
discrediting the former to "the extent that [they] suggest a generally applicable proposition that
legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication.
... 426 U.S. at 244 n. 11. It
did so, even though Keyes speaks of "intent" and "purpose," while Palmer spoke of "motive"
and "purpose." The point of this footnote is not that distinctions cannot be drawn among these
three words; it is simply that the Court has chosen not to do so for over 70 years. Therefore,
when the Court in Arlington Heights phrases the issue in terms of whether or not "invidious
discriminatory purpose" was a "motivating factor" of an official decision, it is doing nothing
unusual. For general discussions of this entire subject, see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REV. 95; Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970);
Note, Legislative Purpose,Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
173. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See note 168 supra.
174. 429 U.S. at 266.
175. In an accompanying footnote, the Court remarked that:
Several of our jury-selection cases fall into this category. Because of the nature of the
jury-selection task, however, we have permitted a finding of constitutional violation
even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of Yick Wo [v.
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But where such a clear pattern is not apparent, the majority opinion sancHopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), involving discriminatory enforcement of building safety
codes against Chinese) and Gomillion fv. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), involving
municipal gerrymandering designed to disenfranchise blacks].
429 U.S. at 266 n. 13 (citations omitted). The accuracy of this statement was borne out later in
the term by the case of Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). That suit involved a challenge
to the Texas "key man" system of selecting grand jurors. Under the system, selection was
vested in jury commissioners authorized to choose persons from the community at large; all
persons so designated were then to be tested for the qualifications required by article 19.08 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, including literacy and good moral character. Partida
was indicted by a grand jury in Hidalgo County for committing burglary with intent to rape and
was subsequently convicted. He challenged his conviction on the grounds that although the
population of Hidalgo County was 79.1% Mexican-American, only 39.0,7 of the grand jurors
serving between 1962 and 1972 had Spanish surnames, only 50.0% of the grand jury that
convicted him had such surnames, and Mexican-Americans generally were subject to economic
and educational disadvantages. Id. at 486-88. The state offered no rebuttal evidence; nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and a federal district court declined to grant a new
trial. Id. at 488-92. The Fifth Circuit reversed the latter decision, however, finding that Partida
had made a prima facie case of discrimination, which the state had failed to rebut. Id. at 492.
The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Blackmun, speaking for a majority of five, said that "in
order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury
selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which he belongs." Id. at 494. He also
ruled that the plaintiff's burden of proof consisted of showing that (I) there exists a distinct
group or class singled out for differential treatment, and (2) underrepresentation is present by
comparing the "proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve
as grand jurors, over a significant period of time." 430 U.S. at 494 (quoting Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954)). A selection procedure that is susceptible to abuse or not
racially neutral was said to support the presumption raised by such an evidentiary showing.
Based on the statistical disparity disclosed by Partida and the inherent subjectivity of a key man
selection system, the majority found that the petitioners had made a prima facie case. Id. at
495-96. It cautioned, however, that it was "not saying that the statistical disparities proved here
could never be explained in another case; we are simply saying that the State did not do so in
this case." Id. at 499. Nor could any contention that Hispanics constituted a governing majority
in Hidalgo county operate as a substitute for the state's introduction of rebuttal evidence. Id. at
500. The key dissents were those of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. The former
complained that Partida had used gross population figures as a referent for comparison, rather
than the figures for the number of Mexican-Americans in Hidalgo County who would be eligible
to serve as grand jurors. Id. at 504-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). There is authority for this
view. In Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), for example, the Court stated that "[a] purpose to
discriminate must be present which may be proven by systematic exclusion of eligiblejurymen
of the proscribed race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show
intentional discrimination." Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added). This language was quoted with
approval as recently as the Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). It
ignores, however, the fact that this is a point that the state should have made (and for which
evidence should have been introduced) in rebuttal; it was the absence of contradiction in the
record that the majority found to be dispositive. Justice Powell went even further than the Chief
Justice, however. He said that the majority misapplied equal protection analysis because cases
like Davis and Arlington Heights established the precept that discriminatory intent and impact
must be proved in order to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 510-11
(Powell, J.,dissenting). Here, the former element was said to be unproven because three of the
five jury commissioners were Hispanic and it would be difficult to presume that they discriminated against members of their own race. Id. at 514. On the basis of this evidence, Justice
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tioned judicial reliance on the four types of evidence listed above.176
Nevertheless, even such extrinsic proof need not be deemed decisive; the
Court went on to note that "[p]roof that the decision by the Village was
motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily
have required invalidation. . . . Such proof would, however, have shifted
to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.", 177 As
Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in Davis,
the burden of proving a prima facie case may well involve differing evidentiary considerations. The extent of deference that one
pays to the trial court's determination of the factual issue, and
indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a
question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different
contexts.178
In the context of housing, the burden of proving a prima facie case of
racial discrimination would appear to be quite heavy. Given the segregated
housing patterns in many communities, a decision to "preserve the zoning
Powell claimed that the district court's ruling that the judge and jury commissioners had never
intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 517.
Again, this analysis slights the fact that the case turned solely on an evidentiary question: was
the evidence adduced by the petitioner sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the state of
Texas? The majority held that it was. Id. at 497-98. The consequent failure of the state to rebut
that evidence foreclosed further consideration. Texas could have brought out the points made
by Justice Powell. Its failure to do anything, however, was decisive. As the Court has said,
"[o]nce a prima facie case of invidious discrimination is established, the burden of proof shifts
to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result."
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972). In Partida, Texas simply wasted its
opportunity to engage in such a rebuttal; because of this unusual procedural characteristic, the
case is not necessarily a harbinger of future developments in this area of constitutional law.
176. See note 168 and accompanying text supra. For an example of how this procedure will
be applied, see Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1977). In
that case the court confronted a challenge to an administrative decision not to renew the
contracts of black school teachers after the integration of a dual school system. The Fifth
Circuit appeared to find what could be classified as a "clear pattern" similar to that found in
Yick Wo. Thus, of the black teachers, 70% did not receive contract renewals, although all white
teachers requesting such renewals were granted them; moreover, of 17 newly-hired teachers, all
were white. Id. at 1356. This is seemingly a stark enough pattern to make the evidence of
impact decisive. Yet the Fifth Circuit went on to consider the other types of evidence adverted
to in ArlingtonHeights. The court noted that the school district had historically maintained dual
facilities; although the district desegregated voluntarily, the court surmised that no "overnight
change" in racial attitudes had occurred. Id. As to the other evidentiary factors listed by the
Supreme Court, the court of appeals lumped these under the rubric "sequence of events." It
focused particularly on the compilation and content of "anecdotal evaluations" made by the
curriculum director of the school district with regard to the black teachers not rehired. Id. at
1357. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit found racially discriminatory purpose. Id. at 1358. Its
procedure suggests that the neat categories supplied by the Court in Arlington Heights will, as a
practical matter, be rather loosely applied.
177. 429 U.S. at 270-71 n.21.
178. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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plan" and to maintain "housing values" may well be tantamount to such
discrimination in fact, notwithstanding the procedural or official propriety
of that decision. Faced with the requirement of corroborating his claim by an
extensive body of extrinsic evidence, the plaintiff will face an extremely
difficult task in attempting to prove an ulterior racial motivation on the part
of the lawmakers. 179 For example, in Arlington Heights, the Court indicated
that lack of consistency in the Village's application of the policy of creating
a buffer zone between residential and commercial land users and the fact
that the Village Planner was never asked for his oral or written opinion on
the rezoning request at issue would not be sufficient to make the threshold
18 0
showing of discriminatory purpose.
The Court's methodology in this respect is instructive. Despite the
inconsistent use of the buffer policy by the Village on previous occasions,
Justice Powell accepted the conclusions of the district court and the Seventh
Circuit that this evidence did not necessitate a finding of discriminatory
administration 8 and this assertion curtailed further inquiry into the subject. 18 2 On all other matters, however, the Court engaged in an independent
review of the record, although it could have rested on the findings of the
intermediate courts. Why it chose to accord a different level of inquiry to the
179. This may not always be the case, however, even after Arlington Heights. In Kirksey
v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977), the court confronted a challenge to the
implementation of a plan to restructure the voting districts for the election of county officers in
Hinds County, Mississippi. The plan was devised in 1975 in order to remedy the incorrect
apportionment effected by a prior 1969 redistricting. The Fifth Circuit said that the evidentiary
criteria of Arlington Heights apply only where official action creates a discriminatory situation;
they do not pertain where admittedly neutral official action perpetuates already existent
purposeful discrimination. Id. at 147. This case raises an important qualification to Arlington
Heights, but proof of prior purpose would still be required. This could be accomplished by
relatively easy means, however, e.g., admission of findings of fact made in previous lawsuits or
stipulations.
180. 429 U.S. at 269-70 n.19.
181. Id. at 270. The plaintiffs in this case alleged fifteen violations of the Village's buffer
policy. The Seventh Circuit found among these only four "clear" violations and two "questionable" violations. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409,
412 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). But this inconsistency v as weighed against the
defendants' evidence on the zoning change refusals: "[T]here were two proposed changes
rejected at least in part on the basis of the buffer zone policy and another four rejections which
might have been on this basis though this was not stated. There were also two proposals that
were withdrawn after the Plan Commission had recommended their rejection at least partly on
the basis of the apartment policy. A third withdrawal after a rejection recommendation might
have been for the same reason." 517 F.2d at 412. Thus, of fifteen discrepancies, the Seventh
Circuit firmly concluded that the buffer policy played a partial role in four, an unknown role in
five, and was possibly violated in six. This was the basis for the finding upon which the
Supreme Court relied; but the Court neglected to note that even the Seventh Circuit admitted
"more detailed factual findings concerning these zoning changes 'Aould have been helpful. . . ." Id.

182. 429 U.S. at 271.
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subject of administrative enforcement of the buffer policy was never explained.
On the failure to ask the advice of the Village Planner, the Court
admitted that this omission was "curious," but claimed that the "respondents failed to prove at trial what role the Planner customarily played in
rezoning decisions, or whether his opinion would be relevant to respondents' claims." 183 This suggests an interesting possibility: a plaintiff might
show a wide variety of procedural irregularities in a zoning decision, but if
the defendant administrator claims that the decision would have been the
same, even had there been no irregularities, the Court would apparently be
willing to regard such procedural lapses as de minimis. Thus, a great burden
is placed on the plaintiff: he must not only show procedural or substantive
departures, but must also engage in the unenviable task of demonstrating a
causal nexus between those departures and an official decision, i.e., that but
for those departures, the decision that might have been reached would, in all
probability, be contrary to the one that was reached. The obvious consequence of such an exacting standard is to foreclose success in all but the
most blatant cases of discrimination.
Nor was that the only limit imposed. The decision by the Village Board
occurred on September 28, 1971. Yet the plaintiffs were not allowed to
question Board members about their motives at the time those members cast
their decisions; they could only do so at the discovery phase of trial, when
memories might have been dim. The Court did not find this objectionable,
because it reasoned that since the theory of the case pressed by the plaintiffs
had been based on effect, not purpose, they had no legitimate grievance
about restrictions on the acquisition of evidence concerning purpose and,
presumably, could not change the thrust of their case at this late stage. 184
But, as a matter of fact, the Court changed the thrust of their case for them.
The Seventh Circuit, which handed down a ruling in 1975, had assumed that
an equal protection claim could be based on evidence of effect.1 85 That
assumption was undermined by Washington v. Davis, 18 6 decided in 1976,
in which the Court expressly rejected judicial overreliance on impact only
and disapproved of many cases utilizing such a technique, including the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Arlington Heights.1 87 Thus, one can see the
logic in the views of Justices Marshall, Brennan and White, who argued that
the case should have been remanded for further proceedings in light of
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 269-70 n.19.
Id. at 270 n.20.
See note 165 and accompanying text supra.
426 U.S. 229 (1976). See notes 158-59 and accompanying text supra.
Id. at 244-45 n.12.
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Davis.8 8 As Justice Marshall said, "[t]he Court of Appeals is better
situated than this Court both to reassess the significance of the evidence
developed below in light of the standards we have set forth and to determine
whether the interests of justice require further District Court proceedings
directed toward those standards."' 189 Arlington Heights is thus an anomaly.
The district court and the court of appeals admitted evidence primarily
relating to one theory of the case, proof of impact. The Supreme Court
reviewed that evidence in light of its retrospective application of an entirely
new theory of the case, proof of purpose, without allowing the plaintiffs to
adduce new evidence to meet the additional burdens imposed by this new
theory.
Apart from this anomaly, however, one may well ask the larger
question: was the significant evidentiary burden imposed on the plaintiffs in
this case misplaced? Arguably, no. Indeed, they may have mischaracterized
the true impact of the Village's decision. The economic reality of such a
decision may well have had a greater impact on the poor in general than on
members of any race in particular. Although the particular plaintiffs in the
lawsuit consisted of one nonprofit corporation and three nonwhite individuals (two blacks and one chicano) and although the individual plaintiffs failed
to win certification of the action as a class action, the district court said that
they merely had a wealth-based, not a racial, discrimination claim. It then
rejected the wealth-based claim." 9 Coupling claims of discrimination
against the poor and against nonwhites as the plaintiffs did raises an even
more difficult threshold question. As Justice Powell noted in his opinion for
the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,' 9 1 a
disadvantaged class consisting of the poor "cannot be identified or defined
in customary equal protection terms. .. ."192 While "the most probative
evidence of intent [may be] objective evidence of what actually happened
[i.e., the impact of official action] rather than evidence describing the
188. Id. at 271-72 (Marshall, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Brennan, J.); id. at 272-73 (White, J.,dissenting); see note 169 supra.
189. Id. at 271-72 (Marshall, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Brennan, J.).
190. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208,209-

10 (N.D. Ill.
1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
191. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In this case, the Court held that a Texas school financing scheme
based in part on revenues raised by local property taxes did not violate the equal protection

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent that it created disparities between the kind
of education given students in low-wealth school districts and that given students in high-wealth
school districts. For general discussions of the extent to which the Constitution protects the
poor as a class, see Michelman, On Protectingthe PoorThrough the FourteenthAmendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the EqualProtectionClause,
1972 Sup. CT.REV. 41.

192. 411 U.S. at 19.
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subjective state of mind of the actor," 193 the impact in Arlington Heights
was upon a class composed of individuals earning a low or moderate
income. Although nonwhites generally constituted a higher percentage of
this class than whites, the Village's actions with respect to those minorities
did not lack an explanation on grounds "other than race." Thus, it could be
argued that, in the context of this case, the burden of proof imposed on the
plaintiffs may not have been unduly rigorous at all, because they may have
been attempting to characterize an economically-motivated decision as a
racial one, and thus avail themselves of the opportunity to claim the benefits
of the strict scrutiny accorded claims of racial discrimination rather than the
mere rationality standard used to analyze wealth-based equal protection
claims. 194 Indeed, the district court in this case appeared to recognize as
much when it stated: "Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of proving
discrimination by defendants against racial minorities as distinguished from
the under-privileged generally."' 195 Thus, that court concluded that the
individual plaintiffs in this case simply did not represent "a definable or
manageable class" 196 such as a racial minority.
2. Reapportionment
The Supreme Court's major reapportionment decision of this term
unfortunately raises more questions than it answers, largely as a result of the
fact that the justices were divided and expressed their varying views in five
different opinions. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.
v. Carey,197 the Court held that a state legislature's use of racial criteria in
drawing legislative district lines in an effort to comply with the Voting
Rights Act1 98 did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
193. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
194. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967) (detailing the consequences of
finding a discriminatory racial classification) with San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-25 (1973) (explaining why the poor do not constitute a disadvantaged
class under traditional equal protection analysis). See also Note, Developments in the Law:
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
195. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp. 208,210

(N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
196. 373 F. Supp. at 209.

197. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). For a general discussion of this subject and of the opinion of the
intermediate appellate court in this case in particular, see Walker, One Man-One Vote: In
Pursuitof an Elusive Ideal, 3 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 453 (1976).
73 973
p (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The pertinent provision of this Act,
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 -1
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) (amended 1975), read in part as follows:

[W]henever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the prohibitions set
forth in section 1973b(a) of this title based upon determinations made under the first
sentence of section 1973b(b) of this title are in effect shall enact or seek to administer
any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1968, such
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absent a clear showing that the resultant reapportionment was unfairly
prejudicial to white or nonwhite voters. There was, however, no majority
opinion on the substantive issues in this case; Justice White's opinion for the
Court was accepted in its entirety only by Justice Stevens. Justices Black-

mun and Brennan joined in all but one section, namely, the one in which
Justice Rehnquist did join. Justices Stewart and Powell concurred in the
judgment only, and the Chief Justice dissented.
The facts of the case are complex. The United States Attorney General
concluded that Kings County, Bronx County and Manhattan County, New
York, had imposed literacy tests upon voters during the 1968 Presidential
election, and were therefore subject to the remedial provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. 199 His approval was subsequently sought for the state's proposed 1972 reapportionment of congressional, state assembly and state
State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect
of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and
until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply' with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided,That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney
General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission,
except that neither the Attorney General's failure to object nor a declaratory judgment
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. Any action under this
section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the
provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
199. See 35 Fed. Reg. 12354 (1970) (determination that New York maintained a literacy test
on November 1, 1968); 36 Fed. Reg. 5809 (1971) (determination that the three counties in
question were subject to the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights Act). New York sought a
declaratory judgment that the three counties were exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (1970)
(permitting a federal court in the District of Columbia to determine that no such test had been
used with the intent to abridge the right to vote on the basis of race during or preceding filing of
the request for a declaratory judgment); the Justice Department consented to the judgment and
it was subsequently granted. New York v. United States, No. 2419-71 (D.D.C. April 13, 1972)
(unreported). Denied the right to intervene in the declaratory judgment proceedings, the
NAACP appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which upheld the denial on the ground
that the request for intervention was untimely. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345,369 (1973).
On a subsequent remand, however, the motion was granted. Thereafter, a New York district
court ruled that failure to provide a Spanish translation for ballots used in the November 6
election constituted a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309,313
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). In light of this precedent, the NAACP obtained an order that re-opened the
1972 District of Columbia judgment and required New York, on behalf of the three counties in
question, to comply with § 5 of the Act. These orders were affirmed summarily. New York v.
United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974).
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senate seats. 20 0 The Attorney General concluded that the state had not met
its burden under the Voting Rights Act of demonstrating that the contemplated redistricting scheme had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote by reason of race or color. 20 1 The state then revised its
reapportionment plan in 1974 to create two state assembly and two state
senate districts with larger nonwhite majorities. 2' One affected white community was Williamsburgh, the home of 30,000 Hasidic Jews. Under the
first plan, the Hasidic community was located entirely in one assembly
(sixty-one percent nonwhite) and one senate (thirty-seven percent nonwhite)
district. 20 3 The revised version divided the community into two assembly
and two senate districts in order to create substantial nonwhite majorities
approaching an idealized proportion of sixty-five percent in those districts. 20 4 To implement this goal, a portion of the white population of the
original single districts was reassigned to adjoining districts; thus, for
example, in Kings County as a whole under the 1974 plan, nonwhite
majorities were created in two state senate districts that were majority white
in the 1972 proposal, while white majorities were established in two districts
that were majority nonwhite under the earlier plan.20 5 The United Jewish
Organizations sued on behalf of the Hasidic Jewish community for an
injunction and declaratory relief, alleging that the revised plan would dilute
the value of each plaintiff's franchise solely for the purpose of achieving a
racial quota, and that members of the community were assigned to electoral
districts solely on the basis of race, in violation of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the complaint2°6 and a
divided United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 20 7
200. See 1972 N.Y. Laws ch. 11. As a result of the 1974 orders by the District of Columbia
court, see note 199 supra, New York sought the Attorney General's approval of the 1972

redistricting in Bronx, Kings and Manhattan counties; the 1972 reapportionment constituted a
change of "standard, practice, or procedure with respect of voting" and such a change requires
approval by the Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970) (amended 1975). See Georgia
v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535 & n.7 (1973).
201. See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512,517
(2d Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144 (1977).
202. 1974 N.Y. Laws chs. 588-91, 599.
203. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512,517 (2d

Cir. 1974).
204. Redrawn state senate districts 23 and 25 were 71.1% and 34.7% nonwhite, respectively; redrawn assembly districts 56 and 57 were 88.1% and 65% nonwhite, respectively. Id. at
518.
205. See 430 U.S. at 152.
206. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 377 F. Supp. 1164,
1166 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).

207. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d at 512, 525
(2d Cir. 1974).
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In rejecting the petitioners' claims, Justice White discussed four propositions: (1) whether the use of racial criteria in districting and apportionment was in fact permissible; (2) whether, even if racial considerations
could be used to remedy the effects of past discrimination, there was, in
fact, a finding of prior discrimination here; (3) whether the use of a racial
quota is ever acceptable in redistricting; and (4) whether the racial criteria
New York used in this case were constitutionally infirm. As to the first three
issues, prior cases construing the Voting Rights Act were deemed control20 8
ling.
As to the fourth question, Justice White held on two grounds that New
York did not utilize constitutionally infirm criteria. First, he contended that
the state did no more than that which the United States Attorney General had
been authorized to require under the Court's previous construction of section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. 2° 9 Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined this
section of the opinion. 210 The second independent ground was that New
York was free deliberately to draw district lines in such a way that the
208. 430 U.S. at 155-62. Relying primarily on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976)
and City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975), the Court found that the
Constitution did not prevent a state subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating
or preserving black majorities in particular districts, and that the use of racial criteria was not
limited to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or apportionment. In the
Beer case, New Orleans had created, pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, one council
district with a black majority where none had previously existed. Eight justices approved such
an approach. 425 U.S. at 141-42 (Stewart, J.,for the Court, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 144 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 158-61 (Marshall,
J.,dissenting). In City of Richmond, the Court approved an annexation that reduced the
proportion of blacks within the city from 52% to 42%; the new system resulting from the
annexation created four wards (out of nine) with 64% nonwhite majorities. The Court held that
"annexation in this context [did] not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
within the meaning of § 5." 422 U.S. at 372. Consequently, in the UnitedJewishOrganizations
case, it was said that "neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per
se rule against using racial factors in districting and apportionment," 430 U.S. at 161, and that
the state may decide how substantial black majorities must be in order to satisfy the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. The Court further stated that unless it had "adopted an
unconstitutional construction of § 5 in Beer and City of Richmond, a reapportionment [could
not] violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State [used] specific
numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majority districts." Id. at 162. For a
more complete discussion of the problems raised by the majority's analysis of the Voting Rights
Act in United Jewish Organizations, see Note, Judicial Deference in the Representation
Controversy:A FurtherErosionofthe JusticiabilityDoctrine, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 143 (1977).
209. In this respect, the Court cited the non-retrogression principle of Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), see note 208 supra; that is, "a legislative reapportionment that
enhances the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise can hardly have the 'effect' of diluting or abridging the right to vote on account of
race within the meaning of § 5." 425 U.S. at 141. In United Jewish Organizations,the Court
reasoned that New York had merely acceded to the recommendations of the Justice Department and thereby effectuated such an enhancement. See 430 U.S. at 164.
210. 430 U.S. at 147.
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percentage of districts with a nonwhite majority approximated the percentage of nonwhites in the county, as long as it did not violate the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution.2 ' Justice Rehnquist agreed
with respect to this argument only. 21 2 Justice White found neither a racial
slur or stigma nor any abridgement of the right to vote on account of race:
"[T]here was no fencing out of the white population from participation in
the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or
unfairly cancel out white voting strength. "213 He emphasized that under the
1974 plan, seventy percent of the assembly and senate districts in Kings
County, for example, retained white majorities. 2 14 He said that "as long as
whites in Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair representation,
we cannot conclude that there was a cognizable discrimination against
whites or an abridgement of their right to vote on the grounds of race.'"215
Thus, the Court concluded that the state has the power to alleviate the
consequences of racial restrictions on the exercise of the franchise and to
achieve a fair allocation of political power between white and nonwhite
216
voters.
Justice Brennan explained his position in a separate concurrence. He
noted that the "one starkly clear fact" was that an overt racial number was
employed. 217 He found, however, that the racial classification used was not
suspect because it was not motivated by any racial animus, and because it
did not downgrade minority participation in the franchise. 118 As for the
problem of so-called benign discrimination, he was willing to defer consideration of this sensitive question for another day because, in his opinion,
the existence of the Voting Rights Act alone supported affirmance of the
219
judgment.
211.

Id. at 165.

212. Id. at 147.
213. Id.at 165.

214. Id. at 166. See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510
F.2d 512, 523 n.21 (2d Cir. 1974).
215. 430 U.S. at 166.
We also note that the white voter who as a result of the 1974 plan is in a district

more likely to return a nonwhite representative will be represented, to the extent that
voting continues to follow racial lines, by legislators elected from majority white
districts. The effect of the reapportionment on whites in districts where nonwhite
majorities have been increased is thus mitigated by the preservation of white majority
districts in the rest of the county. . . . Of course, if voting does not follow racial
lines, the white voter has little reason to complain that the percentage of nonwhites in
his district has been increased.
Id. at n.24.
216. Id. at 167-68.
217. Id. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
218.

See id. at 170.

219. See id. at 171.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, wrote a short opinion concurring in the judgment. He emphasized the petitioners' failure to show that the
legislative plan had either the purpose or effect of discriminating against
them on the basis of their race. 2 0 In short, an awareness of race was not the
equivalent of discriminatory intent. The Chief Justice dissented, finding that
the state's attempt to gerrymander voting districts in order to achieve sixtyfive percent nonwhite majorities in some of those districts violated the
precept established by prior rulings that the "drawing of political boundary
lines with the sole, explicit objective of reaching a predetermined racial
result cannot ordinarily be squared with the Constitution. "221 Nor was the
utilization of such a quota necessary to fulfill New York's obligation under
the Voting Rights Act, at least on the basis of the Chief Justice's view of the
evidentiary record.222 .
More than any other factor, the Voting Rights Act, which necessarily
deals with remedying the effects of discrimination based on race or color,
allowed the Court in this case to avoid a number of "sensitive" political and
constitutional questions, the most important of which is whether gerrymandering that is deliberately based on race may be used affirmatively to offset
previous racial discrimination. This issue was shunted aside when the Court
chose to rely on the holdings in Gaffney v. Cummings 3 and White v.
Regester224 to assess the constitutionality of New York's redistricting
scheme. Gaffney offers a succinct formulation of the standard to be utilized:
State legislative districts may be equal or substantially equal
in population and still be vulnerable under the Fourteenth Amendment. A districting statute otherwise acceptable, may be invalid
because it fences out a racial group so as to deprive them of their
pre-existing municipal vote. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
220. See id. at 179-80 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Powell, J.).
221. Id. at 181 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
222. See id. at 183-85. Chief Justice Burger objected on grounds that there was no evidence

showing that the 1974 plan was designed to comply with the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act, as construed by Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976); see note 208 supra. 430 U.S. at
144. He also failed to find any evidence showing that the 65% figure was "a reasoned response"
to the problem of past discrimination. Id. at 184.
223. 412 U.S. 735 (1973). The case upheld an apportionment plan devised by the Connec-

ticut legislature. The House districts deviated on the average by 1.9% from mathematical
equality with a maximum deviation of 7.83%. No prima facie case of invidious discrimination
was said to be made out by such a showing. Id. at 751.
224. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). This case involved a Texas reapportionment plan where the total
maximum deviation between Texas House of Representatives districts was 9.9%, but the
average deviation from mathematical equality was only 1.82%. The Court cited Gaffney to the
effect that "state reapportionment statutes are not subject to the same strict standards applica-

ble to reapportionment of congressional seats," id. at 763, and accordingly found the deviation
involved in White de minimis, id. at 764.
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(1960). A districting plan may create multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed "to minimize or cancel
out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population." Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).225
White added the insight that
[t]he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings
that the political processes leading to nomination and election
were not equally open to participation by the group in questionthat its members had less opportunity than did other residents in
the district to participate226in the political process and to elect
legislators of their choice.
Justice White had little difficulty in resolving the problem after characterizing it in this fashion. Concentrating not only on the intent of the New York
legislature (i.e., its good faith compliance with the Act), but also on the
effect of its redistricting, he found no evidence that whites were "fenc[ed]
out" from the political process or that their votes were "unfairly"
minimized or cancelled out. 227 The incidence of nonwhite voters was merely
diffused among the state assembly and senate districts in proportion to their
incidence in the population. In fact, whites retained majorities in seventy
percent of all electoral districts. 228 As long as whites as a group were
accorded fair representation, whites within an individual district who might
be disadvantaged simply did not have a cognizable discrimination claim or a
colorable argument about the abridgement of their right to vote on grounds
229
of race.
The case is perhaps most important then for what was implied rather
than for what was stated. The Court concluded by remarking that the use of
"sound districting principles" to redress prior racial inequities is permissible. This raises several interesting questions: (1) is fairness to a racial group
a sufficient surrogate for fairness to the individual and (2) if so, is this meant
225. 412 U.S. at 751 (citations omitted). In Gomillion, the city of Tuskegee, Alabama was
gerrymandered into the shape of a 28-sided figure such that all but four or five of four hundred
black voters, but not one white voter, no longer resided within city limits. The Court vacated a
summary judgment in favor of the city. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960).
Fortson involved a Georgia reapportionment plan that divided the state into substantially equal
senatorial districts; except for the seven most populous counties, one to eight counties comprised a district and the voters therein elected the senator for that district on a district-wide basis.
The seven most populous counties were divided into several districts and the voters therein

elected, on a county-wide basis, as many senators as there were districts within the county. The
Court held that the equal protection clause does not mandate the formation of all single-member
districts. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965).
226. 412 U.S. at 766.

227. See
228. See
n.21 (2d Cir.
229. See

430 U.S. at 165.
United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 523
1974).
note 215 and accompanying text supra.
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to advance sub silentio a theory of benign discrimination that will now be
applicable in reapportionment cases? In his dissent from the majority opinion of the Second Circuit, Judge Frankel raised a number of apposite points.
He argued that the means used by the state did not really accomplish nor
were they necessary to achieve the compelling objective of remedying the
effects of past discrimination. 230 The majority of the judges in the Second
Circuit and Justice White accepted the assumption that the 1974 plan was an
effort by New York to implement a guideline set forth by the Attorney
General, calling for nonwhite majorities in any one district to be limited to
sixty-five percent of that district's voting population. 23 1 As Judge Frankel
pointed out, however, New York did not believe its 1972 proposal, which
failed to meet such a standard, produced a racially discriminatory effect, and
the Attorney General's office itself disclaimed approval of and authority for
the sixty-five percent quota. 232 The Justice Department had merely ruled
that the state had not met its 1urden of proof that the 1972 plan did not
abridge the right to vote; the sixty-five percent figure was arrived at because
the executive director of the state's Joint Committee on Reapportionment
"got the feeling . . . that 65 percent would probably be an approved
figure" after several ex parte conversations with lower echelon Justice
Department officials.23 3 Thus, Judge Frankel concluded that not only was
the idea of racial quotas "at war with our bedrock concepts of individual
worth and integrity, '"234 but also the one utilized in this case was never
found to be necessary by the legislature itself as a means of remedying the
alleged wrongs in question and there was "no ground in logic or law for
translating the percentage relationship of a minority to the whole county
population into a percentage of districts over which that minority should
235
have majority control."
Similarly, in his United Jewish Organizations concurrence, Justice
Brennan expressed doubts as to whether "cognizable discrimination"
cannot be found in any situation so long as whites " 'as a group [are]
provided with fair representation ..
' "236 He went on to identify three
230. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 U.S. 512,530-34

(2d Cir. 1974) (Frankel, J., dissenting).
231. See 430 U.S. at 152 (citing United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1974)).
232. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 527 (2d
Cir. 1974) (Frankel, J., dissenting). Judge Frankel cited the language of the Attorney General's

response of July 1, 1974 to New York regarding the state's 1974 plan.
233. 430 U.S. at 152.
234. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 529 (2d

Cir. 1974) (Frankel, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 533 (emphasis in original).
236. 430 U.S. at 171 n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (quoting the plurality opinion, id.
at 166).
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contentions that the Court would have to grapple with were it to confront
directly the issue of preferential treatment for minorities: (1) whether the
"purportedly preferential race assignment may in fact disguise a policy that
perpetuates disadvantageous treatment of the plans supposed beneficiaries";237 (2) whether such treatment stimulates societal race-consciousness by suggesting "the propriety of basing decisions on a factor that
ideally bears no relationship to an individual's worth or needs";238 and (3)
whether, in light of the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, even a
"benign" racial policy might not at least appear unjust. 239 These are crucial
issues that Justice White glossed over by relying on Gaffney and White. But
even Justice Brennan, after having identified these problems, resolved the
issue by expressing his desire to defer to the judgment of the Attorney
General about whether a particular plan complied with the remedial requirements of the Voting Rights Act; 24° he did so without even considering Judge
Frankel's point that, in this case, the Attorney General had expressed no
judgment at all on the use of quotas in the 1974 plan.241 Moreover, neither
Justice Brennan nor Justice White took the occasion to consider some of the
stark problems suggested by the facts of this case and by the way the
beneficiaries of the New York plan were labelled.
Kings County, New York, for example, is 64.9% white, 24.7% black
and 10.4% Puerto Rican. 242 Neither the state nor the Justice Department
considered the claims of the Puerto Ricans who bitterly objected to being
subsumed in black majorities in order to create "nonwhite" voter proportions of sixty-five percent. They claimed, quite rightly, that the 1974
proposal fragmented the Puerto Rican community, which desired its own
congressional district in Bronx County.2 43 Yet, both the opinion for the
Court and the concurrence by Justice Brennan refer blithely to "nonwhites"
as if that label described one homogeneous class of persons. Similarly, no
one on the Court reached the issue of whether the 1972 or 1974 plans
remedied the adverse effects caused by New York's use of a literacy test.
237. Id. at 172.
238. Id. at 173.
239. Id. at 174.
240. Id. at 175. He pointed out that the Voting Rights Act applies to localities where there is
a past history of discrimination, thus enhancing the Attorney General's power, that the remedial nature of the Act belies any contention that a slur on whites was intended by creating
nonwhite majorities, and that the petitioners had never been deprived of the franchise. All these
factors were said to reinforce the legitimacy of the remedy selected by the Justice Department.

Id.at 177-78.
241. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 527-28

(2d Cir. 1974) (Frankel, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 523 n.21.
243. Id. at 529 n.4 (Frankel, J., dissenting). See also 430 U.S. at 185 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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Such a test would appear to discriminate against those with insufficient
education, and that classification cuts across all races. Yet, the New York
plan rather crudely fashioned a remedy that was based solely on color, not
education. It was apparently never questioned whether this remedy truly
offered redress to all those persons adversely affected by the state's prior
practices. Nor did the authorities take into account the problem implicit in
the fact that the nonwhites in Kings County were unevenly distributed
throughout all the regions of that county, or that they came from different
communal settings, from varying socioeconomic backgrounds and undoubtedly possessed different views about what they expected from the political
process. 2' The authors of the state plan apparently assumed that by drawing
districts with sixty-five percent nonwhite majorities they would thus assure
that all nonwhites would vote for nonwhite candidates for office and thus
regain a sense of solidarity, a meaningful sense of participation in the
political process. But when one gerrymanders in order to create an artificial
majority composed of pluralistic factions that have few things in common
except the fact that they are "nonwhites," one has arguably increased the
chances of intraracial divisiveness that will further fragment minority voters. New York had other options, including uniformly reducing the size of
electoral districts so as to maintain community cohesiveness or changing
single-member districts to multi-member districts. Instead, it adopted a
scheme of gerrymandering without ever really considering whether that
scheme actually hindered, rather than helped, its putative beneficiaries. By
relying on Gaffney and White and not undertaking a more sophisticated
analysis, the Court merely compounded the omission of the state and the
Justice Department. Thus, in light of the simplistic approach used by Justice
White, it is arguable that minority members should view United Jewish
Organizations as, at best, a decidedly mixed victory.
But perhaps the most significant question raised by this case involves
the standard of review that may be applied in evaluating future claims of
"purposeful" racial discrimination. The section of the main opinion that
discussed this point was joined by only two justices in addition to Justice
White; it indicated, however, that although New York utilized racial criteria
in a "purposeful manner," its action was permissible in that it represented
"no racial slur or stigma" with respect to any race.24 - This statement raises
a question: did the Court merely intend that this language would serve as an
alternative expression of the meaning of the adjective "invidious," or did it
intend to restrict the definition of legislative purpose in reapportionment
244. See 430 U.S. at 185 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The assumption that 'whites' and
'nonwhites' in the county form homogeneous entities for voting purposes is entirely without
foundation.")
245. 430 U.S. at 165.
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cases involving claims of racial discrimination to a more narrow concept of
a purpose to stigmatize? As Justice Brennan noted, such a definition imposes formidable fact-finding responsibilities on the courts regarding questions of voter polarization and legislative motive. 24 But the question may,
in fact, be partially answered by the concurrence of Justices Stewart and
Powell. After citing Washington v. Davis,247 they indicated that where the
clear purpose of the state is to attempt to comply in good faith with the
Voting Rights Act, a finding of invidious purpose to discriminate is foreclosed because an awareness of race is not the equivalent of "discriminatory
'
intent." 24
Explicit in this concurrence and perhaps implicit in Justice
White's opinion is the thesis that the test of Davis has been incorporated in
reapportionment cases. Discriminatory intent (or purpose) and impact will
now have to be shown before an instance of gerrymandering will be declared
unconstitutional. The emphasis on the Davis type of intent, however, was
not apparent ineither Gaffney or White.
Gaffney, in fact, appeared to subordinate the issue of intent to that of
effect. The Court therein admitted that district lines are rarely neutral
phenomena and that a "politically mindless approach may produce, whether
intended or not, the most grossly gerrymandered results . . . . '249 It went
on to note that once a "neutral" plan is known, its political effect is also
known, so when such a plan is passed, that effect must therefore be
"intended," in the sense that a decisionmaker intends the consequences that
flow from a decision which he has made.5 0 Similarly, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,25 1 the key case which Gaffney relied upon, has been rightly characterized as a decision where the focus "was on the actual effect of the
246. Id. at 171 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
247. 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). The petitioners in that case claimed that the District of
Columbia's written personnel test for applicants for police officerships was racially discriminatory. The District of Columbia Circuit reversed a motion for summary judgment for the district
on the ground that under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (construing Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964), an employer could not use tests to exclude members of minority
groups, unless the employer demonstrated that the screening procedures were substantially
related to job performance. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). It did so even though the case involved the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of
due process, not Title VII. The United States Supreme Court concluded that such an extension
of Title VII doctrines is a legislative, not a judicial choice. 426 U.S. at 248. Accordingly, it held
that where a test is neutral on its face, the mere fact that it has a racially disproportionate
impact does not warrant an inference of discrimination. Id. at 245-46. See generally Comment,
Washington v. Davis: Reassessing the Bars to Employment Discrimination, 43 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 747 (1977).
concurring in the judgment, joined by Powell, J.).
248. 430 U.S. at 179-80 (Stewart, J.,
249. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973).
250. Id. See also United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d
512, 524 n.23 (2d Cir. 1974).
251. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See note 225 supra.
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[challenged] enactments, not upon the motivation which led the States to
behave as they did."252 Thus, the concept of intent utilized in Gaffney (and
White, which relied on Gaffney) was the tort concept referred to by Justice
Stevens in his concurrence in Davis: "Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather
than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of
his deeds." 3 But the majority in Davis did not follow this approach;
instead, it chose to define intent or purpose by reference to the subjective
state of mind of the decisionmaker. As a consequence, it rejected the more
mechanistic definition utilized implicitly in Gaffney and White. The result
of eschewing reliance on such a mechanistic definition is to compel the
plaintiff in reapportionment cases to actually prove that the decisionmakers
in question harbored discriminatory motives, rather than allowing him to
assume that a court will infer such motives for him from its scrutiny of the
effect of official conduct. Thus it may well be that the Court in United
Jewish Organizations,in the course of applying the doctrines announced in
Gaffney and White, actually reformulated those doctrines in order to give
state legislatures greater discretion in electoral redistricting. Whether or not
this reformulation will apply to cases where there is no context of an effort
by a state to remedy past discrimination against nonwhites is an open
question. If, however, the Court is truly using the definition of intent or
purpose set forth in Davis, which rejected the claim that the use of a written
test by the District of Columbia in the course of its selection procedure for
police officers denied blacks equal protection of the laws,254 the answer
would appear to be affirmative. If so, then from the perspective of racial
minorities, the decision in United Jewish Organizationsmay well be a twoedged sword.
C. illegitimacy Classifications
1. The Search for the AppropriateStandard of Review
In two cases decided this term, the Court reviewed the status of
illegitimacy in the context of equal protection, but reached two different
results with opinions written by two substantially different majorities. In
252. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971). Palmerupheld the decision of a city to
close all public swimming pools following the issuance of a court order that those pools be

desegregated. The Court declined to examine the motive underlying that official action, saying
that "no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it." Id. at 224. But in Davis, the Court
indicated that the precedential validity of Palmer had been undermined by subsequent decisions. 426 U.S. at 244 n.l1.
253. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
254. See note 247 supra.
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Trimble v. Gordon,211 the Court adhered to a position developed last term in
Mathews v. Lucas,256 and engaged in a "less than strict" but more than
"toothless" scrutiny of a law that discriminated invidiously against children
born out of wedlock. 257 Contrary to the result in Lucas, however, the Court
invalidated as unconstitutional an illegitimacy classification in an Illinois
law governing intestate succession. The decision was by a narrow margin of
five to four, with Justice Powell writing for the majority, which included
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens.
The challenged Illinois statutory scheme allowed illegitimate children
to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers, while legitimate
children could inherit by intestate succession from both parents.258 Pursuant
to that scheme, Trimble, an illegitimate daughter, was not permitted to
inherit from her father, who had died intestate, even though he had openly
acknowledged her as his child and had made support payments for her in
accordance with a judicial paternity order.259 The Illinois Supreme Court
rejected the equal protection challenge to the state's discrimination against
illegitimate children2 60 by relying explicitly on the authority of Labine v.
Vincent.26 1
255. 430 U.S. 762(1977).
256. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). For a previous description and discussion of Lucas, see notes
113-121 and accompanying text supra.
257. 427 U.S. at 510.
258. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973). This provision was replaced by a 1976
enactment, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (1976), which recodifies without change the particular
language challenged by the petitioner in this case.
259. 430 U.S. at 763-64.
260. In re Estate of-Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 50-53, 329 N.E.2d 234, 240-41 (1975), rev'd sub
nom. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). The state supreme court also rejected a genderbased equal protection challenge. 61 IIl. 2d at 50-51, 329 N.E.2d at 238-39. The Supreme Court
never reached this issue. See 430 U.S. at 765-66.
261. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In Labine, the Court upheld Louisiana laws that bar an illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimates in the estate of their father. In the present case
the father had publicly acknowledged the child, but had died without a will. LA. CiV. CODE
ANN. arts. 240, 919 (West 1952). It said that the policy choice represented by such laws was one
best suited to determination by a legislature and that Louisiana had created no "insurmountable
barrier" to illegitimates because the statutory disability could always be removed by the simple
formality of executing a will. 401 U.S. at 539. The Court in Labine thus was able to distinguish
that case from its prior rulings in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
Levy invalidated a Louisiana law specifying that an illegitimate child could not recover for
the wrongful death of his or her mother, but a legitimate child could. The Court said that while
states have great discretion to enact classifications in the economic area, this is not true in
situations where basic civil rights are at stake; here, the right involved was "the intimate,
familial relationship between a child and his own mother." 391 U.S. at 71. Because an
illegitimate child is subject to all the responsibilities of a citizen, the Court held that he could not
be denied rights which other citizens enjoy. Id.
Glona involved the. converse situation. The parent was being denied the right to seek
damages for the alleged wrongful death of her child under Louisiana law. The Court found "no
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The Supreme Court reversed and invalidated the statute. Justice Powell's majority opinion refused to emulate the extremely deferential stance of
Labine, insisting instead that when such classifications encroached upon
"sensitive and fundamental personal rights," 262 the Court's many other
illegitimacy decisions required at a minimum some rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose, and sometimes more. The Court then explored the
asserted state purposes and found each of them inadequate to justify the
statute in question. The argument that the law promoted the stability of
family life was rejected because the Court found that it furthered no legitimate aim; a state could not attempt to influence the actions of the parents by
263
imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships.
Similarly, the difficulties of proving paternity and the related danger of
spurious claims in some situations were deemed insufficient to justify a total
statutory disinheritance of illegitimate children whose fathers died intestate. 2 4 At this juncture, the Court emphasized the lack of "fit" between
means and ends. It chastised the Illinois Supreme Court for failing
to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of
paternity. For at least some significant categories of illegitimate
children of intestate men, inheritance rights can be recognized
without jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.
Because it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, [the challenged enactment] is constitutionally
flawed.265
Similarly, the Court rejected the contention that the Illinois law was
valid because it imposed no "insurmountable barrier" in that Trimble's
deceased father could have left a will, married her mother or stated in his
acknowledgement of paternity a desire to legitimate her. This argument was
dismissed because Justice Powell claimed it "loses sight of the essential
question: the constitutionality of discrimination against illegitimates in a
state intestate succession law." 2 6 The final rationale advanced was that the
possible rational basis. . . for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served." 391 U.S. at
75. It therefore held that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of the state to draw such "legal" lines as it chooses. Id. at 76.

The Court in Labine noted that in that case, unlike Glona, Louisiana had a rational basis
for classification in that it wished to promote family life and control the disposition of property
left within the state. 401 U.S. at 536 n.6. Moreover, it classified Levy as the type of case where
the state had, in fact, created an "insurmountable barrier." Id. at 539.
262. 430 U.S. at 767 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972)).
263. Id. at 769-70.
264. Id. at 770-71.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 774.
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statute mirrored the assumed intent of Illinois decedents; presumably, they
knew of the law in question, so if they took no steps to legitimate their
children born out of wedlock, they must have intended to disinherit them.
Justice Powell rejected this thesis, noting both that the Illinois court had
made no such finding and that he could locate no such legislative intent
either in the statute or in the circumstances underlying its enactment.2 67
Instead, he claimed that the intent of the state legislature was to provide a
more just system of intestate succession than that available under prior law,
268
tempered by the state's interest in precluding spurious paternity claims.
The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist
dissented, relying on Labine v. Vincent, 269 which the majority had claimed
was not controlling. 270 Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion
in which he reiterated his familiar view that the Court, under the guise of
equal protection, was engaged in "endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding prin-

ciple. "271
Despite adherence to Lucas' rejection of "strict scrutiny" in illegitimacy cases, 272 the Court again recognized that "illegitimacy is analogous in
many respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be
suspect when used as the basis of statutory differentiations.'"273 The result in
Trimble, however, appears more consistent with this recognition than the
result in Lucas. In the latter case, the Court upheld provisions of the Social
Security Act that required certain categories of illegitimate children to
actually prove, rather than enjoy the benefits of a presumption that, they
were in fact dependents of a deceased wage-earner. 274 But in Trimble the
267. Id. at 776.
268. Id.
269. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
270. See 430 U.S. at 776-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, Blackmun and
Rehnquist, JJ.).

271. Id. at 777 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He claimed that the Court had encountered so
many difficulties in the equal protection area because it had read too much into the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 782. As a result, the Court allegedly (1) was compelled to scrutinize

legislative motive under the guise of considering legislative purpose, although motive is extremely difficult to ascertain, and (2) was required to engage in "a conscious second-guessing of
legislative judgment in an area where [it] has no special expertise whatever." Id. at 783-84.

Because Illinois' distinction was not "mindless and patently irrational," Justice Rehnquist
would have voted to affirm the ruling of the state supreme court. Id. at 786.
272. In Lucas, the Court cited Labine for the proposition that "discrimination between

individuals on the basis of their legitimacy does not 'command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process,' San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez [411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973)], which our most exacting scrutiny would entail." Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 506 (1976).

273. 430 U.S. at 767.
274. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Court in Lucas noted that the
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Court once again failed to articulate a single standard of review and, in fact,
appeared to utilize a number of prior cases- each of which used widely
varying decision-making standards. 27 5 The Court did, however, clear away
some of the confusion that had existed in this area of the law, both because
of Lucas and its reliance on Labine, the only other previous decision in
which it had upheld a classification based on illegitimacy, and because of an
existing "anomaly" in its equal protection analysis in illegitimacy cases that
stemmed from-certain language-in the Labine decision.
The Court did rely on Lucas in analyzing Illinois' interest in assuring
accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property at death, noting that
the prior case provided "especially helpful guidance," although it admittedly arose in a different context. 276 Justice Powell argued that the central
finding in Lucas was that the provisions of the Social Securtiy Act were
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations" and did not "broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more.''2 7 While
recognizing that federal courts must accord substantial deference to a state's
statutory scheme of inheritance, the Court argued that the challenged Illinois
law did exclude broad categories of illegitimate children "unnecessari'Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare explained "the design of the statutory scheme
assailed here as a program to provide for all children of deceased insureds %ho can demonstrate
their 'need' in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths." 427 U.S. at 507. It
concluded that the statutory classifications were in fact reasonably related to the likelihood of
dependency at death and served administrative convenience by avoiding the burden imposed by
case-by-case determination in the many instances where such dependency is objectively probable. Id. at 509.
275. Besides Lucas, the Court in particular discussed Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968). For a discussion of Levy and Labine, and the Court's purported distinction between the
two cases, see note 261 supra. In Weber, the problem was a Louisiana workers' compensation
law which discriminated against dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate children seeking to
recover for the death of their father. The Court cited Levy with approval, saying that that prior
ruling could not be ignored on the basis of "finely carved distinctions." 406 U.S. at 169. It
distinguished Labine by pointing out that (1) the latter case involved "the traditional deference
to a State's prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property within its borders," id.
at 170, and that (2) the intestate in Labine could have modified his illegitimate child's disfavored position, whereas the decendent in Weber could not, id. at 170-71. Since no legitimate
state interest was otherwise present, the Court struck down the Louisiana law as a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 175-76. Thus, the relevant
precedent was decidedly disparate.
276. 430 U.S. at 771-72.
277. Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)). The law in Lucas
precluded the need for an illegitimate to establish that he was the dependent child of a deceased
wage-earner if he could show that he was that wage-earner's legitimate offspring. See note 115
and accompanying text supra. Thus, the Court in Lucas could say that it could not conclude
"that the factors that give rise to a presumption of dependency lack any substantial relation to
the likelihood of actual dependency." 427 U.S. at 513.
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It criticized the state court for failing to consider less burdensome
alternatives or less overinclusive options that would not preclude valid as
well as spurious claims in connection with the settlement of intestate estates.
In short, the statute failed to meet the standard announced in Lucas in that it
extended "well beyond [its] asserted purposes. "279
ly."278

The key to the Lucas and Trimble decisions thus appears to be both
whether there is a conclusive and blanket exclusion of illegitimates "as
such" from the statutory definition of a potential class of beneficiaries and
whether the asserted legitimate state purpose could reasonably be served by
a more narrowly tailored classificatory definition. In Lucas, the asserted
statutory purpose of accommodating the needs of the dependent children of
a deceased wage-earner was clearly a permissible one and the statutory
classifications implementing it were justified because they were "reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death ' 280 and reflected
reasonable empirical judgments. Conversely, in Trimble, the state court had
concluded that the statute was actually enacted for the purpose of ameliorating in part the common law rule under which an illegitimate child was
incapable of inheriting from anyone. 281 While the difficulty inherent in
proving paternity and hence avoiding spurious claims might well be frustrated were a system of case-by-case determinations implemented, achievement of these goals did not justify a policy of complete exclusion. Thus the
Court balanced the state's interests against the constitutional rights of
illegitimates and found that the former may not be served by methodologies
that gratuitously infringe the latter. In effect, the majority in Trimble
evinced a clear willingness to employ in equal protection cases involving
discrimination against illegitimates a variant of the less burdensome alternatives analysis heretofore utilized primarily in cases involving impingements
upon First Amendment rights or attempts by states to burden the free flow of
interstate commerce. 82
278. 430 U.S. at 771. Thus, Justice Powell was careful to note that "we would have a
different case if the state statute were carefully tailored to eliminate imprecise and unduly

burdensome methods of establishing paternity." 430 U.S. at 772 n. 14.
279. Id. at 772-73.
280. Mathews v. Lucas; 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
281. In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 44-45, 329 N.E. 2d 234, 236-37 (1975), rev'd sub

nom. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). In light of this asserted purpose, the Court could
note: "Penalizing children as a means of influencing their parents seems inconsistent with the
desire of the Illinois Legislature to make the intestate succession law more just to illegitimate
children." 430 U.S. at 768 n.13.
282. In the area of economic legislation, see, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951). In the First Amendment context, see, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See generally
Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L.
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Justice Powell also undermined the precedential validity of Labine by
rejecting- any application of the "insurmountable barrier" analysis utilized
in that case. 283 The Illinois Supreme Court had relied on that prior ruling in
support of its holding that the existence of alternative methods of inheritance
from the father (e.g., by will or by intermarriage with the mother coupled
with a declaration of legitimacy) supported the total statutory disinheritance
of those illegitimate children whose male parents die intestate. 284 The
United States Supreme Court found, however, that such alternatives were
without constitutional significance because if the statutory differentation
could not be justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives, it was
not clear how it could be "saved by the absence of an insurmountable
barrier to inheritance under other and hypothetical circumstances. 285 Indeed, the Court invoked Reed v. Reed, 28 6 a case involving gender-based
discrimination, in support of the proposition that constitutional issues cannot
be resolved by resorting to a "hypothetical reshuffling of the facts. "287
Thus, the Court in Trimble eviscerated its prior holding in Labine. While it
agreed with Labine that the promotion of legitimate family relationships and
the establishment of a system of property disposition may well be valid state
interests, 288 its reference to the "insurmountable barrier" discussion in
Labine and in the later case of Weber v. Aetna Casualty& Surety Co. 289 as
an "analytical anomaly" undercuts the one distinctive feature about
Labine, the feature that caused the majority in that case to depart from the
rather exacting scrutiny used by the Court in its 1968 decisions invalidating
laws disfavoring illegitimates. 29° Moreover, even in regard to Labine's
REV. 1463 (1967); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464
(1969).
283. 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971); see note 261 supra.
284. In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 47, 52, 329 N.E.2d 234, 238,240 (1975), rev'd sub

nom. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Much the same analysis had been utilized in the
Weber case, see note 275 supra, where the Court distinguished Labine by pointing out the

absence of alternative means to remove an illegitimate child from the disfavored classification.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972).
285. 430 U.S. at 774.
286. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

287. 430 U.S. at 774. Reed invalidated a provision of the Idaho probate code that gave
preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class apply for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. The Court in Trimble pointed out that Reed gave
no consideration to the fact that if a decedent left a will naming an executor, there would be no
problem of alleged discrimination. But Reed is a gender-based discrimination case while
Trimble is an illegitimacy-based discrimination case; nowhere does the Court attempt to say

why the existence-of-alternatives analysis used in Weber, see note 284 supra, cannot be used in
Trimble.

288. 430 U.S. at 768-70.
289. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See note 275 supra.
290. See note 261 supra and cases cited therein.
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acceptance of the state's interest in deterring unsanctioned family relationships, the Court reiterated the view that the sins of the parents should not be
an excuse for the state to punish their children; consequently, it characterized the Louisiana law involved in Labine, which disinherited all "bastard children," as "a measured, if misguided, attempt to deter illegitimate
relationships. "291 Thus, Trimble confirms the view that Labine was a
digression by five members of the Court, two of whom, Justices Black and
Harlan, are no longer alive. Such a digression is unlikely to have much
292
enduring value as precedent.
Moreover, Trimble may be easily reconciled with the Court's prior
holding in Lucas. While the Court clearly deferred to the statutory purposes
asserted in both Lucas and Trimble, the nature and scope of that objective
in fact dictated the result in both cases. In Lucas, the asserted purpose was
quite narrow and consequently the Court could find that the statutory
classification did promote the underlying legislative objective. In Trimble,
however, the Court could not justify a similar finding because the "motivating purpose" was broad enough to include some illegitimates who were
conclusively but unnecessarily excluded. While the result in the latter case
may be laudable in light of historical discrimination against illegitimates,
the Court's emphasis on the asserted legislative objective and the degree to
which the means used further that objective by incorporating only necessary
invidious classifications injects a continuing note of uncertainty into its
analysis of equal protection claims by illegitimates. The outcome of such
claims may thus be determined by whether or not the plaintiffs pressing
them make a sufficiently strong showing of a legislative purpose (based on
either statutory interpretation or legislative history) that need not be furthered by a law effecting the absolute exclusion of illegitimates as a class.
2. A More Limited Scrutiny in FederalImmigration Legislation
In a case decided the same day as Trimble, the Court replaced the more
critical scrutiny it found appropriate for illegitimacy classifications in state
statutes with an extremely deferential standard of review because the classifications in question occurred in the context of fediral immigration laws.
In Fiallo v. Bell, 293 Justice Powell again wrote for the majority. On this
291. 430 U.S. at 769 n.13.

292. The majority admitted as much in stating that "it is apparent that we have examined
the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To
the extent that our analysis in this case differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis
controls." 430 U.S. at 776 n.17. The Court also stated: "Labine v. Vincent. . . is difficult to
place in the pattern of this Court's equal protection decisions, and subsequent cases have
limited its force as precedent." Id. at 767 n.12.
293. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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occasion, however, he was joined by Chief Justice Burger as well as Justices
Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens, all of whom, except Justice
Stevens, had dissented in Trimble. Fiallo dramatically illustrated a point
not touched upon in Trimble, namely, the significance of the particular
context in which an illegitimacy claim is raised; thus, the majority in Fiallo
noted that "legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as
'"carefully tuned to alternative considerations,"'
. . as those in the

domestic area. "294
The Fiallo case involved a challenge to sections 101(b)(1)(D) and
101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19 5 2 . 215 The Act grants
preferential immigration status to aliens who qualify as the "children" or
"parents" of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents. The
statute's definitions exclude from that status, however, the relationship
between an illegitimate child and the natural father while they include the
relationship between an illegitimate child and the natural mother. Three sets
of fathers and their illegitimate offspring who sought and were denied,
either as an alien father or as an alien child, the special immigration
preference, challenged the constitutionality of the relevant sections of the
Act under the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 296 A three-judge district
court dismissed the suit after finding that the statutory provisions at issue
were neither "wholly devoid of any conceivable rational purpose" nor
294. Id. at 799 n.8 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976))).
295. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(2)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1970). Under § 1101(b)(2), a person qualifies as a
"parent" for purposes of the Act solely on the basis of the person's relationship with a "child."
Pursuant to § 1101(b)(1)(D), one definition of a child is an unmarried person under 21 years of
age who is also illegitimate and "by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or
benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship' of the child to its natural mother. . . ." Other
definitions of the term "child" include (1) a legitimate child, (2) a stepchild, born out of
wedlock or not, who is under 18 at the time the marriage creating his status occurs, (3) a
legitimated child if legitimation occurs before that child reaches 18, (4) a child adopted before
the age of 14 who has resided with the adopting parent for two years or more, or (5) a child
under the age of 14 at the time a petition is filed in his behalf to accord him classification as an
"immediate relative" pursuant to the provisions of the Act. In all cases, the child must be under
21 and unmarried. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1l01(b)(1)(A),(B),(C),(D),(E),(F) (1970).
296. 430 U.S. at 790-91. Ramon Fiallo, a United States citizen by birth, resided in the
Dominican Republic with his natural father, Ramon Fiallo-Sone. The latter sought an immigration visa as the "parent" of an illegitimate child, but was told no such request could be granted
unless he "legitimated" his son. Cleophus Warner, a naturalized American citizen, was the
unwed father of Serge Warner, born in the French West Indies in 1960. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service declined to classify Serge as a "child" for the purposes of procuring a
visa, absent proof of legitimation. Trevor and Earl Wilson, permanent resident aliens, were the
illegitimate children of Arthur Wilson, a Jamaican citizen. They sought an immigration visa for
Arthur, but were told denial was certain in light of the fact that they were neither legitimate nor
legitimated. Id. at 790-91 n.3.
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"fundamentally aimed at achieving a goal unrelated to the regulation of

immigration. "297
In affirming the district court's rejection of the equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court relied almost entirely on "the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation" 298 in defining the permissible
extent of its assessment of the invidious statutory classification being challenged. Although Justice Powell rejected the government's extreme claim
that the statute expressed a nonjusticiable political judgment, 299 he insisted
that the legislative power of Congress over aliens was complete. Such a
power was said to be a sovereign attribute largely immune from judicial
control and the Court rejected all assertions that special factors in the present
case warranted greater scrutiny than that applied generally in immigration
cases, which consisted of a "limited judicial review.'300
The Court found that Congress was concerned with clarifying prior law
in enacting the challenged legislation, so that an illegitimate child would
have the same status as a legitimate child with reference to his or her mother
and that the legislative history reflected an intentional choice not to accord

an applicant a preferential status by virtue of the relationship of illegitimate
child and natural father. 301 This decision was deemed to be clearly a policy
question within the exclusive province of Congress. Moreover, Justice
Powell said that there were "legitimate governmental interests" arguably
297. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell,
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
298. 430 U.S. at 792.
299. Id. at 793 n.5:
Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution
even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of
aliens, and there is no occasion to consider in this case whether there may be actions
of the Congress with respect to aliens that are so essentially political in character as to
be nonjusticiable.
300. Id. at 792. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,713
(1893). In particular, the Court cited the case of Kliendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
There, United States citizens challenged the power of the Attorney General to deny a visa to a
proponent of communism. The visa was refused pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(D) (1970),
which makes such individuals ineligible for a visa absent a waiver by the Attorney General. The
Court rejected the challenge, saying, "when the Executive exercises this [delegated] power
negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look
behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First
Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the appellant." 408 U.S.
at 770. The Court in Fallo concluded that "[w]e can see no reason to review the broad
congressional policy choice at issue here under a more exacting standard than was applied in
Kliendienst .... " 430 U.S. at 795.
301. Id. at 797 & n.7 (citing S. REP. No. 1057, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1957) (the
amendment was designed "to clarify the law so that the illegitimate child would in relation to his
mother enjoy the same status under the immigration laws as a legitimate child"); H.R. REP. No.
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furthered here. 30 ' According to him, it was not the task of the courts to probe
and test the justifications of the legislative decision, regardless of whether
that decision is based on a perceived absence of close family ties or, as in
Trimble, a concern with the serious problems of proof that are usually
3
attendant to determinations of paternity. 03
Justice Marshall was joined by Justice Brennan in dissent. 3°4 The thrust
of his opinion was that the rights granted by Congress are accorded to
citizens, not to aliens, and that such rights must comport with the Fifth
Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. 30 5 Consequently, Justice Marshall declared:
When Congress grants a fundamental right to all but an invidiously selected class of citizens, and it is abundantly clear that such
discrimination would be intolerable in any context but immigration, it is our duty to strike the legislation down. Because the
Court condones the invidious discrimination in this case simply
3
because it is embedded in the immigration laws, I must dissent. 06
Thus, Justices Marshall and Brennan viewed the case as one of "discrimina-

tion among citizens" and found the majority's scrutiny so completely
deferential as to constitute an "abdication" of judicial review. 307 This
minimal level of scrutiny was said to be even more objectionable because
the definitions incorporated in the challenged federal law rested on "two
traditionally disfavored classifications-gender and legitimacy, "308 and because the statute interfered with "the fundamental 'freedom of personal
1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1957) (the amendment was designed "to alleviate hardship and
provide for a fair and humanitarian adjudication of immigration cases involving children born
out of wedlock and the mothers of such children"); 103 CONG. REc. 14659 (1957) (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy) (the amendment "would clarify the law so that an illegitimate child would, in
relation to his mother, enjoy the same status under immigration laws as a legitimate child")).
302. 430 U.S. at 798.
303. Id. at 799.
304. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice White also dissented for "substantially the same reasons." Id. at 816 (White, J.,dissenting).
305. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). In support of this claim,
Justice Marshall cited 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (1970), which provides that "[a]ny citizen of the
United States claiming that an alien is entitled to. . .an immediate relative status under section
1151(b) of this title. . . may file a petition with the Attorney General for such classification."
Id. at 806 & n.7 (emphasis by the Court). The majority acknowledged this argument, but said
Congress' exercise of sovereign power in this area, subject to limited judicial review, would
justify any immigration preference it chose. Id. at 795-96 n.6. Justice Marshall distinguished
Fiallo from the Kliendienst case, see note 300 supra, where the rights of citizens were also
implicated, by pointing out that (1) the focus of that case was on the governmental interest in
keeping out undesirables, a fact which only tangentially involved the rights of citizens, and that
(2) the appellees in the Kliendienst case conceded the power of Congress to exclude communists from entry into the country. Id. at 808.
306. Id. at 816 (Marshall, J.,dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
307. Id. at 805-06.
308. Id. at 809.
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choice in matters of marriage and family life."' 309 Finally, Justice Marshall
said the hypothesized rationale of administrative convenience offered by the
of illegitimajority was an inadequate justification for infringing the rights
310
mate children, citing Trimble in support of this conclusion.
Justice Powell's deference to congressional judgment in this case
appears to be premised upon an analogous technique employed by the Court
in recent cases involving challenges to other types of alienage classifications
incorporated in federal laws.3 11 The basis for such deference is, of course,
the language in article one, section eight of the Constitution empowering
Congress to establish "an uniform Rule of Naturalization." 312 The question
of the propriety of classifying on the basis of illegitimacy, however, was
virtually ignored in Fiallo and few of the prior cases on the subject were
utilized in the Court's analysis. On the surface, the federal law in Fiallo
would seem to be an extreme example of invidious discrimination; the Act's
classifications utilized both illegitimacy and gender as the bases for difference in treatment and denial of benefits. Notwithstanding these factors, any
one of which has in the past evoked greater scrutiny, the majority hypothesized of its own accord a number of rationales for the distinctions
enacted by Congress. Recognizing that the legislative history of the provision established that it was designed to reunite families whenever possible,
the Court held that it was appropriate for Congress to consider not only the
nature of the relationship, but also problems of identification, administration
and the potential for fraud.3 13 It was obvious to the Court that Congress had
determined that preferential status was not warranted for illegitimate children and their natural fathers, "perhaps because of a perceived absence in
most cases of close family ties as well as a concern with the serious
problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity determinations. "314 Thus, in
contrast with Trimble, the context in which Fiallo arose caused the Court to
assume justifications not even presented in the record. The congressional
judgment in this case was deemed to be an example of "policy questions
entrusted exclusively to the political branches of our Government, and we
have no judicial authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the
Congress."315
The matter of judicial assumptions regarding legislative purpose merits
extended analysis. As noted, Justice Powell simply assumed that the justifi309. Id. at 810 (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
310. Id. at 813 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771-72 (1977)).
311. See note 300 supra.

312. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8,cl.4.
313. 430 U.S. at 799 n.8.
314. Id. at 799.

315. Id.at 798.
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cations for the challenged enactment included administrative efficiency and
the need to preclude spurious claims of paternity. On reflection, this was a
remarkable assumption. As Judge Weinstein pointed out in his dissent to the
majority opinion of the three-judge district court:
The legislative history and the statutory scheme leave no
doubt that the exclusive purpose of Congress was to maintain or
reunite family units which include United States citizens or permanent resident members. Not a shred of evidence has been
produced to support the government's claim that the statutory
purpose was to prevent spurious paternity claims by unwed natural fathers. As one of the provision's co-sponsors put it: "This bill
in its fundamental purpose-to reunite famis praiseworthy
316
ilies.
This same conclusion had been arrived at in 1966 in Immigration and
NaturalizationService v. Errico,317 wherein the Court held that:
The intent of the [1957] Act is plainly to grant exceptions to the
rigorous provisions of the 1952 Act for the purpose of keeping
family units together. Congress felt that, in many circumstances,
it was more important to unite families and preserve family ties
than it was to enforce strictly the quota limitations or even the
to keep undesirable or
many restrictive sections that are designed
18
harmful aliens out of the country.
How, then, could Justice Powell suddenly hypothesize a new and
hitherto unsuspected purpose underlying the challenged laws? The answer
may be found in the case of Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong. 3 19 That decision
invalidated a Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens,
including resident aliens, from employment in the federal competitive civil
service. The government in that case contended that there were many
reasons to justify such a regulation, including the President's need for a
bargaining chip in treaty negotiations, the incentive provided for aliens to
become citizens, the consistency of international law on this subject and the
need for civil servants to have undivided loyalties. 32 0 The Court said its role
was to analyze whether the justifications offered by the government were
"interests on which [the Commission] may properly rely in making a
316. Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Weinstein, J., dissenting), aff'd
sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (citing 103 CONG. REC. 15497 (1957) (remarks of
Sen. Pastore)). The dissent also cited H.R. REP. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1957)
reprintedin 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2020-21; H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1952); 103 CONG. REC. 16719 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); 103 CONG. REC. 16307
(1957) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). 406 F. Supp. at 171.

317. 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
318. Id. at 220. This language is dictum. Errico involved the construction of 8 U.S.C. §
1251(f) (1970), which creates an exception to the general rule that one who procures an

immigration visa by fraud is deportable in the case of an "alien otherwise admissible at the time
of entry who is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen. ..
319. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).

320. Id. at 103-04.

.
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decision implicating the constitutional and social values at stake in this
litigation." 3 21 This question was answered in the negative. Unlike Fiallo, in
Hampton the government had to plead justifications which were then
rigorously scrutinized. What, then, accounts for the different technique used
in the former case? A possible answer emerges from the following passage
in Hampton:
When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national
interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would
violate the Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due
process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming that
the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. If the agency
which promulgates the rule has direct responsibility for fostering
or protecting that interest, it may reasonably be presumed that the
asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule. That presumption would, of course, be fortified by an appropriate statement of reasons identifying the relevant interest. Alternatively, if
the rule were expressly mandated by the Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally
be
322
served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption.
Fiallo illustrates the absurdity of this approach. The majority not only
presumed the existence of some interest that would be rationally served by
Congress' express rule in sections 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2), it did so by
ignoring the statements of purpose made by various members of Congress,
the very body to which the Court is proclaiming its great deference. Thus, it
would seem that the rule of reliance on congressional history as the final
determinant of legislative purpose will no longer govern in the context of
equal protection claims concerning naturalization or immigration laws.
Instead, it will be replaced by a rule allowing the Court great creativity in
selecting a purpose that will cause a challenged congressional enactment in
this area to withstand minimal scrutiny.
The significance of context in this field of the law is underscored by the
Court's acceptance not only of a hypothetical justification, but also of
several rationales asserted by the state but rejected by Justice Powell in
Trimble, such as the problems associated with proof of paternity and the
potential for fraudulent claims that might result from "a more generous
drawing of the line." 323 Further comparison with Trimble demonstrates the
Court's willingness in Fiallo to ignore the vital issue of whether or not the
objectives for which the federal immigration statute was passed necessitated
complete exclusion as opposed to a case-by-case determination, regardless
of the fact that some significant categories of illegitimate children and their
natural fathers might be recognized without any excessive administrative
321. Id. at 113-14.
322. Id. at 103.
323. 430 U.S. at 799 n.8.
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burden. Thus, the logic of Fiallo is inherently anomalous. On the one hand,
Justice Powell rejected the government's contention that the case presented
a nonjusticiable controversy. On the other hand, the conclusion that he
derived from the "toothless" brand of judicial review which he did apply
was that the proper forum in which the petitioners should seek redress was
Congress rather than the courts, because the challenged enactment expressed a nonreviewable judgment of policy. 324 Nevertheless, Fiallo is
easily distinguishable from Trimble and other cases simply because the suit
did arise in the context of federal immigration legislation. 3 5 At least there is
as yet no indication that the Court is willing to apply the deferential
technique of Fiallo to federal legislation involving matters other than naturalization policy.
D. Classifications Based on Alienage
Contrary to its analyses in some of the illegitimacy cases, the Court
held in Nyquist v. Mauclet326 that when a law is directed "at aliens and
. . . only aliens .
. [t]he fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does
not mean that it does not discriminate against the class." 3-7 A bare majority
of the Court consequently ruled in favor of alien plaintiffs who challenged
New York's refusal to provide them with financial assistance for higher
education. In an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, and joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens, the Court applied the
standard of strict scrutiny first utilized in this context in Graham v. Richardson 328 and found the asserted interests offered by the state in order to justify
its refusal to provide financial assistance insufficient in light of the exclusive
federal control over immigration and naturalization.
The New York statute restricted the receipt of scholarships, tuition
assistance awards and student loans to citizens, to those applying for
citizenship or to those who submitted a statement affirming their intent to so
324. Indeed, Justice Powell said as much:
[W]e simply note that this argument [that the statute is based upon an outdated,
stereotypical view of the relationship between unwed fathers and their offspring]
should be addressed to the Congress rather than the courts. Indeed, in that regard it is
worth noting that a bill introduced in the 94th Congress would have eliminated the
challenged distinction. H.R. 10993, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
430 U.S. at 799 n.9.
325. This distinction is borne out by the majority's assertion that "our cases clearly
indicate that legislative distinctions in the immigration area need not be as ' "carefully tuned to
alternative considerations,"' Trimble v. Gordon [430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977)] (quoting Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976)), as those in the domestic area." 430 U.S. at 799 n.8.
326. 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
327. Id. at 9.
328. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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apply as soon as they became eligible.329 This law was challenged by two
aliens residing in New York; 330 a three-judge district court held that the
331
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reiterated its holding in
Graham v. Richardson332 that state classifications based on alienage are
inherently suspect and are thus subject to close judicial scrutiny. 333 It
rejected the argument that the state law did not distinguish between citizens

and aliens vel non by remarking that "[tihe important points are that [the
law] is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it." 334 Applying
strict scrutiny to this case, Justice Blackmun declined to accept New York's
two proffered justifications. First, he found that the alleged interest in
providing the incentive for aliens to become citizens was not a state function

but rather a federal one. 335 Second, he rejected the argument that the
restrictions on educational benefits ensured an informed electorate because
he claimed that this alleged goal would not be frustrated by extending such
336
benefits to aliens, who also pay their full share of taxes.
The Chief Justice dissented, pointing out that prior cases involving
aliens had concerned economic benefits, either occupational, professional or
329. N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 661(3) (McKinney Supp. 1977-78):
3. Citizenship. An applicant (a) must be a citizen of the United States, or (b) must
have made application to become a citizen, or (c) if not qualified for citizenship, must
submit a statement affirming intent to apply for United States citizenship as soon as he*
has the qualifications, and must apply as soon as eligible for citizenship, or (d) must be
an individual of a class of refugees paroled by the attorney general of the United States
For the general provisions of the New York law authorizing disbursements, see id. at §§ 605 (l),670 (Regents college scholarships); id. at §§ 604(1), 667(l) (tuition assistance awards); id. at §§
680-684 (student loans).
330. Appellee Jean-Marie Mauclet is a French national married to an American citizen; he
began residing in New York in April of 1969. In an affidavit he indicated his intention not to
relinquish French citizenship. Appellee Alan Rabinovitch is a Canadian citizen who was
admitted to this country as a permanent alien resident in 1964 and has been living in New York
since his admission. He also stated that he had no intention of becoming a naturalized American
citizen, but did intend to continue to reside in New York. 432 U.S. at 4-5.
331. Mauclet v. Nyquist, 406 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 1
(1977). Other lower federal courts have also held that discrimination against resident aliens in
the distribution of educational assistance is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Chapman v. Gerard, 456
F.2d 577, 579 (3d Cir. 1972) (provision of the Virgin Islands Code barring resident aliens from
participation in the Territorial Scholarship Fund); Jagnandan v. Giles, 379 F. Supp. 1178, 1187
(N.D. Miss. 1974), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1976) (challenge by aliens to the declaration of
their ineligibility for resident status for tuition purposes at Mississippi State University).
332. 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971).
333. 432 U.S. at 8-9.
334. Id. at 9.
335. Id. at 10.
336. Id. at 11-12.
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welfare-related. 337 In the present case, he found no fundamental personal
interest at stake and he therefore believed that while the line drawn by the
state was not perfect, it did provide a rational means for New York to further
its stated goals. 338 Moreover, he declared that" [b]eyond the specific case, I
am concerned that we not obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and
339
aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship."
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Stewart joined in Justice Powell's
dissent. He found that the New York law did not discriminate against aliens
in general, but rather between aliens who preferred to remain foreign
citizens and all others. 34° On that basis, Justice Powell argued that no
precedent necessitated the ruling handed down by the majority. 341 Justice
Rehnquist, whose dissent was also joined by the Chief Justice, was troubled
by the mechanical application of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
to this case. He could find no basis for heightened scrutiny. He found that
under the rational basis test, the New York statute could be justified either in
terms of the future benefits that it assured to the state or in economic terms,
since repayment and easier collection of loans were assertedly more likely if
342
such loans were limited to citizens.
If one believes Justice Rehnquist, Nyquist would seem to extend
significantly the Court's prior decisions in the area of discrimination against
aliens, both in terms of the analysis employed and the result reached. The
Court's formal finding on the suspectness of alienage as a statutory classification had occurred as recently as Graham,343 decided in 1971. In that case,
however, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court based its conclusion
on the rationale of footnote four of the CaroleneProducts344 case, namely,
337. Id. at 12-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Examiners Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de

Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Puerto Rican statute permitted only United States citizens to
practice as civil engineers); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (membership in state bar limited
to citizens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (denial of welfare benefits to aliens);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state statute denied fishing license to
persons ineligible for citizenship); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (state constitution
required employers to hire "not less than eighty per cent qualified electors or native-born
citizens of the United States"); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (city ordinance
discriminatorily enforced against aliens so as to prevent Chinese subjects, but not United States
citizens, from operating laundries in wooden buildings within the city)).
338. 432 U.S. at 14.
339. Id.

340. Id. at 15 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, J.).
341. Id. Justice Powell also asserted that the line drawn by the state was a reasonable one,
because New York has a "substantial interest in encouraging allegiance to the United States on
the part of all persons, including resident aliens, who have come to live within [its] borders."
Id. at 16.
342. Id. at 21-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
343. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
344. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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that aliens ought to be protected because they constituted a "discrete and
insular" minority, identifiable by a status, albeit temporary, that the individual members of the minority were powerless to change.345 Justice Rehnquist argued that prior equal protection cases invalidating state legislation
discriminating against noncitizens involved situations where aliens as a class
were being accorded treatment different from that accorded citizens as a
class. 346 Thus, Graham struck down an Arizona law imposing a durational
residency requirement on welfare benefits for certain aliens, but not for
citizens. Similarly, in In re Griffiths347 and Sugarman v. Dougall,348 the
Court invalidated, respectively, a Connecticut statute excluding aliens as a
class from the practice of law and a New York statute permitting only
United States citizens to hold permanent positions in the competitive class of
the state's civil service. In Nyquist, however, Justice Rehnquist contended
that the New York law did not impose an inevitable disability based on
status; "a resident alien has, at all times, the power to remove himself from
one classification and to place himself in the other, for, at all times, he may
become entitled to benefits either by becoming a citizen or by declaring his
decision to become a citizen as soon as possible. "349 For this reason, he said
345. 432 U.S. at 17-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). Under federal
law, aliens are, indeed, at least temporarily powerless to change their status. They can file a
petition for naturalization only after residing in this country for five years, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(1970), or three years, if the alien is married to an American citizen, 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1970).
The naturalization laws have created certain exceptions to this durational requirement where
the alien is (I) married to a citizen employed abroad by the government, by a United States
institution of research, or as a missionary; is present in the country at the time of naturalization
and declares an intention to reside in the country as soon as his or her spouse terminates such
foreign employment; (2) employed for at least five years by a nonprofit corporation recognized
by the United States Attorney General as one that promotes United States interests abroad; or
(3) is the surviving spouse of a citizen killed during a period of honorable service in the armed
forces and who was living in "marital union" with the citizen spouse at the time of death. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1430(b)-(d) (1970). As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, these exceptions are de
minimis. 432 U.S. at 18 n.1. Consequently, he went on to observe:
If a classification, therefore, places aliens in one category, and citizens in another,
then, thereafter, every entering resident alien must pass through a period of time in
this country during which he falls into the one category and not the other. Nothing
except time can remove him from his identified status as an "alien" and from
whatever associated disabilities the statute might place on one occupying that status.
In this sense, it is possible to view aliens as a discrete and insular minority, since they
are categorized by a factor beyond their control.
432 U.S. at 18-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.).
346. See 432 U.S. at 19. Justice Rehnquist noted that "[tihe line drawn by the legislature [in
these cases] was drawn on the basis of a status, albeit temporary, that the included members
were powerless to change." Id.
347. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
348. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
349. 432 U.S. at 20. As a result, even though an alien would still have to wait the prescribed
period before he could become naturalized, see note 345 supra, this fact did not make him a
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that the class affected by the New York law in Nyquist was not a discrete
and insular minority as required by Graham. Moreover, he argued that in
this case, unlike Graham, Griffiths and Sugarman, there existed no period
of disability from which an alien could not escape: "There is no temporal
disability since the resident alien may declare an intent, thereby at once
removing himself from the disabled class, even if the intent cannot come to
50
fruition for some period of time."
The majority disputed these characterizations of precedent. Justice
Blackmun pointed out that Graham involved a law denying welfare benefits
to noncitizens or aliens who had not resided within the United States for
fifteen years; 35 1 it thus differentiated between subcategories of the general
class of aliens, much as the New York law in Nyquist did. 352 On the issue of
voluntariness, the majority pointed out that the plaintiffs in Griffiths and
Sugarman could have applied for citizenship and thus removed themselves
from the disabled class created by the Connecticut and New York statutes

involved in those cases. They did not do so, but their omission in this
respect had not caused the Court's refusal to apply the strict scrutiny
standard of review. 35 3 Indeed, Justice Blackmun pointed out that Justice
member of a discrete and insular minority for the purposes of the state's classification;
educational benefits would be disbursed to any alien filing an affidavit declaring his intention to
become a citizen, even though the period satisfying the federal residency requirement had not
yet elapsed.
350. Id.
351. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233(A) (Supp. 1970-71) (amended 1972):

A. No person shall be entitled to general assistance. . . who does not meet and
maintain the following requirements:
1. Is a citizen of the United States, or has resided in the United States a total of
fifteen years.
It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist's characterization of Graham is not totally inaccurate.
The second case in that consolidated lawsuit involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania law, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(1)-(2) (Purdon 1968) (amended 1976), which provided welfare payments to "(1) needy persons who qualify under the federally supported categorical assistance
programs and (2) those other needy persons who are citizens of the United States." Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 368-71 (1971). The Pennsylvania statute thus did discriminate
between aliens as a unitary class and citizens as a unitary class.
352. 432 U.S. at 8, 9 & n.11.
353. Id. at 9 n. 11. In Griffiths, the Court pointed out that the appellant, who was the spouse
of a citizen, had resided in the United States for a period longer than the federal durational
requirement of three years, see 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1970), and thus was eligible for naturalization; she simply refused to renounce her Netherlands citizenship. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
718 n. 1 (1973). The four appellees in Sugarman were discharged from the state's civil service on
December 28, 1970. One of them had been residing in New York since 1963, another since 1964;
the other two dated their residence from 1967. Thus, two appellees were eligible for naturalization in 1970 and all of them were eligible by the time the Court decided the case. See note 345
supra. The Court observed, however, that "[t]he record does not disclose that any of the four
appellees ever took any step to attain United States citizenship." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 638 (1973).
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of his Nyquist dissent in the
Rehnquist had reiterated the very same theme 354
course of his dissenting opinion in Sugarman.
Moreover, the rationale expressed by Justice Rehnquist had already
been undermined by other rulings of the Court during this term. In Trimble
v. Gordon, 355 for example, the Court had struck down an Illinois law
preventing illegitimates from inheriting from their fathers who died intestate
and, in so doing, it rejected the contention that the law was permissible
because the affected parent could always voluntarily take alternative measures to remove his child from the disabled class, such as drawing up a will.
Moreover, the majority in Trimble also emphasized that the law was
directed at illegitimates and that only they were harmed by it. 356 As a result,
the fact that the statute was not an absolute bar did not mean that it did not
discriminate against illegitimates as a class; 357 in support of this proposition
the Court cited several illegitimacy cases, including Mathews v. Lucas,3 58
which the majority in Trimble relied on extensively.
At first sight, this analysis would appear to be inconsistent with that
utilized in the Fiallo3 5 9 case, in which the Court rejected a discrimination
claim involving a statute containing a classification based on alienage and
illegitimacy and also refused to probe in detail the legislative purpose
underlying the enactment of that statute. This inconsistency is minimized,
however, by the Court's recognition in both Nyquist and Fiallo of the
federal government's exclusive control over immigration and naturalization. 360 Because New York lacked'any colorable claim to a similar sovereign
power, the Court premised its ruling in Nyquist on the assumption that the
states were not entitled to the deferential judicial review appropriate to
congressional acts in this somewhat unique area. To support this distinction,
354. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). There,
Justice Rehnquist said:
But there is a marked difference between a status or condition such as illegitimacy, national origin, or race, which cannot be altered by an individual and the "status"
of the appellant .

. .

. There is nothing in the record indicating that their status as

aliens cannot be changed by their affirmative acts.
Id. This quotation is somewhat inconsistent with Justice Rehnquist's assertion that Sugarnan

and Nyquist are distinguishable. In Sugarman, the appellees had met the federal residency
requirement; the same was true in Nyquist, however, because Nyquist and Rabinovitch had

been residents in this country for eight and thirteen years, respectively, and thus could have
sought naturalization had they so wished. See note 330 supra.
355. 430 U.S. 762 (1977); see notes 255-92 and accompanying text supra.
356. Id. at 774.
357. See id. at 771-72.
358. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
359. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). See notes 293-325 and accompanying text supra.
360. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 n.8 (1977); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-96

(1977).
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the Court cited its own ruling in Mathews v. Diaz, 6 1 which accorded less

than strict scrutiny to a federal statute limiting the eligibility of aliens, but
not citizens, to participate in a federal medical insurance program upon the

satisfaction of a durational residency requirement, wherein it was "at pains
to emphasize that Congress, as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not
shared by the States.' '362 Therefore, Nyquist is consistent not only with the
Court's prior cases involving discrimination by states based on alienage, but

with contemporaneous decisions involving analogous problems in the
context of discrimination against illegitimates.
E. Limited Review of a Fundamental Right
The last significant equal protection case of the term was Maher v.
Roe. 363 In that decision, the Court held by a six-to-three margin that a
state's refusal to provide financial assistance for nontherapeutic abortions
(i.e., those abortions not deemed medically necessary) under a welfare
program that generally subsidized all medical expenses associated with
pregnancy and childbirth did not constitute an undue burden on a woman's
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy.
361. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
362. 432 U.S. at 7 n.8 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976)). Accord,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1976); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358
n.6 (1976). The New York student loan program, see statutes cited in note 329 supra, is largely
subsidized by the federal government. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Under federal regulations, an alien student is eligible for assistance if he is in this country for
other than a temporary purpose and intends to become a permanent resident. 45 C.F.R. §
177.2(a) (1976). Presumably, the Court in Nyquist would find such a discrimination legitimate
because it constituted an exercise of federal power.
363. 432 U.S. 464 (1977), rev'g Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D.Conn. 1975). For
earlier proceedings in this case, see Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd, 522
F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1975). For a prior discussion of this case in the context of the Court's other
decisions this term relating to the funding of abortions under federal statutes, see Comment,
Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-TherapeuticAbortions: The State Does Not Have to Pay
the Bill, 9 Loy. CHI. L.J. 288 (1977). A few comments should be offered at this juncture about
Maher's companion decisions, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S.
519 (1977). Beal dealt with a Pennsylvania plan denying financial assistance for nontherapeutic
abortions. The issue presented was whether Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1396i (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (amended 1976 & 1977), which establishes a Medical
Assistance Program under which participating states may provide federally funded medical
assistance (Medicaid) to needy persons, required the subsidization of such abortions. Lower
federal courts prior to Beal had divided equally on this issue. Compare Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Doe v. Westby, 402 F. Supp. 140, 143-44
(W.D.S.D. 1975), vacated, 433 U.S. 901 (1977); Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726,730 (D. Conn.
1974), revd, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1975); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp.
496, 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) (all the above
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In his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell relied primarily on his own
opinion for the majority in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodrigue 364 and that of Justice Stewart in Dandridge v. Williams365 to
support the proposition that the challenged Connecticut regulation, 366 to the
extent that it burdened female indigents, did not operate against a suspect
finding that a state's refusal to fund all types of nontherapeutic abortions violated Title XIX)
with Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 935 (2d Cir. 1975); Roe v. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279, 283 (6th
Cir. 1975); Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1974); Lady Jane v. Maher, 420 F. Supp.
318, 320 (D. Conn. 1976); Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 182-86 (W.D. Pa. 1974),
modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (all
deeming such a refusal to be not inconsistent with Title XIX). The Third Circuit in Beal had
argued that in light of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), fixing a
woman's decision to abort as within the ambit of the constitutional right of privacy, a state
could not, consistently with Title XIX, decline to fund nontherapeutic abortions sought within
the first or second trimester. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 621-22 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S.
438 (1977). The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that nothing in Title XIX prevented the state
from furthering its "unquestionably strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal
childbirth." 432 U.S. at 446 (footnote omitted). Moreover, it noted that Congress in 1976 had
legislated that no federal Medicaid funds authorized for fiscal year 1977 could be used to
subsidize nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 447 n. 14 (citing Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976)). This law had been held unconstitutional by at least one lower
federal court prior to Beal and Maher. See McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 542
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977). The Court
therefore held that while Title XIX permitted states to subsidize such abortions, it did not
require them to do so. 432 U.S. at 447.
In Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), the appellee had alleged that the refusal by the city
of St. Louis, Missouri, to provide her with publicly-financed hospital services for nontherapeutic abortions infringed her Fourteenth Amendment rights. In a per curiam opinion, the
Court dismissed this claim by citing the rationale of Maher. 432 U.S. at 521. In a similar
fashion, a federal court of appeals relied on Maher to reject a contention that a state may not
exclude from coverage under its medical insurance program for public employees payment for
elective abortions while simultaneously providing benefits for pregnancies resulting in childbirth. Lehocky v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 887,889 (8th Cir. 1977). So the Maher
doctrine will apply in a variety of contexts. For general discussions of the entire problem, see
Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 931 (1977); Note,
Medicaid and the Abortion Right, 44 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 404 (1976).
364. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For a summary of this case, see note 377 infra.
365. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). For a summary of this case, see note 378 infra.
366. See CONN. WELFARE DEP'T, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL, vol. 3, ch. III,

§

275 (1975). Under § 275, funds authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act could be
disbursed only for the payment of "medically necessary," rather than elective, abortions. The
term "medically necessary" was defined to encompass cases of psychiatric necessity. The final
judgment was to be that of the attending physician and of the Chief of Gynecology and
Obstetrics at an accredited hospital. The two appellees, Mary Poe, a sixteen year-old high
school student and Susan Roe, an unwed mother with three children, both had to pay for their
own abortions because they were unable to obtain certificates of medical necessity. 432 U.S. at
467 n.3.
The district court in Maher found that in order to construe the act to avoid constitutional
doubts and to implement the policy of non-interference in doctor-patient relationships, it had to
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class for purposes of equal protection analysis. 367 Similarly, the majority 368
be interpreted so as to bar a state from refusing to fund nontherapeutic abortions. Roe v.
Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726, 730 (D. Conn. 1974), rev'd and remanded, 522 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1975), enforced, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977). The Second Circuit disagreed. It pointed out that the language of Title XIX never
mentions abortions and no intention to limit the powers of the state in this respect could be
derived from the relevant legislative history. 522 F. 2d 928, 935 (2d Cir. 1975). The Supreme
Court dismissed the statutory claim by relying on its decision in the companion case of Beal v.
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). See note 363 supra. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 480.
The Court's decision in this respect is too cursory. Under Title XIX, the state is empowered to set reasonable standards governing the eligibility of medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. §
1396(a)(17) (Supp. V 1975). But, Connecticut having set a standard of "medical necessity"
(including psychic necessity), one may well ask whether the state was not defining that term
unreasonably. As one earlier decision pointed out, a nontherapeutic abortion "may prevent
specific and direct harm which is medically diagnosable (e.g., psychological harm), may protect
the woman's future mental and physical health, and may prevent the distress associated with
the unwanted pregnancy and child." Doe v. Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 190 (W.D. Pa.
1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
Accord, Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
vacated on other grounds, 412 U.S. 925 (1973). If one accepts such a conclusion, then
Connecticut was perhaps acting inconsistently in using a standard of necessity while leaving the
judgment of whether or not that standard was met to persons other than the woman herself.
Indeed, on January 26, 1976, ten days after the district court's order in this case, Connecticut
revised § 275 of its Manual to permit reimbursement for elective abortions without authorization by a physician and a member of the hospital staff. Whether it did so solely in compliance
with the district court order or in recognition of the inherent inconsistency in its own policy is
conjectural. See 432 U.S. at 468-69 n.4.
367. Justice Powell said:
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the limited category of
disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of
the regulation falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a
sense, every denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as
compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But
this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis.
432 U.S. at 470-71. Prior to Maher, a number of courts had concluded that similar state
legislation did create disadvantaged classes for the purpose of equal protection analysis. See,
e.g., Doe v. Rose, 380 F. Supp. 779, 781-82 (D. Utah 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir.
1974) (improper discrimination between the class of women seeking therapeutic abortions and
the class of women seeking nontherapeutic abortions found; strict scrutiny test applied); Doe v.
Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173, 191 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified sub nom. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d
611 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (unconstitutional discrimination between indigent
women who choose to carry their pregnancies to term and those who choose to terminate their
pregnancies by abortion found; strict scrutiny test applied); Klein v. Nassau County Medical
Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated on othergrounds, 412 U.S. 925 (1973),
on remand, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (per curiam), vacatedsub nom. Toia v. Klein,
433 U.S. 902 (1977) (classification of pregnant women eligible for Medicaid into two groups,
those who choose to carry their pregnancies to term and those who choose to abort found
unconstitutional; rational basis test applied). Thus, Justice Powell may have misstated the
classification problem. It was not a matter of differentiating between indigents and nonindigents, but rather between subcategories of indigent women. In light of his ultimate analysis,
however, this error may have been unimportant.
368. The majority consisted of Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart, White, Rehn-
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found that the law in question did not impinge upon the fundamental right of
a woman to be protected against undue governmental interference in her
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, 369 a right that had been
recognized by the Court in Roe v. Wade. 370 Justice Powell concluded that
Medicaid subsidies for the costs attendant to childbirth placed
no obstacles-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an abortion
suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on
private sources for the services she desires. The State may have
made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing
the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access
to abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may
make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for
some women to have abortions is neither
371 created nor in any way
affected by the Connecticut regulation.
quist and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger concurred separately, agreeing that Connecticut's
policy did not place a barrier upon a woman's choice to abort. 432 U.S. at 481 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, essentially
finding that the state law infringed the privacy right created by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). 432 U.S. at 482-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.).
369. 432 U.S. at 474. The district court in this case held:
When Connecticut refuses to fund elective abortions while funding therapeutic
abortions and prenatal and postnatal care, it weights the choice of the pregnant mother
against choosing to exercise her constitutionally protected right to an elective abortion
... . Her choice is affected not simply by the absence of payment for the abortion,
but by the availability of public funds for childbirth if she chooses not to have an
abortion. When the state thus infringes upon a fundamental interest, it must assert a
compelling state interest that justifies the incursion.
Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660, 663-64 (D. Conn. 1975), rey'd sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977).
370. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Wade invalidated a Texas criminal law prohibiting all abortions
except those necessary to save the mother's life. The Court ruled that (a) prior to the end of the
first trimester, the choice to abort is left to the woman and her attending physician; (b) during
the second trimester, the state may "regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health"; (c) during the final trimester, the state may not only prescribe
procedure but also proscribe nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 164-65. The Court found "that the
right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id. at 154. See generally
Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 807 (1973);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade and its Critics, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 53
B.U.L. REv. 765 (1973).
371. 432 U.S. at 474. Justice Powell distinguished Wade by pointing out that it involved a
criminal ordinance placing a bar on the procurement of nontherapeutic abortions. Id. at 472.
But later cases upheld the right of privacy created in Wade against incursions by noncriminal
state laws. Thus, in Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the
Court invalidated a civil law requiring the consent of the husband in addition to that of the
physician before a woman could procure an abortion during the first trimester. Id. at 67-72.
Justice Powell in Maher contended that such a provision had the same vetoing effect as the
criminal law in Wade. 432 U.S. at 472-73. Similarly, he pointed to 4anguage in Belloti v. Baird,
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Moreover, the state's power to encourage an alternative activity consonant
with legislative policy was said to be necessarily different from and broader
than its power to interfere directly with a protected activity. 372 Justice
Powell therefore claimed that Connecticut was not required to demonstrate a
compelling interest in order to justify the legislative policy favoring normal

childbirth. 373 From this assertion, the Court derived the conclusion that, for

equal protection purposes, the challenged enactment need only be subjected
to the rational basis standard of review. 374 Applying Dandridge v. Williams,175 the majority accordingly deferred to the value judgment of the
Connecticut legislature implicit in its enactment of the provision being
challenged; that value judgment was said to be the encouragement of
childbirth and the statute in question was deemed to be a "rational means"
376
of implementing such a policy.
The equal protection analysis engaged in by the majority in Maher was
428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (parental consent requirement for minors seeking abortions; the Court
chose not to rule on the merits until the state clarified the consent procedure), saying "that a
requirement for a lawful abortion 'is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to
seek an abortion.' " 432 U.S. at 473.
372. 432 U.S. at 475-76. The Court at this juncture failed to give meaningful consideration
to problems raised by Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). That case invalidated a Georgia
abortion law, which required, inter alia, that abortions be performed at hospitals certified by
the state Joint Commission on Accreditation, that each abortion be approved by a duly
constituted committee of staff members of the relevant hospital, and that the decision to abort
be concurred in by at least two other doctors in addition to the woman's attending physician.
Id. at 184. The Court in Bolton deemed the first prerequisite not reasonably related to the
purposes of the statute, id. at 194; the second was found to possess "no constitutionally
justifiable pertinence," id. at 197; the third was said to unduly interfere %iththe doctor-patient
relationship, id. at 199-200. Yet the regulation in Mahernot only required that the abortion take
place in an accredited institution, but also that it be approved by the Chief of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at that hospital and by the Chief of Medical Services for the state's Department of
Social Services, 432 U.S. at 466 n.2; Roe v. Norton, 380 F. Supp. 726,727 n.1 (D. Conn. 1974),
and this portion of the regulation was not changed by the 1976 revision thereof. See note 366
supra. The Court said approval of the Chief of Medical Services was permissible. "It is not
unreasonable for a State to insist upon a prior showing of medical necessity to insure that its
money is being spent only for authorized purposes." 432 U.S. at 480. It never considered the
accreditation and chief gynecologist-approval provisions. In omitting to analyze these factors,
the majority in Maher suggests implicitly that the means-ends analysis utilized in Bolton may
apply only in the context of criminal laws such as the Georgia statute involved in that case.
373. 432 U.S. at 476-77. Justice Powell distinguished Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399
(1923), which defined "liberty" as including the right to "establish a home and bring up
children," by pointing out that that case involved a penal law prohibiting the teaching of
German in public schools and that it did not deny states the right to encourage a preferred
course of action. 432 U.S. at 477.
374. 432 U.S. at 478. Application of this test requires only that a regulation be rationally
related to a constitutionally permissible purpose. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
375. 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see note 378 infra.
376. 432 U.S. at 479.
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not innovative. It simply was premised upon (1) the assertion in Rodriguez
that wealth is not a suspect classification 377 and (2) the thesis advanced in
Dandridge that, in the area of economic and social welfare legislation, an
admittedly invidious classification is not also unconstitutional if it has some
"reasonable basis.' '378 What is new is that the Court in Maher applied this
inherently limited standard of judicial review to the fundamental privacy
interest acknowledged in Roe v. Wade. 379 The Court in Dandridge had
been confronted with a challenge to a Maryland welfare scheme imposing a
limit of $250 per month per recipient family, regardless of the size or the
financial needs of that family. It prefaced its assertions with the warning that
the suit involved "state regulation in the social and economic field, not
affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment only because the regulation results in some
disparity in grants of welfare payments to the largest [recipient]
families. "380 Similarly, the Court in Rodriguez declined to invalidate the
Texas school financing system because, inter alia, "[e]ducation, of course,
is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. "381 Thus, the Court in Rodriguez could locate no fundamental interest
that was being infringed. 38 2 In contrast to these two decisions, the claim in
Maher did implicate a constitutional right, an aspect of the right of privacy
recognized in the Wade case. 383 But Justice Powell's majority opinion
simply ignores this crucial difference. In doing so, it sharply circumscribes
the right of privacy developed by Wade, at least to the extent that such a
right conflicts with governmental welfare policy.
This extension of the limiting Dandridgeanalysis to an alleged infring377. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973). The Court
there held that a Texas school financing scheme based partly on revenue derived from taxes on
property within local school districts did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent
that it created wealth-related disparities in the level of education being afforded in each district.
The Court also found that education is not a fundamental right. Id. at 35-36.
378. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970). The Court there held that 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. IV 1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (Supp. V 1975)),
which provides that Social Security funds be disbursed through a state Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) plan, was not infringed by a Maryland law placing a ceiling of $250
per month on all AFDC grants, regardless of the size of the recipient family and its actual need.
See also New York Dep't. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413-14 (1973) and
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-51 (1972) (state policy of computing and assigning
different criteria of need to different categorically needy groups deemed consistent with Social
Security Act in both cases).
379. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
380. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970).
381. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
382. Id. at 35-36.
383. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see note 370 supra.
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ement of privacy seems fundamentally gratuitous. Justice Powell had already averred that state encouragement of an alternative activity concurrent
with legislative policy could not be equated with state interference with or
interdiction of a fundamental right. 384 The criminal statutes involved in
Wade were distinguished from the Connecticut statute involved in Maher
on this basis. 385 As a result, no impingement on a fundamental right was
said to exist. 386 If this is so, then why did the majority feel compelled to
discuss Dandridgeand Rodriguez? The answer may be provided by Justice
Brennan's dissent, which made two points in this regard. First, he noted that
in a case decided in the same term as Maher, Carey v. PopulationServices
International,387 the Court had struck down a New York law criminalizing
the sale of contraceptives to minors and, in doing so, had said that "where a
decision as fundamental as that of whether to bear or to beget a child is
involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by
compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn only to express
those interests.''38 Second, Justice Brennan observed that in the 1976
decision of Singleton v. Wulff, 89 five justices3 9" had agreed that Wade and
its companion cases were not limited to those instances in which the state
directly interdicted a woman's freedom to decide whether or not to abort,
the reason being that
a "direct interference" or "interdiction" test does not appear to
be supported by precedent. . . For a doctor who cannot afford
to work for nothing, and a woman who cannot afford to pay him,
the State's refusal to fund an abortion is as effective an "interdiction",of it as would ever be necessary. Furthermore, since the
right. . . is not simply the right to have an abortion, but the right
384. 432 U.S. at 475.
385. Id. at 472-73.

386. Id. at 474.
387. 431 U.S. 678 (1977). The law invalidated in Carey criminalized (a) sale of contracep-

tives to minors, (b) distribution of contraceptives to adults by anyone other than a licensed
pharmacist and (c)advertisement or display of contraceptives by anyone, even including a
licensed pharmacist. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKinney 1972).
388. 431 U.S. at 686.

389. 428 U.S. 106 (1976). Singleton involved a challenge to a Missouri statute excluding
abortions that are not medically necessary from the purposes for which needy persons may
obtain Medicaid benefits. The district court concluded that the plaintiff-physicians lacked
standing to sue, Wulff v. State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 380 F. Supp. 1137, 1145

(E.D. Mo. 1974), but the Eighth Circuit reversed this ruling, Wulff v. Singleton, 508 F.2d 1211,
1214 (8th Cir. 1975), and went on to decide that the law was unconstitutional, id. at 1216. The
Supreme Court agreed that standing existed, 428 U.S. at 118, but remanded the case for further
proceedings because the district court had never rendered a decision on the merits, id. at 11921.

390. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 122 (Blackmun, J., writing for the Court, joined in
Part IIB by Brennan, White and Marshall, JJ.); see also Justice Stevens' concurrence in Part

IIB of the opinion of the Court, id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). See 432 U.S. at 485
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
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to have abortions nondiscriminatorily funded, the denial of such
funding is as complete an
of the exercise of the
391 "interdiction"
right as could ever exist.
In light of these factors, it is clear that Justice Powell, as a matter of
strategy, needed to find a basis for showing why the Connecticut statute in
Maher could be qualitatively differentiated from the criminal laws involved
in Singleton, Carey and Wade. He did so by relying on the fact that the
enactment in Maher was an example of social welfare legislation and
therefore extended uncritically the Dandridge analysis to that enactment.
Consequently, the majority in Maher insulated an entire class of legislation
which inhibited a woman's decision whether or not to abort from the
compelling interest standard of review normally accorded to laws impinging
upon fundamental constitutional rights.
391. 428 U.S. 106, 118 n.7 (1976), quoted in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 485-86 (i977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). The majority in Maher
disagreed, however, arguing that Singleton was not reliable precedent. See 432 U.S. at 477-78
n. 10. The dissent also argued that cases involving access to the courts by indigents, e.g., Boddie
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); penalization of the right to travel from state to state, e.g., Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and
alleged infringements of First Amendment rights, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
all supported the proposition that the compelling state interest test applied not only where a
fundamental right is completely denied, but also where it is restrained so as to make its exercise
more difficult. 432 U.S. at 487-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Blackmun,
JJ.). The majority dismissed the Douglas-Boddie-Griffin line of cases as inapposite, because
they involved restrictions on governmental monopolies, such as appellate review of criminal
convictions and the opportunity to institute an action for divorce; it noted that the private sector
competed with Connecticut in furnishing abortion services. Id. at 469-70 nn.5&6. This argument seems vacuous, however, because it would appear that Connecticut did monopolize the
furnishing of cost-free abortions; this was in fact the focus of the lawsuit. Indeed, one lower
court arriving at a decision contrary to Maher relied expressly on Boddie. See Klein v. Nassau
County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacatedon othergrounds,
412 U.S. 925 (1973). But Klein was decided before decisions by the Court limiting the Boddie
doctrine. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658-60 (1973) (indigents not entitled to waive
court costs for civil appeals); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 443-50 (1973) (indigents not
entitled to waive filing fee for bankruptcy). Justice Powell said Maricopa and Shapirowere not
controlling because those cases involved the denial of welfare benefits to one engaging in
interstate travel. "But the claim here is that the State 'penalizes' the woman's decision to have
an abortion by refusing to pay for it. Shapiro and Maricopa County did not hold that States
would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the indigent
travelers." 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. Again, this analysis is superficial. Justice Powell focused
solely on the nature of the deprivation exacted when he should have also accorded some
attention to the absence or presence of a punitive purpose on the part of the Connecticut
legislature when it chose to deny funding for nontherapeutic abortions. Sherbert was deemed
inapplicable because it involved a case arising in the discrete context of the establishment and
freedom of religion clauses of the First Amendment. Id. But as one commentator has noted,
Sherbert stands for the proposition that unconstitutional conditions may not be placed upon the
receipt of a statutory entitlement. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-06 (1963); Butler,
The Right to MedicaidPayment For Abortion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 931, 952-53 (1977). Justice
Powell may then have been too hasty in assuming that the doctrine of Sherbert was inapposite.
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In doing so, the Court ignored the gloss placed on Dandridge by its
decision in Jimenez v. Weinberger.392 Jimenez, which invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act denying disability benefits to certain classes
393
of illegitimates born after the onset of the wage-earner's disability,
declined to apply the deferential standard of Dandridge. The Court argued
that the result in Dandridge was necessitated by the state's "finite resources" for welfare benefits and that "there is no evidence supporting the
contention that to allow illegitimates in the classification of appellants to
receive benefits would significantly impair the federal Social Security trust
fund and necessitate a reduction in the scope of persons benefitted by the
Act. ' ' 3 4 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for an eight-member majority in
Jimenez thus seemed to limit the Dandridgestandard of review to situations
where the state could both allege and prove that the service sought by the
plaintiff would cause prohibitive expenses. Jimenez was not cited in Maher,
however, and understandably so. Although the Court in Maher referred to
the "wider latitude" given the states "in choosing among competing demands for limited public funds," 395 it cited no evidence adduced by
Connecticut that the funding of nontherapeutic abortions during the first
trimester would strain the state's finances. Indeed, the district court in
Maher had noted that any attempt to make such an argument would cut the
other way,
because abortion is the least expensive medical response to a
pregnancy. An abortion normally requires two expenditures of
funds: a consultation to determine that an abortion is medically
safe, and the medical procedure itself. By contrast, in the event of
childbirth, the state pays the more extensive costs of prenatal...
support for the unborn child. . . . Furthermore, the birth of a
child to a welfare mother increases the burden on the state's
welfare coffers because the newly-born indigent
396 child will, in al
likelihood, qualify for state welfare assistance.
Thus, Connecticut's policy, in the long run, caused the state to spend rather
than to save money. In light of this fact, it seems curious that the Court
ignored the limiting gloss placed on the holding of Dandridge by the
majority in Jimenez. This omission suggests that the limitation enunciated in
the latter case may no longer be relied upon to circumscribe application of
the standard of review developed in the former decision. Thus, Maher is
392. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
393. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1970).

394. 417 U.S. at 633.
395. 432 U.S. at 479.
396. Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660,664 (D. Conn. 1975). Accord, Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d

1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1974); Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500-01
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated on othergrounds, 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
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important not only because it extends the doctrine of Dandridge to different
types of constitutional claims, but also because it appears to undermine one
of the chief constraints that had heretofore been placed on any application of
that doctrine.
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First Amendment
In the following two sections, nine cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court during its 1976-77 term will be discussed. The common
thread in these decisions is that they analyze the right of free speech in
various contexts. The first section reviews four obscenity decisions and
analyzes the Court's continuing effort to distinguish that class of expression
from constitutionally protected speech. The second section considers the
Court's other decisions on the right of free speech. The first case deals with
the concept of symbolic speech and the related right to refrain from speaking. The next two decisions both concern expression within a particular
context, namely, the right of public employees to speak freely (or to ensure
that no one speaks for them) on subjects about which their elected representatives are engaged in collective bargaining. Finally, the last two cases
conceri the problematic area of commercial expression.
With one relatively minor exception,* this list comprises all the important speech cases decided during the 1976-77 term. These decisions are
analyzed spearately and in relatively exhaustive detail in order to present a
thorough summary of the difficulties that the Court has encountered in
discussing free speech claims and to suggest some of the similarities and
inconsistencies inherent in the various methods by which those claims have
been disposed.
* Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), which held that a prison
regulation forbidding inmates from soliciting their colleagues or staging union meetings on
prison grounds did not violate the First Amendment. For a prior article analyzing the constitutional implications of this case and scrutinizing it in the context of relevant precedent, see
Calhoun, The Supreme Court and the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 219, 233-35 (1977).
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A. Obscenity
1.

Introduction

Meaningful analysis of the four decisions by the United States Supreme
Court on the subject of obscenity during the 1976-77 term1 requires a brief
summary of judicial developments in this area during the past two decades.
The Supreme Court placed obscenity, along with libel and fighting words,
in the category of speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment as
early as 1942.2 In Roth v. United States,3 Justice Brennan, on behalf of
himself and four of his colleagues, 4 specifically emphasized this point
fifteen years later:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of
the guaranties [of the First Amendment], unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the universal
judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the
international agreement of over 50 nations, .in the obscenity laws
1. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977)'i Smith
v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
2. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
3. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This decision rendered judgments in two quite separate cases.
The first was a prosecution under federal obscenity statutes conducted in a district court in
New York. The consequent conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit. Roth v. United
States, 237 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1956), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The second was a prosecution
under a California obscenity law, which again resulted in a conviction that was upheld on
appeal. People v. Alberts, 138 Cal. App. 2d 909, 292 P.2d 90 (1955), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
For more extensive discussion of this case, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION 471-74 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON]; F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY

33-40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SCHAUER]; Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 7-28; Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
ConstitutionalStandards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19-29 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lockhart &
McClure].
4. Justice Brennan's opinion was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Burton and
Whittaker. Chief Justice Warren concurred separately, noting that since the material in question was clearly pornographic and the defendants engaged in commercial exploitation of
shameful and morbid cravings, he would affirm the convictions. 354 U.S. at 494-96 (Warren,
C.J., concurring). Justice Harlan concurred in Alberts, but dissented in Roth, finding that while
states could freely regulate sexually-oriented materials, the federal government's control was
restricted to the regulation of hard-core pornography. Id. at 496-507 (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, arguing that the
First Amendment prohibited suppression of all utterances, offensive or not. Id. at 508-14
(Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).
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of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the
Congress from 1842 to 1956. . . .We hold that obscenity is5 not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.
Roth decided the broad constitutional issue of whether or not obscenity
is speech safeguarded by the First Amendment. Subsequent formulation of a
definition of what is or is not obscene was consequently necessary. Justice
Brennan offered the assertion in Roth that "[o]bscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.' 6 He further
concluded that a determination of whether a given publication met this
criterion was dependent upon "whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.", 7 Thus, the key words and
phrases that have influenced all subsequent judicial discourse on the subject
of obscenity were introduced. On the basis of this discussion, the majority in
Roth ruled that section 1461 of Title eighteen of the United States Code,
which prohibits the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy"
materials, 8 and the California law criminalizing the sale of or advertisement
for "obscene or indecent" publications 9 were not void for vagueness, in
5. 354 U.S. at 484-85. Accord, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,23 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,230 (1972); United
States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971).
6. 354 U.S. at 487. According to Justice Brennan this meant "material tending to excite
lustful thoughts." Id. n.20. "Prurient" was further defined as "itching, longing; uneasy with
desire or longing; of persons, having, morbid or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or
propensity, lewd ..... Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1949)).
7. 354 U.S. at 489.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970):
Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter,
writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; andEvery written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or
notice of any kind giving information, directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from
whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or things may be
obtained or made, .. whether sealed or unsealed...
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this
section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose
of circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (West 1955) (repealed 1961): "Every person who wilfully and
lewdly. . .[w]rites, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale,
or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book. . . is guilty of a misdemeanor."
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that, while imprecise, each statute was sufficient to give adequate notice for
purposes of due process. 10
The consensus arrived at in Roth was an exceedingly fragile one, and it
proved to be short-lived. One source of continuing controversy was whether
the "contemporary community standards" referred to in Roth should be
national or local in character.' 1 The issue first arose in the context of a state
obscenity prosecution in Jacobellis v. Ohio,'2 decided in 1964. Of the six
different opinions in that case, only two addressed the problem of the
geographical scope of community standards, and the result was a deadlock.
Justices Brennan and Goldberg advocated a national standard in state prosecutions in order to ensure procedural uniformity, 13 whereas Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Clark rejected such an approach on the grounds that no
one national standard exists. 14 Nor did the problem disappear with subsequent changes of personnel on the Court; in three dissents in decisions
handed down in 1970, Chief Justice Burger alone, and in conjunction with
Justices Harlan and Blackmun, advocated a more flexible, variable ap15
proach to the problem of the applicable standard in state prosecutions.
Nevertheless, in spite of this indecision among the members of the Court, at
least five circuit courts and a number of state tribunals elected to implement
national standards in the years following Jacobellis.16
10. 354 U.S. at 492.
11. In two early cases involving federal obscenity prosecutions, the First Circuit selected
the former alternative. Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362, 365 (1st Cir.
1962); Flying Eagle Publications, Inc. v. United States, 273 F.2d 799, 803 (Ist Cir. 1960). That
approach was also adopted by Justices Harlan and Clark in the case of Manual Enterprises, Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962), a suit that also involved section 1461. None of the three other
opinions in this case discussed the subject. See id. at 495 (Black, J., concurring in the result);
id. at 495-519 (Brennan, J., concurring in the reversal, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas,
J.); id. at 519-29 (Clark, J., dissenting).
12. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). See O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity in the Supreme Court:A Note
on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1964).
13. 378 U.S. at 192-95 (Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.).
14. Id. at 200-01 (Warren, C.J., dissenting, joined by Clark, J.).
15. See Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524, 524-25 (1970) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined
by Burger, C.J., and Harlan, J.); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 434 (1970) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319, 319 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
16. See Chemline, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. West Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855, 861 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd on othergrounds sub
nom. Aday v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d
Cir. 1965); Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59, 61 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Ginzburg, 338 F.2d 12, 14 (3d Cir. 1964), aff'd without considering the point, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 151, 397 P.2d 949, 951 (1964); State v. Lewitt, 3 Conn. Cir.
605, 608, 222 A.2d 579, 581 (1966); State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50, 56 (Mo. 1967); Keuper v.
Wilson, 111 N.J. Super. 489, 490, 268 A.2d 753, 755 (1970); People v. Stabile, 58 Misc. 2d 905,
907, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815, 820 (1969); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 101, 447 P.2d 304, 310 (1968);
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A more troubling question involved the extent of the federal and state
governments' respective powers to regulate obscentiy. While it appeared
that this issue was settled by Roth, the close vote in that case and subsequent
changes in the Court's personnel in effect re-opened the question for further
consideration. Thus, in the succeeding decade, Justices Black and Douglas
adhered to the view that federal and state governments were not empowered
to regulate sexually-oriented speech at all, 17 Justice Stewart expressed the

position that federal and local authorities could exercise control only over
that class of obscenity labelled "hard core pornography" 18 and Justice
Harlan reiterated the view that whereas the federal government could regulate only hard core publications, states could ban all materials rationally

adjudged to treat sex in a "fundamentally offensive" manner. 19 A fourth
view on the subject soon surfaced, however. It originated in the opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, in which Justice Goldberg joined, in the
Jacobellis case. In addition to advocating national standards, Justice Brennan construed Roth to imply that any sexually-oriented publication could
Robert Arthur Management Corp. v. State, 220 Tenn. 101, 110, 414 S.W.2d 638, 642 (1967) rev'd
on othergrounds, 389 U.S. 578 (1968). A number of state courts, however, adopted standards
based on a smaller community. See In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563,578, 446 P.2d 535, 543, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 655, 664 (1968) (community-wide); Carter v. State, 388 S.W.2d 191, 191 (Tex. Crim. 1965)
(statewide); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 149, 121 N.W.2d 545, 553 (1970) (of
the locality); Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 477-78, 393 S.W.2d 219 226 (196-) (citywide), iev'don
othergrounds sub nom. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); Felton v. City of Pensacola,
200 So. 2d 842, 848 (Fla. 1967) (community-wide), rev'd on othergrounds, 390 U.S. 340 (1968).
See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 116-135.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 379-80 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,476,49192 (1966) (Black, J., and Douglas, J.,dissenting); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)
(Black, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.)
18. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,499 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Jacobellis, Justice
Stewart did not define hard core pornography, but said that he knew it when he saw it. Id. In
Ginzburg, he proposed the following definition:
Such materials include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of
artistic value, graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including various acts
of sodomy and sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgylike character. They also include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly
depicting similar activities in an exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets
and books, sometimes with photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with no attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of
character or situation and with no pretense to literary value.
383 U.S. at 499 n.3.
19. See, e.g., Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434,434-45 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cain v.
Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319, 319-20 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ginzburg v. United States, 383
U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205,215
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Clark, J.); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 204 (1964)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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not be proscribed unless it was both " 'utterly' without redeeming social
importance" 20 and so constituted that one could say it went "substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation. "21 This
language formed the nucleus of a tripartite test for obscenity promulgated by
the plurality in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.22 Justices Brennan and Fortas
and Chief Justice Warren argued that federal or state constraints on the
distribution of sexually-oriented materials were permissible where
three elements . . . coalesce: it must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive
because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to
the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the
material is utterly without redeeming social value.2
The Memoirs plurality thus held that the Massachusetts Supreme Court
had committed reversible error when, in reliance on testimony asserting that
John Cleland's Fanny Hill: Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure had only
minimal literary value, the state court had ruled that the publication was
obscene. The Supreme Court noted that the conclusion that a work lacks
significant literary worth may not be equated with the further conclusion that
it utterly lacks social (including but not limited to literary) value.24 To these
three tests the plurality in Memoirs added a fourth factor, pandering. It
suggested that in close cases, evidence of commercial exploitation for the
sake of prurient appeal might be a decisive indicator on which a jury could
20. 378 U.S. at 191. Justice Brennan had previously noted in Roth that obscenity was
"utterly without redeeming social importance," Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957), but had not, at that juncture, elevated this observation into a definitional criterion.
21. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). The language is borrowed from the Model
Penal Code's definition of obscenity, which was cited in Roth: "A thing is obscene if,
considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in description or representation of such matters ... " ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957), quoted inRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20
(1957). See also Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J.)
(first introduced concept of "patent offensiveness").
22. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). For discussions of this case, see EMERSON, supra note 3, at 47678; SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 42-44, 138-39.
23. 383 U.S. at 418. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the judgment, expressing
their usual absolutist view, see note 17 and accompanying text supra, of the First Amendment
in obscenity cases. Id. at 421 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 424 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart also concurred, expressing his typical views, see note 18 and accompanying text
supra, about hard core pornography. 383 U.S. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Clark
dissented, claiming that social importance cannot-be a separate test for determining obscenity
vel non. Id. at 445 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice White expressed a similar position. Id. at 462
(White, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan espoused his customary views, see note 19 and accompanying text supra, about how states have wide discretion to regulate sexually-oriented materials. Id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 419.
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rest a finding of obscenity. The issue was said not to exist in Memoirs,
however.2 5 The element of pandering as a factor in a jury's calculus of
obscenity had first been articulated by Chief Justice Warren in his separate
opinion in Roth .26 It was first applied in Ginzburg v. United States,27
decided the same term as Memoirs. In Ginzburg, five justices upheld a
prosecution for the dissemination of materials which were presumptively not
obscene, but which had been advertised in a prurient fashion. As a result,
the Court stated that it would be permissible in this case for the jury to make
a finding of obscenity vel non by according decisive weight to the fact that
the materials in question had been pandered. 2 8
The tripartite test of Memoirs represented the views of only three
Justices and thus was not entitled to any great deference on the part of judges
in state and lower federal courts. 29 The test was, however, adopted by nine
federal circuits and a number of state courts." ° As for the Supreme Court
itself, the disparate views of the justices led to a pragmatic approach in
obscenity cases. Beginning in 1967,31 the Court issued a series of per curiam
25. Id. at 420.
26. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren. C.J., concurring in
the result) (pandering defined as "the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly
advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of [the purveyor's] customers."). See also United
States v. Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1940) (opinion of L. Hand, J.).
27. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). See generally Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: An Analysis of the
Ginzburg Case, 28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1966); Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriageof
Obscenity PerSe and Obscenity PerQuod, 76 YALE L.J. 127 (1966); Semonche, Definitionaland
Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court'sNew and DisturbingAccomodation, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1173 (1966).
28. 383 U.S. at 472. The five justices who joined this opinion were the members of the
Memoirs plurality, plus Justices Clark and Whiie. For a further analysis of this case, see notes
333-352 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 188-191 and accompanying text infra.
30. See United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 588, 590 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973) (the seven dissenters and one concurring judge comprising a
majority on this issue); Cinecom Theaters Midwest States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d
1297, 1298 (7th Cir. 1973); Huffman v. United States, 470 F.2d 386, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd
on othergrounds but aff'd on this point, 502 F.2d 419, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Pellegrino, 467 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1972); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Oklahoma City,
459 F.2d 282, 283-84 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. 35mm Motion Picture Film, 432 F.2d 705,
708-09 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissedsub nom. United States v. Unicorn Enterprises, Inc., 403
U.S. 925 (1971); United States v. Ten Erotic Paintings, 432 F.2d 420, 421 (4th Cir. 1970); United
States v. A Motion Picture Entitled "I Am Curious - Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 200 (2d Cir.
1968); Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200, 202 (8th Cir. 1968); Armijo v. United States, 384
F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled
"I Am Curious - Yellow," 367 F.2d 889, 891 (2d Cir. 1966); Books, Inc. v. United States, 358
F.2d 935, 937 (Ist Cir. 1966), rev'd on othergrounds, 388 U.S. 449 (1967). Attorney Gen. v. A
Book Named "Naked Lunch," 351 Mass. 298,299,218 N.E.2d 571,572 (1966); Commonwealth
v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 196, 233 A.2d 840, 844 (1967).
31. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
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reversals of criminal convictions for the distribution of materials that at least
five justices, applying their own individual tests, deemed nonobscene. 32 As
of 1972, a total of thirty-one cases had been disposed of in this summary
33
fashion.
Recognizing that the tortured history of its obscenity decisions had
failed to yield very much in the way of concrete standards, the Court
attempted to formulate some comprehensive criteria in 1973. Thus, five
justices in the case of Miller v. California,34 announced three important
points. First, they indicated that obscenity regulation would be limited to
depictions or descriptions of hard core sexual conduct defined specifically
by the language of the regulating statute itself, or by authoritative judicial
constructions of that statute. 35 Second, the majority repudiated the Memoirs

test, which had been incorporated into section 311 of the California Penal
Code, 36 the law challenged in Miller. In lieu of that test, Chief Justice
32. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
33. In addition to the three cases consolidated in Redrup, the other cases are: Wiener v.
California, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Harstein v. Missouri, 404 U.S. 988 (1971); Burgin v. South
Carolina, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971); Childs v. Oregon, 401
U.S. 1006 (1971); Hoyt v. Minnesota, 399 U.S. 524 (1970); Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434 (1970);
Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970); Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970); Henry v.
Louisiana, 392 U.S. 655 (1968); Felton v. City of Pensacola, 390 U.S. 340 (1968); Robert-Arthur
Management Corp. v. Tennessee, 389 U.S. 578 (1968); I.M. Amusement Corp. v. Ohio, 389
U.S. 573 (1968); Chance v. California, 389 U.S. 89 (1967); Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); Conner v. City of Hammond, 389 U.S. 48 (1967); Potomac
News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); Schackman v. California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967);
Mazes v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967);
Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967); Aday v. New York, 388 U.S. 447 (1967);
Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S. 446 (1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Cobert
v. New York, 388 U.S. 443 (1967); Ratner v. California, 388 U.S. 442 (1967); Friedman v. New
York, 388 U.S. 441 (1967); Keney v. New York, 388 U.S. 440 (1967).
34. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 40-44; Clor, Obscenity and
the First Amendment: Round Three, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 207 (1974); Hunsaker, The 1973
Obscenity-PornographyDecisions:Analysis, Impact andLegislative Alternatives, 11 S. DIEGO
L. REv. 906 (1974); Leventhal, The 1973 Round of Obscenity-PornographyDecisions, 59
A.B.A.J. 1261 (1973). The majority in Miller consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Douglas dissented, reiterating his usual
absolutist view, see note 18 and accompanying text supra, of the First Amendment in this
context. 413 U.S. at 37-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall, also dissented, finding the statute at issue overbroad. Id. at 47-48 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ.). In a companion case, these last three justices
issued a lengthy dissent, concluding that while the state might regulate the dissemination of
sexually-oriented materials to juveniles and nonconsenting adults, it could not constitutionally
do so with respect to consenting adults. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-114
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
35. 413 U.S. at 24.
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1978), amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a)
(West 1970):
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Burger's opinion for the Court defined the basic guidelines for the trier of
fact in obscenity cases as:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work, depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the
"utterly without redeeming social value" test of [Memoirs]; that
concept has never commanded the adherence of more than three
justices at one time ...
We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory
schemes for the States. That must await their concrete legislative
efforts. It is possible, however, to give a few plain examples of
what a state statute could define for regulation under part (b) of
the standard announced in this opinion, supra:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the
37
genitals.
Third, the majority in Miller ruled that by "contemporary community
standards," it meant local, or state, as opposed to national, standards. 38The
reason given for this conclusion was identical to that expressed by Chief
Justice Warren in Jacobellis: the impossibility of identifying any one
39
controlling standard of decency for the nation as a whole.
Miller effected changes in degree, not changes in kind. Its tripartite
test is actually not a sharp departure from prior rulings. Part (a) of that test
merely restates Roth.40 Part (b) adopts the "patent offensiveness" rule of
Memoirs, but appears to link that rule to definitions provided by state law
rather than to contemporary community standards, as was done in Memoirs.
At a later point in the opinion the Court does indicate that local rather than
national community standards will govern the determination of what is or is
not patently offensive. 4 1 Part (c) of the Miller test marks a shift of empha"Obscene" means that to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the predominant appeal of the matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; which goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of

such matters; and is matter which is utterly without redeeming social importance.
37. 413 U.S. at 24-25 (citations omitted).
38. See id. at 33-34.
39. Id. at 32.
40. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
41. See 413 U.S. at 30: "Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment
limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from community to community, but this
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sis-from "utterly" without social value to "seriously" without four
specified types of social value. This does lessen the evidence necessary to
42
convict, and it is in this respect that Miller altered prior obscenity law.
The other important change, of course, was the adoption of local standards
as a referent, but that shift marked no departure from the Court's prior
43
rulings, which had never adopted national standards in the first place.
Miller involved state obscenity laws. The guidelines set forth in that
case, however, were later held to govern judicial construction of corresponding federal statutes. Thus, in a footnote in the case of UnitedStates v.
Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film,' the Court indicated that it would
interpret federal obscenity .laws "as limiting regulated material to patently
offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard-core' sexual
conduct given as examples" in Miller.45 Indeed, in 1974, two cases provided important glosses on Miller; one of those cases involved a prosecu46
tion under section 1461 of Title eighteen of the United States Code.
The federal case was Hamling v. United States.47 The Court in that
decision made three noteworthy points. First, it held that the element of
pandering, which had first been utilized to sustain a conviction in the
Ginzburg case, 48 had survived Miller and was still relevant in determining
what is or is not obscene. 49 Second, the Court indicated that prosecutions
under federal obscenity laws would, as Miller had held with respect to state
prosecutions, be governed by local rather than national standards. 50 Third,
the Court remarked that while Miller would be given retroactive effect with
respect to cases on direct appeal when it was decided,51 a jury instruction to
give effect to national rather than local standards would not constitute
reversible error unless it could be shown that such an instruction materially
affected the deliberations of the jury.5 2 Indeed, the Court warned that
does not mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of precisely
what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive.' " Accord, United States v. B &
H Distrib. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 136, 141 (W.D. Wis. 1974).

42. Accord, United States v. Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d

1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380, 382 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
43. See notes 11-16 and accompanying text supra.
44. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).

45. Id. at 130 n.7. Accord, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974); United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 145 (1973).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970); see note 8 supra.
47. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
48. 383 U.S. 463 (1966); see notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
49. 418 U.S. at 130.

50. Id. at 104-06.
51. Id. at 102.

52. Id.at 108.
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Miller's rejection of a uniform national standard does not mandate "the
substitution of some smaller geographical area into the same sort of formula. .. . The second noteworthy case was Jenkins v. Georgia,' which
offered an even more flexible interpretation of what is meant by the term
"local'':
What Miller makes clear is that state juries need not be instructed
to apply "national standards". . . . Miller held that it was
constitutionally permissible to permit juries to rely on the understanding of the community from which they came as to contemporary community standards, and the States have considerable
latitude in framing statutes under this element of the Miller decision. . . as defined [therein] without further specification, as was
done here, or it may choose to define the standards in more
precise geographic terms, as was done by California in Miller.55
The Court in Jenkins, however, proceeded to note that juries have no
"unbridled discretion" to determine what is patently offensive.5 6 It therefore reversed a conviction for the screening of the film "Carnal Knowledge" under a Georgia law that defined obscenity in language similar to that
employed in Memoirs.57 The Court pointed out that while the film included
nudity and scenes of simulated copulation, the camera did not focus on the
actors' or actresses' genitals during such scenes; the Court thus concluded
that the motion picture was simply not "legally obscene" under the Miller
5
tests. 9
The four cases that will be discussed in this section constitute the first
attempt by the Supreme Court since 1974 to indicate how the doctrines of
Miller, Hamling and Jenkins will operate in the context of actual criminal
prosecutions under state and federal obscenity laws. It is important to
recognize the rather narrow issues with which this quartet of decisions
grapples. After all, the broad constitutional issue in obscenity cases was
decided as long ago as Roth and the key definitions of concepts like
"obscenity" and "contemporary community standards" had already been
promulgated and, to some extent, explicated by the 1973 and 1974 rulings
of the Court. Thus, the four cases under consideration are interesting
primarily because they suggest how the Court will manipulate its own
definitions, and because they indicate how the Court will resolve certain
procedural and evidentiary problems common to criminal prosecutions
under state and federal obscenity statutes.
53. Id. at 104.
54. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).

55. Id. at 157.
56. Id. at 160.
57. See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101(b) (1972).
58. 418 U.S. at 161.
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2. Marks v. United States: Ex Post Facto Considerations in Obscenity
Cases
The case of Marks v. United States59 presented the United States
Supreme Court with an opportunity to consider one of the most vexing
issues in the law of obscenity: to what extent the doctrine of Miller v.
California6° may be applied retroactively. In dealing with this issue, the
Court not only had to distinguish prior rulings that had, at least tangentially,
resolved the problem in a different manner, but it also had to interpret its
own case law on the retrospective application of judicial rulings in a
somewhat novel fashion.
a. The Decision
The defendants in Marks were charged with several counts of transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce in violation of section
1465 of Title eighteen of the United States Code 61 and the general federal
conspiracy statute. 62 The conduct in question occurred prior to February 27,
1973. The trial did not commence until the following October. In the
interim, on June 21, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Miller v. California,63 which promulgated a new tripartite definition of
obscenity 64 held to apply to federal obscenity laws.6 5 The petitioners in
Marks argued at trial that they were entitled to jury instructions framed
under the more libertarian definition of obscenity advanced by the plurality
in the Court's 1966 decision in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.6 Memoirs
defined material as obscene only if it was "utterly without redeeming social
59. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
60. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1970):

Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose of
sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture,
film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph
recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any
other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 182-84.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970):
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United

States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the

conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.

See generally Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
63. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

64. Id. at 24-25. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
65. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
66. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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value.' '67 The district court judge instructed the jury on the basis of Miller,
however, which defined material as obscene only if, taken as a whole, it
lacked serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 6 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion which will be
69
scrutinized in detail later, affirmed the petitioners' resulting conviction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell delivered the
majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined. The Court began by noting that this case
presented no issue under the ex post facto clause of article one of the
Constitution, 70 which only limits the powers of legislatures. 7 1 But the

principle embodied in that clause, "the notion that persons have a right to

72
fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties",
was also said to prevent the retrospective application of an unforeseeable

judicial enlargement of a criminal statute. In support of this contention, the
73
Court cited the leading case on the subject, Boule v. City of Columbia,

which had prohibited just such an application of South Carolina's criminal
trespass statute by invoking the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
and a prior obscenity ruling, Rabe v. Washington,74 which was said to
support the same principle. Having thus identified the relevant precedent,
67. Id. at 418. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
68. United States v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
69. United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 922 (6th Cir. 1975). See notes 94-166 and
accompanying text infra.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl. 3: "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."
71. 430 U.S. at 191. Accord, James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213,247-48 (1961) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Frankfurter, J.); v. Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 161 (1913).
72. 430 U.S. at 191.
73. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). For a further discussion of this case, see notes 167-176 and
accompanying text infra.
74. 405 U.S. 313 (1972). In Rabe, the petitioner was convicted under a Washington
obscenity law criminalizing the distribution of "obscene" materials and the exhibition of
"obscene" shows. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.010 (1970). The conviction arose from the fact that
the appellant, an owner of a drive-in theatre, had exhibited the film "Carmen Baby." On
appeal, the state supreme court admitted that under the Roth-Memoirs standards, the film was
probably not offensive, but nevertheless upheld the conviction, reasoning that in the "context
of its exhibition," "Carmen Baby" was obscene. Rabe v. State, 79 Wash. 2d 254, 263, 484 P.2d
917, 922 (1971). On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded:
To avoid the constitutional vice of vagueness, it is necessary, at a minimum, that a
statute give fair notice that certain conduct is proscribed. The statute under which
petitioner was prosecuted, however, made no mention that the "context" or location
of the exhibition was an element of the offense somehow modifying the word "obscene." Petitioner's conviction was thus affirmed under a statute with a meaning quite
different from the one he was charged with violating.
405 U.S. at 315. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the state court. Id. at 316.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Winter 1978]

the Court then went on to consider the petitioners' chief contention, "that
Miller and its companion cases unforeseeably expanded the reach of federal
75
obscenity statutes beyond what was punishable under Memoirs."
Justice Powell admitted that the tripartite definition of obscenity in
Memoirs never commanded the adherence of more than three justices at one
time. 76 But he went on to note that when "no single rationale explaining the
result [in a decision] enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.' ",77 In Memoirs, six
justices concurred in the judgment. Three of those formed the plurality that
issued the definition the petitioner in Marks thought should govern at his
trial. Two others, Justices Black and Douglas, concurred on the far broader
ground that the First Amendment barred all governmental attempts to
regulate obscenity, while the last, Justice Stewart, contended that states are
empowered only to restrict the dissemination of "hard core pornography."' 78 Consequently, reasoned Justice Powell, "[t]he view of the
Memoirs plurality therefore constituted the holding of the Court and provided the governing standards," 79 a fact that many courts had recognized in
80
subsequent years.
If Memoirs was the law, then to the extent that Miller reformulated the
social value aspect of the definition of obscenity in the former case, it
marke4 a "significant departure" from that law. 1 Indeed, said Justice
Powell, the majority in the 1973 case had clearly thought "that some
conduct which would have gone unpunished under Memoirs would result in
conviction under Miller." 82 The Court admitted that Marks was not entirely
75. 430 U.S. at 192.
76. Id. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.

77. 430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.)).
78. See note 23 supra.
79. 430 U.S. at 194.
80. See note 30 supra.
81. 430 U.S. at 194.
82. Id. Justice Powell at this juncture cited language in Miller to the effect that because
Memoirs required prosecutors to prove a negative proposition (i.e., utter lack of redeeming

social value), it created "a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof." Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973)). But as Justice

Brennan noted in a companion case, part (c) of the Miller test still requires proof of a negative
proposition. "[Wihether it will be easier to prove that material lacks 'serious' value than to
prove that it lacks. any value at all remains, of course, to be seen." Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 98 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
However, in a 1974 decision, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Miller standard

concerning social value permits "a lesser burden on the prosecution in this phase of the proof of
obscenity ...

" Harnling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116-17 (1974). For similar views, see

the cases cited in note 42 supra.
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analogous to Bouie. In Boule, there had been an unforeseeably expansive
judicial construction of a narrow and precisely-drawn statute, whereas
section 1465, the statute involved in Marks, prohibited the transportation of
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy" materials8 3 and thus had always been
worded broadly.84 Because of this fact, Justice Powell noted that the reach
of the statute,
necessarily has been confined within the constitutional limits announced by this Court. Memoirs severely restricted its application. Miller also restricts its application beyond what the language
might indicate, but Miller undeniably relaxes the Memoirs restrictions. The effect is the same as the new construction in Boule.
Petitioners, engaged in the dicey business of marketing films...
had no fair warning
that their products might be subjected to the
8 5
new standards.
Accordingly, the Court held, in light of Bouie, that the petitioners in Marks
could not be subjected to criminal liability based upon the definition of
obscenity announced in Miller. They were therefore entitled to jury instructions incorporating only the Memoirs definition. 86 At the same time, however, the Court restated its view that any constitutional principle enunciated
87
in Miller that would benefit a petitioner should be applied retroactively.
The majority then remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion.
The other two opinions in this case were unmemorable. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented in part, repeating his
oft-stated view that section 1465 is unconstitutionally overbroad.8 8 Justice
Stevens also dissented in part, claiming that the instant criminal prosecution
was impermissible for three reasons: (1) because the statute in question
regulates free expression,8 9 (2) because it "is predicated on the somewhat
illogical premise that a person may be prosecuted criminally for providing
another with material he has a constitutional right to possess" 90 and (3)
83. See note 61 supra.
84. Despite the breadth of this language, several lower courts have held it constutitional.
See United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 420 U.S. 931 (1975);
United States v. New Orleans Book Mart, Inc., 490 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1007 (1974); United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 947
(1971); United States v. Marks, 364 F. Supp. 1022, 1026-27 (E.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 913

(6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
85. 430 U.S. at 195.
86. Id.at 196.
87. Id. at 196-97.
88. Id. at 197-98 (Brennan, J.,dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.) (citing
Cangiano v. United States, 418 U.S. 934, 935 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
89. 430 U.S. at 198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. Justice Stevens at this juncture cited the case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), which held that private possession of obscene materials in one's home cannot constitu-
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because the substantive and procedural standards in obscenity trials are so
vague as to offend the concept of due process. 9 The authors of these
opinions, then, would have reversed the petitioners' conviction, but would
not have remanded the case for a new trial.
b. Analysis
The Supreme Court's peremptory analysis might imply that Marks was
an easy case which could be dealt with summarily. If so, one wonders why
the Sixth Circuit arrived at a completely contrary disposition 92 and why the
Tenth Circuit, in another case, also reached the opposite result. 93 The
problems raised by Marks are in fact more complex then one might assume
at first glance. In order to explore these complexities, it is necessary first to
consider the arguments offered by the Sixth Circuit in Marks while reviewing the Supreme Court's treatment of these issues and then to analyze some
problems that were considered neither by that court of appeals nor, in some
respects, by the Supreme Court.
(1) The Supreme Court'sAnalysis ofIssues Raised by the Courtof Appeals
(a) The Right of Fair Warning
The first issue raised by the Sixth Circuit is the construction to be
accorded certain language in Hamling v. United States.9 In the Hamling
case, the petitioner was indicted on March 5, 1971, on various counts of
violating section 1461 of Title eighteen of the United States Code, which
prohibits the distribution through the mails of obscene materials. 95 A conviction resulted on December 23, 1971, and was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit on June 7, 1973.96 A rehearing of this affirmance was denied on July
tionally be made a crime. Id. at 559. But, in later decisions, the Court has held that merely
because private possession is permissible does not mean that the state is barred from regulating
obscenity as it passes through the channels of commerce. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.

291, 307 (1977); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973); United States v. Twelve
200-ft. Reels of Super 8 mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126-29 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (opinion of White, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351, 354.56 (1971). And in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973), the Court
pointed out that the zone of privacy acknowledged by Stanley was confined to the home and did
not follow the consumer of pornography wherever he went. See generally Note, Roe and Paris:
Does Privacy Have A Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1185-89 (1974).
91. 430 U.S. at 198.
92. See United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 922 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 430 U.S. 188
(1977).
93. See United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 925
(1977).
94. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
95. See note 8 supra.
96. United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 325 (9th Cir. 1973).
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9th, but the court of appeals withdrew this order in light of the decision in
Miller; upon reconsideration, rehearing en banc was again denied on Au97
gust 22, 1973, whereupon the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioners argued that until the Court's decisions in Miller and its
companion cases, section 1461 did not apply only to those examples of
obscene materials enumerated in Miller."8 They therefore urged that the
Court's 1973 obscenity cases imposed a specificity requirement that had not
been mandated at the time the conduct in question occurred. 99 To this, the
Court in Hamling responded:
[n]or do we find merit in petitioners' contention that cases
such as Bouie v. City of Columbia . . . require reversal of their
convictions. The Court in Boule held that since the crime for
which the petitioners there stood convicted was "not enumerated
in the statute" at the time of their conduct, their conviction could
not be sustained. . . . The Court noted that "a deprivation of the
right of fair warning can result not only from vague statutory
language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial
expansion of narrow and precise statutory language.". . . But
the enumeration of specific categories of material in Miller which
might be found obscene did not purport to make criminal, for the
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1461, conduct which had not previously
been thought criminal. That requirement instead added a "clarifying gloss" to the prior construction and therefore made the meaning of the federal statute involved here "more definite" in its
application to federal obscenity prosecutions . . . . Judged by
both the judicial construction of § 1461 prior to Miller, and by the
construction of that section which we adopt today in the light of
Miller, petitioners' claims of vagueness and lack of fair notice as
to the proscription of the material which they were distributing
must fail. 10
The Sixth Circuit assumed implicitly that the language in Hamling
governed its disposition of Marks' claim. 10 1 While the Supreme Court
acknowledged the court of appeals' argument in a footnote, it dismissed that
argument as follows:
In Hamling we rejected a challenge based on Bouie v. City of
Columbia, ostensibly similar to the challenge that is sustained
here . . . . But the similarity is superficial only. There the petitioners focused on part (b) of the Miller test. . . . They argued
that their convictions could not stand because Miller requires that
the categories of material punishable under the statute must be
specifically enumerated in the statute or in authoriative judicial
construction. No such limiting construction had been announced
at the time they engaged in the conduct that led to their convic97. 418 U.S. at 97-98.
98. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.

99. 418 U.S. at 110-11.
100. Id. at 115-16 (citations omitted).
101. See United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 921 (6th Cir. 1975).
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tions. We held that this made out no claim under Boule, for part
(b) did not expand the reach of the statute ...
For the reasons noted in text, the same cannot be said of part
(c) of the Miller test, shifting from "utterly without redeeming
social value" to "lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." This was implicitly recognized by the Court in Hamling itself. There the trial took place before Miller, and the jury
had been instructed in accordance with Memoirs. Its verdict
necessarily meant that it found the materials to be utterly without
redeeming social value. This Court examined the record and determined that the jury's verdict "was supported by the evidence and
consistent with the Memoirs formulation of obscenity.". .. We
did not avoid that inquiry on the grounds that Memoirs had no
relevance, as we might have done if Miller applied retroactively in
all respects. 1° 2
Implicit in this statement are two interrelated propositions. The first is that
part (b) of the Miller test made section 1465 more definite, whereas part (c)
did not; the second is that while part (c) of the Miller test constitutes an
expansive reading of section 1465, at least when compared with part (c) of
the Memoirs test, the same cannot be said of part (b) of the Miller test
Phrased in this manner, the argument is much easier to scrutinize. To begin
with, how much more definite does part (b) of the Miller test make section
1465? As noted earlier, 10 3 in United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super
8mm Film,1 4 the Court had limited the scope of federal obscenity laws to
those types of depictions specifically enumerated in Miller. 0 5 This would
appear superficially to be a very narrowing construction. But the Court in
Hamling stated that the list of representations mentioned in Miller was
never intended to be "exhaustive" 1 and consequently implied that that list
could be supplemented with innumerable other examples in a future case.
Moreover, in the decision of Ward v. llinois,1° 7 a case decided in the same
term as Marks, the Court by its action clearly indicated that the prerequisite

of specificity is an extremely elastic one, which may be fulfilled by an
authoritative judicial construction that fails to proscribe explicitly any specific type of depiction or representation.l 0 8 Thus, part (b) of the Miller test
does not necessarily make the federal obscenity laws more definite. Indeed,
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,109 a
companion case to Miller, noted pointedly that "the valiant attempt of one
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

430 U.S. at 195-96 n.10 (citations omitted).
See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
413 U.S. 123 (1973).
Id. at 130 n.7.
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974).
431 U.S. 767 (1977). See notes 667-832 and accompanying text infra.
Id. at 774-75. See notes 689-697 and accompanying text infra.

109. 413 U.S. *49 (1973).
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lower federal court to draw the constitutional line at depictions of explicit
sexual conduct seems to belie any suggestion that this approach marks the
road to clarity." 110 He then cited the experience of the District of Columbia

Circuit in Huffman v. United States," wherein application of a criterion
similar to part (b) of the Miller test was said to require an attempt to make
somewhat esoteric distinctions "between 'singles' and 'duals,' between
'erect penises' and 'semi-erect penises,' and between 'ongoing sexual activ-

ity' and 'imminent sexual activity.' 1112 As Professor Schauer has noted,
the attempt of the Court in Miller to limit part (b) of its tripartite definition
of obscenity to examples of "hard core pornography" results in something
that resembles "more of a conclusion than a test."1 1 3 Even after Miller,
then, courts may still have to resort to the crude but useful guideline
suggested by Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio: 114 one knows it when
one sees it. 115 Nor is this the only problem. After Miller, patent offensiveness is to be judged according to contemporary community standards, not
national standards. 116 Hamling extended this requirement to federal
cases. 1 17 Therefore, one could argue that part (b) of the Miller test makes
federal statutes less definite and certain because it substitutes for a unitary
national standard, however difficult to define, a multifarious and often
1 18
inconsistent set of localized standards.
But what of the corollary implied by the Court in Marks, that part (c)
of the Miller test, as applied to federal obscenity laws, is not merely a
"clarifying gloss," intended to render the statutes in question less vague?
110. Id. at 99 (Brennan, J.,dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.)
111. 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on rehearing,502 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The
Court in the first Huffman case ruled that Danish erotic magazines depiciting nude or nearly
nude women in lesbian embraces were obscene. It found that although the models depicted
were not actually engaging in ultimate sexual acts, "[m]any of the photographs before us may
fairly be characterized as portraying models who are sufficiently close to the point of 'sexual
activity' to warrant the judgment that the First Amendment does not prohibit an obscenity
determination made under the Roth-Memoirs standard. . . ...
470 F.2d at 401. On rehearing,
however, the District of Columbia Circuit retrenched, stating that it was unsure whether the
magazines in question constituted hard core pornography, as defined by Miller. It noted in this
regard that there were no depictions of "vaginal, anal or oral penetration" and left open the
question of whether representations of imminent sexual acts would suffice. 502 F.2d at 423.
The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that, at least where proof of pandering is adduced,
"portrayal of ultimate sexual acts is not a necessary ingredient of obscenity." United States v.
Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975).
112. 413 U.S. at 99 n.16.
113. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 113.
114. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
115. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). See note 18 supra.
116. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
117. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-06 (1974).
118. For a more complete discussion of how courts have defined the applicable community
after Miller, see notes 475-556 and accompanying text infra.
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Part (c) of the Memoirs test spoke only of general "social value"; 119 part (c)
of the Miller test would appear to cure the imprecision inherent in that term
by specifying four relevant types of social value that courts may consider. 120
This thesis would require one to contend that the Court rejected part (c) of
the Memoirs test because of its vagueness. The Court in Hamling, however,
indicated that such a contention would be founded on a false premise:
Petitioners' final Miller-based contention is that our rejection of
the third part of the Memoirs test and our revision of that test in
Miller indicate that 18 U.S.C. § 1461 was at the time of their
convictions unconstitutionally vague for the additional reason that
it provided insufficient guidance to them as to the proper test of
"social value." But our opinion in Miller plainly indicates that we
rejected the Memoirs "social value" formulation, not because it
was so vague as to deprive criminal defendants of adequate
notice, but instead because it represented a departure from the
definition of obscenity in Roth, and because in calling on the
prosecution "to prove a negative," it imposed a "[prosecutorial]
burden virtually
impossible to discharge," and not constitutionally
2
required.' '
Thus, one could argue that regardless of the actual effect of part (c) of the
Miller test, it was not intended to cure the vagueness inherent in part (c) of
the Memoirs test. Therefore, parts (b) and (c) of Miller's definition of
obscenity are distinguishable on the basis of the intent of the Court in
promulgating them. The Court in Marks could then perhaps find part (b) but
not part (c) of the Miller test to be a "clarifying gloss" by taking into
account only the purpose underlying its formulation and not the actual
practical effect it has had in federal obscenity prosecutions.
Similar problems arise in connection with the issue of whether part (c),
but not part (b), of the Miller test expands the reach of federal obscenity
statutes. Certainly part (c), by repudiating the "utterly without redeeming
social value" criterion of Memoirs, does increase the risks of criminal
liability for the dissemination of sexually-oriented materials. But the same
could be said for part (b); as noted earlier, 122 patent offensiveness in federal
cases after Hamling was to be judged by local, not national, standards. This
shift in emphasis arguably improves the opportunities for a federal prosecutor to obtain an obscenity conviction by making it relatively easier for him to
prove the content of those standards. Thus, it would appear that both part (b)
and part (c) of the Miller test extend the scope of potential criminal liability
under the federal obscenity statutes. Yet the Court in Marks was wholly
oblivious to this counter-argument. As a result, it was able to draw a rather
119. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
120. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.

121. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116-17 (1974).
122. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
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vacuous distinction between what it said in Hamling and the effect of its
decision in the instant case.
(b) The Retroactive Effect of the "Benefits" and "Burdens" of Miller
After quoting Hamling, the Sixth Circuit then proceeded to consider
the applicability of the decision by the First Circuit in United States v.
Palladino.12 3 In that case, both a trial and a decision by the appellate court
had occurred prior to Miller. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 124 On remand, the First Circuit
adopted a position that had originally been advanced by the Fifth Circuit in
its 1973 decision in United States v. Thevis.1 5 In the Thevis case, the court
of appeals had held that the material in question must be found to be obscene
126
under both Memoirs and Miller, or the defendants must be acquitted.
This reasoning was based on the premise that Miller and its companion
cases had imposed a requirement of specificity regarding what is or is not
patently offensive that had not theretofore existed under the Memoirs test.
Consequently, the First Circuit believed that the defendants in Palladino
should have reaped the benefits conferred by Miller's adoption of a specificity requirement. 127 The court of appeals in Marks was unimpressed with
this logic and cited the dissent of Judge Bailey Aldrich in Palladino:
[T]he Court majority in Miller evinced no compunction about
convicting Miller by a definition of obscenity that was not in effect
at the time of his publication. Having in mind the mass of uncertainties in this field. . .I can see why the Court felt that the First
Amendment did not bar an adverse change in the rules. If not for
Miller, why for Palladino? 128
Judge Aldrich raises an interesting point. The Court in Miller remanded that case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with the First Amend123. 490 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1974).

124. Palladino v. United States, 475 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded, 413
U.S. 916 (1973).
125. 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932 (1974).

126. 484 F.2d at 1154-55. The combined Miller-Memoirstest was summarized as follows by
the First Circuit in Palladino:
(1) do the materials depict or describe sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable federal law; (2) do the materials, taken as a whole, appeal primarily to
prurient interests of the average adult (or, if directed to deviants, to the prurient
interests of the intended group. . .); (3) are the materials patently offensive because
they affront contemporary community standards relating to sexual matters; (4) are the
materials utterly without redeeming social value.
490 F.2d at 501 (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 501.
128. Id. at 504 (Aldrich, J.,dissenting), quoted in Marks v. United States, 520 F.2d 913,
921-22 (6th Cir. 1975).
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ment standards established by this opinion." 129 Justice Douglas, in his
dissent, argued cogently that this disposition of the case violated the Bouie
rule, because the defendant in Miller had not received fair warning at the
time of his conduct that his acts could be classified as criminal under a
standard that would subsequently come into existence. 13 0 One could argue
that the policy reasons for applying Boule in Miller were even greater than
those present in Marks. At least in the latter case, the trial and the appeal
occurred after Miller was decided, so the defendant was not totally surprised by the district court's instructions. Indeed, if one can construe the
Supreme Court's decision in Marks as holding that due process requires that
conduct occurring before Millerbe judged by a jury instructed under part (c)
of the Memoirs test,13 ' one may legitimately wonder why the same five
justices in Millerdid not use similar language in framing the terms on which
they remanded that case to the California courts.
This raises the inferential problem of whether the terms of the remand
in Miller mandated a retroactive application of the principles announced in
that case. This argument would seem to have merit, especially in light of
one of Miller's companion cases, Kaplan v. California,132 in which the
same remand was ordered, although the majority specifically agreed that the
133
materials in question were obscene under the Memoirs standard.
Confronted with this argument, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Thevis 1 4 had responded:
We decline to read so much into Miller. Rather, we conclude that
by indiscriminately vacating and remanding these cases, the Supreme Court declared that all obscenity cases which had not
reached final adjudication should be re-examined in light of its
clarification of previous standards and its declaration of new
129. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973). Following this statement, the Court cited

United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973). This
citation suggests that the "First Amendment standards" adverted to may well have been the
examples offered to explicate part (b) of the Miller test, to which the footnote in Twelve 200-ft.
Reels had referred. Nevertheless, the cited language is not a model of clarity.
130. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41-42 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
131. 430 U.S. at 196.
132. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
133. Id.at 118:
Finally the state court considered petitioner's argument that the book was not "obscene" as a matter of constitutional law. Pointing out that petitioner was arguing, in
part, that all books were constitutionally protected in an absolute sense, it rejected
that thesis. On "independent review," it concluded "Suite 69 appeals to a prurient
interest in sex and is beyond the customary limits of candor within the State of
California." It held that the book was not protected by the First Amendment. We
agree.
Earlier, the Court observed that the appellate department of the superior court had detected
sufficient evidence of lack of redeeming value. Id.
134. 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932 (1974).
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standards. We do not read this as precluding our application of the
Memoirs standard to materials involved in transactions occurring
in 1970.135

As a result, the court in Thevis interpreted the remand in Miller as requiring
a retrospective application of any of the benefits that might accrue to a
defendant from the latter decision. 136 Thus, any count of the indictment in
Thevis that was based on the distribution of a periodical which was not
obscene under both Miller and Memoirs was dismissed. 13 7 This was in fact

the position that had been adopted subsequently by the First Circuit in
Palladino;138 it was also a position that had been restated by the Fifth Circuit
in numerous cases 139 and accepted by the Second 14° and Ninth 141 Circuits.
The point was finally settled in the Court's decision in Hamling v. United
States,142 in which the Supreme Court held that "any constitutional princi135. 484 F.2d at 1154. In Thevis, trial occurred prior to Miller, so the standard used therein
was that of Roth-Memoirs. Between the date of conviction and the date that the Fifth Circuit
heard Thevis' appeal, Miller was decided. United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1014
(5th Cir. 1974).
136. 484 F.2d at 1155. "Benefits" is an ambiguous term. In Palladino, the First Circuit
deemed the benefit of Miller to be its requirement that an obscenity law define specifically that
sexual conduct the description of which was proscribed. United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d
499, 501 (1st Cir. 1974). Thevis adopted a similar view. 484 F.2d at 1154. But the concept of
"benefits" in this context really connotes something far more pragmatic: namely, any aspect of
Miller that will afford a new trial to a person appealing an obscenity conviction. Thus,
petitioners have even used Miller's "contemporary community standards" language in the
hopes of winning a new trial. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974);
United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 840-42 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d
913, 921 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); United States v.
Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 21-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975); United States v.
Henson, 513 F.2d 156, 158 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Carter, 506 F.2d 1251, 1252 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. Ratner, 502 F.2d 1300, 1302 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1974). In all these cases,
petitioners attempted to win reversals of their convictions because the trial judge instructed the
jury to apply national standards rather than community standards, as prescribed by Miller.
Thus, in this context Miller's requirement on this point may be perceived as a benefit, even
though in other contexts it might be interpreted as a burden. This only underscores the fact that
the concept of "the benefits of Miller" is a phrase of distinctly protean significance.
137. 484 F.2d at 1155.
138. See United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 501 (lst Cir. 1974). See note 126 and
accompanying text supra.
139. United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192, 202 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Thevis,
526 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); United States v. Groner, 494 F.2d 499, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Sulaiman, 490 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. New Orleans Book
Mart, 490 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1974); United States v. Millican,
487 F.2d 331, 332 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 947 (1974); United States v. Cote, 485
F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. See United States v. Alexander, 498 F.2d 934, 935 (2d Cir. 1974).
141. See United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Jacobs, 513 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Henson, 513 F.2d 156, 158 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Elkins, 556 F.2d 978, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1977).
142. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
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which would serve to benefit petitioners must be
ple enunciated in Miller
143
applied in their case."
This language was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Marks,
in which the majority declared:
The Court of Appeals apparently thought that our remand in
Miller and the companion cases necessarily meant that Miller
standards were fully retroactive. . . .But the [quoted] passage
from Hamling . . .makes it clear that the remands carried no
such implication. Our 1973 cases were remanded for the courts
below to apply the "benefits" of Miller.'"
There are some difficulties with this holding, however, and they are best
emphasized by a closer examination of the Hamling case. The passage from
Hamling that is quoted in Marks appears in a paragraph in which the Court
also stated: "[o]ur prior decisions establish a general rule that a change in
the law occurring after a relevant event in a case will be given effect while
the case is on direct review . . . .Since the judgment in this case has not
become final, we examine the judgment against petitioners in the light of
principles laid down in the Miller cases." 145 In support of this proposition,
the key ruling cited by the Court was Linkletter v. Walker,146 a 1965
decision addressing the problem of whether to give retroactive effect to the
exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio. 147 The Court in Linkletter
148
had ruled that retrospectivity must be considered on a case-by-case basis;
it did, however, permit the application of the new constitutional principles
promulgated in Mapp to all cases pending on appeal at the time those
principles were first declared. 149 But two years after Linkletter, the Court
decided Stovall v. Denno,15° a case involving the issue of the retroactive
effect of the Court's earlier ruling in UnitedStates v. Wade.1 51 In the Wade
case, the Court had held that an identification of criminal defendants in a
post-indictment police "line-up" from which the defendant's attorney was
barred was inadmissible as evidence in any subsequent trial.152 The Court in
Stovall held that a choice in favor of retroactivity must be made after a
consideration of the following factors: "(a) the purpose to be served by the
143. Id. at 102.
144. 430 U.S. at 197 n.12.

145. 418 U.S. at 102 (citations omitted).
146. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
147. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp held that evidence obtained as the result of a search and
seizure that violated the right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment must be

excluded from admission in any subsequent criminal proceeding in state courts. Id. at 659.
148. 381 U.S. at 629.
149. Id.
150. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
151. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
152. Id. at 236-37.
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new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards."' 53 Accordingly, Stovall
adopted a rule of almost pure prospectivity, making those who had raised
the constitutional challenge in the Wade case the only retroactive beneficiaries of the new principles declared as a result of that challenge. This
approach was said to be grounded on considerations of practicality and "of
154
the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as dictum."
Cases like Marks present few problems under Stovall; the same is not
true for cases like Pallandinoand Thevis. Certainly, the language of the
remand in Miller does not, by itself, mandate retroactivity. Moreover, the
courts of appeal in Thevis and Palladinonever engaged in the balancing test
required by Stovall, although the concern for the efficient administration of
the federal court system should have been sufficient to compel such a
weighing process. The Supreme Court in Hamling was, however, guilty of
the same omission; it never even cited Stovall. Moreover, the language in
Marks, which appears to have interpreted the remand in Miller as a policy
choice to grant retroactive effect to the benefits of that decision, suggests
that obscenity prosecutions may well present an exception to the Stovall
rule. If so, Marks adds an important "clarifying gloss" to the Court's prior
decision in Hamling.
153. 388 U.S. at 297. The balancing test has been applied by the Court in a number of other
cases, some of which have granted retroactivity and some of which have not. See, e.g.,

Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 51-57 (1973) (denying retroactivity to the rule of North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), which held that while there exists no absolute bar to the
imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial, that sentence may not be the product of a
judge's vindictiveness toward a defendant who succeeded in getting his first conviction reversed); Ivan V. v. New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204-05 (1972) (holding retroactive the rule of In re

Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which ruled that in state proceedings involving juveniles, "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" was a requirement of due process); Elkanich v. United States, 401
U.S. 646, 650-56 (1971) (denying retroactivity to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969),
which limited searches incident to a lawful arrest to that area from within which the arrestee

could have obtained a weapon or incriminating evidence); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244, 249-54 (1969) (denying retroactivity to the rule of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967), which excluded evidence obtained through an unauthorized wiretap of any area where a
defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315
(1969) (holding retroactive the rule of Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), which deemed those

situations in which a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial
proceedings against the same defendant as exceptions to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation
clause); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-35 (1968) (holding nonretroactive Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), which extended the

Sixth Amendment's guarantee of jury trial to the states); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293,29495 (1968) (holding retroactive the rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), which
held that a conviction must be set aside even though the jury rendering it was instructed to
disregard the confession of a codefendant inculpating the one convicted).
154. 388 U.S. at 301.
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Aside from this complexity, Judge Bailey Aldrich's dissent in Palladino raises a more important problem: that case and Thevis involved the
retroactive application of the benefits of Miller; Marks concerned the
problem of whether to give retrospective effect to the burdens of Miller. In
Thevis, the Fifth Circuit had noted that it could not assume, "given ex post
facto considerations, that the Supreme Court intended to impose any detriment ensuing from the Miller standards on appellants"; 15 5 in Palladino,the
First Circuit had simply commented that the case presented no due process
or ex post facto problems. 156 Both these passages were dicta, and were
unrelated to the chief issues confronted by the First and Fifth Circuits. But
according to the Sixth Circuit in Marks, the cases that did deal with
retroactive application of the detriments of Miller, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Wassermcn 157 and the Ninth Circuit's opinion in
United States v. Jacobs,158 did so by relying erroneously on either Palladino, or Thevis or both. 15 9 That assertion is simply false. In Jacobs,
which involved a situation identical to that of Marks, the Ninth Circuit had
found a violation of due process by relying on Bouie.160 It cited Thevis
solely for the proposition that, should the government wish to retry Jacobs,
it would have to afford him the benefits of Miller.16 1 In Wasserman, the
Fifth Circuit had noted the problem even more clearly:
Thus Thevis held that where a defendant was tried under RothMemoirs standards, on appeal he may obtain any benefits to be
derived from the recent Miller decision. In the present case by
contrast, Wasserman and his co-defendants were tried under the
Miller standard, and they contend that this ex post facto application of a new obscenity standard to pre-Miller
162 acts was improper.
Thevis thus has no direct application here.
The application of Thevis 163 was at best, indirect, because "by applying
solely the benefits of Miller, [the Thevis court refused] to apply retroactively the detriments of Miller.'"1 The direct authority given for the holding in
Wasserman, however, was Boule and Jacobs."16 Similarly, the District of
Columbia Circuit, the only other court of appeals that has approached this
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1155 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 501 n.7 (1st Cir. 1974).
504 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974).
513 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974).
United States v. Marks, 520 F. 2d-913, 922 (6th Cir. 1975).
513 F.2d at 566 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964)).
Id. at 567.
504 F.2d at 1014.

163. The Fifth Circuit also cited Palladinoin a footnote as another example of a case of
indirect application. Id. at 1014 n.7.
164. Id. at 1014.
165. See id. at 1014-15.
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problem, applied the Bouie rule in reliance on Wasserman and Jacobs,
without even mentioning Thevis or Palladino.16 6 Thus, at least in this aspect
of its argument, the Sixth Circuit simply engaged in a tactic of deliberate
obfuscation. Nevertheless, the court of appeals did elsewhere suggest
genuine difficulties, which the Supreme Court subsequently glossed over.
(2) Residual Issues Raised by the Supreme Court's Opinion
(a) Applicability of the Bouie Rule
One issue that was not considered by the Sixth Circuit is whether the
Bouie rule is applicable to a case like Marks. In order to analyze this
question, the case of Bouie v. City of Columbia1 67 must be examined more
closely. South Carolina's criminal trespass statute prohibited entry upon the
property of another after "notice . . . prohibiting such entry. ' 168 The
defendants in Bouie were blacks who entered a local drug store and sat at
booths reserved for whites only. After doing so, the management requested
that they leave but the defendants refused. The South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the defendants' convictions for violating the criminal trespass laws. In doing so, it relied on the contemporaneous construction given
in a companion case to the effect that the statute in question proscribed not
only the act of entry on the premises of another after receiving notice not to
enter, but also the act of remaining on the premises of another after
receiving notice to depart. 169 The United States Supreme Court concluded
that South Carolina had punished the defendants "for conduct that was not
criminal at the time they committed it, and hence has violated the requirements of the Due Process Clause that a criminal statute give fair warning of
170
the conduct which it prohibits."
In reviewing the facts, the Court in Bouie was careful to identify what
the South Carolina Supreme Court had, in fact, done. The code section in
question was narrow and precise. It thus "lull[ed] the potential defendant
into a false sense of security, giving him no reason even to suspect that
conduct clearly outside the scope of the statute as written will be retroactive166. See United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Similarly,
the other federal courts that have declined to apply the burdens of Miller retrospectively did so
primarily on the authority of Boule. See Detco, Inc. v. McCann, 380 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); United States v. B & H Distrib. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 136, 144 (W.D. Wis. 1974);
United States v. Lang, 361 F. Supp. 380, 382 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
167. 378 U.S. 347 (1964)).
168. S.C. CODE § 16-836 (Supp. 1960).
169. City of Columbia v. Bouie, 239 S.C. 570,573, 124 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1961) (citing City of
Charleston v. Mitchell, 239 S.C. 376, 387, 123 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1961), rev'd, 378 U.S. 551

(1964)).
170. 378 U.S. at 350.
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ly brought within it by an act of judicial construction. ' 171 The effect of the
state court's decision was to give retrospective effect to an unforeseeably
broad construction of that precise statutory language. This was impermissible: "[i]f a judicial construction of a criminal statute is 'unexpected and
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
conduct at issue,' it must not be given retroactive effect." ' 172 The Court
found such an unexpected construction in the Bouie case. The terms of the
law itself did not indicate that they prohibited a person from remaining on
the premises of another after being asked to leave, and prior South Carolina
criminal cases did not support a different interpretation, but in fact emphasized that proof of notice before entry was a prerequisite to any conviction
under the statute. 173 The Court noted that the state supreme court had relied
on two factors in support of its ruling: several of its prior decisions that were
simply not on point174 and a construction by the North Carolina Supreme
Court of that state's own criminal trespass law, which was consistent with
prior rulings by other North Carolina tribunals. 175 Both of these factors were
dismissed as irrelevant by the United States Supreme Court: "[t]he South
Carolina Supreme Court's retroactive application of such a construction here
is no less inconsistent with the law of other States than it is with the prior
case law of South Carolina and, of course, with the language of the statute
itself." 176 Thus, the Bouie rule consists of three elements: (1) the retroactive application (2) of an unexpected, unforeseeable and inconsistent judicial interpretation (3) of narrow and precise statutory language.
However, did the facts in Marks fall within the ambit of the Bouie
rule? Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Marks, only one court of
appeals had even examined the ramifications of this problem. In United
States v. Wasserman,177 wherein the Fifth Circuit applied the Bouie rule,
the court admitted:
171. Id. at 352.
172. Id. at 354 (quoting J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 1960)).
173. 378 U.S. at 356 (citing State v. Green, 35 S.C. 266, 268, 14 S.E. 619, 620 (1892); State
v. Cockfield, 15 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 53, 55 (1867)).

174. See Shramek v. Walker, 152 S.C. 88, 99-100, 149 S.E. 331, 336 (1929) (civil trespass
action); State v. Williams, 76 S.C. 135, 142, 56 S.E. 783, 785 (1907) (prosecution for murder in
which the defense was raised that the victim was a trespasser who refused to obey an order to
leave).
175. See State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455,462, 101 S.E.2d 295,300 (1958). The Court noted
that under traditional principles of American law, an action for criminal trespass usually lies
when one enters the property of another after being told not to do so. 378 U.S. at 360-61 (citing
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1942); Brunson v. State, 140 Ala. 201,203, 37 So.
197, 198 (1904); Goldsmith v. State, 88 Ala. 55, 57, 5 So. 480, 480-81 (1889); Commonwealth v.
Richardson, 313 Mass. 632, 640, 48 N.E.2d 678, 682 (1943); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Fucello, 91
N.J.L. 476, 477, 103 A. 988, 989 (1918)).

176. 378 U.S. at 361.
177. 504 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Bouie is somewhat distinguishable in that judicial interpretation in
that case expanded the reach of the statute in an extreme and
unpredictable way while the judicial opinion with which we are
concerned [Miller] merely redefines "obscenity" in a manner
which in no way runs counter to the plain words of the statute [18
U.S.C. § 1461]. Miller did, however, represent a marked shift in
the scope of material deemed to be obscene. Therefore in terms of
notice to the defendant and the just application of criminal sanctions, we believe the effect on the defendant is the same. Prior to
Miller, a distributor of sexually oriented material could not recognize that material which simply lacked "serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value" could be constitutionally regulated.
As far as such a distributor could determine, he was protected as
long as the material was not utterly without redeeming social
value. To convict Wasserman for distribution of material which
was protected under the Roth-Memoirs standard violates the
rationale underlying Boule.
We do not go so far as to hold that the application of the
Miller standard to Wasserman violated the due process clause. We
do hold, however, that such a retroactive application is inappropriate without substantial justification outweighing the above discussed ex post facto considerations. Lacking such justification,
the conviction must be reversed. 178
Wasserman illustrates the pitfalls inherent in trying to be too scrupulous
about explaining a ground for decision. The initial sentence admitted that
Miller in no way established a definition contrary to the terms of section
1461; therefore a situation analogous to Bouie, in which a court gives an
unforeseeable reading to a facially precise law, was not presented. The Fifth
Circuit proceeded to argue by implication, however, that the Memoirs
definition of obscenity had in fact been "read into" section 1461, at least
until the Miller decision, and thus, the abrupt shift in emphasis signalled by
Miller constituted a denial of fair notice. The court of appeals, however,
then concluded that retroactive application of the detriments of Miller did
not violate the due process clause in Wasserman's case. Yet, the Bouie rule
is premised on the concept that the judicial action proscribed by that rule
does infringe constitutional rights to procedural due process. Consequently,
if such rights are not violated, it seems anomalous nevertheless to invoke the
rule. The Fifth Circuit glossed over this problem, and purported instead to
apply a balancing test to determine whether to give retrospective effect to
the burdens of Miller in obscenity cases. Such a technique was not advocated in Bouie; as a result, a new legal doctrine was, in effect, established
by the court of appeals in Wasserman.
Justice Powell's opinion in Marks avoids some of the more obvious
pitfalls that marked the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Wasserman. He also
178. Id. at 1015-16.
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admits that the case is not "strictly" analogous to Bouie. 17 9 Section 1465,
the statute involved'in Marks, is clearly not as narrow and precise as the
South Carolinia criminal trespass law considered in Bouie.180 Like the Fifth
Circuit, however, the Supreme Court assumed that the necessary precision
of the law in question was supplied by the Court's own judicial constructions.181 One confronts a problem in this regard, however. The Supreme
Court indicated in Hamling v. United States18 2 that the Miller standards in
general apply to federal obscenity legislation.183 The Court has never indicated that the Memoirs standards applied to such legislation, although a
number of lower federal courts have so held. 184 The Supreme Court never
IThastised these courts for making this assumption, at least until 1973. But is
this silence by the Court, which might be presumed to indicate approbation
of a certain construction placed upon federal obscenity statutes, an adequate
surrogate for the facial precision of a law, such as the statute involved in
Bouie? Arguably, not. The Court pointed out in Bouie that a person could
be lulled into a "false -ense of security" by overreliance on the text of a
statute as written. 185 How can a similar sense of security occur with respect
to a law that is facially broad, but which has been construed narrowly only
by lower federal courts? The differences in degree between these factual
situations would seem to produce a cumulative difference in kind.
Justice Powell did not adequately analyze this problem in Marks.
Indeed, his main concern was to determine if Miller represented an unforeseeable, unpredictable departure in the interpretation of section 1465. In
order to make such a determination, it was necessary to ascertain in what
body of law Miller effected a change: that represented by the Roth case or
that represented by the plurality opinion in Memoirs. As Justice Powell
noted, "[i]f indeed Roth, not Memoirs stated the applicable law prior to
of the Court of
Miller, there would be much to commend the apparent view186
law."
the
change
significantly
Appeals that Miller did not
The majority noted, in this regard, that when a court is completely
fragmented, its holding will be that of the justices who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds; under this rule, the holding in Memoiis
179. 430 U.S. at 195.
180. See note 168 supra.
181. 430 U.S. at 195.
182. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).

183. Id. at 105 (citing United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S.
123, 129-30 (1973)).

184. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
185. See note 171 and accompanying text supra.
186. 430 U.S. at 193.
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187
could indeed be construed as that presented by the plurality opinion.
Therefore, Justice Powell asserted that the plurality opinion provided the
"governing standards" in obscenity cases. But this assertion is false. The
plurality opinion in Memoirs, was, as the Tenth Circuit noted in United
States v. Friedman,188never entitled to binding effect. 189 In support of this
statement, the. Tenth Circuit pointed to the following language in the
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Pink:
Nor was our affirmance of the judgment . . . by an equally
divided court an authoritative precedent. While it was conclusive
and binding upon the parties as respects that controversy. . . the
lack of an agreement by a majority of the Court on the principles
of law involved prevents
191 it from being an authoritative determination for other cases.
If this is true in a situation where the justices on the Court are divided fourto-four, it should be even more apt where the statement "on the principles of
law involved" emanated from only three of the nine members on the
deciding tribunal. Thus, Justice Powell's broad assertion that Memoirs
provided a governing standard is invalid. It is true that all federal courts that
considered the problem between 1967 and 1973 elected to follow
Memoirs; 192 but the Supreme Court is certainly not bound by the choices of
inferior tribunals. Thus, the question that Justice Powell should have asked
is: between 1967 and 1973, did a majority of the Court itself ever adopt the
Memoirs standard or some other standard? This is especially advisable
when one remembers that two of the three members of the Memoirs
plurality, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, were no longer sitting on
the Court by 1973.
The period between 1967 and 1973 was one marked by the so-called
"Redrup reversals," 193 in which the Court overturned "convictions for the

187. Id.
188. 528 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 925 (1977). Friedman was the one other
decision by a federal court of appeals that has followed the rationale expressed by the Sixth

Circuit in Marks. The appellees in Friedmanhad been convicted in 1971 under section 1465 of
Title eighteen of the United States Cod for transporting in interstate commerce a book entitled
The Animal Lovers. After Miller was decided, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for
reconsideration. United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d 1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 1973). A retrial, in
which the Miller standards were applied, resulted in a second conviction. On appeal the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. It concluded that The Animal Lovers "would be considered obscene under
any standards, whether it be Memoirs, Miller or for that matter even those of ancient Sodom
and Gomorrah." 528 F.2d at 789.
189. 528 F.2d at 788.
190. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
191. Id. at 216. Accord, Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910); Berlin v. E. C.
Pub. Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 n.3 (2d Cir. 1964).

192. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
193.

See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
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dissemination of materials that at least five members of the Court, applying
their separate tests, deemed not to be obscene." 194 But even during this
period, there was some evidence to suggest that the Court might be leaning
toward the Memoirs standard. Thus, in the per curiam opinion of Landau v.
Fording,195 five justices, not including the members of the Memoirs plurality, 196 upheld a conviction based upon the finding by a state trial court that
197
the materials in question were obscene under the Memoirs standard.
Similarly, in Ginsberg v. New York, 198 five justices' 99 joined in an opinion
allowing special restrictions on the purveyance of obscenity to minors. In
doing so, they upheld a New York law that incorporated the Memoirs test in
modified form.2" ° Thus, prior to the changes of personnel on the Court that
occurred in 1969, there might have been some grounds to suspect that a
majority of the justices would, in fact, accept Memoirs.
In later cases, however, this contention becomes less plausible. Thus,
in United States v. Reidel,20 1 a section 1461 case,2 ' 2 six justices, including
Justice Brennan, 20 3 concluded that the Roth decision "remains the law in
194. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined
by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
195. 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
196. The five justices were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Harlan, Marshall
and White.
197. Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 830, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (1967). For
similar interpretations of the meaning of Landau, see United States v. A Motion Picture Film
Entitled "I Am Curious-Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, C.J., concurring); Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200, 206 n.15 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. B & H
Distrib. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 136, 143 (W.D. Wis: 1974).
198. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 88-92; Krislov, From
Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour in Obscenity Ligitation, 1968 Sup. CT.
REV. 153; Note, A Double Standard of Obscenity: The Ginsberg Decision, 3 VAL. L. REV. 57
(1968).
199. The five justices were Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Harlan, Marshall and White. Although he joined the opinion of the Court, however, Justice
Harlan filed a separate opinion in a companion case in which he reaffirmed his view that while
federal control of obscene materials should be limited to "hard core pornography," the Court
should defer to state determinations of obscenity except in those instances where such a
determination appears to be no more than the product of prudish over-zealousness. See
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 708 (1968) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
200. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(1)(F) (McKinney 1965)(repealed 1967):
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in
whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic
abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest
of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable for minors, and (iii) is utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors.
201. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
202. See 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970); note 8 supra.
203. The six justices were Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Harlan, Brennan, Stewart and Blackmun.
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this Court and governs this case. "204 The ruling in Memoirs was not even
discussed. One can, of course, argue that because Roth also involved the
constitutionality of section 1461,205 it was deemed to be governing precedent; but if so, this suggests that Roth, not Memoirs, always remained the
controlling rule in federal cases, 20 6 a point that Justice Powell disputes in
Marks. The difficulties are exacerbated by Kois v. Wisconsin,2 7 a case
decided in 1972 involving a conviction under state obscenity laws. In that
case, seven justices 2 8 again ignored Memoirs and ruled that the applicable
standard was the "prurient interest" test of Roth .2 0 These cases suggest
that by 1970, and certainly by 1972, no majority of the Court was willing to
accept the Memoirs standards as governing, and that therefore those stan2 10
dards did not in any sense constitute the law.
Is this interpretation borne out by a consideration of the Miller opinion
itself? The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Thevis2 11 did not seem to think
so; it claimed that the Court in Miller viewed the Memoirs standard as the
source of previous judicial limits on the powers of legislatures to impose
criminal sanctions for the distribution of obscenity, citing general language
in Miller to that effect. 2 12 But the court in Thevis may well have read too
204. 402 U.S. at 354.
205. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
206. The attempted distinction is further undermined by the fact that consolidated with
Roth was Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), a case involving an obscenity prosecution
under state law. See note 3 supra. Thus, Roth stated a rule generally applicable to both state
and federal proceedings.
207. 408 U.S. 229 (1972). Kois involved a prosecution under a Wisconsin obscenity statute
for the publication in an underground newspaper of pictures of nudes and of a sex poem. The
Court reversed one count of the petitioner's conviction, finding that the poem as a whole did
not possess a dominant appeal to prurient interest. Id. at 232. See notes 641-643 and accompanying text infra.
208. The only dissenter in Kois was Justice Douglas, 408 U.S. at 232-33 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 232 (Stewart, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 230.
210. Accord, United States v. Groner, 479 F.2d 577, 580-82 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973). The quotation represents the views of Judge Gewin, joined by
Judges Bell, Coleman, Ainsworth, Dyer, Ingraham and Roney. Judge Clark concurred separately, finding the tripartite standard of Memoirs applicable. 479 F.2d at 588 (Clark, J.,
concurring). Judge Thornberry, joined by Chief Judge Brown and Judges Wisdom, Goldberg,
Godbold, Simpson and Morgan essentially agreed that the trial court had not erred in relying on
the tripartite test. Id. at 590 (Thorberry, J., dissenting). So a total of seven judges in Groner
prevailed on this issue. The dissenters argued that Roth itself had formulated a patent offensiveness test for obscenity because in that case Justice Brennan cited with approval the
definition set forth in the Model Penal Code, see note 21 supra. 479 F.2d at 590. It is true that
Justice Brennan cited that definition, but there is no indication that he adopted its language as a
test for determining obscenity vel non. Accord, SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 102.
211. 484 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932 (1974).
212. 484 F.2d at 1152 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973)).
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much into the Supreme Court's opinion. The criticism has been cogently
presented by Judge Doyle in his opinion in United States v. B & H
DistributingCorp. :213
In Miller the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction for distributing obscene material in violation of a California statute that
limited prosecution to "matter which is utterly without redeeming
social importance.". .. The Miller observation, relied on by
Thevis . . . that Memoirs "was correctly regarded at the time of
trial as limiting state prosecution under the controlling case law"
must be read together with the immediately preceding statement
that "this case was tried on the theory that the California obscenity statute sought to incorporate the tripartite test of Memoirs"
...
I find the former passage ambiguous as to whether Miller
viewed Memoirs as only the controlling California standard, or
also as the controlling constitutional standard. At the outset of the
Miller opinion, the Court described the constitutional standard set
forth in Roth as a balancing test between free expression of ideas
and the social interest in order and morality. It characterized the
Memoirs plurality standard as a "drastically altered- test" that
gave absolute protection to any material not "utterly without
redeeming social value.". . . The Court also remarked. . . that
only "the necessity of circumstances" justified the series of summary reversals of obscenity convictions which followed Redrup v.
New York. . . . Although not directly controverting the Thevis
interpretation, these remarks raise additional doubts as
214to whether
Miller viewed Memoirs as a constitutional standard.
Other passages in Miller support Judge Doyle's reading. It was thus stated
in Miller that "[a]part from the initial formulation in the Roth" case no
majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a standard
to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to
regulation under the States' police power.'"215 Similarly, both the majority
in Miller and Justice Brennan's dissent in ParisAdult Theater I reiterated
the point that the Memoirs standard never represented the views of more
than three justices on the Court. 2 16 In light of all these statements, it would
seem that the majority in Miller never believed that Memoirs had been a
source of governing law in obscenity cases. Thus, at least from the perspective of the Supreme Court, as expressed in Miller, Kois and leidel, the
controlling standard between 1957 and 1973 was, and always had been, that
of Roth.
This yields one additional question: is Miller a sharp departure from
Roth? Justice Powell in Marks assumed that this question could only be
213.
214.
215.
216.

375 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
Id. at 142-43 n.7 (citations omitted).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined

by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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answered in the negative. This is an accurate assumption. Certainly part (a)
of the Miller test, relating to "prurient interest," does no more than restate
Roth. But part (b) of that test, relating to "patent offensiveness," was never
adverted to in Roth. This concept first appeared in Justice Harlan's opinion
in ManualEnterprisesv. Day217 and was later adopted by Justice Brennan's
219
opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio2 18 and then by the plurality in Memoirs.
However, as Jacobellis points out, this test of patent offensiveness is based
on certain language in the Model Penal Code 220 that was quoted approvingly
by the Court in Roth.221 One could thus perhaps argue that this element of
the Miller criteria was implicit in Roth, although not as a full-fledged test
for differentiating obscenity from protected speech. As for part (c) of the
Miller standard, which relates to literary, artistic, political or scientific
value, the Court in Roth did point out that obscenity was not entitled to First
Amendment protection because it was utterly lacking in social importance. 222 Again, however, this language forms no part of the definition
utilized in Justice Brennan's 1957 opinion; that came later, in his plurality
opinions in Jacobellisand Memoirs.223 Thus, upon closer examination, two
aspects of the tripartite Miller test do mark a significant departure from
Roth. But they do not mark an unpredictable departure thoroughly inconsistent with prior case law, as Bouie requires. The evolution of the Court's
views on this subject from Roth to Miller was not sudden and unexpected,
and could be gauged by a consideration of intervening opinions. Thus, one
is left with the inevitable conclusion that the Bouie rule, as stated by the
Court in 1964, simply has no application to a case like Marks.
Was the decision in Marks therefore incorrect? As a matter of constitutional law, yes; as a matter of policy, perhaps not. While lower courts were
never obliged to give binding effect to the plurality opinion in Memoirs, it is
easy to see why they chose to do so. That opinion provided specific,
succinct guidelines, however inadequate, by which obscenity could be
determined. No doubt Memoirs appeared to provide a relative haven of
certainty in what was otherwise an area of stormy confusion in the law.
Recognizing this, the majority in Marks perhaps decided to deny retroactive
application of the burdens of Miller in order to alleviate, in part, problems
217. 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
218. 378 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
219. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). See note 23 and accompanying
text supra. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 102-05.
220. See note 21 supra.
221. 354 U.S. at 487 n.20.
222. Id. at 484.
223. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,418 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,
191 (1964). See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 137.
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that it had created for lower federal courts and criminal defendants due to its
vacillation prior to Miller. As a judicial policy choice, this is an acceptable
option. One merely regrets that the Court attempted to fit the Bouie rule
onto the Procrustean bed engendered by this choice. The deformed result
creates some uncertainty about whether the newly-expanded scope of that
rule will cover factual situations arising in contexts other than obscenity.
Yet, one can understand why the Court in Marks chose to apply Bouie in a
creative fashion. The other alternative would be to acknowledge that, at
least prior to Miller and its companion cases, the federal obscenity statutes
had never received an authoritative judicial construction incorporating sufficiently specific standards to rebut a claim of vagueness. The result of such
an acknowledgement might be to invalidate all convictions under those
statutes that were based on conduct occurring before June 21, 1973, and that
were not yet final. Undoubtedly, the majority in Marks considered this
alternative to be unacceptable, which is why they elected to manipulate the
Bouie rule as they did.
(b) The Power of Appellate Courts to Make an Initial Finding of Obscenity
There remains one final issue in Marks. The Sixth Circuit in that case
asserted that the materials in question were obscene under either the Miller
or the Memoirs standard;124 it apparently regarded the error of the trial judge
in framing jury instructions solely on the basis of Miller as essentially
harmless. Thus, an issue was raised about the power of appellate courts to
make independent initial determinations on the issue of obscenity under a
given judicial standard. The problem is a troublesome one. In the Thevis
case, for example, the Fifth Circuit itself inspected the magazines in question and determined whether they were obscene under both Memoirs and
Miller.2 'S This technique has been applied by the Fifth Circuit in other cases
similar to Thevis, where the appellate court was asked to give retrospective
effect to the benefits of Miller.226 In the Wasserman case, however, in
224. United States v. Marks, 520 F.2d 913, 922 (6th Cir. 1975). It did so apparently without
having ever viewed the films that were the subject of the prosecution in the first place. See id.
at 932 n.1 (McCree, J., dissenting). The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d
1141 (10th Cir. 1973), did not take a similar position. On an appeal from the first conviction in
that case, it did not apply Miller unilaterally, but remanded it for a new trial. Id. at 1142. See
note 188 supra.
225. See United States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1155-57 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418

U.S. 932 (1974).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192,202 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Thevis, 526 F.2d 989,993 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733,738 (5th Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975); United States v. Groner, 494 F.2d 499, 501 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Sulaiman, 490 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. New Orleans Book
Mart, 490 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1007 (1974); United States v. Millican,
487 F.2d 331, 332 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 947 (1974); United States v. Cote, 485
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which the issue was the retroactivity of the burdens of Miller, the Fifth
Circuit drew the line as follows:
Although in a Thevis-type situation the appellate court will
apply the benefits of Miller without requiring a remand . . . it
would be inappropriate for this court to usurp the jury function of
applying the Roth-Memoirs test to the materials at issue. Under
Thevis, the application of the Miller test by the appellate court is
justified since the Miller formulation was unavailable to the trial
court. In the present case, however, the trial court erroneously
failed to employ the appropriate existing standard as set forth in
Roth-Memoirs. 27
This position makes a good deal of sense. While courts do have an independent duty of review in cases, like those involving obscenity, where issues of
"constitutional fact" are present, this power should not be abused so as to
infringe the right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions, as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court in Marks seemed to recognize
this point when it asserted:
The Court of Appeals stated, apparently without viewing the
materials . . . that in its opinion the materials here were obscene
under either Memoirs or Miller. . . . Such a conclusion, absent
other dependable means of knowing the character of the materials, is of dubious value. But even if we accept the court's
conclusion, under these circumstances it is not an adequate substitute for the decision in the first instance of a properly instructed
jury, as to this important element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. §
1465.Y
In light of this statement, one must also wonder about the pennissibility of
the Fifth Circuit's action in Thevis-type cases. In such situations, a conclusion by the appellate court would also seem to be an inadequate substitute
for the judgment of a jury. Thus, although the Court in Marks limited its
comments to the circumstances of the case, its broad assertion suggested
that the powers of courts of appeal in this respect are very limited.
In sum, Marks is a case in which the result seems correct, but the
rationale underlying that result seems incorrect. The decision would seem to
require an elaborate due process analysis any time a new judicial construcF.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1973). Of the three circuits that have followed Thevis, two have
indicated that the court of appeals may itself review the materials in question under the
combined Memoirs-Miller test. See United States v. Alexander, 498 F.2d 934, 935 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499, 501 (Ist Cir. 1974). See also United States v.
One Reel of 35mm Color Motion Picture Film Entitled "Sinderella," 491 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206, 210 (lst Cir. 1973) (both cases where the
trial antedated Miller, but the appellate court heard the case afterwards and applied Miller
without remanding).
227. United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1016 n.11 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations
omitted).
228. 430 U.S. at 196-97 n.11 (citations omitted).
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tion of an obscenity statute yields a change in the kind of evidence needed
for a conviction. This analysis would be necessary regardless of how
unforeseeable, as a practical matter, that change was, or to what extent there
existed a fixed body of prior law that could be said to have been changed.
3. Splawn v. California: ProceduralErrorsand the PanderingProblem
The most difficult problems presented in any of the four obscenity
cases decided this term were raised by Splawn v. California.229This decision dealt with a number of crucial issues relating to appellate review of
alleged procedural errors committed by a state trial court, particularly in the
areas of instructions to the jury, and the criteria by which an ex post facto
claim is to be judged. More importantly, the majority in Splawn and Justice
Stevens in his disseit raised troubling questions about the current scope of
the doctrine of pandering in obscenity prosecutions, particularly the extent
to which that doctrine has been affected by the new concept of commercial
speech espoused in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. VirginiaCitizens
Consumer Council.230
a. The Decision
Roy Splawn was convicted in 1971 of selling two reels of obscene film
in violation of section 311.2 of the California Penal Code. 231 The California
obscenity law2 32 essentially incorporates the tripartite definition of obscenity
advanced by the plurality in Memoirs v. Massachusetts;233 section 31 1(a)(2)
of that law, added by the California legislature in 1969 after Splawn's
offense occurred, reads:
In prosecutions under this chapter, where circumstances of
production, presentation, sale, dissemination, distribution or publicity indicate that matter is being commercially exploited by the
defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal, such evidence is
probative with respect to the nature of the matter and can justify
the conclusion
234 that the matter is utterly without redeeming social
importance.
229. 431 U.S. 595 (1977).
230. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
231. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2(a) (West Supp. 1977):

Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be
brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares,
publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to others or who offers to
distribute, distributes, or exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
232. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a) (West Supp. 1978.) See note 36 supra.
233. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
234. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311(a)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
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Splawn was duly convicted. After a state appellate court upheld this judgment, the Supreme Court in 1974 vacated that conviction23 5 and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of Miller v. California,16 which set
forth the standards by which the constitutionality of section 311 as a whole
was to be determined. In a separate case decided in 1976, the California
Supreme Court ruled that the statute satisfied the requirements articulated in
Miller.23 7 The state court of appeal then reaffirmed Splawn's conviction and
the state supreme court denied review of the judgment. 238
Splawn presented a number of contentions on appeal. The first was that
the trial judge's instruction to the jury constituted reversible error. The
challenged portion of the instruction reads as follows:
In determining the question of whether the allegedly obscene
matter is utterly without redeeming social importance, you may
consider the circumstances of sale and distribution, and particularly whether such circumstances indicate that the matter was
being commercially exploited by the defendants for the sake of its
prurient appeal. Such evidence is probative with respect to the
nature of the matter and can justify the conclusion that the matter
is utterly without redeeming social importance. The weight, if any,
such evidence is entitled [to] is a matter for you, the Jury to
determine.
Circumstances of production and dissemination are relevant
to determining whether social importance claimed for material
was in the circumstances pretense or reality. If you conclude that
the purveyor's sole emphasis is in the sexually provocative aspect
of the publication, that fact can justify the conclusion
23 9 that the
matter is utterly without redeeming social importance.
In an opinion written for the Court, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun and Powell, ruled that evidence of pandering was admissible on the issue of obscenity vel non. In
support of this assertion, he cited the Court's prior rulings in Ginzburg v.
United States24° and Hamling v. UnitedStates.241 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that the Court in Hamling had upheld an instruction similar to
the one at issue in Splawn. 242 Moreover, he remarked that Hamling and
Ginzburg
235. Splawn v. California, 414 U.S. 1120 (1973).
236. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
237. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71,81,545 P.2d 229,235, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317,323

(1976).
238. 431 U.S. at 597.
239. Id. at 597-98 (quoting Brief for Appellee, at 38-39).

240. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). For an analysis of this case, see notes 333-352 and accompanying
text infra.
241. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
242. 431 U.S. at 599 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974)). The trial
judge in Hamling had instructed the jury to apply the tripartite Memoirs test of obscenity and,
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were prosecutions under federal obscenity statutes in federal
courts, where our authority to review jury instructions is a good
deal broader than is our power to upset state-court convictions by
reason of instructions given during the course of a trial. .

.

.We

can exercise the latter authority only if the instruction renders the
subsequent conviction violative of the United States Constitution.
Questions of what categories of evidence may be admissible and
probative are otherwise for the courts of the States to decide. 24 3
Splawn also contended that his conviction violated the ex post facto
prohibition contained in article one of the Constitution, 244 and that it
contravened the fair notice principle established in Bouie v. City of
Columbia.245 The claim based on Bouie was rejected because the majority
found no attempt by the California courts to give retrospective effect to a
new and unforeseeable interpretation of a state law. 246 The ex post facto
argument was dismissed because it was said that section 311(a) "does not
create any new substantive offense, but merely declares what type of
evidence may be received and considered in deciding whether the matter in
question was 'utterly without redeeming social importance.' "247 Justice
Rehnquist observed that Splawn's ex post facto argument was based upon
the petitioner's reading of the California Supreme Court's 1967 ruling in
People v. Noroff.248 The petitioner claimed that under the Noroff rule
evidence such as that admitted at his trial would be inadmissible were it not
for the enactment of section 311(a)(2). The Court repudiated this contention, noting that the court of appeal in Splawn said of Noroff that it did not
" 'disapprove of any use of evidence of pandering for its probative value on
the issue of whether the material was obscene. It merely rejected the concept
of pandering of non-obscene material as a separate crime under the existing
laws of California.' "249 Since the majority claimed that the ex post facto
determination must "turn on a proper reading of the California decisions,'" 50 this language by the court of appeal was deemed to foreclose the
need to make any such determination." 1 Accordingly, the Court affirmed
Splawn's conviction.
if it found the case to be close, also to consider whether the mateiisals in question had been
pandered by looking to their "'[m]anner of distribution, circumstances of production, sale,
. . . advertising . .
Appellee, at 245).

.

. [and] editorial intent.....'

243. 431 U.S. at 599 (citations omitted).
244. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl.
1: "No State shall.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

418 U.S. at 130 (quoting Brief for

. .

pass any.

. .

ex post facto Law

378 U.S. 347 (1964). See notes 167-176 and accompanying text supra.
431 U.S. at 601.
Id. at 600.
67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967).
431 U.S. at 600-01 (quoting Petition for Certiorari, at ix app.).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, dissented,
expressing his oft-stated view that section.311 as a whole was unconstitutionally overbroad.2 52 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart
and Marshall, also dissented, but proffered a far more interesting argument.
He contended that the pandering doctrine of Ginzburg v.United States253
could not survive the ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,254 which had held that commercial
speech is protected by the First Amendment unless such speech is deceptive
or otherwise subject to regulation.255 Accordingly, he claimed:
Truthful statements which are neither misleading nor offensive are protected by the First Amendment even though made for
a commercial purpose. . . .Nothing said on petitioner's behalf in
connection with the marketing of these films was false, misleading, or even arguably offensive either to the person who bought
them or to an average member of the community. The statements
did make it clear that the films were "sexually provocative," but
that is hardly a confession that they were obscene. And-, if they
were not otherwise obscene, I cannot understand how these
6 films
lost their protected status by being truthfully described.25
Consequently, Justice Stevens said he would not send Splawn to jail "for
telling the truth about his shabby business."257
He also found that Splawn had presented a cognizable ex post facto
claim. Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens construed the decision of the
California Supreme Court in Noroff as one barring any submission of
evidence of pandering to the jury. "After petitioner's offense, the California
Legislature retroactively adopted Ginzburg by statute. In my view, petitioner had the right to rely on the Noroff decision, and to believe that he was
entitled to truthfully advertise otherwise nonobscene material. "28 Thus, on
this issue also, the dissenters detected reversible error.
b. Analysis
For so brief an opinion, Splawn raises a surprisingly large number of
troublesome questions. Perhaps the best method of dealing with these
questions is to divide the analysis of the case into three sections dealing with
252. Id. at 601-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joihed by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
253. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
254. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

255. 431 U.S. at 603 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
JJ.). Justice Brennan, the author of the majority opinion in Ginzburg, did not join in this
footnote. Id.
256. Id. at 602-03 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens also argued that truthful advertising

ought to be encouraged because it provides "a warning to those who find erotic materials
offensive that they should shop elsewhere for other kinds of books ...

257. Id.
258. Id. at 604-05 n.4.

."

Id. at 604.
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(a) the problem of the scope of review of jury instructions, (b) the ex post
facto problem and (c) the pandering problem.
(1) Scope of Review of Jury Instructions
In reviewing Splawn's claims, Justice Rehnquist initially asserted that
the Court's power to upset state court convictions because of allegedly
erroneous jury instructions was extremely limited. Citing Cupp v. Naughton1 9 and Henderson v. Kibbe,2" he argued that in such a situation,
reversal was mandated only if the instruction renders the conviction violative of the Constitution. 261 While both of these cases involved state prosecutions, and the constitutional validity of jury instructions given therein, both,
unlike Splawn, involved collateral attacks on the convictions in question.
The significance of this fact was explicitly noted in each decision.
Cupp involved a "presumption of truthfulness" instruction 262 that was
challenged, after exhaustion of all remedies in state court, in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. The Court in that case noted:
Before a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a
state trial in which this instruction was used, it must be established
not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even
"universally condemned," but that it violated some right which
was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment. 263
Similarly, in Henderson, which involved a challenge by a habeas corpus
petitioner based on a New York trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on
the issue of causation in a murder case, the Court said:
The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so
prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the
showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal. The
question in such a collateral proceeding is "whether the ailing
instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process," Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S.
141, 147, not merely whether "the instruction is undesirable,
erroneous or even 'universally condemned,' " id., at 146.2m
The net effect of Henderson and Cupp is to place severe limits on the power
of federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings to overturn state court
convictions because of faulty jury instructions. In that particular context,
259. 414 U.S. 141 (1973).
260. 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
261. 431 U.S. at 599.

262. Under the ruling of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970), the dictates of due process
require that guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be proven, even in delinquency proceedings.
263. 414 U.S. at 146.

264. 431 U.S. at 154 (citation omitted).
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these limits are sensible. The desirability of conferring collateral relief is
countervailed by the need to preserve the finality of state court judgments,
especially if a habeas corpus proceeding is initiated many years after the
state conviction, when it may be impossible, as a practical matter, to
265
conduct a retrial.
The Cupp-Henderson doctrine has no applicability to a case like
Splawn, however. The petitioner therein lodged his challenge against the
trial judge's instructions while the case was on direct appeal; no collateral
attack was involved. Thus, it would seem that in the specific context of state
obscenity prosecutions, Splawn applied a standard of review appropriate for
considering the merits of collateral attacks to a judgment being contested on
direct appeal, where the reasons for implementing such a standard are not
present. If the Cupp-Henderson standard is inapposite in such a situation,
one may still ask what reviewing criterion should control direct appeals like
the one involved in Splawn.
Henderson implies, at the very least, that the burden of proof to
establish reversible error with respect to a jury instruction is significantly
less onerous in a direct appeal. In the context of obscenity cases, the key
Supreme Court decision discussing the appropriate burden of proof is
Hamling v. United States.266 In that case, the petitioner, in an appeal from
his conviction under section 1461 of Title eighteen of the United States
Code, 267 argued that the instruction of the trial judge advising the jury to
apply national standards in its determination of obscenity vel non
constituted reversible error, because the Court in Millerv. California268 had
mandated the application of local community standards. There were eighteen questioned references to national standards in the instructions in Hamling, which admittedly encompassed a wider geographical basis for deriving
criteria by which obscenity could be judged than was warranted under
Miller. The Court held that these references did not require reversal absent a
showing that they "would have materially affected the deliberations of the
jury." 2 69 Clearly, this test is less restrictive than that expressed in Cupp and
Henderson. Should it have been applied in the Splawn case?
Several decisions emanating from the Ninth Circuit suggest that this
question ought to be answered affirmatively. In United States v. Dachstein265. See id. at 154 n.13; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 83 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 256-66 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Sanders
v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J.,dissenting).
266. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.

267. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). See note 8 supra.
268. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
269. 418 U.S. at 108.
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er,270 another section 1461 prosecution, the trial court judge also issued jury
instructions incorporating references to "contemporary national community
standards" rather than to the standards of the judicial district from which the
jurors were drawn. Since there was no proof that the national standards were
more stringent than local ones, the Ninth Circuit applied Hamling, and said,
"[jiudging from the evidence, arguments and instructions in this case, [the
defendant] was not significantly prejudiced by the trial judge's erroneous
27 1
instructions on national standards."
In contrast, in United States v. Henson,272 the Ninth Circuit reached a
different result. The defendant in Henson was prosecuted under section
1462 of Title eighteen of the United States Code,27 which forbids interstate
transportation of obscene materials. There, also, instructions on national
standards were tendered to the jury. But in that case, the government
introduced expert testimony disclosing that the hypothetical national standard "likely would tolerate less sexual candor than the attitudes prevailing
in Southern California [where the trial was conducted] or in the State of
California as a Whole."274 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such
efforts by the government to posit a less libertarian national standard
ensured that any jury instruction embodying a reference to that standard
275
would be so prejudicial as to require a new trial.
Finally, in United States v. Cutting,2 76 the court of appeals discussed
the problem of prejudice at length. National standards were mentioned in
Cutting only in the jury instructions and once in the defense counsel's
270. 518 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975).
271. 518 F.2d at 22.
272. 513 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1975).

273. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970):
Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion
picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; or

[w~hoever knowingly takes from such express company or other common carrier
any matter or thing the carriage of which is herein made unlawfulshall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or

both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
274. 513 F.2d at 158 (emphasis in original). The government had introduced the expert
testimony of Homer Young, a former FBI agent and then Director of the Administration of

Justice Department at California Lutheran College. He claimed that the contemporary standards of California were far less stringent than those of the nation as a whole.
275. Id.
276. 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976).
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closing arguments; 277 no evidence was admitted to show that the putative
national standard was any stricter than that prevalent in the Central District
of California, where the trial occurred.2 7 8 Thus, the case could be, and was,
distinguished from Henson. In making such a distinction, the court noted
that the essence of prejudice in these cases was whether or not the challenged instruction led the jury to apply some specialized test other than that
consisting of the "average person, applying contemporary community standards." 279 Therefore,
[p]rejudice does not depend on whether the [local and national]
standards differ in fact, but whether the jury thought they did. A
remand to determine whether the national standard is more or less
strict than the local standard would be an exercise in futility. To be
relevant to the question of prejudice the hearing would have to
determine whether the jurors thought the two standards differed,
and if so, whether they thought the national standard was stricter.
Obviously such a hearing would be inappropriate. The question of
prejudice is to be resolved on what the record shows as to the
probability that the reference to a national standard would have
materially affected the deliberations of the jury.2M
At this juncture, two questions could be raised: does the "materially
affect the deliberations of the jury" criterion apply to all types of jury
instructions, or only to instructions relating to contemporary community
standards? If the former characterization is accurate, does it apply only in
federal cases, such as Hamling, Dachsteiner, Henson and Cutting? The
Court in Hamling also confronted a challenge to a trial instruction on the
issue of pandering. It held such an instruction permissible "as long as the
proper constitutional definition of obscenity is applied,' '281 but said nothing
about what the criterion for reviewing such an instruction would be. In
Splawn, the petitioner contended that the instruction given by the California
trial judge allowed the jury to convict him for advertising material that was
not obscene per se under the Miller standards. 28 2 This contention raises the
same issue discussed by Hamling and the Ninth Circuit: whether the
challenged instruction prejudiced the jury against the defendant, causing it
to fit the evidence adduced at trial into an incorrect theoretical framework.
277. Id. at 840-41.
278. Id. at 841.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 841-42. Of course, this level of scrutiny applies only to jury instructions.
Instructions to a grand jury that incorporate an erroneous test for obscenity will not serve to
invalidate an indictment. United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Slepicoff, 524 F.2d 1244, 1247 (5th Cir. 1975).
281. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130(1974). Of course, if onefails to object toa

particular pandering instruction, one forfeits the right to argue any error on appeal. United
States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971).

282. 431 U.S. at 597.
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Indeed, Cutting's discussion of prejudice asia concept would appear to be
useful in a variety of contexts. It would appear to suggest that the "materially affect the deliberations of the jury" test comprises a general standard
that should be applied by an appellate court whenever it reviews an instruction in an obscenity case on direct appeal. Applying the Hamling standard to
the facts in Splawn, it could be argued that the challenged instruction did, in
fact, constitute error that materially influenced the jury's consideration on
the issue of obscenity vel non. By instructing that "commercial exploitation
for the sake of prurient appeal" justified the conclusion that the material
being exploited was utterly without redeeming social value,2 83 the trial judge
permitted the jury to apply a "specialized test" to the defendant's disadvantage. Even if the trier of fact found inadequate evidence to support a finding
of obscenity under the Memoirs standard, which is embodied in the California penal code, it could nevertheless render a guilty verdict by concluding
that material not obscene in the abstract became proscribable because of the
manner in which it was merchandised. Such a result would clearly be
improper. As Professor Schauer observed, "no amount of pandering can
render a clearly nonobscene work obscene, and without some evidence of
prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and lack of value, the question of
pandering is irrelevant. '"2" The effect of the trial judge's instruction in
Splawn is to make pandering the decisive criterion by which lack of social
value is to be ascertained. In so doing, it makes one component of the
definition of obscenity depend upon evidence purportedly admitted for the
sole purpose of assisting the jury in deciding close cases where there is
already independent evidence of prurient appeal, patent offensiveness and
lack of value. So under the Hamling standard of review, the jury instruction
in Splawn would seem to constitute reversible error. But one could argue
that, even assuming that the Hamling criterion applied to instructions on
pandering, it does not govern federal appellate review of state prosecutions.
While it is true that the test of Hamling has been analyzed solely in the
context of federal cases, that test, articulated in a case involving an obscenity prosecution being challenged on direct appeal, would seem to be far
more relevant to Splawn than the doctrines espoused in Cupp and Henderson. Both of the latter cases involved collateral attacks on state court
judgments in habeas corpus proceedings; neither of them concerned prosecution for the dissemination of obscene materials. Thus, while Justice
Rehnquist may be correct in asserting that the state has wide discretion in
determining the categories of admissible evidence in trials conducted in its
283. See note 239 and accompanying text supra.
284. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 85.
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courts, he neglects to take into account the Supreme Court's duty to subject
such evidence, and the instructions relating to it, to exacting review; "it
remains the function and obligation of the appellate court to restrict obscenity findings to the guidelines of the Miller case, both as to legal and factual
determinations. '"285 Thus, in Jenkins v. Georgia,286 the key post-Miller
case reviewing a. conviction under state obscenity laws, the Court focused
on the jury's fact-finding process, and emphasized that the scope of review
in general is greater where the issues under review involve First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. 287 If so, the restrictive Cupp-Henderson test
288
would simply seem to be inapposite in a case like Splawn.
Even if one assumes otherwise, however, there remains another problem with the scope of review utilized in Splawn. In Ginzburg v. United
States,289 the case that established the concept of pandering, the Supreme
Court defined its reviewing function as follows:
In the cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since Roth [v. UnitedStates], it has regarded the materials as
sufficient in themselves for the determination of the question. In
the present case, however, the prosecution charged the offense in
the context of the circumstances of production, sale, and publicity
and assumed that, standing alone, the publications themselves
might not be obscene. We agree that the question of obscenity
may include consideration of the setting in which the publications
were presented as an aid to determining the question of obscenity,
and assume without deciding that the prosecution could not have
succeeded otherwise. As . . . did the courts below. . . we view
the publications against a background of commercial exploitation
of erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal. The record
in that regard amply supports the decision of the trial jude that
the mailing of all three publications offended the statute.29'
The majority in Ginzburg then proceeded to scrutinize in detail the evidence
of pandering, including the choice of a place from which the material in
question was mailed, the extent of the mailings actually made and the nature
of the advertising brochures used to promote the material in question. 291 On
the basis of such a scrutiny, the majority concluded that this evidence
resolved all "ambiguity and doubt." ' 292 The upshot of Ginzburg, then, is
that an appellate court always has the duty to review the sufficiency of the
285. Id. at 115.
286. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
287. See id. at 160.
288. Indeed, United States v. Young, 465 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1972), held that error inherent
in a pandering instruction will be considered harmless only if it had no effect on the outcome of
the case. rd. at 1099-1100.
289. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).

290. Id. at 465-66 (citation & footnotes omitted).
291. See id. at 466-73.
292. Id. at 470.
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evidence underlying the conviction in an obscenity prosecution. Indeed, this
proposition was reiterated in Smith v. UnitedStates,293 a case decided in the
same term as Splawn. Where the issue is one of whether the materials in
themselves are obscene, an appellate court will be satisfied if those materials
have been introduced into evidence at trial. 294 Hard core pornography
presumably "can and does speak for itself. '"295 But where the issue is
whether the defendant engaged in pandering, Ginzburg suggests that a court
of appeals must make an independent review of the evidence underlying a
charge to the jury on that issue, in order to ascertain whether that evidence
was sufficient to warrant such a charge. 296 Once again, one might respond
that Ginzburg was a federal prosecution, and perhaps different standards
ought to apply in cases involving convictions under state law. But such a
contention is faulty. Ginzburg establishes the general doctrine of pandering,
purportedly defining the constitutionally permissible uses to which that
293. 431 U.S. 291, 305-06 (1977).
294. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 84, 104 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,
122 n.5 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973); United States v.
Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975); United States v. Wild,
422 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971); Kahm v. United States, 300
F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962). The rule has been succinctly stated by
the Ninth Circuit: "United States v. Hamling [sic] . . .supports the proposition that, if the
government does rely upon exhibits which meet the Miller test and wins, the defendant is not
entitled to a reversal for insufficient evidence." United States v. Obscene Magazines, Film &
Cards, 541 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir. 1976).
295. United States v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971),
quoted in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973). See also United States v.
Davis, 353 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966); Kahm v. United
States, 300 F.2d 78, 84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962); United States v. Womack,
294 F.2d 204, 205-06 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961).
296. For other cases utilizing the concept of reviewing evidence of pandering in order to
test its "sufficiency," see United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Dachsteiner, 518 F.2d 20, 22-23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975). In
other cases, courts simply engage in independent review of the proofs adduced at trial without
characterizing such review as part of their duty to test the sufficiency of the evidence. This
independent scrutiny is entirely sensible when one considers the fact that pandering entails a
concept of "variable obscenity," of obscenity as "a chameleonic quality of material that
changes with time, place and circumstance." Lockhart & McClure, supra note 3, at 68. The
necessary consequence of such a concept is the subjective determination that materials which
might not be obscene in other contexts become obscene because of the manner in which they
have been purveyed. In order to test the validity of such a determination by a jury, a court
must, ipso facto, review the manner of purveyance. Moreover, the need to engage in such
painstaking scrutiny of the evidence of pandering might also be derived from the idea that
obscenity cases present instances of "constitutional fact" meriting de novo review. See notes
637-648 and accompanying text infra. For general discussions of the basic concept of variable
obscenity, see Emerson, Toward a GeneralTheory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
938-39 (1963); Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 834,
847-52 (1964); Lockhart & McClure, supra note 3, at 68-88; Schauer, The Return of Variable
Obscenity?, 28 HASrINGs L.J. 1275, 1277-80 (1977).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

doctrine may be put in obscenity prosecutions. There is no indication in the
majority's opinion that a different level of review would apply in state cases.
Indeed, a year after Ginzburg, the Court confronted a set of state cases
in which the pandering issue had been raised. But, after briefly reviewing
the facts of the three prosecutions consolidated under the title of Redrup v.
New York, 2 97 the Court detected no "evidence of the sort of 'pandering'
which [it] found significant in Ginzburg."298 This case suggested that the
relatively rigorous review applied in the latter ruling would also extend to
state decisions. The point was emphasized by the Ninth Circuit in Childs v.
Oregon,299 a federal habeas corpus proceeding to challenge an obscenity
conviction rendered in a state court. There, it was said that the federal court
of appeals had a constitutional duty to make a de novo determination of
obscenity. 300 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit examined closely the evidence of pandering adduced at trial, and said that such evidence indicated
that the conviction was proper. 30 1 Thus, these decisions do suggest that the
Ginzburg requirement of an independent appellate review on the sufficiency
of the evidence with respect to pandering will apply in appeals from
prosecutions in state court.
If this assessment is accurate, then Justice Rehnquist's conclusion in
Splawn seems improper. He stated that "[q]uestions of what categories of
evidence may be admissible and probative are otherwise for the courts of the
States to decide"3°2 absent a clear-cut infringement of the Constitution. The
majority made no attempt to review the proof of pandering in this case to
determine whether the instruction to the jury was, in fact, based on sufficient evidence. As a result, Splawn creates some doubt about what type of
scrutiny the Court will now employ in state obscenity cases involving
297. 386 U.S. 767 (1967). The three cases were Redrup v. New York, Austin v. Kentucky
and Gent v. State. In Redrup, the petitioner, a clerk at a New York City newsstand, was
prosecuted for selling two books, Lust Pooland Shame Agent, to a plainclothes patrolman who
asked for them by name. Id. at 768. In Austin, the petitioner was the ow ner-operator of a retail

bookstore. A woman bought two magazines, High Heels and Spree, from a salesgirl at the store
after requesting them specifically. Plenary review of the resulting conviction was denied by the

Kentucky Court of Appeals. Id. at 768-69 & n.2. Gent involved efforts by a prosecuting
attorney to enjoin distribution of various allegedly obscene magazines. A state chancery court

entered the requested judgment and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed its order. Id. at 769.
298. Id. at 769.
299. 431 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated on othergrounds, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971). For a
more complete discussion of this case, see notes 375-378 and accompanying text infra.
300. 431 F.2d at 275-76 (quoting Lockhart & McClure, supra note 3, at 114 & 116). The
quoted language refers to the duty of courts in obscenity cases to make a de novo determination
of whether or not the materials in question are obscene. See note 296 supra.
301. 431 F.2d at 277.
302. 431 U.S. at 599.
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pandering. It suggests that because such cases emanate from state courts,
they are insulated from a rigorous review of the record by federal courts on
appeal. If so, Splawn marks a new direction in the Court's treatment of the
entire issue of pandering.
(2)

Ex Post Facto Issues
The petitioner in Splawn identified two ex post facto issues. One
involved the rule of Boule v. City of Columbia,130 and the other involved the
constitutional prohibition against the enactment of retroactive criminal laws.
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
The Bouie problem may be disposed of summarily. Boule established
the general rule that where a court gives retrospective effect to its unforeseen
expansive interpretation of a narrow and precise criminal statute, such an
action violates the requirements of due process. The Court in Marks v.
United States,304 an obscenity case, extended the Bouie rule to situations in5
30
which the broader interpretation is not entirely sudden and unforeseen.
The majority in Splawn rejected the petitioner's Bouie contention, finding
that "[n]o such change in the interpretation of the elements of the substantive offense prohibited by California law took place here.'" 301 This assessment appears accurate. As noted, Splawn's case was originally remanded to
the California court in 1974 for reconsideration in light of the 1973 Miller
decision. In 1976, the California Supreme Court decided the case of Bloom
v. Municipal Court.307 It held that section 311(a) of the penal code, which
defined "obscene matter,''308 is constitutional; it did so by incorporating
into that statutory language the two examples of hard core pornography
given by the Supreme Court in Miller.30 9 After this ruling, the state court of
appeal then reaffirmed Splawn's conviction, presumably relying upon
303.
304.
305.
306.

378 U.S. 347 (1964). See notes 167-176 and accompanying text supra.
430 U.S. 188 (1977). See notes 59-228 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 167-223 and accompanying text supra.
431 U.S. at 601.

307. 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976).

308. See note 36 supra.
309. 16 Cal. 3d at 81, 545 P.2d at 235, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 323. Bloom was not the first
California case to attempt to read the Miller standards into section 311 (a). In People v. Enskat,
33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 937 (1974), a state

appellate court concluded that the statute proscribed only "hard-core pornography" and
"graphic description of sexual activity." 33 Cal. App. 3d at 908-09, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.

Subsequently, a three-judge federal court held that this judicial gloss did not meet the specificity requirements of Miller. Miranda v. Hicks, 388 F. Supp. 350, 357-60 (C.D. Cal. 1974). On

appeal, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment, saying that the lower court committed error
in reaching the merits of the case because there was not such a showing of bad faith on the part
of state agents enforcing the obscenity statute to require a relaxation of the principle of
abstention. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-52 (1975).
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Bloom in doing so. Thus, a judicial interpretation of a criminal statute may
have been given retrospective effect in this case, but it was a limiting
interpretation, not an expansive one. Bloom cured the vagueness inherent in
the California law and, in so doing, narrowed rather than extended the scope
of that law. Thus, the situation in Splawn is distinguishable from both
Bouie and Marks.
The petitioner's claim based on the ex post facto prohibition in the
United States Constitution is considerably more troublesome. Certainly,
there appeared to be a tenable ex post facto argument. As noted earlier,
Splawn was convicted in 1971; section 31 1(a)(2) was enacted in 1969. Both
the majority and Justice Stevens agreed that while the law defining the
substantive misdemeanor for which Splawn was convicted was in effect
both at the time of his trial and at the time that he committed his offense,
section 31 l(a)(2), which authorized an instruction on pandering, was enacted by the state legislature after Splawn's offense but before his trial. 310 In
light of this fact, what the majority had to say on the ex post facto issue is
extremely disturbing.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion on this issue can be criticized on several
grounds. In response to Splawn's argument that the instructions were given
pursuant to a state law enacted after the conduct in question, the majority
asserted that section 311 (a)(2) does not create any new substantive offense,
but merely establishes what evidence is admissible to show lack of "redeeming social importance." 311 While Justice Rehnquist cites the definitive
discussion of ex post facto laws given by Justice Chase in the Supreme
Court's 1798 decision of Calder v. Bull, 312 he ignores the express holding
of that case. Justice Chase stated that an ex post facto law consists of any
statute that (a) punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was
innocent when done; (b) makes more burdensome the punishment for a
crime than that which existed at the time the crime occurred; (c) aggravates
retrospectively the nature of a crime or (d) alters the legal rules of evidence
so that a defendant may be convicted upon lesser or different evidence than
the law required at the time he committed his offense.3 13 Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that section 311(a)(2) was enacted after Splawn committed
the conduct for which he was convicted; his point seemed to be that a
change in procedure governing the admissibility of categories of evidence at
310. See 431 U.S. at 600; id. at 604-05 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
311. 431 U.S. at 600.
312. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
313. Id. at 390. Accord, Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169 (1925); Malloy v. South

Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1915); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 589-90 (1896);
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325-26 (1867).

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

trial could never be an ex post facto law because it creates no "new
substantive offense." But Calderbelies such an assumption. Justice Chase
defined as an ex post facto law any retroactive statute altering the legal rules
of evidence so as to make a conviction depend on evidence differing from
what was previously required. Section 31 l(a)(2) appears to do exactly that:
it allows admission of evidence of pandering on the issue of obscenity vel
non. Moreover, what Justice Rehnquist said in Splawn is not entirely
consistent with what he said in his opinion for the majority in Dobbert v.
Florida,314 the major decision interpreting the ex post facto prohibition
handed down by the Court during its 1976-77 term. Dobbert was not an
obscenity case; it involved various ex post facto challenges to Florida's
death penalty statute. In Dobbert, Justice Rehnquist not only quoted language indicating that the concept of an ex post facto law encompassed a
variety of statutes other than those merely creating new offenses, 315 but he
also cited approvingly further language holding that the provision prohibiting such statutes reached changes of modes in procedure affecting matters of
substance. 316 In Splawn, the statute authorizing inclusion of evidence regarding pandering clearly goes to a substantive issue, namely, whether the
materials in question were "utterly without redeeming social importance."
This new rule of evidence affects directly the substantive issue in a prosecution under section 311, that of obscenity vel non.
Justice Rehnquist seemed to recognize this problem because he then
attempted to show that section 311(a)(2) in fact effectuated no change in
prior law. He based his conclusion on the assertion by the state appellate
court in Splawn that the 1967 decision of People v. Noroff317 did not delimit
318
the admissibility of pandering evidence in state obscenity prosecutions.
But the appellate court in Splawn was mistaken and, as a result, so was
Justice Rehnquist.
Noroff also involved a charge that a defendant violated section 311.2
of the state's penal code. A municipal court in Los Angeles dismissed all
charges, and its decision was upheld by the appropriate appellate department
of the superior court. After a transfer, however, the state court of appeal
reversed. That appellate court cited the holding in Ginzburg v. United
314. 432 U.S. 282 (1977).
315. Id. at 292 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925)).

316. Id. at 293 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)). Beazell upheld against
an ex post facto challenge an Ohio law that had provided that when two or more persons are
indicted for a felony, each should be tried separately on application to the court but that was
amended to require joint trial unless good cause was shown for adopting an alternative
procedure.
317. 67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967), rev'g 58 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1967).
318. 431 U.S. at 600-01.
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States3 19 that evidence of pandering may be admissible in obscenity prosecutions. The court of appeal claimed that a similar proposition had been
advanced by the California Supreme Court in its 1966 decision in In re
Klor,320 in which it was said:
[The central issue in a criminal obscenity trial pivots on the
potentially punishable conduct of the defendant rather than upon
the allegedly obscene nature of the material. . . .No constitutionally punishable conduct appears in the case of an individual
who prepares material for his own 321
use or for such personal satisfaction as its creation affords him.
In sum, the appellate court claimed that it would be a "'rare case" where
evidence of pandering would not be admissible in a prosecution for dissemination of obscenity. 322 The California Supreme Court reversed. Justice
Tobriner, speaking for a majority of six, 323 noted that "[n]othing in Klor, of
course, suggested the adoption of a 'pandering' concept similar to that
elaborated in Ginzburg.
...
324 He also observed that the indictment
against Noroff had included no charge of pandering; nor had the legislature,
at that juncture, made pandering a crime. Accordingly, he concluded that
"we cannot accept the People's argument . . . that the trial court should
have permitted the prosecution to go to the jury with evidence bearing upon
the defendant's 'pandering' of the magazine in question." 325 The interpretation of Noroff advanced by the state appellate court in Splawn thus ignores
the fact that the court in the 1967 case rejected both the argument that
pandering constitutes a distinct crime and the argument that evidence of
pandering ought to be admissible. Justice Rehnquist, by following that
interpretation, commits a similar error.
There is yet a third problem with Justice Rehnquist's approach. In
citing the interpretation of Noroff espoused by the state appellate court in
Splawn, he claimed it was "unnecessary to determine whether if
319. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
320. 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal Rptr. 903 (1966).
321. Id. at 821, 415 P.2d at 794, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 906, quoted in People v. Noroff, 58 Cal.

Rptr. 172, 177 (1967).
322. People v. Noroff, 58 Cal. Rptr. 172, 177 (1967).

323. Justice Tobriner was joined by Chief Justice Traynor and Justices McComb, Mosk,
Peters and Sullivan. Justice Burke dissented, claiming that the majority "flagrantly fails to
adopt" the Supreme Court's test for obscenity. 67 Cal. 2d at 797, 433 P.2d at 483, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 579 (Burke, J., dissenting).
324. 67 Cal. 2d at 793 n.4, 433 P.2d at 480 n.4, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 576 n.4. Prior to Noroff at
least one California court of appeal had expressly adopted and applied the Ginzburg doctrine.
Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 824, 830, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 179-80, 183 (1966), aff'd

per curiam, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The California Supreme Court in Noroff explicitly disapproved of that portion of the holding in Landau. 67 Cal. 2d at 793, 433 P.2d at 480, 63 Cal. Rptr.

at 576. This supports the conclusion that the court meant to reject the pandering concept in toto.
325. 67 Cal. 2d at 793, 433 P.2d at 480, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
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§ 311(a)(2) had permitted the introduction of evidence which would have
been previously excluded under California law, petitioner would have had a
tenable claim under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. ' ' 326 The rationale implicit in this holding is that because the state
appellate court found that section 311(a)(2) did not alter prior law, no ex
post facto problem was presented. But the ex post facto argument was based
on a prohibition contained in article one, section ten of the United States
Constitution. While the state court's decision on jury instructions and admissibility of evidence might be entitled to deference, even the majority indicated that such a decision would be subject to ultimate constitutional
strictures. 327 Why is the same not true with respect to Splawn's ex post facto
claim? Indeed, *on this point, it is instructive to compare Splawn with
Dobbert.32 8 In the latter case, the state supreme court also dismissed an ex
post facto claim, 3 29 but the United States Supreme Court did not find this
action decisive. Instead, the majority in Dobbert engaged in its own independent analysis in order to determine whether the new Florida death
penalty statute was in fact more onerous than the old law. It answered this
question negatively, pointing out that under the new statute "[d]eath is not
automatic, absent a jury recommendation of mercy, as it was under the. old
procedure." 330 This conclusion was founded not only on a statement by the
Florida Supreme Court in a 1975 case, but also on the Supreme Court's
ruling in 1976 that the new Florida statute was unconstitutional, and on the
331
majority's own consideration of the differences between the two laws.
Subsidiary ex post facto claims raised by Dobbert were also dealt with by
reference to prior United States Supreme Court decisions. 332 Yet, curiously
326. 431 U.S. at 601.
327. Id. at 599.

328. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). See notes 314-16 and accompanying text
supra.

329. See 432 U.S. at 286-87.
330. Id. at 295.
331. Id. (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), cited with approbationin
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976)).
332. Dobbert presented two other ex post facto claims in addition to the contention that the

state's new death penalty statute was more onerous than its predecessor. First, he claimed that
at the time he committed the crime in question, first-degree murder, the state lacked, any valid
death penalty as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). Furman was applied to the old Florida statute by the state's supreme court in Donaldson

v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499, 501 (Fla. 1972). Dobbert thus contended that any attempt to invoke the
penalty of death against him violated the Constitution's ex post facto proscription. The Court

found this argument sophistic, relying on Chicot' County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940), for the proposition that the existence of the invalidated statute served
as an "operative fact" affording the petitioner with "fair warning as to the degree of culpability

which the State ascribed to the act of murder." 432 U.S. at 297. Second, Dobbert argued that
while the new Florida statute provided that anyone sentenced to life imprisonment must serve
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enough, Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in Dobbert,
declined to follow a similar approach in Splawn. This fact suggests that the
deference to state decisions in considering an ex post facto claim may well
be greater in the context of obscenity prosecutions than it is in other criminal
law cases. Why this should be so remains a mystery never resolved by the
majority in Splawn.
(3) Pandering
The problems raised in Splawn regarding the concept of pandering
merit extensive comment, especially since three justices now appear
convinced that the pandering doctrine is defunct. To facilitate such
comment, the discussion of pandering will be divided into two sections: one
on pandering per se and one on pandering and commercial speech.
(a) Pandering Per Se
Pandering, according to the Court in Ginzburg v. UnitedStates,333 was
described as the "commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of
their prurient appeal." 334 One question left somewhat unsettled by Ginzburg is whether the factor of pandering will cause a work that is not obscene
in the abstract to be deemed obscene because of the context in which it was
merchandised. The Court in Ginzburg assumed, but declined to hold, that
the materials involved therein, standing alone, might not be obscene. 335 This
suggests that if one markets the Bible in a pruriently exploitative manner,
one could be prosecuted for selling it. As the Court in Memoirs v. Massachusetts 336 said, "where the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually
provocative aspects of his publication, a court could accept his evaluation at
its face value." 337 But it would be incorrect to read Ginzburg so broadly.
at least twenty-five years before becoming eligible for parole, the prior statute contained no
similar provision. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court had held that this new section could not
be given retrospective effect. Lee v. State, 294 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1974). The petitioner
argued that he had thus made out a legitimate ex post facto claim. Language in Lindsey v.
Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 400-01 (1937), seemed to support this contention by requiring courts
to consider in an ex post facto case the standard of punishment prescribed by statute rather than
the sentence actually imposed. But the Court in Dobbert distinguished Lindsey on its facts and
declined to find an ex post facto violation "where the change has had no effect on the defendant
in the proceedings of which he complains." Since Dobbert had been sentenced to death, not life
imprisonment, his challenge was rejected. 432 U.S. at 300.
333. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).

334. Id. at 466. For Chief Justice Warren's definition of the term, see note 26 supra.
335. 383 U.S. at 465-66.
336. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

337. Id. at 420. See also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966); Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 472 (1966); Childs v. Oregon, 431 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1970),
vacated, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971); People v. Kuhns, 61 Cal. App. 3d 735, 750, 132 Cal. Rptr. 725,

733 (1976); People v. Burnstad, 32 Cal. App. 3d 560, 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 247, 251 (1973),
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The Court therein said evidence of pandering "was relevant in determining
the ultimate question of obscenity and, in the context of this record, serves
to resolve all ambiguity and doubt.''338 Later in its opinion, the Court said
"[w]e perceive no threat to First Amendment guarantees in thus holding that
in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect to the
nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test." ,339 The net
effect of these statements is to suggest that evidence of pandering is just one
more item in the jury's calculus of deciding whether a publication possesses
a dominant appeal to prurient interest; it is an item that will become decisive
only in those close cases where there is genuine doubt. But one interpretation of the quoted sentence is that evidence of pandering is relevant in
"close cases" only, and this interpretation seems to have won some ad340
herents.
If this characterization of Ginzburg is accurate, one might argue that
section 31 1(a)(2) is overbroad, because it is not limited by its own terms to
close cases. Indeed, at least one California court has said that this section
need not incorporate the "close cases" caution of Ginzburg. Thus, in
People v. Kuhns, 341 decided in 1976, it was ruled:
We reject the argument that the statute is overbroad because
it fails to include the "close cases" limitation mentioned in one
quotation from Ginzburg . . . As noted in Ginzburg and the
other cases the evidence is generally relevant in determining the
question of obscenity, not only on the factor of social importance,
but also in relation to the element of appeal to prurient interest
...
. The fact that Ginzburg may have been a close case, and
that the evidence served to resolve "all ambiguity and doubt"
. . . does not indicate that the relevancy, as distinguished from
the probative force, is any less in other cases. . . . Moreover, we
note that the defendants, in urging that the matter presented is not
obscene on its face, are in effect urging that there is some question
overruled, People v. Superior Court (Freeman), 14 Cal. 3d 82, 534 P.2d 393, 120 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1975); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 599, 512 P.2d 1049, 1059 (1973), cert.

denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974). Professor Schauer perceives the pandering doctrine as embodying
a concept of estoppel: "[i]n other words, having proclaimed his materials to be obscene, or
pornographic, or appealing to the prurient interest, or whatever, the distributor is estopped

from denying those conclusions in court, or, at the very least, they constitute evidentiary
admissions against him." SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 83.
338. 383 U.S. at 470. The lower courts in Ginzburg also adopted a similar approach. See
Ginzburg v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 338 F.2d 12, 14-15

(3d Cir. 1964).
339. 383 U.S. at 474.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 465 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1972); Childs v.
Oregon, 431 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971)
(citing United States v. Baranov, 418 F.2d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir. 1969)); People v. Mature

Enterprises, Inc., 73 Misc. 2d 749, 753, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911, 916 (1973); SCHAUER, supra note 3,
at 82.
341.

61 Cal. App. 3d 735, 132 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1976).
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as to the nature of the material in question. The danger that the
Bible, if improperly exploited, will be considered obscene material
is controlled by the necessity of proving the other two elements of
the statutory offense. There was no error in rejecting the defendants' instruction concerning a "close case" ....- 'IThis argument makes a good deal of sense. It distinguishes between the
relevance of pandering evidence and the probative force of such evidence, a
distinction that may be derived from the Ginzburg language quoted earlier.3 43 Yet, as was noted, some courts and commentators do not accept such
a distinction and would appear to limit Ginzburg to close cases. If so, then
section 311(a)(2), as construed by Kuhns, is unconstitutional.
From Splawn's perspective, this argument may be irrelevant. He apparently conceded that the materials he sold were obscene under the Miller
standard; moreover, since the Kuhns case was decided six months after his
conviction had been reaffirmed, 3 4 the doctrine of that case could not have
been applied to him. But the intriguing possibility remains that Kuhns may,
in fact, have correctly described the effect of Ginzburg.
An even more interesting problem is presented by the type of evidence
underlying the pandering instruction in Splawn. To analyze this problem, it
is necessary to consider in some detail what evidence the courts have
deemed to be sufficient proof of pandering. In Ginzburg itself, the materials
in question consisted of three items: a hard cover magazine entitled Eros, a
bi-weekly newspaper entitled Liaison and a pamphlet entitled The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity. 4 The evidence of pandering
consisted primarily of three factors. First, the petitioner had originally
sought mailing privileges from the postmasters of the hamlets of Intercourse
and Blue Ball, Pennsylvania. He eventually obtained such privileges from
the postmaster of Middlesex, New Jersey. The trial court had concluded that
this mailing site was selected because of the "salacious appeal" of its
name.' Second, the petitioner had engaged in indiscriminate mass mail342. Id. at 751, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
343. See notes 337-338 and accompanying text supra.
344. Kuhns was decided on September 8, 1976. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 735, 132 Cal. Rptr. at

725. Splawn's conviction was affirmed on March 29, 1976. Splawn v. California, 45 U.S.L.W.
3194 (U.S. Sept. 21, 1976).
345. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1966). The specified issue of Eros
contained fifteen articles and photo-essays on sex. The relevant issue of Liaison consisted
primarily of digests of two articles on sex which had appeared earlier in professional journals
and the transcript of an interview with a psychotherapist favoring sexual liberation. The
Handbook "purports to be a sexual autobiography detailing with complete candor the author's
sexual experiences from age 3 to age 36. The text includes, and prefatory and concluding

sections of the book elaborate, her views on such subjects as sex education of children, laws
regulating private consensual adult sexual practices, and the equality of women in sexual
relationships." Id. at 467.
346. 383 U.S. at 467-68.
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ings; he sent out several million advertising brochures to members of the
public in general. 347 Finally, the Court considered the content of the
brochures themselves. Eros was billed as a "new quarterly devoted to the
subjects of Love and Sex" and as "frankly and avowedly concerned with
erotica." 348 On the face of the advertisements for Liaison appeared the
question, "Are you a member of the sexual elite? ' 34 9 The advertising copy
indicated that if the addressee fitted within this august group, then he would
enjoy Liaison because he would be able to "read about love and sex and
discuss them without blushing and stammering"; the publication was further described as "Cupid's Chronicle." 350 In addition, promotional brochures
for all three of these publications contained slips of paper assuring the
addressee a full refund of his remittance "if the book fails to reach you
because of U.S. Post Office censorship interference. "351 According to the
Court, the cumulative impact of this evidence was to eliminate any doubt
about what the purchaser was being asked to buy. 352 The facts in Ginzburg
may be usefully contrasted with the evidence adduced in Redrup v. New
York. 353 There, the evidence indicated that various retailers had publicly
displayed and sold various allegedly obscene magazines and books; there
was no showing of any advertising campaign to inform the public of the
availability of these materials. 3-4 On that basis, the Court simply declined to
355
conclude that there was pandering.
Redrup and Ginzburg suggest two opposite extremes. The decisions of
lower federal and state courts create a continuum between those extremes,
some decisions being very restrictive, others less so. A few examples should
illustrate the point. In United States v. Pellegrino,356 the government
claimed that the advertisements in question were themselves obscene and
constituted pandering. The promotional material in dispute was a brochure
advertising a book entitled Woman: Her Sexual Variations and Functions,
which was described as a "complete photo-guide of female sex response." 357 The twelve-page brochure contained several color photographs
depicting female pudenda, purportedly taken from the book itself. Of these
347. Id. at 468-70.
348. Id. at 469 n.9.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
1969).
356.
357.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 470.
Id.
386 U.S. 767 (1967).
See note 297 supra.
386 U.S. at 769. Accord, United States v. Baranov, 418 F.2d 1051, 1053 (9th Cir.
467 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 43.
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photographs, the Ninth Circuit said "[t]hese illustrations, however, are not
presented as the 'feast-your-eyes-on' type of pornographic entertainment
... .Rather they are presented as illustrating various aspects of the book's
claimed contributions to general knowledge respecting the functions and
characteristics of female sexual organs."358 There was also proof of mass
mailing to the public in general. In light of this evidence, one might expect
that the Ginzburg rule would have been applied. Although there was no
titillating advertising copy, as was true in the brochures for Eros and
Liaison, there were instead explicit photographs demonstrating the content
of the book. Yet the Ninth Circuit concluded:
However, we do not regard this brochure as pandering as that
term is defined or used in Ginzburg. The brochure does not
proclaim the book to be obscene. In a chaste and self-serving
disclaimer it asserts the opposite. While one is not given room for
the slightest doubt that enjoying the educational virtue of this
work is going to be pretty exciting in an erotic sense, still, the
persistent theme of the brochure, running throughout the text, is
that the book is worth buying because it imparts knowledge
and
359
understanding of matters of importance to all adults.
As for the mass mailings, the court found this policy "wholly consistent"
with the publisher's goal of educating all adults about female sexual responses. 360 Thus, Pellegrino indicates how much deference a court may
accord a "self-serving" disclaimer; it stands in sharp contrast to Ginzburg,
where the brochures for Eros and Liaison claimed, respectively, that the
relevant publication was "a genuine work of art" and "not a scandal
sheet,' '361 but where the Supreme Court discounted such assertions.
In People v. Mature Enterprises,362 a New York trial court was
confronted with certain newspaper advertisements for the film "Deep
Throat." According to these advertisements, the motion picture was "[t]he
very best porn film ever made" and perfectly exemplified how "[i]magination has gone to work in the porno-vineyards."363 Although there was
independent evidence that the fillf was, indeed, legally obscene, the state
trial court said "we do not equate that chest thumping with the circum364
stances of presentation and dissemination condemned in Ginzburg.'
358. Id. The court thus distinguished the materials at issue from those involved in Miller v.
United States, 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970), see notes 372-374 and accompanying text infra.
359. 467 F.2d at 46. The court noted that such a disclaimer would not be accepted where it

was "transparently spurious." Id. See also United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (9th
Cir. 1977).
360. 467 F.2d at 46.
361. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 469 n.9 (1966).
362. 73 Misc. 2d 749, 343 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1973).
363. Id. at 754, 343 N.Y.S. 2d at 916.
364. Id.
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Again, this is a surprisingly libertarian view. Since the material in question
was a motion picture being shown in theaters, evidence of mass mailings or
postal addresses chosen for their salacious connotations would, predictably,
be absent. But the advertising copy in MatureEnterpriseswould seem to be
emphasizing prurient appeal as much as that involved in Ginzburg. Yet the
New York court did not believe so.
United States v. Stewart 365 involved advertisements for a number of
books, including Sex in Marriage,Decision in Denmark, Oral Sex & The
Law, The Way Homosexuals Make Love, Sex, Pornography& The Law
and Sex Freedom. The brochure in question promised "sex education
without censorship," and went on to inform the addressee that
"we can at last offer to you, as an adult over the age of 21 years,
these valuable educational books: Sex and Censorship do not mix!
You can't make love with all your clothes on and neither can a
book offer complete instruction by omitting or avoiding the proper
photos or information! To do less would be to deny each individual the right to read, look, ponder, evaluate and reach his own
conclusions on which path to follow to happiness. This is a right
Americans have and are fighting and dying for! The right to read,
learn
and think is ours! Let those who wish to . . .exercise this
right!!"366
The remainder of the text consisted of descriptions of each book offered for
sale, accompanied by illustrative black and white photographs depicting
various sexual acts. Each brochure was contained in a sealed inner mailing
envelope warning minors and the uninterested not to open it because "[t]he
enclosed brochures may photographically or pictorially illustrate pictures of
nude women and/or nude men together or separately in erotic situations,
sexual embrace or intercourse and may include pertinent text.' '367 As in
Pellegrino, the government claimed the brochure was obscene per se and
constituted pandering. The federal district court disagreed, claiming that the
"entire thrust" of these advertisements was to "promote the legitimate
purpose of sexual education. "368 Moreover, it observed that any pernicious
effect caused by the mass mailing of the brochures in question was eliminated by the quoted language on the inner sealed envelopes. 369 Here, too, a
court is taking great liberties with the Ginzburg doctrine. The cited language
in the brochure itself seems to be designed to inform the addressee about the
erotic qualities of the books being proffered for sale, not to propagandize the
365. 336 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1971).

366. Id. at 300.
367. Id. at 301.

368. Id.at 303.
369. Id. See also State v. Lebevitz, 294 Minn. 424, 430, 202 N.W.2d 648, 652 (1972)
(warnings posted outside an adult theater).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

cause of sex education. While the quoted statement on the inner envelope
may provide a useful warning to the unduly sensitive recipient, it could also
be argued that the description given of the contents was meant to arouse the
curiosity of the addressee who otherwise might have thrown the solicitation
away without opening it.
In People v. Sarnblad,370 a California court of appeal dealt with an
obscenity prosecution initiated against the owner of a theater displaying
adult films. The name given this establishment was the "Por-No Theater."
The court of appeal said "the pandering nature of the name of the theater
reasonably implies that one. . . would be aware of the kind of films shown
therein. ',371 Here is a case where a court goes too far and finds pandering
solely because of the name given the place where the materials in question
are displayed. There was no evidence of salacious newspaper advertising, or
sensationalistic slogans on the theater's marquee or similar affirmative
conduct. Without that, there would seem to be no excuse to apply the
Ginzburg doctrine.
Miller v. United States3 72 involved a federal prosecution for distribution of a forty-eight page book entitled The Name is Bonnie, consisting
entirely of photographs of the same nude model, who was positioned so as
" 'to reveal as much as possible of the vulva, perineal and anal area by
means of contrived and awkward legs apart poses.' "13 This book had been
370. 26 Cal. App. 3d 801, 103 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1972).

371. Id. at 805, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 213. See also Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that a radio program entitled "Femme
Forum" had been pandered based on announcer's response to an offended viewer and the

manner in which he presented an advertisement for auto insurance during the course of his
broadcast).
372. 431 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated on othergrounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973), reaffirmed, 505 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974).
373. 431 F.2d at 658 (quoting the government's brief). The nature of the poses served to
differentiate the photographs in question from the less exploitative, more "artistic" depictions
of nudes. See also Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. 77
Cartons of Magazines, 300 F. Supp. 851, 854 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. 392 Copies of a
Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485, 497 (D. Md. 1966), afq'd, 373 F.2d 633 (4th

Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Central Magazine Sales Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967); People
v. Berger, 185 Colo. 85, 89, 521 P.2d 1244, 1246 (1974). Yet the holding in Miller on this point
presents some difficulties. As the district court noted in United States N'.Pinkus, 333 F. Supp.
928 (C.D. Cal. 1971), appeal dismissed, 466 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1972), the materials in Miller
were substantially similar to equally lurid photos deemed nonobscene by the Supreme Court in

a number of per curiam opinions. See Bloss v. Dykema, 398 U.S. 278 (1970), rev'g 17 Mich.
App. 318, 333, 169 N.W.2d 367, 373 (1969); Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S.
50 (1967), rev'g United States v. 392 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 373 F.2d 633,

634 (4th Cir. 1967); Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967), rev'g United States
v. 56 Cartons Containing 19,500 Copies of a Magazine Entitled "Hellenic Sun," 373 F.2d 635,
640 (4th Cir. 1967). Thus, the court in Pinkus declined to follow the example set by Miller on
this point. 333 F. Supp. at 930. See also United States v. Baranov, 418 F.2d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir.
1969).
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advertised by a brochure featuring thirteen sample photographs; these and
other promotional materials were mailed indiscriminately, sometimes forwarded only to the "occupant" of a given address. At least 300,000
envelopes containing this brochure were sent out. The Ninth Circuit said of
this evidence: "The volume of circulation of this material, the indiscriminate possible market to which it was disseminated, the character of the
enclosures all indicate the type of pandering which was held to support the
finding of obscenity in Ginzburg . . .and distinguishes this case from
Redrup v. New York. . ...
-74 What the court of appeals in Miller did
was focus almost exclusively on the manner of the mass mailings, without
considering extensively the content of the brochures. While Ginzburg suggests that the manner of mailing is relevant to show pandering, it is, at best,
a subsidiary factor that should not be given the inordinate weight the court in
Miller seemed to accord it.
Childs v. Oregon375 involved a prosecution for the sale of obscene
books. The evidence of pandering consisted of two varieties. The first of
these was the cover of the book itself. The front cover depicted, in color,
two nude women reclining on a bed and contained the following capitalized

quotation:

" 'THEY SLASHED EACH OTHER WITH THE SAVAGERY OF PER-

"BEAT ME!" SHE CRIED.' ",376 The back cover portrayed
the upper half of the body of a woman clad, only in a brassiere. Below this
photograph was the following caption:
"Betty was rich and perverted. Her need for another woman's
love was so great that she was willing to descend from her upper
crust life to the sordidness of a cheap rented room and third rate
job. . . just so she could have a lesbian roommate. But when her
darling took a liking to men, Betty turned to a savage beast.""
VERTED DESIRES.

The Ninth Circuit asserted that the book was thus deliberately represented as
erotically arousing; the cover appealed to prurient interest, rather than to
intellectual concerns. 378 Moreover, the court of appeals noted that when the
arresting officer asked the petitioner where he kept his "dirtier books," the
latter identified a particular rack on which, among others, the volume in
374. 431 F.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
375. 431 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971).
376. 431 F.2d at 276.

377. Id.
378. Id. Childs presents a problem in this respect. In Books, Inc. v. United States, 358

F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966), the court of appeals cited Ginzburg for the proposition that "it would
be appropriate for the District Court or this Court to take into account the front and back covers
of [the book in question] and from them to reach a conclusion that there were pandering and an
exploitation of interests in titillation ...

" Id. at 938. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed

in a per curiam ruling. Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U.S. 449 (1967) (citing Redrup v. New
York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)). This ruling suggests that the use of the pandering doctrine in Books,

Inc., and, by implication, in Childs, may, at one point, have been unwarranted.
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379
question was displayed and said that the "worst ones" were kept there.
The only pandering by the retailer in Childs was a statement of where his
most objectionable books were located. This is a far cry from the kind of
organized exploitation involved in Ginzburg; indeed, it seems to be little
more than an accurate response to an inquiry from a customer, a response
meant to impart information rather than appeal to prurient interest. Moreover, the acts of exploitation in Childs seemed to consist of nothing more
than presenting on the cover of a book an accurate summary of its contents
accompanied by two photographs portraying nudity, but nothing classifiable
as "hard core pornography." The remainder of the evidence in Childs
consisted of the language and depictions on the cover of the book in
question, something for which the retailer had no responsibility. In contrast,
in Ginzburg, the petitioner was the one who published both the materials in
question and the advertisements promoting them; he was being prosecuted
entirely for his own handiwork.
All these cases present a continuum. Pellegrino, Mature Enterprises
and Stewart represent a set of rulings construing Ginzburg so narrowly as to
preclude the prosecution from proving pandering in any but the most blatant
situations. In contrast, Sarnblad, Miller and Childs represent a set of
rulings where pandering was found on the basis of far less evidence than was
adduced in Ginzburg. The question might be raised: where does Splawn fall
within this spectrum? According to Justice Stevens, Splawn, at best, could
be accused of having sold the film in question and of having advertised it as
being sexually provocative, although not in any offensive manner. 380 The
petitioner claimed that the trial judge's instruction to the jury allowed it "to
consider motives of commercial exploitation on the part of persons in the
chain of distribution other than himself.' '381 The majority in Splawn admitted the accuracy of this characterization, but nevertheless concluded that
382
Ginzburg clearly showed that the instruction in question was permissible.
In fact, however, Ginzburg demonstrates nothing of the kind. The Court
therein did note that "there was abundant evidence to show that each of the
accused publications was originated or sold as stock in trade in the sordid
business of pandering," 383 but the originator in that case was the petitioner
himself, Ginzburg. In Splawn, however, the originator was an unindicted
third party whose motives of commercial exploitation were being imputed to
the defendant. Quite apart from those motives and whatever evidence may

379. 431 F.2d at 277 n.7.
380. 431 U.S. at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
JJ.).
381. Id. at 599.
382. Ird.

383. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966).
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have been adduced about them, there remained only the fact of Splawn's
sale and his apparently discreet advertisement, and it is not clear that this
conduct, in and of itself, would be sufficient to constitute pandering under
Ginzburg. In fact, if one were to place the Splawn case on the continuum
adverted to earlier, it seems to most resemble Childs v. Oregon,384 which
appeared to expand the pandering doctrine of Ginzburg to encompass a
situation where the conduct of the defendant was minimal. If this characterization is accurate, then Splawn may well mark a significant extension of the
Ginzburg doctrine.
(b) Pandering and Commercial Speech
Justice Stevens' dissent in Splawn contends that the pandering doctrine
of Ginzburg did not survive the new rulings on commercial speech, particularly Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.385 In that decision, the Court struck down a state law which
provided that a licensed pharmacist who advertised the prices of prescription
drugs was guilty of unprofessional conduct. In the course of the opinion, the
Court considered the problem of the extent to which commercial advertising
is protected by the First Amendment. As early as 1942, in the case of
Valentine v. Chrestensen,386 which upheld a New York law forbidding the
circulation of handbills, the Court had said that although the First Amendment would prohibit the banning of all communication by circulars in the
public thoroughfares, it imposed "no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising." 38 7 The Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board tacitly overruled Valentine, reasoning that consumers in particular and society in general have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information. Recognizing that advertising serves the twin goals
of perpetuating the system of free enterprise and ensuring enlightened public
decisionmaking in a democracy, the Court held that commercial speech was
388
subject to the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
What effect does this decision have on Ginzburg itself? Curiously
enough, the Court in that case was not oblivious to the problem. It said:
No weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have profited
from the sale of publications which we have assumed but do not
384. 431 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971). See notes 375-379 and
accompanying text supra.
385. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See generally Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial
Expression, 3 HASnTNGS CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976).
386. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
387. Id. at 54. See also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (upheld ordinance
prohibiting door to door solicitation by uninvited peddlers, by pointing out that, as applied to
one selling magazine subscriptions, it concerned restraints upon commercial advertising).

388. 425 U.S. at 763-770.
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hold cannot themselves be adjudged obscene in the abstract; to
sanction consideration of this fact might indeed induce self-censorship, and offend the frequently stated principle that commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment. Rather, the
fact that each of these publications was created or exploited
entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient interests strengthens
the conclusion that the transactions here were sales of illicit merchandise, not sales of constitutionally protected matter.38 9
Thus, the mere fact that the transactions in Ginzburg were commercial in
nature was deemed irrelevant; the gravamen of the decision was that the
pandering in question was a component of a series of transactions constituting the dissemination of obscenity and was itself a useful determinant in
ascertaining whether the product being merchandised could, in fact, be
labelled obscene. This statement suggests that the pandering doctrine does
not rest on any distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech,
but is instead premised on the difference between vending that which is
illicit and that which is not, between "mere commercialism, in the sense of
a sale for profit, and the promotion for such sales by reference to the prurient
appeal of the material being sold. ' ' 390 In a word, the distinction is one drawn
between subcategories of commercial speech. However, in a footnote in
Ginzburg, the Court added:
See Valentine v. Chrestensen.

.

.where the Court viewed hand-

bills purporting to contain protected expression as merely
commercial advertising. Compare that decision with Jamison v.
Texas . . . and Murdock v. Pennsylvania . . . where speech

having the characteristics of advertising was held to be an integral
part of religious discussions and hence protected. Material sold
solely to produce sexual arousal, like commercial advertising,
does not escape regulation because it has been dressed up as
speech, or-in other contexts might be recognized as speech.3 91
The effect of this footnote is to obscure the problem somewhat. The Court
seemed to be drawing an analogy between commercial speech and obscenity; it said that both are subject to regulation, however much one may attempt
to disguise them as protected speech. This analogy might have once been
389. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
390. People v. Kuhns, 61 Cal. App. 3d 735, 752, 132 Cal. Rptr. 725, 735 (1976).
391. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,474 n.17 (1966) (citations omitted). Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance prohibiting street

distribution of advertising material. Jamison was convicted for distributing handbills inviting
the recipient to a religious gathering and advertising two religious books. The Court said that the
city "may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity
merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books. . . or because the handbills seek in
lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes." Id. at 417. In Murdock

v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court struck down a statute exacting a fee to canvass
or solicit that had been applied to door to door salesmen of sectarian pamphlets. It was found
that the law violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause. Id. at 114.
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helpful in explaining why obscenity can be regulated, but it does not justify
the chilling effect resulting from application of the concept of pandering
where the advertising in question may not be obscene per se, but may
nevertheless be a decisive factor in the jury's determination that what was
being advertised is obscene. Moreover, this footnote was appended to the
passage where the Court in Ginzburg spoke of a publication "created or
exploited entirely on the basis of its appeal to prurient interests," 39 so it is
possible to argue that a tacit analogy was being drawn between purely
commercial speech and that class of exploitative communication constituting pandering. Thus, while Ginzburg did not rely directly on the Valentine
doctrine, it may have analogized pandering to purely commercial speech in
order to justify its decision. Moreover, even if one disagrees and contends
that Ginzburg differentiated between subcategories of commercial speech,
one could still argue that after Virginia PharmacyBoard truthful advertising about sexually-oriented materials ought not to be chilled because the
advertiser fears that, should he be prosecuted in the future, his commercial
speech will be labeled as pandering and may influence a jury's determination of the obscenity of the material being promoted.
Thus, the next question is, assuming that Justice Stevens is right in
Splawn and that the doctrine of VirginiaPharmacyBoard ought to apply in
obscenity cases, will it preclude further application of the concept of
pandering in such cases? There are, in fact, a number of reasons to suggest
that it will not.
First, one might raise the contention suggested by the Court as long ago
as the Roth3 93 case that if obscenity per se is not protected by the First
Amendment, it makes no difference that such obscenity is cast in the form of
commercial speech. This is clearly false; obscene advertising is still speech
falling outside the safeguards of the Constitution. But to cast the problem in
this fashion raises a tantalizing question: if both the material being advertised and the advertisement itself are claimed to be obscene per se, and the
government decides to prosecute solely for the distribution of the latter
publication, is there any usefulness left for the doctrine of pandering in such
a case? In other words, can advertising pander itself? The question has been
raised in only one case: United States v. Pellegrino.394 There it was said:
Appellant contends that pandering in the Ginzburg sense is
never relevant to the question of whether advertising in itself is
obscene, since advertising does not "pander" itself. Ginzburg, it
392. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).

393. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See notes 3-10 and accompanying text
supra.
394. 467 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1972).
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is argued, did not make pandering a distinct offense. The court
there was considering the obscenity of the advertised works themselves in the context of their promotion. Here the question, appellant asserts, is whether the advertising, standing alone, is obscene.
The only "context" is the material itself which speaks for itself.
There is no occasion to give consideration to other material for the
light it can shed on the nature of the material in question.
We agree that in the case of advertising the fact that such
material constitutes or includes pandering does not serve the purpose of enlightenment served in Ginzburg. We cannot say, however, that the question of pandering is wholly irrelevant. Pandering advertising may well forfeit an otherwise available claim of
redeeming social value. Further it may cast light on the question
whether the dominant theme of the advertising
brochure itself is
3 95
an appeal to a prurient interest in sex.
This argument is a cogent one. Where the advertising itself is claimed to be
obscene, evidence of pandering may still be adduced by considering how the
advertisement was formulated, how it was distributed and so on. 396 But
since the subject of the prosecution is commercial speech, which a jury must
decide is or is not obscene, it is absurd to say such speech cannot be
regulated by the state under the Virginia PharmacyBoard doctrine when
the outcome of the jury's determination will be to ascertain if the First
Amendment applies at all to such speech. So in the subcategory of cases
where the material alleged to be obscene and pandered is itself commercial
speech it would simply be anomalous to apply Virginia PharmacyBoard
because doing so would frustrate the very purpose of obscenity regulation
and give advertisements in this context greater First Amendment protection
than other forms of communication. Justice Stevens in Splawn does not
make such an argument and, indeed, the problem is not presented in
Splawn. There is no indication that the advertising engaged in by the
petitioner in that case was in any way offensive.
But there is a second difficulty that Justice Stevens ignored: does
"pandering" advertising fall within any of the exceptions stated in Virginia
395. Id. at 46.
396. But, while acknowledging the cogency of the argument, one must also admit that it is
an extension, albeit a logical one, of the Ginzburg doctrine. The Court in Ginzburg did not deal
with obscene advertisements. The subject of the prosecution was the set of materials being
advertised. Nevertheless, as indicated, the kinds of proofs relied upon in Ginzburg may be
adapted to encompass situations where the obscenity vel non of the advertisement itself is at
issue. Problems also arise when, as in Pellegrino, the advertisement consists of little more than
portions of what is being advertised: can an advertisement be held to be obscene per se only if

what is being advertised is held to be obscene? At least one court has noted the problem, United
States v. Stewart, 336 F. Supp. 299, 301 (E.D. Pa. 1971), but declined to answer it. If the answer
is no, interesting res judicata problems may be created should the government fail to win a

prosecution for advertisement of the material and then seek to impose liability for distribution
of the materials being advertised.
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PharmacyBoard? The Court therein noted that some forms of regulation on
commercial speech are permissible, particularly where (1) the regulation
consists entirely of a mere time, place and manner restriction, (2) the
regulation seeks to delimit the dissemination of false or misleading advertising, (3) the regulation is one of commercial advertising that proposes illegal
transactions or (4) the regulation arises in the context of the special problems
of the electronic broadcast media. 397 In Splawn, advertisement through the
broadcast media was not at issue. Moreover, as Justice Stevens pointed.out,
there could be no argument that the petitioner was engaging in deceptive
advertising; he merely told the truth about his "shabby business." 398 As an
example of commercial speech proposing illegal transactions, the Court
cited cases where sexually or racially discriminatory advertisements were at
issue, 399 so the extent of this exception may be limited to situations where
both the transaction proposed and the commercial speech promoting that
transaction are equally prohibitable. If so, pandering may not fall within this
exception, unless the state can show that the advertising itself was obscene
per se, in which case the situation resembles the one adverted to earlier.
Otherwise, the problem remains that one cannot know in obscenity cases if
the transaction being proposed is illegal unless one knows that the materials
which are the subject of that transaction are obscene. Such a separate
judicial determination can be made only after considering all circumstances,
including that of the advertising itself, in order to determine whether such
commercial speech constitutes pandering. Therefore, the obscenity cases do
not quite fit within this exception in Virginia PharmacyBoard.
That leaves the problem of time, place and manner restrictions. In the
obscenity context, the closest case on the subject is Rowan v. Post Office
Department,4°° which upheld a federal postal statute allowing the postmas397. 425 U.S. at 771-73.
398. 431 U.S. at 604 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
JJ.).
399. 425 U.S. at 772-73 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Rights, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 934 (1972)). Pittsburgh Press upheld an ordinance forbidding employees to engage in
discriminatory hiring practices and prohibiting others from assisting such employees. The
petitioner was a newspaper that had published sex-designated employment advertisements.
After noting that the advertisements in question were "classic examples of commercial
speech," 413 U.S. at 385, the Court found no First Amendment interest would be served by
activity at issue, id. at 388-89. In Hunter, the Fourth
permitting advertisement of the illegal
Circuit upheld provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970), which
proscribe the publication of discriminatory notices relating to the sale or rental of a dwelling.
The defendant had printed a classified advertisement for an apartment for rent in a "white
home." The Court found that the publicity in question was prohibited "only in a commercial
context and not in relation to the dissemination of ideas." 459 F.2d at 211.
400. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
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ter general, at the request of one receiving unsolicited pandering advertisements in the mail, to require the sender to strike that individual's name from
the mailing list and to refrain from mailing any other such material to that
address. 4°1 The Court found that the interests in commercial speech do not
justify invasions of privacy:
We therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has
the right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted
material into the home of another. If this prohibition operates to
impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has
a right to press even "good" ideas on the unwilling recipient. That
we are often "captives" outside the sanctuary of the home and
subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we
must be captives everywhere. . . .The asserted right of a mailer,
we re eat, stops at the outer boundary of every person's domain.

Rowan is a narrow decision and has been construed narrowly by subsequent
cases. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,4 3 the Court invalidated a
municipal ordinance making it a punishable offense for a motion picture
theater to exhibit films containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a
public street or place. It rejected an argument based on Rowan that the state
was protecting the privacy interests of persons on public streets, by pointing
out that such persons could readily avert their eyes if they were easily
offended.' ° Similarly, in Pacifica Foundation v. FCC,4 5 the District of
Columbia circuit struck down an FCC order 4°6 prospectively banning the
401.

39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1970). The statute specifically refers to "'pandering advertise-

ments." A companion provision respecting "sexually oriented advertisements" also exists. Id.
§ 3010. This provision has been held constitutional by lower federal courts relying on Rowan.

See Universal Specialties, Inc. v. Bount, 331 F. Supp. 52, 53 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Pent-R-Books,
Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 328 F. Supp. 297, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Note,
FederalPanderingAdvertisements Statute, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 149 (1971).

402. 397 U.S. at 738. The Court noted that Congress gave this pow.er to the homeowner
"not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitutional questions that might arise from
vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental
official." Id. at 737. This language comports with the statement in Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967), see notes 290-91 and accompanying text supra,expressing the sentiment that a

state has a legitimate interest in preventing "an assault upon individual privacy by publication
in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure
to it." Id. at 769.
403. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

404. Id. at 212. Thus, the Court indicated that the interest in privacy was sufficiently
important to create a legitimate state interest in preventing invasion of it. Id. (citing Redrup v.
New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)). See note 402 supra. The Court also observed that "[tihe
Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content. Its effect is
to deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or
even educational. This discrimination cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant
intrusions on privacy." 422 U.S. at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
405. 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
406. Pacifica Foundation, 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975).
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broadcast, whenever children are in the audience, of language which "depicts sexual or excretory activities and organs, specifically seven patently
offensive words." 4 7 Judge Tamm's opinion for the court rejected any
invasion of privacy claim, saying the offended listener could always turn off
the radio. 40 8 In his concurrence, Chief Judge Bazelon found that privacy
interests were involved, but distinguished Rowan by observing that those
interests are reduced whenever one opens up one's home by turning on the
radio, and that the statute in Rowan enabled the homeowner to decide not to
receive any further communications, while the FCC order vested the power
of decision in a governmental official. 4°9 So, at least with respect to
pandering sent to the home, some regulation is permissible in the interests of
upholding a right of privacy, so long as the ultimate arbiter is the addressee,
rather than an agent of the government. However, since Erznoznik the Court
has recognized that some time, place and manner restrictions furthering a
legitimate governmental interest are permissible. Thus, in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. ,410 which upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance providing, inter alia, that no two adult theaters could be situated within 1,000
feet of one another, a plurality of the justices on the Court distinguished
Erznoznik by pointing out that in the earlier case, the city attempted to
regulate films solely on the basis of content, while in Young, Detroit was
interested in regulating secondary effects of showing adult films, namely,
the deterioration of residential neighborhoods and the proliferation of urban
crime. 411 Moreover, the plurality opinion in Young, which was written by
Justice Stevens, 412 had the following things to say about commercial speech
and obscenity:
407. 556 F.2d at 10-11. The seven words in question, "shit," "piss," "fuck," "cunt,"
cocksucker," "motherfucker" and "tits," were utilized in a comic monologue by George
Carlin aired by station WBAI in New York; it was this broadcast that prompted the Commission's order. The authority for promulgating such an order was said to be located in 18 U.S.C. §
1464 (1970), which provides "[w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned more than
two years, or both." See generally Note, Filthy Words, The FCC and the FirstAmendment, 61
VA. L. REv. 579 (1975).

408. 556 F.2d at 17 (opinion of Tamm, J.). Judge Tamm concluded that the FCC's order not
only violated its duty to avoid censorship of radio communications under 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1970), but also was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 556 F.2d at 18.

409. 556 F.2d at 27-28 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Thus, Chief Judge Bazelon only emphasized a point elucidated in Rowan. See note 402 supra.

410. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). See generally Clor, Public Morality and Free Expression: The
JudicialSearch for Principles of Reconciliation,28 HASTINGs L.J. 1305, 1309-11 (1977); Fried-

man, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Theaters, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1293-1304 (1977); Schauer, The Return of VariableObscenity?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1286-90 (1977); Note, Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.: CreatingLevels

of ProtectedSpeech, 4 HASoNGS CONsT. L.Q. 321, 327-57 (1977).
411. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
412. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices White and Rehnquist.
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We have recently held that the First Amendment affords
some protection to commercial speech. We have also made it
clear, however, that the content of a particular advertisement may
determine the extent of its protection. A public rapid transit system may accept some advertisements and reject others. A state
statute may permit highway billboards to advertise businesses
located in the neighborhood but not elsewhere, and regulatory
commissions may prohibit businessmen from making statements
which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive. The measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech
will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication.
More directly in point are opinions dealing with the question
whether the First Amendment prohibits the State and Federal
Governments from wholly suppressing sexually oriented materials
on the basis of their "obscene character." In Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 [1968], the Court upheld a conviction for
selling to a minor magazines which were concededly not "obscene" if shown to adults. Indeed, the members of the Court who
would accord the greatest protection to such materials have repeatedly indicated that the State could prohibit the distribution or
exhibition of such materials to juveniles and unconsenting adults.
Surely the First Amendment does not foreclose any such prohibition, yet it is equally clear that any prohibition must rest squarely
on an appraisal of the content413 of material otherwise within a
constitutionally protected area.
Young provides a perfect rationale for distinguishing pandering from other
forms of commercial speech. The plurality states that advertising may be
regulated on the basis of content. It then notes that one example of legitimate differential treatment because of content is comprised of sexuallyoriented materials that would not be legally obscene in the context of their
dissemination to consenting adults.
How do these cases apply to Splawn? There is no indication that the
petitioner in Splawn mailed so-called pandering advertisements to individuals at their residences, so quite possibly the fundamental privacy interest of
Rowan is not involved in this case. Even if one assumed otherwise,
however, Rowan could be distinguished in the same manner utilized by
Chief Judge Bazelon in Pacifica Foundation: the individual homeowner is
not the one seeking to curtail or restrict the dissemination of such advertising. It is the state that is making the decision, and because of that, individual
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment and in portions of the opinion; he concluded that the
Detroit zoning ordinance was a legitimate time, place and manner restriction. 427 U.S. at 73-84

(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Stewart dissented, saying that the statute impermissibly effectuated a regulation on the basis of content. Id. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by

Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.) Justice Blackmun also dissented, finding the ordinance
vague. Id. at 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
413. 427 U.S. at 68-70 (footnotes omitted).
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privacy interests would not appear to be a source from which a time, place
or manner restriction could be derived. If Splawn's commercial speech
consisted of public advertising (e.g., signs in a window fronting upon a
public thoroughfare), Erznoznik would seem to suggest that such speech
could not be regulated on the basis of content, unless it consisted of
representations of hard core pornography. Since Splawn's advertising was
characterized as being accurate and inoffensive, it would seem to be fully
protected by the First Amendment. However, as indicated earlier, Erznoznik has been qualified somewhat by the plurality opinion in Young. Under
the logic of that decision, Splawn's commercial speech could be regulated
on the basis of content, even though not obscene per se. In order to make
such a determination, however, one would have to know what Splawn's
advertisement consisted of, how it was presented to the public and who was
exposed to it. By failing to make such a detailed analysis, the majority in
Splawn slights the VirginiaPharmacyBoard doctrine, while the dissent in
Splawn blithely ignores the qualifications and exceptions inherent in that
doctrine. Thus, when Justice Stevens asserts that Ginzburg did not survive
Virginia Pharmacy Board, he neglected to consider the full import of the
latter case, the precedential effect of apparently still valid decisions such as
Rowan and the ramifications of his own plurality opinion in Young.
Finally, one could note a third objection to Justice Stevens' broad
assertion. The commercial speech cases decided in 1976 by the Supreme
Court have all dealt with attempts by a state to suppress or criminalize
certain types of advertising. The Court in VirginiaPharmacyBoard underscored this point: "What is at issue is whether a state may completely
suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely
lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its disseminators
and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we conclude that the answer to
this one is in the negative." 41 4 But the pandering doctrine of Ginzburg
achieves no similar suppression. Pandering is not a separate crime; 4 15 it is
merely an item of evidence which a jury in a criminal prosecution may or
may not rely on. It is difficult to conclude that an evidentiary rule is the sort
414. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
773 (1976).
415. See Hanling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974); United States v. Thevis, 484
F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 932 (1974); United States v. Levy, 331
F.Supp. 712, 713 (D. Conn. 1971); Milky Way Prod. Inc. v. Leary, 305 F.Supp. 288, 294

(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom. New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970). Accordingly, pandering need not be charged in an indictment in order to be included in instructions to a
jury. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974); United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d
1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ratner, 502 F.2d 1300, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Palladino, 475 F.2d 65, 70-71 (1st Cir.), vacatedon othergrounds,413 U.S. 916
(1973); United States v. Gundlach, 345 F.Supp. 709, 713 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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of regulation of advertising that the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board
meant to find is precluded by the First Amendment. Undoubtedly, the
Ginzburg doctrine does have an indirect chilling effect on commercial
advertising, especially in light of some of the lower court decisions applying
that doctrine. But the state has never said that pandering advertising not
itself alleged to be obscene is subject either to a criminal sanction or to
outright suppression. So Justice Stevens glossed over a rather crucial problem: is the extent of regulation effected by the evidentiary rule developed by
Ginzburg serious enough to trigger the protective mechanisms announced in
416
Virginia PharmacyBoard?
As indicated earlier, Splawn raises a host of fascinating questions and
problems which have not been dealt with in any meaningful fashion. But in
light of'the sharp division of the Court on the issue of whether pandering is
protected commercial speech, it is probably fair to say that this case will
provide a useful starting point for further developments in this area.
4.

Community Standardsin a FederalProsecution:Smith v. United States
In Smith v. United States ,417 the Court considered the effect of a state
obscenity statute on the determination of "contemporary community standards" in the context of a federal prosecution for the mailing of lewd and
indecent materials in violation of section 1461 of Title eighteen of the
United States Code. 41 8 Smith held that states could not legislatively define
such standards, especially in cases involving federal law. The Court cited
Hamling v. United States4 19 as authority for the proposition that "community standards simply provide the measure against which the jury decides the
questions of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness";420 it
416. There is another problem implicit in this case. One of Splawn's contentions for
examination by the Supreme Court was: "In obscenity prosecution of retail bookstore owner
not shown to have had any connection with creator or publisher of material in question, is it
constitutional to instruct jury that financial motives of creator of material could be considered

as evidence that material was obscene?" Splawn v. California, 45 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Sep.
21, 1976). Splawn was clearly arguing that the motives of the originator ought not to be imputed
to him. But, assuming he had argued that the statute in question infringed the First Amendment
commercial speech rights of the originator, would such a claim have been cognizable? Possibly

not. The Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), indicated that tha
overbreadth doctrine did not apply in the context of "professional advertising." Id. at 2707-08.
So to the extent that Splawn might have wished to raise an overbreadth claim, he may well not
have been able to do so, at least with respect to a commercial speech contention. Nevertheless,
the language in Bates concerning professional advertsing may indicate that overbreadth claims
may still be possible in cases involving the advertisement of sexually-oriented materials.
417. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
418. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).

419. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
420. 431 U.S. at 302.
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therefore ruled that the standards utilized by jurors must be applied "in
accordance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the average
person in their community." 42 1 The ruling rendered in Smith is interesting
for two reasons. Not only does it disclose some of the ambiguities inherent
in the concept of "community standards," but it also raises some troubling
questions regarding the effect of a narrow definition of this term on the First
Amendment rights of national publishers of allegedly obscene materials who
are prosecuted in federal courts.
a. The Decision
Jerry Lee Smith was indicted in a federal district court located in the
southern district of Iowa for transmitting allegedly obscene magazines and
films through the mail in violation of section 1461. The offenses charged
were said to have occurred between February and October of 1974, and the
trial occurred in 1975. Up to 1974, Iowa law classified as a misdemeanor
the sale 422 or deposit in any post office within the state of "lewd, indecent,
lascivious, or filthy" books, pamphlets and photographs. 423 In 1973, however, the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Wedelstedt42 4 relied on the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Miller and held that this law was
unconstitutionally vague. 4' The state court refused to correct this deficiency
by judicial construction, saying "[i]f changes in the law are desirable from a
policy, administrative or practical standpoint, it is for the legislature to enact
them, not for the court to incorporate them by interpretation. "426 A response
to this mandate went into effect on July 1, 1974. Not only did the Iowa
legislature abrogate the statutes declared invalid in Wedelstedt, it also
enacted a new set of provisions which defined "obscene material" and
criminalized the dissemination of such materials to minors, but not to
adults. 427 Subsequently, in 1976, Iowa completely revamped its criminal
code. The new provisions, which became effective on January 1, 1978,
prohibited the knowing sale or offer of obscene materials to any person,
428
including an adult.
At his trial, Smith submitted six questions for purposes of voir dire. Of
the five rejected by the presiding judge, one made inquiry into a venire421. rd. at 305.
422. IowA CODE ANN. § 725.5 (West Supp. 1977) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1978).

423. IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.6 (West Supp. 1977) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1978).
424. 213 N.W.2d 652 (Iowa 1973).

425. Id. at 656. See also State ex rel. Faches v. N.D.D., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa
1975) (state cannot enjoin exhibit of films under a statute concerning the use of premises "for
the purposes of lewdness" where "lewdness" is never defined).
426. 213 N.W.2d at 656-57.
427. IOWA CODE ANN. § 725.2 (West Supp. 1977) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1978).
428. IowA CODE ANN. § 2804 (West Spec. Pamph. 1978).
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man's knowledge of contemporary community standards respecting sex and
nudity in the southern district of Iowa, two others probed a potential juror's
knowledge and comprehension of those standards and the final two dealt
with individual knowledge of Iowa law on the subject.4 29 The latter two
queries were requested because Smith contended that the statute that became
effective in July of 1974 constituted the controlling community standard and
that, under that standard, he was not criminally liable because he had only
made intrastate sales to "adult book stores" from which juveniles were
presumably barred.4 30 Consequently, at trial, Smith introduced into evidence the text of the 1974 state law as part of his defense. Nevertheless, the
jury found him guilty on all counts after being instructed by the presiding
judge that contemporary community standards consisted of those accepted
in fact by the community as a whole. The district judge also found that
section 1461 neither incorporated nor depended upon the laws of the states,
and that jurors could rely on their own knowledge of the standards prevailing within the appropriate community. 431 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but noted that although
offense to contemporary standards was a federal question determinable by
the jury in a federal prosecution, it would be proper to admit evidence of
state law as was done by the district court for the purpose of enabling jurors
4 32
to make that determination.
In an opinion by Justice Blackmun, which was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist, the Supreme Court
essentially agreed -with the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Initially, the
Court explored the meaning of the term "contemporary community standards." Relying on Miller v. California,a33it noted that what appeals to a
prurient interest or what is patently offensive is a question of fact to be
measured by the standards of the community. 43 4 Justice Blackmun then
quoted Hamling v. United States,435 one of the Court's prior rulings on
section 1461, for the proposition that:
A juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the views of
the average person in the community or vicinage from which he
comes for making the required determination, just as he is entitled
to draw on his knowledge of the43propensities
of a "reasonable"
6
person in other areas of the law.
429. 431 U.S. at 296-97.
430. Id. at 295-96.
431. Id. at 303-04.

432. Id. at 299.
433. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
434. 431 U.S. at 302.

435.. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
436. 418 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R., 350 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1956);
Stone v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 344 U.S. 407, 409 (1953)). Schulz was a Jones
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He thus concluded that it would be just as inappropriate for a legislature to
define these community standards as "to attempt to freeze a jury to one
definition of reasonableness." 4 7 While a state may place some geographical limits on those standards, as well as specify the types of conduct it
deems necessary to regulate, it may not conclusively define such. standards
for the purposes of an obscenity trial. 438 Justice Blackmun asserted that the
community standard to be applied in a section 1461 prosecution is a matter
of federal law; 43 9 thus, while a relevant state statute could not be given
conclusive effect, it could be admitted into evidence at a federal trial in
order to provide proof "of the mores of the community whose legislative
body enacted the law. It is quite appropriate, therefore, for the jury to be
told of the law and to give such weight to the expression of the State's policy
on distribution as the jury feels it deserves.'"44 The fact that the mailings in
question were wholly intrastate was said to be immaterial to the disposition
of this issue. The Court simply noted that it had traditionally acknowledged
the constitutional power of Congress to exclude obscenity from the mails
regardless of whether the materials so excluded traversed state boundaries.441
The Court also rejected petitioner's counterarguments on this issue. It
claimed that its ruling that standards expressed in state laws could not
govern in federal prosecutions in no way nullified the legislative efforts of
the states. Thus, Justice Blackmun reasoned that "the State's right to
abolish all regulation of obscene material [if it so wished] does not create a
correlative right to force the Federal Government to allow the mails or the
channels of interstate or foreign commerce to be used for the purpose of
sending obscene material into the permissive State.'' 4 2 Furthermore, he
remarked that the 1974 decision of the Iowa legislature to regulate only the
distribution of obscenity to minors did not necessarily signify that dissemiAct, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970), case involving the question of whether there was sufficient
evidence to go to the jury on the issue of whether the respondent employer had failed to provide
a safe place to work for the decedent employee. Stone was a Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1970), case involving issues of negligence and causation; the petitioner
claimed he had suffered an injury while removing worn cross-ties on the respondent's railroad
line.
437. 431 U.S. at 302.
438. Id. at 302-03.
439. Id. at 303.

440. Id. at 308.
441.

Id. at 305.

442. Id. at 307. He rejected the contention that Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
which upheld the right of a person to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home,
mandated a contrary conclusion. Id. In doing so, Justice Blackmun followed a number of prior
cases decided by the Court which had similarly declined to extend the principles of Stanley. See
note 90 supra.
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nation of such materials.to adults was condoned. The legislature may have
been convinced that the limited resources available to prosecutors should be
expended on matters deemed to have a greater priority than the enforcement
of obscenity laws, or it may have believed that the gap it had created would
be filled by appropriate federal statutes such as section 1461, or it may also
have deemed it easier to penalize over the counter retail sales to minors
rather than the mailing of materials to private residences or it may simply
have refrained from restricting the dissemination of obscenity to adults in
1974 because it required more time to study how such distribution should be
efficaciously regulated. 443 For these reasons, the Court refrained from
concluding that the 1974 legislation represented any judgment of policy on
the part of the state's lawmakers.
Thus, the majority in Smith reiterated the rule that "contemporary
community standards must be applied by juries in accordance with their own
understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community. "'I Such applications were reviewable solely in order to ensure that
jurors (a) did not rely exclusively on either their subjective reactions to the
evidence admitted at trial or the reactions of an overly sensitive or overly
jaded minority, (b) found obscene only that type of conduct that fell within
the ambit of the substantive examples mentioned in Miller445 and adopted in
Hamling,446 with respect to section 1461 prosecutions, (c) found obscene
only those materials lacking serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value, a determination said to be "particularly amenable" to appellate
447
review and (d) based their verdict on sufficient evidence.
Two other issues raised by the petitioner were dismissed summarily.
Justice Blackmun found that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in
denying the petitioner's proposed voir dire questions because the particular
inquiries requested would not have elicited useful information regarding a
potential juror's qualifications to apply contemporary community standards
in an objective manner.44 8 Finally, the Court found that, as construed in
Hamling, section 1461 was not unconstitutionally vague. 449 This latter
ruling merely restated a conclusion that the Court had consistently been
450
expressing for two decades.
443.
444.
445.
446.

431 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 305.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). See note 37 supra.
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974).

447. 431 U.S. at 305-06.

448. Id. at 308.
449. Id. at 308-09.
450. See Harnling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974); United States v. Reidel, 402
U.S. 351, 354 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490-91 (1957).
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized the narrow
ground of the Court's decision. For him, the case involved only two issues:
whether Congress intended to incorporate state obscenity laws into the
federal statutes and whether the concept of "community standards" follows
changes in state statutes. In regard to the first question, he agreed with the
majority that the record of legislative debates underlying the enactment of
section 1461 evinced no intent to adopt the rules set forth in relevant local
legislation. 451 As for the second question, he simply echoed the view of
Justice Blackmun that changes in state law are relevant, but never controlling. 452 Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, issued a
brief dissent that merely reiterated the view they had expressed elsewhere
453
that section 1461 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Justice Stevens' dissent was considerably more elaborate. Although he
admitted that the majority opinion represented a "logical extension" of
precedent, 454 he claimed that a federal statute defining a criminal offense
could only be enforced with reference to national, not local, standards. In so
doing, he followed the view expressed by Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day455 that the proper test under a federal obscenity statute
"reaching as it does to all parts of the United States whose population
reflects many different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, is a national standard of decency."456 The majority in Miller had repudiated this thesis,
457
claiming that no national- standard could ever be legislatively defined.
Acknowledging this contention, Justice Stevens then responded that it
provides "a reason for questioning the suitability of criminal prosecution as
the mechanism for regulating the distribution of erotic material.''458
Moreover, he noted acerbically that defining local community standards in
terms of "concrete descriptive criteria" is also an arduous task, especially
when the locality in question is a "culturally diverse" state, like New York
459
or California.
Justice Stevens then proceeded to list the objectionable aspects of the
local community standards concept. First, he noted that the geographic
boundaries of a local community are never defined with precision but rather
451. 431 U.S. at 310 (Powell, J., concurring).
452. Id.
453. Id. at 310-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.) (citing
Millican v. United States, 418 U.S. 947, 948 (1974) (Brennan, I., dissenting, joined by Stewart
and Marshall, JJ.)).
454. 431 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
455. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
456. 370 U.S. at 488 (opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Stewart, J.).
457. 413 U.S. at 31-34.
458. 431 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
459. Id. at 313-14.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

"appear subject to elastic adjustment to suit the needs of the prosecutor.' 460
Second, he found that whereas application of a national standard would have
yielded a "substantial body of evidence and decisional law" concerning its
content, no such fund of precedent can be established under a system of
local community standards, which are "necessarily dependent on the perceptions of the individuals who happen to compose the jury in a given
case."' 1 Third, he warned that,
an opinion held by a large majority of a group concerning a neutral
and objective subject has a significant impact in distorting the
perceptions of group members who would normally take a different position. Since obscenity is by no means a neutral subject, and
since the ascertainment of a community standard is such a subjective task, the expression of individual jurors' sentiments will inevitably influence the perceptions of other jurors, particularly
those who would normally be in the minority.462
Thus, a given juror's reaction in a private setting to allegedly obscene
materials might differ significantly from his or her reaction in a social
context. Fourth, Justice Stevens noted that because an appellate record
never discloses the actual standards applied by a jury, effective review of a
criminal conviction for violating obscenity laws is thereby precluded. 463
Finally, he simply asserted that because of the subjectivity underlying a
jury's determination of obscenity, "the line between communications which
'offend' and those which do not is too blurred to identify criminal conduct.
It is also too blurred to delimit the protections of the First Amendment. "4
As an alternative, Justice Stevens urged a non-criminal approach to the
regulation of obscenity, stating that while all protected communications are
not equally immune from regulation under the First Amendment, criminal
prosecutions are an unacceptable method of abating what is essentially a
public nuisance.6 5 He would acknowledge that regulation of speech could
take into account "obvious differences in subject matter." Thus, sexuallyoriented materials could be regulated in a manner in which political
460. Id. at 314-15.
461. Id. at 315.
462. Id. See generally Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distor-

tion of Judgments, in GROUP DYNAMICS 189-200 (D. Cartwright ed. 1960); Rosenblatt & Rosenblatt, Six-Member Juries in Criminal Cases: Legal and Psychological Considerations, 47 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 615, 631-32 (1973).
463. 431 U.S. at 315-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

464. Id. at 316.
465. Id. at 318. For other suggestions that hard core pornography might best be limited by
nuisance laws, see Loewy, A Better Test for Obscenity: Better for the States-Better for
Libertarians,28 HASTINGS L.J. 1315 (1977); Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography:The Casefor

an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 509 (1977). See generally Note,
Restricting the Public Display of Offensive Materials:The Use and Effectiveness of Public and
PrivateNuisance Actions, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 232 (1975).
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comment could not.466 But that regulation could not depend upon the
opinions or sensibilities of laymen and judges. Justice Stevens noted that
there was some legitimate controversy about the beneficial or therapeutic
value of pornographic magazines and films;4 67 he would therefore "rely on
the capacity of the free marketplace of ideas to distinguish that which is
useful or beautiful from that which is ugly or worthless.' '46 Because Smith
sent the materials in question to those who requested them and because these
materials were mailed in sealed envelopes and thus did not constitute a
nuisance to "unwilling third parties," Justice Stevens would have reversed
469
his conviction.
b. Analysis
In order better to analyze the Court's decision in Smith, the consideration of that case will be bisected. The first section that follows will
consider the extent to which the Court's ruling marks a departure from the
definitions and procedural rules utilized in prior cases. The second section
will treat the broader policy questions and their ramifications raised by
Justice Stevens' dissent.
466. 431 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This appears to comport with the views
expressed in his plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,69-70
(1976). See notes 410-13 and accompanying text supra.
467. Compare, e.g., COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE

COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 53 (1970) ("[o]n the positive side, explicit sexual
materials are sought as a source of entertainment and information by substantial numbers of
American adults. At times, these materials also appear to serve to increase and facilitate
constructive communication about sexual matters within marriage.") with W. BERNS, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 215 (1976) ("censorship, in
trying to maintain the moral distinction between the non-obscene and the obscene, has the
effect of maintaining the distinction between the human and the base, and therefore...
between art and trash. A people that is told by the law, with the support of the learned
professions, that it is not improper to satisfy its taste for pornography will come to understand
sexual relations in the language of pornography and will lose sight of the moral setting in which
human sexual relations exist. Such a people will have no taste for moral questions, and,
therefore, no taste for the great art which deals with these questions. It will prefer Fanny Hillto
The Red and the Black, ultimately because it is taught that there is no reason not to.") and
Sparrow, Freedom of Expression: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 46 AM. SCHOLAR 165, 178
(1977) ("I should say that the unrestricted circulation in the bookshops and on the bookstalls of
grossly indecent and sadistic books and magazines. . . coupled with the knowledge that these
things are permitted by the law of the land, would make a difference in the way the general
public regards the indecent and the inhumane, particularly in the area of sex and violence.
People would unconsciously redefine these concepts, and alter their attitude toward the things
they stand for: accepted standards of decency and humanity would themselves be modified;
things that today disgust us by their indecency would no longer seem indecent, things that today
horrify us by their brutality would no longer seem brutal, or not so shockingly brutal as they do
now"). See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 58-64.
468. 431 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
469. Id.
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(1)

Consistency with PriorLaw
The first question that needs to be asked about "contemporary community standards" is: what is the geographic scope of the community referred
to in that phrase? After the decision in Miller v. California,470a number of
legislatures enacted laws defining the applicable community as the state
itself; 47 thus, in prosecutions under the various obscenity statutes of those
states, these definitions of the appropriate community would, of course,
control. There is nothing questionable in this approach; indeed, the majority
in Smith refers to such a technique with approval. 472 Similarly,"even absent
such a precise statutory requirement, the Court in Miller indicated that an
instruction by the presiding judge in a state prosecution advising the jury to
apply the contemporary community standards of the forum state is not
reversible error.4 7 3 By analogy, where state law is silent, a jury could
presumably be instructed to apply the standards of a geographic subdivision
of a state, such as a county or a township; as Professor Schauer has noted,
"[t]he standard to be applied should be based upon the balancing of the
competing factors of workability of the standard, on the one hand, and the
overall effect on First Amendment values, on the other." 4 74 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has even gone so far as to approve instructions where the
jury was told to "apply 'community standards' without specifying what
'community.' "75 Thus, in local prosecutions where there is no controlling
state law, presiding judges are accorded a considerable degree of discretion
in particularizing the geographic scope of the relevant community.
The issue is more problematic in the context of federal obscenity
prosecutions. As noted earlier, 476 two justices in Manual Enterprises,Inc.
v. Day4 77 contended that in such prosecutions a "national standard of
decency" governs, 47 8 and many lower federal courts adopted this position. 479 In Hamling v. UnitedStates,480 however, a majority of the Court, in
470. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
471. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193-(a)(3) (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 31
(1972), amended, ch. 430 § 12 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.l(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977); OR.
REV. STAT. § 167.087(2)(b) (1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-27(1) (1977 Supp.); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-3010(G) (1977 Supp.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.13 § 2801(B) (1977 Supp.).
472. 431 U.S. at 303.
473. 413 U.S. at 31.

474. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 125.
475. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). See notes 54-58 and accompanying text
supra.
476.
477.
478.
479.

See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
370 U.S. 478 (1962).
Id. at 488.
See cases cited note 16 supra.

480. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
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a case involving section 1461, found that national standards were not
controlling in federal actions to enforce obscenity laws. Instead, it held that
local community standards would govern. 48 1 The geographic scope of the
term "community" was said to be the judicial district from which the
members of the jury were drawn. 482 To this observation, however, the Court
added the following caveat: "But this is not to say that a district court would
not be at liberty to admit evidence of standards existing in some place
outside of this particular district, if it felt such evidence would assist the
jurors in the resolution of the issues which they were to decide.,' 483 Thus, in
fact, Hamling does not mandate the application of any standard fixed with
reference to a given locality. Instead, the primary criterion proffered for
admitting evidence from which a jury may derive a community standard is
whether or not the jury will in fact be assisted in fulfilling its function by
484
such an admission.
The decisions of lower federal courts during the years after Miller have
predictably reached disparate results on this problem. One approach has
been to limit the relevant community solely to the judicial district in which
the case is tried. The formative decision in this respect was United States v.
Groner,485 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1973. That case involved a
prosecution under section 1462 of Title eighteen of the United States
Code, 486 which proscribes the distribution of obscene materials in interstate
commerce. The Fifth Circuit noted that under the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 1968, litigants in federal court are entitled to "a fair cross section of
' 7
the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.' 4
Based on this observation, the court of appeals rejected any attempt to
define the community in federal obscenity cases as the entire nation:
For the trial of obscenity cases under federal law "the community" should logically embrace that area from which the jury is
drawn and selected. According to the Jury Act federal juries are
generally drawn from a division within a district or from the
district at large. Depending upon the population involved these
districts vary greatly in geographical area. In a few cases a district
is as large as a state; but in metropolitan areas the boundaries of a
481.
482.
483.
484.

418 U.S. at 105.
Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106.
For general discussions of the concept of community standards after Miller, see

SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 120-131; Shugrue, An Atlas for Obscenity:Exploring Community

Standards, 7 CREIGHTON L. REv. 157 (1974); Comment, Pornography, the Local Option, 26
BAYLOR L. REV. 97 (1974); Comment, Obscenity:Determinedby Whose Standards?,26 U. FLA.
L. REV. 324 (1974).

485. 479 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.), vacated on othergrounds, 414 U.S. 969 (1973).
486. See note 273 supra.
487. 479 F.2d at 583 (quoting 28 U.S.C; § 1861 (1970) (emphasis by the court)).
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district may be comparatively small, though in such districts the
population is varied and large. It does not seem reasonable or
sensible to require a-jury in federal criminal obscenity cases drawn
from a single district or division to assess the thinking of the
average person of the community, to consider the common conscience of the community, or the present-day standards of the
community if the word "community" is to include all of the
people within the boundaries of this vast nation North, South,
East and West. 4m
In United States v. One Reel of 35mm ColorMotion PictureFilm Entitled
"Sinderella, " Sherpix, Inc. ,489 the Second Circuit dealt with a judgment of
forfeiture pursuant to section 1305 of Title nineteen of the United States
Code, 490 which prohibits importation into the United States of "obscene or
immoral" materials, rendered by a federal judge sitting without a jury. The
court defined the relevant community in the following fashion:
A jury in this case would have been selected from members of
communities in the Eastern District of New York, i.e., Brooklyn,
Long Island and Staten Island. In theory they would be supposed
to know how an "average person" would apply "contemporary
community standards" to whether Sinderella appealed to their
"prurient interest." The Judge was vested with this same power
and burden. His task was to gauge the reaction of the community
when, as and if it viewed the film which he saw. The community
could not extend beyond the ken of the jury and, in this case, the
Judge. Thus the narrowing geographic standards of Miller have
been met. In fact the Judge at the opening of the trial quite
understandably inquired: "How am I to judge national standards?" Naturally he could not possibly do this. Even State
491 standards or city-wide standards would have been too broad.
The result in "Sinderella" had been anticipated by a New York district
court in United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,
Schedule No. 896, 492 another suit involving section 1305. There, it was
stated unconditionally that the "patent offensiveness" and "prurient interest" elements of the tripartite Miller test for obscenity would be determined
with reference to the standards prevalent in the southern district of New
York.4 93 All these cases preceded the Court's decision in Hamling. All of
488. Id. at 583.
489. 491 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1974).

490. 19 U.S.C. § 1305 (1970): "All persons are prohibited from importing into the United
States from any foreign country. . . any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, drawing, or other representation, figure, or image on or of paper
or other material or any cast, instrument, or other article which is obscene or immoral .... "
See generally Comment, Government Seizures of Imported Obscene Matter: Section 305 of the
Tariff Act of 1930 andRecent Supreme Court Obscenity Decisions, 13 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 114 (1974).

491. 491 F.2d at 958.
492. 363 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y.. 1973).
493. Id. at 167.
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them do what Hamling does not, that is, find that community standards
must be defined with respect to a fixed geographic area. Presumably, courts
following these cases would deny judges in federal prosecutions the
privilege of admitting evidence of standards outside the relevant judicial
district, a technique that Hamling.leaves to the discretion of individual
judges.
One may well ask whether or not these restrictive decisions survive
Hamling, with its more expansive approach. The Groner case was vacated
on appeal by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Miller.494 On
remand, 495 the Fifth Circuit did not reappraise its position on the geographic
scope of the relevant community, so presumably its prior discussion on that
point would still be controlling, since Miller would not impair the result
reached therein. This decision on remand antedated Hamling, so the court
of appeals did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's teachings in that
latter case. However, three months after Hamling was handed down, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ratner496 cited both decisions in Groner
with approval, so perhaps the restrictive geographical approach taken in the
first of those decisions is still controlling law within that circuit. In contrast,
the Second Circuit has never reconsidered "Sinderella" in light of Hamling. The one pertinent decision by a New York district court on the subject
is United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise,497 decided in
1976, wherein "Sinderella" was said to typify the position that "a federal
court may invoke the community standards of the district in which it sits and
from which it draws a jury." 49 Thus, "Sinderella," with its severely
circumscribed geographic limitation, may still govern in the Second Circuit.
A strikingly different approach to the problem of defining the geographic scope of the relevant community was taken by the First Circuit in
United States v. Palladino,499 decided after Miller but before Hamling.
There, it was said that community standards under Miller meant national,
not local, standards. Palladinoinvolved a prosecution under section 1461;
the First Circuit observed that in footnote seven of United States v. Twelve
200-ft Reels of Super 8mm Film,5°° the Supreme Court had said that the
494. Groner v. United States, 414 U.S. 969 (1973).

495. United States v. Groner, 494 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974).
496. 502 F.2d 1300, 1301 (5th Cir. 1974).
497. 433 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977).

498. 433 F. Supp. at 1137. On appeal in Obscene Merchandise, the Second Circuit elected
to apply the standards of the judicial district in which the items in question were seized and in
which prosecution had been initiated. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1977). It thus acted consistently with "Sinderella".
499. 490 F.2d 499 (lst Cir. 1974).

500. 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973).
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standards of Miller would be interpolated into federal obscenity legislation,
but it remarked that the Court in that footnote had cited the pages of Miller
describing the elements of obscenity, not the pages discussing community
standards. 50 1 Because of this lack of any "explicit holding" by the Supreme
Court, the First Circuit felt free to devise its own approach to the problem.5 °2 Moreover, Chief Judge Coffin's opinion in Palladinoexpressed the
view that the Constitution mandated this approach:
Since [section 1461] proscribes the deposit for mailing, conveying
in the mails, and delivery of obscene materials, were a state
standard to govern the level of tolerance, guilt or innocence could
easily turn on the choice to prosecute in the state of mailing, the
state of delivery, or a state through which the material passed.
This would open the possibility of senders of identical materials
from the same state to be found guilty or not, depending on the
course of transit or state of delivery of their materials. The vice of
selective prosecution would also be present, as well as the anomalous situation of having prosecution under a national law depend
upon the laws of the least permissive states. None of these eventualities would promote the uniform application normally attributed to federal legislation.503
Not surprisingly, the petitioner in Hamling cited Palladinoin support
of the proposition that section 1461 prosecutions are governed by national
50 5
community standards. 50 4 The Supreme Court rejected this proposition,
but did not overrule Palladinoinsofar as it was inconsistent with the result
in Hamling. Nor has the First Circuit reconsidered the matter; indeed, in
light of Hamling's insistence that community standards should not be
determined with reference to a definition of the term "community" that
substitutes some smaller locality for the nation as a whole, it might well be
possible for a court of appeals to require that the federal district courts under
it must "assist" jurors by admitting evidence of so many different local
standards throughout the nation that the result, in fact if not in name, would
be the application of a national standard. Such a technique would violate the
spirit, but not necessarily the letter of Hamling, so the option selected by the
First Circuit in Palladinomay not have been entirely foreclosed by subsequent rulings. Nevertheless, in the main post-Hamling case to reconsider
the validity of Palladino'sadvocacy of national standards, the Sixth Circuit
501. 490 F.2d at 502.
502. Id.

503. Id. at 503. Accord, United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206,210 (1st Cir. 1973)
(Coffin, J., concurring). Of course, the First Circuit had always applied national standards in
federal obscenity prosecutions. See note 11 supra.
504. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
505. See id. at 105-06.
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concluded without hesitation5°6that the Supreme Court had "rejected" the
position of the First Circuit.
A third approach consists of attempts by courts to take Hamling at its
word and apply a flexible approach not tied to geographical considerations.
As the Ninth Circuit has admitted, implementation of the Hamling test
"tends to result in application of 'local' attitudes because of the limited area
from which the jury is drawn, but this does not make the obscenity standard
any more a geographic one than tests involving 'the propensities of a
"reasonable" person in other areas of the law.' "507 On closer examination,
however, as the test of Hamling has been applied, it does appear to result in
the conjunction of the concept of "community" with a fixed locality. For
example, in United States v. Dachsteiner,50 8 a section 1461 prosecution, the
Ninth Circuit said:
Because the jurors in this case resided in the Northern District of
California, they will draw upon their knowledge which may be
representative of that area. Neither Miller nor Hamling, however,
requires the trial court to define the relevant community in metes
and bounds. . . Likewise, in deciding whether the district court
committed prejudicial error, we need not
5 9 define the relevant community in precise geographical terms.
Similarly, in United States v. Marks, 510 the Sixth Circuit held that under
Hamling it would be permissible for a district judge to define the term
"community" by the "precise political-geographic boundary of the Eastern
District of Kentucky" from which the jury had been drawn, even though
that same judge had allowed testimony during trial with respect to community standards prevalent in Cincinnati, Ohio. 511 In United States v. Miscellaneous PornographicMagazines,512 an Illinois district court gave Hamling
a pragmatic reading. In that case, after a first trial resulted in a hung jury,
the parties submitted the evidence adduced at that proceeding to a judge
sitting without a jury. He concluded that while Hamling permitted admission of evidence from varying localities, he would be bound by the standards of the city of Chicago, where all members of the jury in the first trial
had resided, simply because the evidence adduced at that first trial did not
take into account the standards of communities other than Chicago. 5 13 In
506. Marks v. United States, 520 F.2d 913, 922 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on othergrounds, 430

U.S. 188 (1977). See also United States v. Miller, 505 F.2d 1247, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1974).
507. United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1976).
508. 518 F.2d 20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 954 (1975).
509. Id. at 22.
510. 520 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). For a
discussion of other issues raised by this case, see notes 95-166 and accompanying text supra.
511. 520 F.2d at 919.
512. 400 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. IlM.1975).

513. 1d. at 354.
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terms of the results reached, these cases do not differ significantly from
restrictive decisions like Groner or "Sinderella." In Dachsteiner, while
the Ninth Circuit purported not to define the geographical scope of the
relevant community, it acknowledged, as a practical matter, that the standards in fact applied would undoubtedly be those of the judicial district from
which the jury was drawn. In Marks, the trial judge actually admitted
evidence relating to standards of localities falling outside the relevant
judicial district, but in his instructions to the jurors, he defined the appropriate "community" as the eastern district of Kentucky. It is difficult to
reconcile this practice with the assumption implicit in Hamling and explicit
in Smith that the determination of community standards is a jury function
and the judge's role is to "assist" the jurors in fulfilling their duty. In fact,
however, there is some confusion on this point, and-the practice condoned in
Marks has been approved elsewhere, most prominently by the Tenth Circuit
in UnitedStates v. Friedman.514The court there held that "[a] consideration
of the application of national or local standards should be initially made by
the trial court in addition to the determination of what such standards may
be."' But apart from the difficulties concerning the division of responsibility between judge and jury in federal prosecutions, the result arrived at in
Marks is one which binds community standards inextricably to the metes
and bounds of the judicial district in which the prosecution is tried. Similarly, the court in MiscellaneousPornographicMagazines presumably could
have adduced evidence of standards outside Chicago to assist its determination; instead, it confined its considerations to the criteria that would have
been applied by a jury and assumed that these criteria would have been those
of the judicial district in which the jurors resided. Thus, although in theory
Hamling permits a flexible non-localized approach, in practice it has been
relied on to support conclusions like those reached in Groner and "Sinderella" that the governing standards are those existing within the forum's
judicial district.
Perhaps the leading case contrary to this trend is United States v.
Danley,5 16 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 1975. There, in a prosecution
under section 1462, 517 a trial court situated in Oregon admitted into evidence
not only the standards prevalent in that state, but also the standards prevalent
in states in which the various recipients of the allegedly obscene materials
resided. The Ninth Circuit upheld this practice, saying,
514. 488 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1973).
515. Id. at 1142.
516. 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 929 (1976).

517. See note 273 supra.
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In judging the community standard, the court, dealing as it
was with laws regulating the mails and interstate commerce, properly considered the community as embracing more than the State
of Oregon. While under Miller v. California. . .taken in conjunction with United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film . . . it is

permissible in federal prosecution to define the state as a commuconnity, it is clear from Hamling v. United States . . .that
518
sideration may be given to standards without the state.
Danley represents a rare effort to apply Hamling literally, and simultaneously exposes a weakness in the approach utilized by the Court in
Hamling. If the publication in question is one like Hustler, which presumably is subscribed to by residents of all fifty states, then the standards of
those states ought to be admissible in a federal prosecution. The result of so
doing, however, would be to confront the jury with the task of considering
conflicting concepts of obscenity held by different portions of this nation,
one of the very problems that repudiation of the national standard in
Hamling was supposed to have resolved. With this prospect in mind, it is no
surprise that courts construing Hamling often do what the Court in that case
abjured: they substitute for the nation as a whole some smaller, circumscribed locality.
A fourth approach to defining the geographical scope of the relevant
community is a functional one, depending upon the nature of the conduct
being proscribed by the applicable federal obscenity law. Section 1461
provides a perfect illustration of the problem. Prior to 1958, section 1461 by
5 19
its terms prohibited only the deposit into the malls of obscene materials.
On the basis of this language, the Tenth Circuit in 1953 held, in the case of
United States v. Ross,52° that prosecution for violation of section 1461
could be initiated only at the place where the item in question was deposited
for mailing; it was said that "[t]hat act [of admission into the mails] is
complete when the deposit is made and is not a continuing act. It does not
involve a use of the mails.'521 In response to this ruling, Congress in 1958
amended section 1461 to prohibit the knowing use of the mails for the
mailing, carriage in the mails, delivery, or causing of delivery to a place
directed by the sender, of obscene materials. 522 Moreover, prosecution
518. 523 F.2d at 370 (citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Harding, 507 F.2d 294, 297

(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975) (noted that in Hamling the Court had not said
that a juror is constitutionally limited to considering local standards); United States v. Miller,
505 F.2d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 1974) (noted that the Court in Hamling accepted the use of
contemporary community standards "without defining the geographical limits of that communi-

ty"); United States Mfg. & Dist. Corp. v. City of Great Falls, 169 Mont. 298,304, 546 P.2d,522,
525-26 (1976) (quoted Danley approvingly in regard to construction of state obscenity statute).
519.
520.
521.
522.

See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 174.
205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953).
Id. at 621. See also United States v. Comerford, 25 F. 902, 903 (W.D. Tex. 1885).
Pub. L. No. 85-796, § 1, 72 Stat. 962 (1958).
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under 1461 was made subject to the venue provisions of section 3237(a) of
Title eighteen of the United States Code:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district
and completed in another, or committed in more than one district,
may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such
offense was begun, continued, or completed. Any offense involving the use of the mails, or transportation in interstate or foreign
commerce, is a continuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, may be inquired of
and prosecuted in any district from,
5 3 through, or into which such
commerce or mail matter moves. 2
From the beginning, courts had held that section 3237(a) did not violate
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.5 24 But even though it was not
constitutionally infirm, it might produce difficulties when construed in
conjunction with supervisory rules developed by the Supreme Court, particularly Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b), which authorizes a
transfer of venue if the offense for which an individual is indicted occurred
in more than one district and if the transferring court is convinced that a
change of venue is necessary "for the convenience of the parties and in the
interests of justice." 525 The two leading section 1.461 cases decided prior to
Miller that dealt with the problems raised by section 3237(a) and Rule 21(b)
523. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1970). See generally Note, Multi-Venue and the ObscenityStatutes, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (1967).

524. See, e.g., Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372, 380 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 390
U.S. 457 (1968); United States v. Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500, 507 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Toscano v.
Olesen, 184 F. Supp. 296, 297 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
525. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(b). The "interests of justice" encompass many factors. See, e.g.,
United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (in securities fraud case, court
took into account the fact that most of the transactions occurred out of state, that the
defendants had family contacts in the proposed transferee district, that the potential witnesses
resided in that district and that defendants were in "financial straits"); United States v. White,
95 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D. Neb. 1951) (the term must be defined not on "the basis of any
inflexible and universally applicable rule, but must be resolved in each case upon its peculiar
facts and in its own setting, with the mature balancing of the factors pointing in divergent
directions. The interests of the government, no less than those of the defendant, must be
carefully regarded"); United States v. Erie Basin Metal Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D.
Md. 1948) (term must take into account "the rights of the accused, the Government, and the
public, that is to say, the promotion of a speedy and at the same time a fair trial, with
appropriate consideration for the curtailment of unnecessary expense or prolongation of litigation, and in this connection the relative cost to the parties, their possible embarassment [sic] by
reason of absence from their homes and places of business for extended periods of time, the
relative cost and hardship through removal of books and records into another jurisdiction, as
against non-removal"); United States v. National City Lines, 7 F.R.D. 393, 397 (C.D. Cal.
1947) (the term "implies conditions which assist, or are in aid of or in the furtherance of,
justice. Both call for the doing of things which bring about the type of justice which results
when law is correctly applied and administered. They import the exercise of discretion which
considers both the interests of the defendant and those of society").
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are United States v. West CoastNews Co. 526 and UnitedStates v. Luros.527
In West Coast, the defendants were charged with mailing obscene materials
from Fresno, California to businesses located in the western judicial district
of Michigan, the locality where the government initiated its prosecution.
They filed a motion to have the case transferred to the southern district of
California pursuant to Rule 21(b). The court found that under the 1958
amendments, a section 1461 prosecution could legitimately be brought in
the district in which the books in question were delivered. 528 It also found
that the applicable community standards were those of the western district of
Michigan. Implicit in its disposition of the issue was the assumption that
even had a transfer been granted, a California jury would have had to apply
the standards of Michigan. 529 In Luros, the court was primarily concerned
with whether to grant a transfer from the southern district of Iowa, where
allegedly obscene items were delivered, to California, from which the
government claimed they were sent. On the choice of forum problem, the
court simply ruled:
Use of the mails or interstate commerce may involve acts in
several states as part of the same offense. Congress may make
such use a continuing offense. Where, as in this case, a continuing
offense is charged, the defendant may be prosecuted in the district
or in any district through
of deposit, in the district of delivery,
which the obscene material passed. 530
As a consequence of this conclusion, the court in Luros ruled that the venue
power
provisions of section 3237(a) take precedence over the discretionary531
trial.
of
site
the
transfer
to
court
district
a
to
21(b)
Rule
by
granted
A choice of law rule like that espoused in Luros presents few difficulties when federal courts in any district apply a uniform national standard.
526. 30 F.R.D. 13 (W.D. Mich. 1962).
527. 243 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Iowa 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 389 F.2d 200 (8th Cir.

1968).
528. 30 F.R.D. at 19.

529. Id. at 19-20.
530. 243 F. Supp. at 167-68 (citing Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 637 (1961)

(involving failure to file an affidavit required by the Taft-Hartley Act; venue lies wherever such
failure occurred); United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 409 (1958) (involving an alien crewman
who stays in the country longer than the duration prescribed by his conditional landing permit;
prosecution may be initiated wherever the crewman was found, not just where his permit
expired). Accord, Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Levy, 331 F. Supp. 712, 713 (D. Conn. 1971); Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372, 378
(D.D.C. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 457 (1968); United States v. Sidelko, 248 F. Supp. 813,815 (M.D.
Pa. 1965).
531. 243 F. Supp. at 177-78. Cf. United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 588

(1948) (legislative history of section twelve of the Clayton Act showed a congressional intent to
deprive a court of its discretionary power to effect transfer pursuant to the forum non

conveniens principles of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970)).
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But after Miller and Hamling, the problem of which of many possible
community standards should govern became a genuine one. Predictably, it
has led to confused results. In United States v. Germain,32 a section 1461
prosecution was initiated in the southern district of Ohio where the materials
in question were delivered; pursuant to Rule 21(b), the defendants requested
a transfer of venue to the central district of California, where they resided.
Noting that were transfer made, jurors in California would be compelled to
apply Ohio community standards, the court denied this request, reasoning
that residents of the southern district of Ohio would be "in a uniquely better
position" to apply the standards of their own community. 5 33
In United States v. Elkins, 534 there had already been a 21(b) transfer
from the northern district of Iowa to the central district of California, both of
which were permissible forums for prosecution under Section 3237(a). The
California district court said that on a change of venue, the law of the
transferor district should apply; thus, in this case the governing community
standard would be that of the northern district of Iowa. 535 The court recognized that under Hamling, out-of-state standards could be admitted into
evidence but it held:
The Court concludes that a jury selected from the residents of
this District could not determine the contemporary community
standards of the Northern District-of Iowa by reason of its members not possessing the knowledge of a juror in Iowa of the
community standards in which the Iowa juror resides, necessary
in deciding what conclusion the average person, applying the
contemporary community standards of Iowa, would reach based
on the facts adduced in the instant case . . . . This Court
concludes that it was not the intention of the Supreme Court or
Congress, as indicated by the current case and statutory law, that
a District Court Judge or jury in the Central District of California
should decide the standards of obscenity to be deemed the contemporary community standards of any and all States in the Union
from which these cases may be transferred on motions for change
obscene mateof venue resulting from the fact that the allegedly
536
rial was made or published in this District.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the indictment. 53 7
Instead of appealing this dismissal to the Ninth Circuit, the government
sought a reindictment in the northern district of Iowa. Once again, the
petitioners countered with a Rule 21(b) request for transfer to the central
district of California; once again, an Iowa district judge granted this request.
532. 411 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Ohio 1975).

533. Id. at 729.
534. 396 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
535. Id. at 317-18.

536. Id. at 318.
537. Id.
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This time, however, the government appealed that action to the Eighth
Circuit, contending that the normal rules affecting transfers under Rule
21(b) do not apply to obscenity prosecutions. The court of appeals, in
United States v. McManus,53 8 agreed. The court noted that because the
government brought the indictment in Iowa, only an Iowa jury applying
Iowa standards could make a determination of obscenity. 539 It further said
that this conclusion was unimpaired by Rule 21(b), because Congress had,
in passing section 3237(a), deprived courts of their discretionary power to
transfer postal obscenity cases to other districts, and that there was ample
evidence that Congress intended "to allow the district to which allegedly
obscene matter is mailed, the recipient district, to institute the prosecution
and to judge the character of the material under local standards."54° After
citing Luros to support this assertion in regard to the intent of Congress, the
Eighth Circuit pointed out that because Hamling mandated the utilization of
local standards, those extant in the northern district of Iowa would govern; it
tempered this observation, however, with the remark that a showing of
"intentional overreaching" by the government might overcome the federal
prosecutor's choice of forum, and thus his choice of the relevant communi541
ty, in postal obscenity cases.
A similar choice of law was expressed by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Slepicoff,542 where the teachings of Hamling and the language of
section 3237(a) were said to yield the conclusion that:
it is logical to try a defendant who is charged with a violation of §
1461 in the district to which he allegedly mailed obscene materials.
Appellant's choice to do business throughout the nation limited his
right to be543tried in the locality where he lives and bases his
operations.
The one court that has attempted to provide a plausible rationale for its
choice of an applicable community standard is United States v. Various
Articles of Obscene Merchandise,544 decided by a federal court located in
the southern district of New York. This was not a section 1461 prosecution,
but was instead an action brought pursuant to section 1305(a) of Title
nineteen of the United States Code, prohibiting the importation from foreign
countries of obscene materials. 545 The material in question, a German erotic
magazine sent by first class mail, was seized by a customs agent in New
538. 535 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977).
539. Id. at 463.
540. Id.

541. Id. at 464.
542.
543.
544.
545.

524 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1249.
433 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1977).
18 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
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York City, but was addressed to the petitioner's place of residence in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. District Judge Frankel concluded that the controlling standard would be that of the locality to which the seized item was
addressed. 54 In support of this conclusion, he commented:
This approach is in harmony with the prevailing principle in
conflict of laws jurisprudence mandating that the controlling law
be taken from the jurisdiction which has the most significant
contacts with the allegedly wrongful act. . . .For purposes of 19
U.S.C. § 1305(a), that jurisdiction is surely the recipient's community, not the port where a customs official happens to open sealed
mail and expose its assertedly obscene contents. .

.

.To be sure,

the multiple venue provisions of some of the federal obscenity
statutes complicate the problem of choosing the appropriate standard or standards, especially when applied to a multi-state distributor.

.

.

but such difficulties are not acute under 19 U.S.C. §

1305(a) and, moreover, cannot be invoked to justify the application of a standard that the Constitution does not permit.5 47
Of course, the consequence of such an approach was that a New York jury
would have to apply the standards of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. But Judge
Frankel rejected this possibility, saying Hamling's requirement of local
standards would be contradicted if one were "to have people from one
community purport to go by the sentiments of another. "54 The only option,
then, was to refer disputes of this nature to the district of the claimant's
residence. Judge Frankel found that "the choice of venue must be given to
the recipient of the questioned mail," 5 49 and because the standards of
546. 433 F. Supp. at 1138.
547. Id. n.10 (citations omitted). On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the applicable
community standards could be those of the place where the items in question were seized.
United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1977). In
doing so, it noted both that expert testimony on the standards of the addressee's residence
might be difficult to procure, id. at 189, and that the alleged standards adduced by the claimant,
namely, those of the Lancaster Mayor's Committee on Pornography were entitled to no great
deference, id. at 187 n.3. The gravamen of the court's holding, however, appeared to be based
on the'premises that the statute did not by its terms authorize trial at the addressee's residence,
and that customs regulations are different in kind from domestic postal regulations. Id. at 18889. But even the Second Circuit admitted that:
no judge or jury can be expected to determine "community standards" with respect to
[the item in question). . . .The best that anyone can do is to give his or her personal
reaction to it. No juror or judge armed with a copy of [the item] will have the
opportunity to rush up and down the streets of his community asking friends and
neighbors how they feel about it. Nor should they rudely seek insights into community
mores by asking others what their intimate sexual practices may be. Yet the fiction
remains that a jury is somehow capable of reflecting or determining "community
standards." This is so probably because there is simply no better method for applying
this test.
Id. at 189-90 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. 2,200 Paperback Books, 565 F.2d
566, 570 (9th Cir. 1977).
548. 433 F. Supp. at 1138.
549. Id. n.ll.
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Lancaster were more libertarian than those of New York City, the petitioner
would undoubtedly require the government to initiate its prosecution in
Pennsylvania.
All of these cases represent efforts by courts to define the geographic
scope of the relevant community by considering the nature of the underlying
violation being alleged; these courts are consciously attempting to relate the
character of the offense that is the subject of a federal grand jury's indictment to the manner in which community standards to be applied in a
subsequent trial are selected. In the instance of section 1461, the 1958
amendments created a continuing offense, one which could therefore be
prosecuted at any locality the purportedly obscene item in question passed
through in its course through the national postal system. When this aspect of
section 1461 is coupled with the liberal transfer provisions of Rule 21(b),
the result is an anomaly like the Elkins case. The court in Elkins simply
assumed that the standards of the transferor district governed, said that
jurors in the transferee district could never become adequately cognizant of
those standards and dismissed the indictment. Yet the only support cited for
the conclusion that the law of the transferor district must control was the
general rule on change of venue in civil cases, 550 as established by the
Supreme Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack.55' Yet Elkins involved a criminal
proceeding; the "law" in question was not necessarily statutory, but instead
consisted of community standards, which could be proven by the usual
methods of expert testimony, statistical surveys and so on. In fact, under
Hamling, the court in Elkins, because California was a possible forum,
could have permitted application of the standards of the central district of
California as well as admitted evidence of Iowa standards. The same
approach was possible in Germain and McManus where, respectively,
evidence of Ohio and Iowa standards could have been supplemented with
evidence of California standards. This is not an impossible task and, as the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Danley552 suggests, it is a
technique that thoroughly comports with the mandate of Hamling. Indeed, it
550. United States v. Elkins, 396 F. Supp. 314, 317-18 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
551. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Applying the Van Dusen doctrine to a case like Elkins is

especially anomalous because Van Dusen involved a state-created right. In Van Dusen, a
number of wrongful death actions were initiated in Pennsylvania by the survivors of various
passengers killed in an airliner crash which occurred in Massachusetts. The defendant sought to
transfer the proceedings from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts; the latter, but not the former,
state had a monetary limit on the amount recoverable in wrongful death actions. The Court
therefore held that, in order to avoid prejudice, the transferee state would have to apply the law
of the transferor state. Id. at 639. But Elkins presents no issue of an attempt to prejudice a

state-created right; rather, it concerns a rule of evidence to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions.
552. 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 929 (1976).
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would seem to be a technique well suited to avoid the possible abuse
inherent in a penal scheme that enables a federal prosecutor to forum shop
for the community with the most restrictive standards as the place in which
an indictment will be sought.
There nevertheless remains the conflicts of laws problem adverted to
by Judge Frankel in the Obscene Merchandise case. He resolved the
problem by the rather crude method of the "most-significant contacts" test
developed by the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock i. Jackson,553 and

altogether ignored the fact that decisions by that court subsequent to Babcock have obscured the scope of its holding. 554 He also ignored the fact that
Hamling does permit judges to allow jurors to consider standards of
communities outside their vicinage. 555 A New York jury would have had
little difficulty in ascertaining the standards of Lancaster, which, as summarized by Judge Frankel, were "that nothing is to be outlawed as obscene
that is (1) viewed by an adult in private and (2) not offered or purveyed to
children.''556 A jury could, under Hamling, have utilized this foreign
standard in its determination of obscenity; as for the need to reconcile the
553. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Professor Schauer has
suggested a similar approach. See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 129; Schauer, Obscenity and
Conflict of Laws, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 377, 398 (1975).
554. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972) (guest statute case involving Ontario passenger and New York driv er; held applicable law
is that of the situs unless a contrary approach would advance the relevant substantive law
purposes of the jurisdictions involved); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301
N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969) (guest statute case involving a New York driver and passenger killed in
Michigan; held that application of Michigan law would frustrate interests of New York); Miller
v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968) (liability limitation case
involving death of a New York passenger in an auto being driven in Maine by a resident of that
state who later moved to New York; held that Maine lacked any interest in proceedings and the
expectations of the parties were not seriously implicated); Farber v. Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198,
229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967) (New York residents killed in North Carolina; held that
because the situs of injury was the "merest lateral chance," law of the forum controlled); Long
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965)
(action for the death of Pennsylvanians killed in a Maryland airline crash deemed to be
governed by laws of Pennsylvania, which had the greater interest in the outcome); Dym v.
Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (as in Babcock, a guest
statute case involving two New Yorkers killed in Colorado; held, unlike Babcock, law of the
situs of the accident controls; overruled by Tooker); Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.2d Ill,
204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965) (tort case involving New Yorker injured in Puerto
Rico who sued in New York, relying on Puerto Rican law; held, Puerto Rican interest controlled
as long as its law did not violate New York's public policy). As a result of these decisions, one
commentator has said "[a]New York lawyer with a guest statute case has more need of a ouija
board. . . than a copy of Shepard's citations." Rosenberg, Two Views of Kell v.Henderson,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 460 (1967).
555. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 433 F. Supp. 1132, 1137
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)).
556. Id. at 1136.
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tension between that standard and the less liberalized mores of the southern
district of New York, it would appear to be a natural consequence flowing
from the decision in Hamling to allow into evidence anything likely to assist
the jurors. Thus, while all the decisions applying a functional approach
eventually elected to implement the standards of one judicial district or
another, one may well ask whether the fact that violations of obscenity
statutes like section 1461 represent continuing offenses prosecutable in a
variety of localities requires judges to be more amenable to the approach
suggested in Hamling and endorsed in Danley. This would be accomplished
by allowing juries to consider evidence of the standards not only of the
community of the forum but also those of the other communities where a
prosecution could have been initiated.
The point of this lengthy excursus concerning the various ways courts
have defined the geographic scope of the community whose standards are to
be applied in a federal obscenity prosecution is to suggest a factor which the
Court in Smith glossed over. In cases like Danley in which the relevant
standards are deemed to include those of communities located outside the
forum state, the laws of the forum state can never be controlling, because
the standards of that state form only a portion of the jury's decisional
calculus on the issue of obscenity. Indeed, to the extent that the Danley
approach represents the optimal method of relating the concept of community standards to the nature of the offense that triggers a prosecution entailing
the necessity of defining those very standards, it might well be argued that
for the reason given above, all section 1461 prosecutions involve situations
where the law of a single state can never govern. If so, this thesis would
provide a much narrower ground for achieving the same result arrived at by
the Couri in Smith. But, in fact, this broad generalization overstates the
case. First, it does not grapple with the problems raised by cases like Smith,
in which all the alleged offenses occurred entirely within one state. Second,
it does not deal with the difficulties presented by cases like Groner or
"Sinderella," in which a given circuit has appeared to adopt the rule that
the relevant standards can only be those of the judicial district in which the
case is tried. Third, it does not take into account the fact that, in reality,
even those courts purporting to apply the Hamling rule or the functional
approach often, as a practical matter, define the relevant community as that
from which the jurors are drawn. To the extent that Smith holds that state
law can never be controlling on the issue of community standards in that
subcategory of section 1461 prosecutions like Danley where evidence of
out-of-state communities is admitted and utilized, it is only restating the
obvious. Whether the same can be said for its holding with respect to those
subcategories of section 1461 prosecutions where evidence of standards
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outside the forum state is either not admitted or could not be admitted
requires a close analysis of the rationale proffered by the majority.
Justice Blackmun points out that neither the language nor the history of
55 7
section 1461 indicate that Congress intended to incorporate state law.
This is correct. Section 1461 represents the current version of a law enacted
by Congress in 1865 and amended at various junctures during the next
ninety-five years. 558 Some of the debates underlying the enactment of the
1958 amendments discussed earlier do suggest that members of Congress
intended that one reason for allowing prosecutions under section 1461 to be
initiated in the locality where allegedly obscene matter is delivered was
because there is no one better qualified to "judge the effect of such vicious
and low activity than the people of the community who have been harmed
by the dissemination of such filth." 559 This deference to local values does
not evince any proclivity to incorporate local legislation, however. 56" Reliance on legislative history in the interpretation of the meaning of federal
obscenity statutes has, however, never really been a salient feature of recent
court decisions; as the Fifth Circuit has noted, "these statutes avoid due
process vagueness difficulties due to authoritative judicial construction. "561
Thus, for instance, in United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm
Film,562 the Court ruled that the materials regulated by federal obscenity
laws were limited to those examples specified in the Miller decision. 563 This
construction was not based on any perception of congressional intent, but
rather on the Court's self-imposed duty to construe federal laws so as to
avoid, whenever possible, a finding of constitutional infirmity. 564 Thus, the
557. 431 U.S. at 304 n.10.
558. For the history of the statute, see Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,50011 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.); SCHAUER, supra
note 3, at 168-72; Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship:The Assumptionsof Anti-Obscenity

Laws and the EmpiricalEvidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1010-11 n.2 (1962); Paul, The Post
Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An HistoricalNote, 8 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 44, 51-57
(1961).
559. 104 CONG. REC. 8994 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Feighan).

560. Moreover, statements by the original enactors belie any suggestion that local standards were to prevail:
If there be a trial in this country or anywhere else of an obscene character--of
that character that a report of it would corrupt the morals of the youth and the morals
of the country generally-then I do not think that the United States should provide the

means to circulate that kind of literature in whatever paper or in whatever book it may
be published.

44 CoNG. REc. 696 (1876) (remarks of Rep. Cannon).
561. United States v. Wasserman, 504 F.2d 1012, 1015 n.10 (5th Cir. 1974).
562. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
563. Id. at 130 n.7.

564. See United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (opinion of
White, J.) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
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Court was the institution primarily entrusted with the judgment of deciding
whether or not federal postal obscenity statutes should subsume the standards expressed in local legislation.
The Smith majority appeared to recognize this point because it went on
to state:
The regulation of the mails is a matter of particular federal
concern, and the nationwide character of the postal system argues
in favor of a nationally uniform construction of § 1461. The
Constitution itself recognizes this fact, in the specific grant to
Congress of power over the postal system. Art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
Obscenity in general has been a matter of both national and local
concern. To the extent that local concern is relevant, however, the
jurors' application of contemporary community standards fully
satisfies that interest. Finally, to the extent that the state law and
federal law conflict, traditional principles of federal supremacy
require us to follow the federal policy. See ClearfieldTrust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States v. StandardOil
Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); De Sylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580 (1973) . . . . We therefore decline petitioner's invitation to
adopt state law relating to distribution for purposes of the federal
statute regulating use of the mails. 565
Justice Blackmun's analysis is somewhat disingenuous. No one disputes the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate the postal system. The issue in
Smith does not involve the state's capacity to interfere with that power,
however, but rather the state's capacity to regulate obscenity within its own
boundaries. The Court admits that such regulation is a legitimate "local"
concern, but says that that concern is adequately protected by the contemporary community standards rule. If by "local" the Court means "of the
vicinage," this ipse dixit is probably accurate. But this whole paragraph
deals with the problem of resolving a conflict between state and federal
interests. It is not apparent that application by jurors of contemporary
community standards will, in fact, further state regulatory policies, especially since Smith asserts that state legislatures cannot define the content of
those standards, but only their geographic scope or the kinds of conduct that
will trigger a criminal prosecution in which they will be utilized. 566 Thus,
the true basis of the Court's disposition of this issue is its perception of the
requirements of the supremacy clause.
In order to test the validity of that perception, it is necessary to consider
the holdings of the cases cited by the Court. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States567 involved the issue of whether or not an action based on the express
565. 431 U.S. at 304 n.10 (citations omitted).
566. See id. at 302-03.
567. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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guarantee of prior endorsements of a check drawn on the treasurer of the
United States through the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia would be
governed by the commercial law of Pennsylvania. The Court said:
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law. . . .But reasons which may make state
law at times the appropriate federal rule are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of commercial paper by the United States
is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to
payment will commonly occur in several states. The application of
state law, even without the conflicts of laws rules of the forum,
would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by
making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws
56 of
the several states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. 8
In United States v. StandardOil Co. ,569 the Court found that the right of the
government to recover for damages resulting from injuries to a soldier was a
federal question governed by federal rules. Applicable state law was rejected because the case was said to raise issues "of federal fiscal policy, not of
special or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens," 570 and because it
was said that the government's right of recovery ought not to "vary in
accordance with the different rulings of the several states. "571 De Sylva v.
Ballantine572 involved the issue of whether the law of California could be
relied upon in order to determine if an illegitimate offspring was the "child"
of an author and therefore entitled under the federal copyright laws to renew
the author's copyright. The Court answered this question in the affirmative,
saying:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by
state, rather than federal law. . . .This is especially true where a
statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of3
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.57
The Court warned, however, that if the applicable state law was aberrant, if
it defined the term "child" "in a way entirely strange to those familiar with
its ordinary usage," then it need not be adopted as a federal standard.57 4 In
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co. ,575 the issue was whether the
prescription of the mineral rights of former owners of land subsequently
568. Id.at 367 (citation omitted). See also Miree v.DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29-31
(1977).
569. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).

570. Id.at 311.
571. Id.at 310.
572. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).

573. Id.at 580.
574. Id.at 581.
575. 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
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acquired b), the government pursuant to the Migratory Bird Conservation
Act 576 would be controlled by the law of Louisiana, the state in which the
land was situated. Under the relevant state statute, the rights of the former
owners would be imprescriptible by the federal government, even if the
transactions creating those rights occurred before the date that the statute
became effective.5 7 7 In addition to citing De Sylva's dictum about aberrant
state law, the Court also quoted language in Reconstruction Finance Corp.
v. Beaver County578 to the effect that courts need not incorporate state rules
into an act of Congress where those rules "effect a discrimination against
the Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act. 5 7 9 Here, it
was said that the Louisiana rule of retroactive imprescriptibility was "plainly hostile to the interests of the United States" in that it deprived the federal
government of bargained-for contractual interests. 8 0 Moreover, the Court
noted that the legislative history underlying the enactment of the Migratory
Bird Conservation Act indicated a concern about contractual certainty that
would conflict with any efforts by a state to modify retroactively the terms
58
of land conveyances to the United States. '
Thus, a close examination of these decisions suggests that they do not
"require" the adherence to a putative federal policy as was done in Smith.
The holding in Clearfield Trustwas based on the perceived need for a
"uniform rule" in transactions involving federal commercial paper that
would avoid "great diversity in results" arising due to the "vagaries" of
local laws. The same considerations do not govern section 1461 prosecutions. In Hamling, the Court rejected the need for a uniform national
standard of decency, saying that more localized standards could be relied
upon in postal obscenity prosecutions. 582 In so holding, the Court
concluded:
The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be
subjected to varying community standards in the various federal
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not
render a federal statute unconstitutional because of the failure of
application of uniform national standards of obscenity. Those
same distributors may be subjected to such varying degrees of
criminal liability in prosecutions by the States for violation of state
576. 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715s (1970) (amended 1973 & 1974).

577. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5806A (West Supp. 1973).
578. 328 U.S. 204 (1946). In this case, the Court held that Pennsylvania law would provide
the definition for the term "real property" as it is used in a statute authorizing states to tax
certain property of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Id. at 210.
579. Id. at 210, quoted in 412 U.S. at 596. See also U.A.W. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383
U.S. 696, 706 (1966).
580. 412 U.S. at 597.

581. Id. at 597-99.
582. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974).
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obscenity statutes; we see no constitutional
impediment to a simi58 3
lar rule for federal prosecutions.
At this point, one might respond that the Court in Hamling was
referring to the burdens placed on defendants in obscenity cases due to the
inconsistencies inherent in the varying standards developed by communities
throughout the nation, whereas the Court in Clearfield Trust was concerned
about the burden placed on the government in the enforcement of duties
owed to it due to the diversity of local laws regarding commercial paper. But
to the extent that the federal government has a right to regulate obscenity,
that right is burdened by the construction accorded section 1461 in Hamling. A federal prosecutor may have greater or lesser difficulty in showing
that an item sent through the mails was in fact obscene, depending upon in
which judicial district he initiates a prosecution. Even if he brings an
indictment in a district where the community standards are favorable to the
government, he still faces the possibility that the defendant may win a
change of venue under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(b)584 to a
district where the standards are less favorable. The choice of laws problems
thus created might well lead to a result such as that in United States v.
Elkins ,585 where the need to apply localized standards actually caused a
court to dismiss an indictment on the grounds that the standards presumed to
apply were unascertainable by the potential jurors of the transferee district.
Thus Hamling, to the extent it requires application of localized standards,
does "subject the rights. . . of the United States to exceptional uncertainty"; but the Court in that decision was apparently willing to accept this
consequence in order to provide juries in postal obscenity cases with understandable criteria for reaching a judgment on the ultimate issue of obscenity
vel non. Thus, unlike the situation in Clearfield Trust, section 1461 prosecutions present an area in which it has been judicially recognized that a
"nationally uniform construction" is undesirable, at least to the extent that
the term "obscene" in that statute is to be judged according to localized
standards.
The same rationale suggests that the Court's citation to StandardOil is
also inapt, because the government's ability to win its case will, under
Hamling, "vary in accordance" with the different standards of the several
states or the discrete communities located therein. Moreover, while the
Court in Standard Oil could find that federal fiscal policy was not of
"special or peculiar concern to the states or their citizens," the Court in
583. Id. at 106.
584. See note 525 and accompanying text supra.
585. 396 F. Supp. 314 (C.D. Cal. 1975). See notes 534-37 and accompanying text supra.
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Smith could make no similar assertion and, indeed, acknowledged that
regulation of obscenity was a legitimate local concern.
De Sylva involved a situation where state law was in fact incorporated
into a federal statute, so it appears to rebut the very point Justice Blackmun
was making. One must then, however, ask whether the 1974 Iowa statute,
presuming it did define "contemporary community standards," defined
them in a way "entirely strange to those familiar with [the term's] ordinary
usage." The obvious problem raised is: what is the "ordinary usage" of a
term that expresses merely "the measure against which the jury decides the
questions of appeal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness" ?586 The
answer is that there can be none, because the content of the term was
intended to vary from locality to locality. Even assuming the contrary,
however, and presuming that the Iowa legislature did in fact desire to define
community standards by enacting the 1974 legislation, it is not clear that
restricting only the dissemination of obscenity to minors is an "entirely
strange" definition; indeed, states other than Iowa do have laws regulating
obscenity only as to minors. 587 Thus, the exception to incorporation
specified in De Sylva would not seem to be very useful in the context of the
Smith case.
The same can be said for the exceptions listed in Little Lake Misere.
The 1974 Iowa legislation, unlike the Louisiana law in Little Lake Misere,
in no way discriminated against the federal government. Nor did it appear to
run counter to the terms of section 1461; the federal statute does not
mandate regulation of the distribution of obscenity to adults. Moreover, the
legislative history of section 1461, unlike that of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act involved in Little Lake Misere, does not evince a congressional
concern in conflict with the presumed goals of Iowa's lawmakers. The one
issue left is whether the 1974 legislation is "plainly hostile to the interests of
the United States." The answer is no; the Louisiana legislation in Little
Lake Misere was found plainly hostile because it retroactively deprived
only the federal government of a bargained-for contractual interest. Neither
retroactivity nor application solely to the federal government nor impairment of contract were features of the 1974 Iowa obscenity laws.
Thus, a close examination of the cases cited by Justice Blackmun
indicates that "traditional principles of federal supremacy" in no way
required the Court to follow federal law. Rather, this proffered rationale
seems to be little more than an effort to disguise a policy judgment by the
Court that state law on the issue of contemporary community standards
586. 431 U.S. at 302.
587. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 167.065 (1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-36
(Supp. 1975); W. VA. CODE. § 61-8A (Supp. 1975).
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would not be incorporated as a rule of decision in federal postal obscenity
cases.
It is then necessary to consider how lower federal courts after Hamling
have dealt with the problem. There are five decisions dealing directly with
the subject. All of them rejected the contention that state law should be
controlling, but they did so in rather suggestive ways. Two of these decisions, United States v. Hill5 88 and United States v. Slepicoff,589 were
rendered by the Fifth Circuit and involved similar factual problems. In both
cases, section 1461 prosecutions were initiated in federal district courts
located in Florida. In each case, the defendant wished to show that the state
of Florida had no enforceable obscenity law at the time of the alleged
offense because a three-judge federal district court had declared that law
unconstitutional in 1970.90 The Fifth Circuit in Hill dismissed this contention with the remark that:
There was no error in refusing to let the defense show that
Florida did not have a valid, enforceable obscenity law at the time
of Hill's interstate travel. The community standard is not necessarily gauged by the state law, and the fact that a three-judge
federal court . . . declared Florida Statutes § 847.011 (1967) unconstitutional
was not relevant to this federal obscenity prosecu591
tion.
The court in Slepicoff merely quoted this language from Hill in disposing of
592
the contention raised in the former case.
In UnitedStates v. Treatman,593 a defendant in a section 1461 prosecution similarly claimed that the fact that the Louisiana Supreme Court had
invalidated the state's obscenity statute several months before the commission of the conduct for which the defendant was being prosecuted meant that
there were no community standards by which that conduct could be judged. 594 The court cited Hamling for the proposition that "community standards" do not necessarily mean "statewide standards"; on this basis, it held
that the action of the Louisiana Supreme Court "has no bearing" on a
595
section 1461 prosecution.
588. 500 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975).
589. 524 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).

590. See Meyer v. Austin, 319 F. Supp. 457, 470 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appealdismissed, 413
U.S. 902 (1973). The court therein held FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.011 (West 1967) unconstitutional
on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.
591. 500 F.2d at 739.
592. 524 F.2d at 1249.
593. 399 F. Supp. 258 (W.D. La. 1975).

594. See State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So.2d 464, 470 (La. 1974).
595. 399 F. Supp. at 264.
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In United States v. Danley,596 another section 1461 case, the trial
court, situated in Oregon, admitted into evidence both the obscenity law of
the forum state, where the materials in question were posted, and the laws of
the various localities to which the materials in question were delivered. The
defendants contended that Oregon law, which proscribed only the furnishing
of obscene materials to minors, 597 fixed the applicable community standard.
To this, the Ninth Circuit retorted:
We deal with a federal law which neither incorporates nor
depends upon the law of the states. . . .Rather, the federal law
depends for its consitutionality upon definitions incorporating
community standards. Community standards are aggregates of the
attitudes of average people-people who are neither "particularly
susceptible or sensitive . . . or indeed . . . totally insensitive."
• . . The fact that a law of a state permits a given kind of conduct
does not necessarily mean that the people within the state approve
of the permitted conduct. Whether they do is a question of fact to
be resolved by the trial court and in this case the trial court did
resolve it.5 98
Finally, in United States v. Harding,59 9 a prosecution under section
1462 of Title eighteen of the United States Code prohibiting the transportation of obscene materials in interstate commerce,10° the defendant entered
into a stipulation with the government that the materials in question were
obscene. After a trial in 1972, the defendant was convicted; the Supreme
Court eventually remanded this conviction for reconsideration in light of
Miller.6° 1 After a retrial and on a second appeal, the defendant contended
before the Tenth Circuit that the trial court had erred in not submitting the
definitions contained in the forum state's obscenity laws to the jury. The
court of appeals disagreed, saying "[s]urely the Supreme Court did not in
Miller decree that state laws would henceforth govern these federal prosecutions.'' °2 Accordingly, it found no prejudice in holding the defendant
60 3
bound by his prior stipulation.
Hill and Slepicoff are intriguing because they indicate that state laws
do not "necessarily" govern federal prosecutions. The implication of the
enigmatic use of this adverb is that where a state law is voided by a court on
constitutional grounds, no judgment of policy concerning the content of
596. 523 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 929 (1976).
597. See OR. REV. STAT. § 167.065 (1974).

598.
599.
600.
601.
(1973).
602.
603.

523 F.2d at 370 (citations omitted).
507 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1974).
See note 273 supra.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See Harding v. United States, 414 U.S. 964
507 F.2d at 297.
Id. at 298.
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community standards can possibly be imputed to the state's elected representatives, so the fact of that voidance should not be admissible in evidence
in a federal postal obscenity case. But presumably, if a state's lawmakers
repealed the state's obscenity legislation and enacted no replacement, the
Fifth Circuit might have been disposed to deem that fact controlling on the
issue of community standards. The same cannot be said for the district court
in Treatman, however; that court, although confronted with a similar
situation, repudiated unconditionally the applicability of state law as evidence of community standards. But Hill and Slepicoff do point to an
important insight. If state law is to govern at all, it can only do so if it
represents a clear-cut policy judgment of the legislature, and making that
determination requires a consideration of the context in which the law in
question was enacted, amended, repealed or interpreted. The Court in Smith
was not oblivious to the importance of context; it both suggested a variety of
reasons why the 1974 Iowa legislation need not be construed as an expression of a legislative intent to leave unregulated the distribution of obscene
materials to adults and it also pointed out that the enactment of the 1976
statutes by the state legislature indicated that the 1974 laws were probably
never intended to be more than stopgap legislation. 6°4 This is a valid
criticism. Moreover, it is a criticism that suggests that Smith falls within
another one of the subcategories of section 1461 prosecutions where it
would be improper to presume that state law is controlling. But Hill and
Slepicoff could be construed as instances where this technique of contextual
scrutiny will be utilized to distinguish between those state laws, or gaps in
state laws, that define the content of community standards and those that do
not. Smith, on the other hand, accepts the thesis that state legislatures
cannot "freeze" community standards; the Court therein used the technique
of contextual scrutiny in a negative fashion, solely in order to rebut the
claim that it was nullifying Iowa law.
Danley, as noted earlier, is one of those cases in which the applicable
standards include those of localities both within and without the forum state,
so that, by definition, the law of the forum state should not be governing.
But Danley also stands for the broader proposition that whether members of
the relevant community condone what the state legislature permits is a
question for the trier of fact. Superficially, Hardingwould seem to conflict
with Danley on this point, because in the former case the Tenth Circuit
upheld the decision of the trial court not to submit evidence of the forum
state's laws to the jury. But the discrepancy may well be explained by the
fact that in Hardingthe defendant had already entered into a stipulation with
the government that the materials he was charged with distributing were in
604. See 431 U.S. at 306.
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fact obscene. At any rate, to the extent that there was any difficulty on this
point, the Court in Smith clarified it by expressly adopting the rule of
Danley.605
Thus, it could be argued that the result in Smith was proper because
that case represents one of those section 1461 prosecutions where the import
of state law is ambiguous and thus evidence of that law should only be
deemed probative, rather than conclusive. Indeed, except in those cases
involving the clearest expressions by a state legislature of its intent to define
community standards, one might well argue that most section 1461 prosecutions will fall within this subcategory of situations where the opinions of the
state legislature are inherently ambiguous. But Smith goes further and says
that even in those clear-cut, indisputable cases, states cannot fix community
standards. 606 This conclusion with respect to federal postal obscenity cases
is premised on the argument noted earlier that the community standards
aspect of section 1461 presents issues of federal law, and that such law
overrides inconsistent state legislation. But what is that "federal law"? It
cannot be located in the language of section 1461, which never mentions
community standards. It must therefore be the language in Hamling holding
that the relevant standards are those of the jurors' vicinage. 6°7 The problem
with this interpretation is that the language in Hamling never addresses the
issue of what effect jurors must give to state law. Thus, Smith reads into the
language of Hamling the assumption expressed in Danley that merely
because one's elected representatives enact laws evincing a particular policy
with respect to the suppression of obscenity, this does not mean that one
must condone or abide by that policy. The Court in Smith then blithely
proclaims that this newly-coined interpretation of Hamling is governing
federal law. The troubling aspect of the decision is that the Court need not
have taken this step. It could have attempted to identify passages in Hamling that supported its interpretation of what federal policy was. There are
some such suggestive paragraphs in that earlier opinion. Thus, the Court in
Hamling noted that evidentiary rulings of a federal trial judge will rarely
constitute reversible error, "since 'in judicial trials, the whole tendency is to
leave rulings as to the illuminating relevance of testimony largely to the
discretion of the trial court that hears the evidence.' "6'8 On this basis, the
action of the district court judge in Smith in admitting the evidence of the
1974 Iowa legislation, but considering such evidence to be less than conclu605. See id. at 308.
606. See id. at 302.
607. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974).
608. Id. at 124-25 (citing Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962);
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,480 (1948); NLRB v. Donnelly Co., 330 U.S. 219,236
(1947)).
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sive on the issue of contemporary community standards could have been
upheld by itself as a legitimate exercise of discretion. Or the Court could
have engaged in the discriminating approach of Hill and Slepicoff and
looked to the circumstances surrounding the enactment, amendment, repeal
or interpretation of the law alleged to be controlling. Indeed, the technique
of contextual analysis would have been consistent with Hamling. The Court
in that case had rejected the contention that the materials involved therein
were not obscene because they had been mailed under a second-class
mailing permit; it noted that the federal law creating standards for the
issuance of such permits ° could not be controlling on the issue of obscenity
vel non because it has been judicially determined that the law gave postal
inspectors no power of censorship. 6 10 Thus, there were narrower bases for
the result reached by the majority in Smith, which would not have entailed
reading something into Hamling that was not explicitly there. The Court
seemed to ignore these narrower bases of decision primarily because it
initiated its discussion of the whole problem with the flat assertion that state
legislatures can never define community standards even in the context of
state obscenity prosecutions; it therefore' began with the presumption that
the same would hold true in federal prosecutions.
The rationale underlyingthis generality is that "contemporary community standards" represent no more than an inherently subjective measure of
local mores, and that states cannot freeze the definition of that measure.
Actually, the issue appears to be trivial; those state statutes that have
explained the meaning of "contemporary community standards" have done
no more than define the relevant community as the state as a whole, 611 a
practice which Smith approves. 6 12 Moreover, Justice Powell, who provided
the swing vote in Smith, specifically cautioned that "this case presents no
question concerning the limits on a State's powers to design its obscenity
statutes as it sees fit or to define community standards as it chooses for
purposes of applying its own laws. Within the boundaries staked out by
Miller, the States retain broad latitude in this respect. '613 Justice Powell's
caveat is well taken; Justice Blackmun's assertion that states may never
legislatively fix community standards would appear to be erroneous, at least
609. See 39 U.S.C. § 4354 (repealed 1970); 39 C.F.R. Pt. 132 (1973) (no longer in force).
610. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (1974) (citing Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146, 158 (1946)). The Court in Hanneganheld that "[t]he validity of obscenity laws is
recognition that the mails may not be used to satisfy all tastes, no matter how perverted. But
Congress has left the Postmaster General with no power to prescribe standards for the literature

or the art which a mailable periodical disseminates."
611. See note 471 supra.
612. 431 U.S. at 303.
613. Id. at 310 (Powell, J., concurring).
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with respect to state obscenity actions. The "broad latitude" accorded by
Miller v. California6 14 and ParisAdult TheaterI v. Slaton615 would appear
to support this view. Thus, in Miller, the Court claimed that "[w]e emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States.
That must await their concrete legislative efforts."616 Paris went even
further, finding that "[t]he States of course may follow . . .a 'laissezfaire' policy and drop all controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is
what they prefer, . . . but nothing in the Constitution compels the States to
do so with regard to matters falling within state jurisdiction." 6 17 Earlier in
Paris, the Court had spoken of the states' interests in protecting social order
and morality. In conjunction with this statement it quoted with approval the
following assertion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
rhe proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do
whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some express
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States or of the State,
and that Courts should be careful not to extend such prohibitions
beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions 6of
18
public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain.
Both Hamling and Miller assert that the First Amendment does not require
the application of national standards. 619 Conversely, it would seem that this
same constitutional provision does not mandate local standards. Indeed, the
Court in Hamling ruled that a jury instruction containing eighteen references
to "national standards" would not constitute reversible error, absent a
showing that it materially affected the deliberations of the jury. 620 Moreover, even Justice Blackmun in Smith noted that Miller only held that states
could not be compelled to adopt a national standard; he left open the
possibility that states might be permitted to adopt such a standard voluntarily.62 Thus, Miller, Paris and even Smith point out that the matter of
"contemporary community standards" is subject to the Supreme Court's
notion of judicial convenience, not the dictates of the Constitution. If so,
then Justice Holmes' stafement would appear to support the proposition that
the states can do whatever they "see fit" on the subject at least, according to
Paris, so long as they act on "matters falling within'their own jurisdiction."
614. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).

615. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
616. 413 U.S. at 25.
617. 413 U.S. at 64 (emphasis in original).

618. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting, joined by
Brandeis, J.), quoted in 413 U.S. at 60 n.l1.
619. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106-07 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
31-32 (1973).
620. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107-08 (1974).
621. 431 U.S. at 304 n.ll.
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A state obscenity prosecution based upon state law obviously falls within the
jurisdiction of the state, so under Paris and Miller it seemed that a state
could fix the definition of "contemporary community standards" with
respect to such prosecutions. Justice Blackmun's holding on this issue in
Smith would thus appear to run counter to the great deference due to the
wishes of the state legislatures, as expressed in the 1973 obscenity cases.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun's remark that states cannot freeze community standards is inherently vacuous, at least with respect to state prosecutions. When a state revises its obscenity laws to permit criminal sanctions
to be applied only against those who disseminate "obscene materials" to
minors, for example, it is implicitly setting a standard with respect to adults,
namely, that they can be sold or given any type of sexually-oriented
materials with impunity. A community within the state might not condone
this policy, but its condonation is irrelevant; the potential jurors will never
get a chance to evince their disagreement with the policy of the state
legislature, because they will never get a chance to be part of a trial
involving one accused of distributing obscenity to adults under existing state
law. Thus, the state has, as a practical matter, established a community
standard by promulgating a policy of law enforcement. It has done so with
the same force and effect as if it had passed a law saying "the contemporary
community standards of this state are that sexually-oriented materials disseminated or displayed solely to persons over the age of eighteen can never
appeal to prurient interests or be deemed patently offensive." Nevertheless,
Justice Blackmun in Smith would permit a state to "define the kinds of
conduct" that it will regulate. He never notices that one effect of such a
definition may in fact be the "freezing" of community standards. Therefore, on this aspect of the case, Justice Powell's concurrence advocates not
only a much more pragmatic approach, but also one that remains consistent
with Miller, Paris and Hamling.
The obvious consequence of the Smith decision in light of Justice
Powell's concurrence is that a jury composed of the citizens of a given state
will be bound by the contemporary community standards defined explicitly
or implicitly by that state's legislature, whenever they serve in a state
prosecution. That identical jury, however, sitting in a federal prosecution
conducted within the same state, is free to ignore the local legislature's
definitions. The five prevailing justices in Smith elected to create this
situation by relying on a flat assertion about preeminent federal policy, a
policy which they themselves invented in this case. One can only wonder
whether a narrower ground of decision, such as those suggested earlier,
would not only have yielded a more internally consistent rule but would also
be less likely further to obscure an already murky subject.
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(2) Questions of Policy
Justice Stevens' dissent in Smith is interesting because he advocated a
reconsideration of the step undertaken in Hamling, the repudiation of
national standards for federal postal obscenity prosecutions. In arguing for a
"principled re-examination" of the very premises upon which the result in
Smith rests, he focused on some concerns that had formerly been well
expressed by Justice Douglas, concerns that involve matters outside the
relatively narrow issues resolved in this case. In his dissent in Miller,
Justice Douglas had stated that "[t]o send men to jail for violating standards
they cannot understand, construe, and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a
Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process." 622 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in one of Miller's companion cases, Justice Douglas asserted
that "[t]he Constitution never purported to give the Federal Government
censorship or oversight over literature or artistic productions . . . [and to
construe colonial history] . . . as qualifying the plain import of the First
Amendment is both a non sequitur and a disregard of the Tenth Amendment. ' ' 623 Justice Stevens, when he argued that the line of demarcation
between speech that is protected by the First Amendment and that which is
not is "too blurred" to be left to the subjective reactions of individual
jurors, 624 particularly for the purpose of identifying criminal conduct under
federal law, is thus, to a great extent, reiterating the sentiments of the man
whom he replaced on the Court.
Indeed, Justice Stevens' entire criticism of the policy of basing community standards on the viewpoints of individuals is an acute one. The
majority's citation of the remark in Hamling that a juror can draw on his
knowledge of the vicinage to judge the issue of obscenity vel non in the
same way that he could draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a
reasonable man is a specious comparison. The Court in Hamling cited as
supporting authority for its statement tort cases involving issues of negligence. 625 While the exercise of common sense and sound judgment by each
juror may well suffice for a determination of civil liability for personal
injury, is it an appropriate method by which to measure criminal liability for
speech that may or may not be protected by the First Amendment, depending upon the result of the measurement made? It can be argued persuasively
that the application of such local standards creates a chilling effect on the
dissemination of materials because sellers are unwilling to risk a criminal
622. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 43-44 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
623. United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1973) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
624. See 431 U.S. at 316 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
625. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974). See note 436 supra.
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conviction for testing variations in standards from place to place. Justices
Brennan and Marshall, joined at times by Justice Stewart, have often noted
this problem in obscenity cases; they advocate the desirability of balancing
the First Amendment interests of a defendant in an obscenity prosecution
against those the government has in protecting public morals. Thus, in his
dissent in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,626 Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Stewart and Marshall, stated:
I am forced to conclude that the concept of "obscenity" cannot be
defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice
to persons who create and distribute sexually oriented materials,
to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct
of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech and to avoid very
costly institutional harms. Given these inevitable side effects of
state efforts to suppress what is assumed to be unprotected
speech, we must scrutinize with care the state interest that is
asserted to justify the suppression. For in the absence of some
very substantial interest in suppressing such speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that seem to flow inevitably from the
effort. 627
The majority in Miller was not insensitive to the "ill effects" adverted
to by Justice Brennan. It noted that the use of national standards implies that
materials deemed intolerable under such standards might, as a result, be
unavailable in those communities where local tastes are such that those
materials would be acceptable. 62 Consequently, the majority argued that
the potential for suppression would be as significant were prurient interest
and patent offensiveness to be judged in accordance with a nationwide
standard as it might be under a regime utilizing local standards. 629 Therefore, it was said that it would be "neither realistic nor constitutionally sound
to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or
Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas,
or New York City.''630 But, as Justice Stevens points out, the standard
applied by the majorities in Miller and in Smith focuses upon the content of
the materials in question and their impact on the average person in the
community and "that impact is not a constant; it may vary widely with the
use to which the materials are put.'"631 Thus, he argues that there is neither
absolute immunity from governmental regulation for protected speech in
626. 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
627. Id. at 103 (emphasis in original) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart and
Marshall, JJ.). See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-54 (1959); Loekhart, Escapefrom
the Chill of Uncertainty: Explicit Sex and the FirstAmendment, 9 GA. L. REV. 533, 536-57
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Chill of Uncertainty].
628. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
629. Id. n.13.

630. Id. at 32-33.
631. 431 U.S. at 317 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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fact, nor should there be absolute criminal liability for any use of obscene
material. After all, "[w]hat is one man's amusement, teaches another's
doctrine." 632 Justice Stevens then arrives at much the same conclusion
reached by Justice Brennan in Paris. He would permit states to regulate
obscenity in a manner short of outright suppression, particularly where the
speech in question poses the threat of being a nuisance to unconsenting
adults. 633 Thus, the slim majority of five that prevailed in Miller and
Hamling remains exactly that, a slim majority.
Justice Stevens also points out that the effect of relying on jurors'
subjective interpretations is to make guilty verdicts in obscenity cases
virtually unreviewable by appellate courts. 634 The majority's opinion in
Smith compels a consideration of the problem. Although the subsequent
review of a particular conviction does little to alleviate the chilling effect of
the jury's use of ill-defined, variable standards in arriving at a verdict of
guilty, at least the possibility of reversal by an appellate court provides some
assurance that "convictions from provincial communities where the views
of what is acceptable material were badly out of line with contemporary
views in most American communities" 635 will not prevail as precedent. As
the majority in Miller appeared to concede, First Amendment values are
protected not only by its definitional formula of obscenity, but also "by the
ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of
constitutional claims when necessary."636 That power is especially crucial
in obscenity cases. This is so because those cases involve issues concerning
what are referred to as "constitutional facts." In Roth v. United States, 637
the Court held that obscenity is not speech protected by the First Amendment. The determination that an item is not obscene is therefore simultaneously a determination that it is or is not shielded by the Constitution.
Thus, as Justice Harlan noted in his separate opinion in Roth, obscenity is
"not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the
most sensitive and delicate kind. "638
One effect of denominating an issue to be one of "constitutional fact"
is to require appellate courts to make an independent judgment on the issue
by means of a de novo review of the trial record. As two commentators have
phrased it:
632. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).

633. See 431 U.S. at 318-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
634. Id. at 315-16.
635. Chill of Uncertainty, supra note 627, at 551.

636. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
637. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See notes 3-10 and accompanying text supra.

638. 354 U.S. at 498 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in the
original).
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This obligation-to reach an independent judgment in applying
constitutional standards and criteria to constitutional issues that
may be cast by lower courts "in the form of determinations of
fact"-appears fully applicable to findings of obscenity by juries,
trial courts, and administrative agencies. The Supreme Court is
subject to that obligation, as is every court before which the
constitutional issue is raised. 639
The Supreme Court acknowledged this obligation both before and after
Miller. Thus, in Kois v. Wisconsin, 64° decided in 1972, the Court was
confronted with the problem of whether two features appearing in an
"underground" newspaper had, as their dominant theme, an appeal to
prurient interest. The first was an article purporting to chronicle the author's
arrest for possession of obscene material and including two photographs
depicting naked men and women embracing each other, photographs that
were said to be representative of the materials in question; the other was a
"Sex Poem" that consisted of "an undisguisedly frank, play-by-play account of the author's recollection of sexual intercourse."641 The Court noted
that "[w]hile 'contemporary community standards,'

.

.

.

must leave room

for some latitude of judgment, and while there is an undeniably subjective
element in the test as a whole, the 'dominance' of the theme is a question of
constitutional fact."642 On the basis of its independent review of the items in
question, the Court found no dominant appeal to prurient interest and thus
reversed a judgment of conviction.6 43 Similarly, in Jenkins v. Georgia,644
decided in 1974, the Court was confronted with a conviction arising from
the theatrical showing of a film entitled "Carnal Knowledge." The majority
opinion cautioned:
Even though questions of appeal to "prurient interest" or of
patent offensiveness are "essentially questions of fact," it would
be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that juries have
unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive."
Not only did we there say that "the First Amendment values
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment are
adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to
conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary,"

.

. .

but we made it plain that under that holding "no one

will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene
materials unless these materials de ict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' conduct . ...
639.
640.
641.
642.
Oregon,

Lockhart & McClure, supra note 3, at 116.
408 U.S. 229 (1972).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 232 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). See also Childs v.
431 F.2d 272, 276 (9th Cir. 1970), vacated on othergrounds, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971).

643. 408 U.S. at 232.
644. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
645. Id. at 160 (citations omitted).
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Thus, after reviewing the film in question, the Court held that it was not
legally obscene because it contained no depictions of "hard core pornography" as defined by the examples given in Miller.646 In his concurrence,
Justice Brennan remarked that "[a]fter the Court's decision today, there can
be no doubt that Miller requires appellate courts-including this Court-to
review independently the constitutional fact of obscenity.'' 647 This assessment appeared to be correct and, as a result, the Court in Jenkins appeared
to adopt a very wide-ranging concept of appellate review of the three
elements of the Miller test.
How wide-ranging this concept is may be appreciated by considering
Professor Schauer's explanation of what it entails:
What the scope of review involves is a determination of whether,
as a matter of constitutional law, the materials are of such character as to be clearly outside the scope of First Amendment protection, or, if the issue is not clear, to contain arguably prurient,
patently offensive, and valueless depictions or descriptions such
that jury findings of pruriency, offensiveness, and lack of value
would not offend the Constitution. In other words, the appellate
court must make an independent review, but the question to be
asked is not whether the materials are obscene, but whether the
materials create a jury issue of obscenity. Since this involves
questions of constitutional law, more evidence is needed to create
a jury issue than in other criminal cases, not by virtue of a
different standard, but by virtue of the various elements of the
Roth-Miller test. Thus, the independent review by an appellate
court must deal with prurient interest, dominance of the theme,
patent offensiveness, lack of value, and whether or not the materials depict or describe hard-core sexual conduct. If, as to each of
these issues, a jury issue is created, then the verdict must be
allowed to stand. But if, as to any one of these issues, the reviewing court finds that the material is not within the Roth-Miller
definition of obscenity, then a verdict of obscenity must be reversed. 64s
This quotation certainly seems to be an accurate summary of Jenkins. Yet,
language in Smith would appear to espouse a significantly different view of
the scope of appellate review of obscenity cases. Justice Blackmun therein
said review would be limited to four issues: (a) whether jurors were instructed to consider the views of their entire community and not just their own
views or those of an atypical minority; (b) whether the conduct depicted
falls within the examples specified in Miller; (c) whether the item in
question meets the third part of the Miller test, i.e., lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value and (d) whether the evidence was
646. Id. at 161.

647. Id. at 163 (Brennan, J.,concurring, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.).
648. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 152 (emphasis in original).
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sufficient.649 By the fact that the Court in Smith specified that the third part
of the Miller test was "particularly amenable" to appellate review, it
suggested that the other two parts, appeal to prurient interest and patent
offensiveness, are not. Presumably, this would be so because those two
elements depend upon jurors' application of contemporary community standards, something judges sitting on appellate courts could never hope to
ascertain. If this is so, then extensive review of these issues of constitutional
fact is precluded. Instead of considering whether all the evidence creates a
jury issue on each of these two aspects of the Miller test, appellate courts
after Smith are alloted a much narrower role, one of ascertaining whether
the materials in question consist either of "[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions-of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or
simulated" or of "[p]atently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. "650
The effect of this limitation is to restrict appellate review of patent offenIsiveness solely to these enumerated examples, a fact
which reduces such
review to a mechanical exercise in matching the evidence adduced at trial
with one or more of the types of depictions mentioned. Moreover, this
limitation precludes any independent review on the issue of appeal to a
prurient interest; the appellate court is instead allotted the minor role of
ascertaining if the jurors were instructed on the right standard to be used in
judging the existence of such an appeal. One might argue that the traditional
scope of appellate review might be preserved by Justice Blackmun's inclusion of the catch-all phrase "sufficiency of the evidence" as an appropriate
subject for consideration by judges sitting on a court of appeals. This
phrase, however, refers merely to whether the government introduced sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a finding of obscenity. Thus, in Smith, for
example, the issue would be whether the materials in question, which were
all that the federal prosecutor introduced on this issue, would serve as a
sufficient basis for a jury's determination on the matter of obscenity vel non.
Phrasing the requirement in this way suggests that an appellate court might
still be able to decide whether or not a jury issue of obscenity exists in the
course of its review of the materials admitted by the trial court. In fact,
however, the appellate court has no such broad powers under the "sufficiency of the evidence" criterion of review. As the Court said in ParisAdult
Theater I v. Slaton:651
Nor was it error to fail to require "expert" affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene when the materials them649. 431 U.S. at 305-06.
650. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
651. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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selves were actually placed in evidence. . . . The [materials],
obviously, are the best evidence of what they represent. "In the
cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since
Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for
the determination of the question." 652
Thus, once the government introduces the allegedly obscene materials into
evidence at trial, appellate review of the issue of whether those items
constitute sufficient evidence on which to base a finding of obscenity is
virtually precluded. Consequently, as noted above, Smith would seem to
foreclose independent appellate review on the issue of appeal to prurient
interest, and fixes an extremely narrow range for such review on the issue of
patent offensiveness. The Court appears to engage in this sharp departure
from prior cases like Kois and Jenkins because of its perceived need for
judges to defer to jurors' own assessments of what their community's
standards are.
This deference in Smith in many ways compels the general conclusions
on reviewability reached by Justice Blackmun. If jurors must apply contemporary community standards in accordance with "their own understanding
of the tolerance of the average person in their community," 653 can the
Supreme Court, which sits in Washington, disagree with that assessment?
The substantive examples of patent offensiveness suggested in Miller and
incorporated in section 1461 prosecutions by the Court in Hamling will
permit appellate courts to reassess the jury issue of obscenity vel non to
some extent, but those examples will primarily be helpful only in the
relatively easy cases like Jenkins. These substantive limitations will not
forcefully constrain the trier of fact'in a borderline case, and while "hard
core" depictions may be obvious on many occasions, one can imagine
numerous instances where sexually-oriented materials will be at the very
periphery of acceptability. Thus, Smith confirms the view of Professor
Lockhart that the Court has, in effect, placed "the application of two major
factors in the constitutional standard-pruriency and offensiveness-beyond effective appellate judicial review, making virtually conclusive the
views of local jurors and. judges applying these highly subjective factors. '"654 In so doing, the Court has also signaled that the "constitutional
fact" doctrine simply may not apply with regard to these two aspects of the
tripartite Miller test.
But what of the independent review accorded the third aspect of that
test, the determination of whether the material, taken as a whole, lacks
652. Id. at 56 (citations & footnote omitted). For other similar expressions on this subject,
see note 294 supra.
653. 431 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).

654. Chill of Uncertainty,supri note 627, at 552.
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serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value? The problem is that this
is a rather difficult test to apply. It requires "not only a searching inquiry
into the actual merit of the material, but an analysis of the relationship of the
serious matter to the sexually explicit matter, which will inevitably involve a
determination of intent as well as effect.' '655 If the issue is explored by
expert testimony at trial, an appellate court may be able to engage in a
reasoned, careful evaluation of the problem. But what happens in a case like
Smith, where no evidence on the subject is ever introduced? Obviously, the
judges sitting on the court of appeals must then evaluate intent and effect on
their own. A finding of saving value may be easy to make when the work in
question is a book like Ulysses or Tropic of Cancer or Psychopathia
Sexualis, or a film like "Carnal Knowledge." It becomes extremely difficult when the materials are similar to those involved in Smith:
(1) issues of "Intrigue" magazine, depicting nude males and
females engaged in masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, and sexual
intercourse; (2) a film entitled "Lovelace," depicting a nude male
and a nude female engaged in masturbation and simulated acts of
fellatio, cunnilingus, and sexual intercourse; and (3)a film entitled
"Terrorized Virgin," depicting two nude males and a nude female
engaged in fellatio, cunnilingus, and sexual intercourse. 65 6
Thus, from the perspective of the defendant in a case such as Smith,
independent appellate review of the issue of whether the material in question, taken as a whole, has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value may not provide a helpful means by which to challenge a criminal
conviction.
Given the virtually conclusive nature of juror determinations on the
issues of pruriency and patent offensiveness, it thus becomes imperative that
counsel select the members of the jury panel with care. Smith, however,
recognizes the broad power of the trial judge to regulate the conduct of voir
dire. The Court noted that the particular inquiries sought by the defendant in
this case, which requested the jurors to describe their understanding of
community standards, "would not have elicited useful information about
the jurors' qualifications to apply [these standards] in an objective way.' '657
It therefore held that the district court judge had not abused his discretion in
declining to ask those questions. 6 8 While the Court implied that it would
accept other "more specific and less conclusory questions for voir dire,"6s9
Justice Blackmun's own examples of permissible questions were quite
655. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 147. Thus, the issue of social value or lack of it must be
gauged independently by a court. It may not be gauged by reference to contemporary community standards. United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977).
656. 431 U.S. at 293.
657. Id. at 308.
658. Id.
659. Id.
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general in effect and would assist defense counsel in an obscenity prosecution only slightly in challenging the qualifications of a particular juror.
Thus, Justice Blackmun said that it would be helpful to know "how long a
juror has been a member of the community, how heavily the juror has been
involved in the community, and with what organizations having an interest
in the regulation of obscenity the juror has been affiliated.' ' 66 With the
exception of the last query, a juror's response to these inquiries would yield
few insights into his awareness and comprehension of contemporary community standards concerning obscenity.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that a federal trial judge in a criminal
prosecution possesses a great deal of discretion in how he chooses to
conduct voir dire is well taken. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
24(a) such a judge may submit "such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as [he] deems proper.' '661 But one has to ask whether voir
dire in an obscenity prosecution ought not be different from voir dire as
conducted in other criminal cases. Professor Schauer states the problem
well:
Whether the voir dire examination is conducted by the judge or by
the attorneys, an examination more searching than that in a more
conventional case seems justified. In an obscenity case, more so
than in most cases, the personal political, moral, religious, and
sexual opinions of jurors are likely to affect the verdict they
render. Few people think there ought not to be laws against
murder, burglary, or rape, but many think there ought not to be
laws against obscenity, and this is the kind of personal bias of
which the prosecutor should be aware. Similarly, in few other
areas of the law are jurors likely to discover that acts personally
abhorrent and shocking to them are nonetheless legally protected.
The defense should be given an opportunity to know of any such
personal views in advance. 662
Arguably, one way for a defense counsel to elicit these personal views is to
test exactly what a potential juror knows about the contemporary standards
of his community. The Supreme Court, however, has not accepted the need
for a more "searching examination." In Ham v. South Carolina,66 decided
in 1973, the Court was asked to review a conviction for the possession of
marijuana. The defendant was a young, bearded black. On voir dire, the
trial judge did question potential jurors whether they were cognizant of any
bias against the defendant in particular and whether they could render an
660. Id.
661. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a).
662. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 261.

663. 409 U.S. 524 (1973). See generally Van Dyke, VoirDire:How Should It Be Conducted
to Ensure That OurJuries Are Representativeand Impartial?,3 HAsrNGs CONST. L.Q. 65, 8995 (1975).
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impartial verdict. He refused, however, to submit questions to them about
possible prejudices arising from the fact that the defendant was black and
wore a beard. The Supreme Court ruled that the failure to inquire into the
matter of possible racial bias constituted reversible error, but it declined to
say the same about the failure to question prospective jurors regarding their
attitude toward beards, claiming an inability "to constitutionally distinguish
possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar
prejudices. '"" A year later, in Hamling v. United States,665 the Court
adopted the rule of Ham in an obscenity case. In Hamling, the trial court
had refused to ask questions as to whether the jurors' educational, political
and religious beliefs might affect their views on obscenity. The Court ruled:
Here, as in Ham, the trial judge made a general inquiry into the
jurors' general views concerning obscenity. Failure to ask specific
questions as to the possible effect of educational, political, and
religious biases did "not reach the level of a constitutional violation,". . . nor was it error requiring the exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of justice in the federal
courts.M
Thus, Smith's ruling on voir dire is consistent with precedent. But it
deprives defense counsel of the opportunity to elicit any but the most general
information about a potential juror's views concerning the standards of his
community, and thus precludes him from ascertaining whether those views
do in fact reflect communal values or are thoroughly idiosyncratic. The
Smith decision leaves defense counsel in the unenviable position of attempting to construct questions "general" enough to protect his client, but at the
same time, "specific" enough to avoid being ruled "conclusory," with
very little substantive guidance from the Court and with an insignificant
chance of reversal should the presiding judge refuse to submit a proffered
question to potential jurors. Here, as elsewhere, the Court's desire to protect
and defer to individual jurors' notions of contemporary community standards appears to deprive the defendant in a federal obscenity prosecution of
opportunities with which he can wage a meaningful defense to the criminal
charge leveled against him.
5. Ward v. Illinois: The Specificity Requirement and the Mishkin Doctrine
In the last obscenity decision of the 1976-77 term, the Court in Ward v.
Illinois667 faced yet another vagueness/fair notice challenge to a law regulating the distribution of sexually-oriented materials. Not only did it deal with
664. 409 U.S. at 528.
665. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
666. Id. at 140 (quoting Ham v. United States, 409 U.S. 524,528 (1973) (citation omitted)).

667. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
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the doctrine of variable obscenity established by the case of Mishkin v. New
York 6 8 in a rather loose fashion, it also failed to consider the problems that
arise when an authoritative judicial construction, which purportedly cures
the vagueness inherent in a given obscenity statute, itself neglects to indicate
the kinds of conduct judicially deemed to be proscribed by that statute. As a
result, the Court's decision in Ward not only engenders significant confusion regarding both the current viability of the Mishkin doctrine and the
exact nature of the specificity requirement in Miller, it also obscures the
relationship between that requirement and the concept of furnishing a
criminal defendant with fair notice of the crime that he is accused of having
committed.
a. The Decision
In October of 1971, Wesley Ward was charged in the state of Illinois
with having sold two publications, entitled Bizarre World and Illustrated
Case Histories, A Study of Sado-Masochism, in violation of section 1120(a)(1) 669 of the Revised Statutes of fllinois. That provision prohibits the
sale of "obscene" matter; under section 11-20(b) of the same statutes,
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant
appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest
in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in description or representation of
such matters. A thing is obscene even though the obscenity is
latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs. 670
668. 383 U.S. 502 (1966). See generally Reiss, The Supreme Court and Obscenity:Mishkin
and Ginzburg-Expansionof Freedom of Expressionand ImprovedRegulation Through Flexible Standards of Obscenity, RUTGERS L. REV. 43, 50 (1966).

669. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) provides that a person
commits the offense of obscenity whenever, with knowledge of the contents thereof or after
recklessly failing to engage in a reasonable inspection that would have disclosed the contents
thereof, said person
(a) Sells, delivers or provides, or offers or agrees to sell, deliver or provide any

obscene [material] or other representation or embodiment of the obscene; or ....
(3) Publishes, exhibits or otherwise makes available anything obscene, or ....
(5)

Creates, buys, procures or possesses obscene matter or material with intent

to disseminate it in violation of this Section, or of the penal laws or regulations of any
other jurisdiction; or
(6)

Advertises or otherwise promotes the sale of materials represented or held

out by him to be obscene, whether or not it is obscene.
670. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-20(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). Under § 11-20(c) of the
same statute, "[o]bscenity shall be judged

. . .

with reference to children or other specially

susceptible audiences if it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of its
dissemination to be specially designed for or directed to such an audience." ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 11-20(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
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Ward's nonjury trial resulted in a conviction. This judgment was upheld by
both levels of the Illinois appellate system 671 in decisions rendered subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. California.672 The Illinois
Supreme Court expressly rejected the petitioner's claims that section 1120(b) did not comport with the specificity requirements of Miller673 and that
the two publications in question were not obscene. 674 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on these two issues to resolve the conflict
between the judgment of the state court upholding the statute and the
separate ruling of a three-judge federal district court that the Illinois law was
675
void for vagueness.
In an opinion authored by Justice White, in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist joined, the Court affirmed
Ward's conviction and upheld the validity of the Illinois obscenity statute
under the standards announced in Miller. Justice White began by briefly
reviewing the Miller ruling and acknowledging that it had recognized that
official regulation of obscenity must be limited to works that depict or
describe hard-core pornography, and that such conduct '"'must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
construed.' "676 The majority found that the Illinois statute fulfilled these
requirements.
The Court interpreted Ward's questions on certiorari as presenting four
distinct issues. The first of these was whether the Illinois law was written or
had been construed in a fashion that comported with Miller's specificity
requirement; Ward asserted that "absent such compliance the Illinois law is
unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give him notice that materials
dealing with the kind of sexual conduct involved here could not legally be
sold in the State.' '677 Justice White replied by noting that the Illinois statutes
did meet the standards of Miller,678 but even assuming the contrary, Ward
had ample guidance that the sale of sado-masochistic materials did violate
state law. To support this proposition, Justice White cited the Illinois
Supreme Court's 1965 decision in People v. Sikora,679 which had upheld a
671.

People v. Ward, 25 Il1. App. 3d 1045, 324 N.E.2d 205 (1975), aff'd, 63 Il.2d 437, 349

N.E.2d 47 (1976).
672. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See notes 34-43 and accompanying text supra.
673. People v. Ward, 63 Ill.
2d 437, 441, 349 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1976).
674. Id. at 442, 349 N.E.2d at 49.

675. See Eagle Books, Inc. v. Reinhard, 418 F. Supp. 345,350 (N.D. Ill. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 432 U.S. 902 (1977).
676. 431 U.S. at 768 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
677. Id. at 771.
678. Id.
679. 32 11. 2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
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conviction under the predecessor of section 1 1-20(a)(1) for the sale of
publications dealing with sadism and masochism. This construction by the
state court was deemed to be binding on the Supreme Court, and thus, was
680
said to preclude a claim of vagueness.
Ward's second contention was that "sado-masochistic materials may
not be constitutionally proscribed because they are not expressly included
within the examples of the kinds of sexually explicit representations that
Miller used to explicate the aspect of its obscenity definition dealing with
patently offensive depictions of specifically defined sexual conduct.''681
Justice White retorted that the Miller examples were just that, examples
that, according to Hamling v. United States,682 were "not intended to be
exhaustive." 683 Furthermore, he noted that the majority in Miller had not
meant to extend constitutional protections to the kinds of flagellatory publications deemed obscene in the Court's 1966 decision in Mishkin v. New
York. 6 84 Assuming such publications remained unprotected, "surely those
before us today deal with a category of sexual conduct which, if obscenely
68 5
described, may be proscribed by state law."
The third issue raised by the petitioner was that the materials in
686
question were simply not obscene under the tripartite standard of Miller.
The majority found that this argument was "foreclosed" by Mishkin, which
permitted the regulation of obscenity directed to deviant groups. 68 7 Since the
Illinois courts had found the two publications at issue to be obscene under
68 8
state law, Justice White found no reason to differ with their conclusions.
Finally, there remained Ward's contention that, even assuming that the
Illinois statute was not inherently vague, the state had nevertheless "failed
to conform to the Miller requirement that a state obscenity law, as written or
authoritatively construed, must state specifically the kinds of sexual conduct
the description or representation of which the state intends to proscribe by its
obscenity law." 689 To this assertion, the majority responded by pointing to
the case of People v. Ridens, 69° decided by the Illinois Supreme Court in
680. 431 U.S. at 772-73.
681. Id. at 773.
682. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.
683. Id. at 114.

684. 383 U.S. 502 (1966). See notes 737-740 and accompanying text infra.
685. 431 U.S. at 773.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id.
689. Id. at 774.
690. 59 Ill.
2d 362, 321 N.E.2d 264 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975). The Illinois
Supreme Court had originally heard this case in 1972 and, at that juncture, had found that § 1120 was constitutional in that it provided the same test for obscenity as was set forth in Roth v.
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1974. In Ridens, the state court found 691 that section 11-20 of the Criminal
Code incorporated parts (a) and (b) of the Miller test for obscenity 692 and
part (c) of the test originally set forth in Memoirs v. Massachusetts.693 The
court in Ridens, however, did not go further and describe the kinds of
conduct referred to under part (b) of the Miller guidelines. Finding that no
difficulty had arisen from this omission, Justice White claimed:
The Illinois court thus must have been aware of the need for
specificity and of the Miller Court's examples explaining the reach
of part (b). . . .The Illinois court plainly intended to conform the
Illinois law to part (b) of Miller, and there is no reason to doubt
that, in incorporating the guideline as part of the law, the Illinois
court intended as well to adopt the Miller examples, which gave
substantive meaning to part (b) by indicating the kinds of materials
within its reach. The alternative reading of the decision would lead
us to the untenable conclusion that the Illinois Supreme Court
chose to create a fatal flaw in its statute by refusing to take
6
cognizance of the specificity requirement set down in Miller. 1
Justice White also noted that in People v. Gould,695 a 1975 ruling, the
state court had reaffirmed its action in Ridens and, in doing so, had quoted
not only part (b) of the Miller test, but also the examples that were intended
to explicate that part. 696 Thus, the majority asserted that it would be a
"needlessly technical and wholly unwarranted reading of the Illinois opinions to conclude that the state court did not adopt these explanatory examples as well as the guidelines themselves. '" 697 Justice White went on to
observe that one might claim that section 11-20 was overbroad because "the
state had not provided an exhaustive list of the sexual conduct the patently
'
offensive description of which may be held obscene under the statute. "698
But he noted that under Broadrick v. Oklahoma ,699 the overbreadth "must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." 700 Because the Illinois courts had recognized
limitations on the kinds of sexual conduct that could permissibly be depictUnited States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See notes 2-9 and accompanying text supra. People v.
Ridens, 51 111. 2d 410, 414, 282 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1972). This decision was vacated by the

Supreme Court and remanded for reconsideration in light of Miller. Ridens v. Illinois, 413 U.S.
912 (1973). The state court's 1974 decision was its ruling on remand.
691. 59 Ill.
2d at 373, 321 N.E.2d at 270.

692. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
693. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
694. 431 U.S. at 775.
695. 60 Ill.
2d 159, 324 N.E.2d 412 (1975).

696. 431 U.S. at 775-76.
697. Id. at 776.
698. Id.
699. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).

700. Id. at 615. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 154-58; Note, The Eirst Amendment OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
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ed, no overbreadth claim could be made out. 701 In fact, the majority noted
that Ridens and Gould could be interpreted to accomplish exactly what was
achieved in Hamling and other federal cases, which was holding the applicable obscenity laws "to be limited to 'the sort of' patently offensive
representations or descriptions of that specific hardcore sexual conduct
given as examples in Miller." 702 The majority thus upheld the affirmance of
70 3
Ward's conviction.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, repeating his
previously stated view that section 11-20 was unconstitutionally overbroad.70 4 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
also dissented. He claimed that the majority's opinion abandoned the specificity requirement of Miller.70 5 Justice Stevens agreed that the Illinois court
had made it clear that section 11-20 covered all the Miller examples; "[i]t
has not, however, stated that the statute is limited to those examples, or to
any other specifically defined category. "76 The fact that the Sikora decision had held that the law proscribed dissemination of sado-masochistic
materials did not alleviate the problem:
But, if such notice is all that is required, it is difficult to understand why the Miller case itself was remanded for consideration of
the specificity issue. . . For the description of the materials
involved in Miller leaves no room for doubt that they were similar
to materials which had often been the subject of prosecutions
in
7°7
the past; there clearly was no question of fair notice.
Moreover, the majority's ruling that the list of conduct proscribed by a
statute need not be exhaustive was tantamount to holding that a person could
be prosecuted for selling materials not on the list. This conflicted with
Miller's assurance that no one could be subject to prosecution except for the
sale of hard core pornography defined by the regulating state law, as written
or authoritatively construed. 70 8 Thus, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court
in Ward withdrew the "cornerstone of the Miller structure and, undoubtedly, [hastened] its ultimate downfall.'7'9
701. 431 U.S. at 776.
702. Id.

703.
704.
912, 914
705.
JJ.).
706.
707.
708.
709.

Id. at 777.
Id. (Brennan, J.,dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.) (citing Ridens v. Illinois, 413 U.S.
(1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting, joined by Stewart and Marshall, JJ.)).
431 U.S. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
Id. at 779.
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 781.
Id. at 782.
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b. Analysis
Perhaps the best method of considering the Ward case is to analyze
separately each of the four issues identified in Justice White's majority
opinion. In order to maintain continuity, Justice Stevens' remarks on each of
these issues will be discussed contemporaneously with the analysis made by
the majority.
(1)

Relevance of PriorRulings
According to the majority, the 1965 decision in People v. Sikora71
gave detailed meaning to section 11-20, which bound all subsequent courts.
Unfortunately, the opinion in Sikora did not attempt to fix the meaning of
the statute in the manner asserted by Justice White in Ward.7 11 The Illinois
Supreme Court in that case gave detailed descriptions of three books, Lust
Campus, PassionBride and Crossroadsof Lust. The first two were said to
contain several scenes of flagellation, 7 12 and the third was represented as
including three voyeuristic tableaux, one of which was "characterized by
sadism and masochism. '"713 After presenting these summaries, the state
court went on to say:
The sole appeal of these books is to prurient interest and the
stimulation of that interest, is clearly the author's intention. The
aberrational conduct portrayed can appeal only to a shameful and
morbid interest in nudity and sex. The kind of scenes that are
described and the detail of description go beyond the customary
limits of candor in this country. The defendant does not contend
that any of these books has literary or artistic merit. No one of
them can be said to represent a serious attempt to discuss any
problem that confronts society. They are discussions of sex and
perversion, almost totally unrelated to anything else. Such plot
and characterization as they contain serve as transitions from one
sexual episode, normal or abnormal, to another. It is not enough,
in our opinion, to say that they are escapistic, and so serve a social
function. Without their obscenity they would interest no one and
would perform no function. All obscenity is essentially
escapistic;
it can not be allowed to justify itself on that basis. 714
The court in Sikora did not hold that the category of sado-masochistic
depictions was subsumed under the general definition of section 11-20(b).
In fact, it offered no generalities regarding the extent to which the term
"obscene" as utilized in that provision encompassed materials designed for
deviant groups. Rather, the court simply acknowledged that materials
710. 32 Ill.
2d 260, 204 N.E.2d 768 (1965).

711. Indeed, it is worth noting that neither of the state appellate courts in Ward even
mentioned the Sikora case in the course of their opinions.
712. See 32 Ill.
2d at 267-68, 204 N.E.2d at 772-73.
713. Id. at 268, 204 N.E.2d at 773.
714. Id. at 268-69, 204 N.E.2d at 773.
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containing flagellatory depictions, in addition to numerous representations
of other types of sexual encounters, both "normal" and "aberrational,"
may, as a whole, appeal to a prurient interest in nudity and sex. Ward could
very well have argued that his materials, which presumably emphasized
primarily sado-masochistic depictions, would not appeal to the average
person's prurient interests, but instead would disgust and sicken everyone
who was not a member of the deviant group to whom he directed these
publications. 715 Under Sikora, this may have been a valid argument, because the court never considered the character of the group being addressed;
that is, is the prurient interest that of the average person, or that of the
"typical" sadist or masochist? The court in Sikora simply stated that some
specific materials containing sado-masochistic elements appealed primarily
to a shameful interest in nudity and sex. These remarks, which were made in
a specific context, should not be interpreted as a conclusive effort to give
fair notice that the concept of "shameful interest in nudity and sex" would
thereafter be construed to include sado-masochistic representations. Remarks in a 1965 decision could not realistically inform Ward seven years
later that only materials containing depictions of deviant sex were proscribed by the law. Nor could this decision inform Ward of the prurient
interests that would provide the relevant measuring standard. Indeed, Justice
White's attempt to derive a broad clarifying gloss from language construing
the intentions of certain authors and the content and structure of three
specific books seems clearly vacuous; it is an attempt to read too much into
a rather narrow decision.
The same criticism applies to the other two cases cited by the majority,
City of Blue Island v. DeVilbiss 716 and City of Chicago v. Geraci.7 17 Again,
the Illinois Supreme Court mentioned sado-masochism in these rulings only
to a limited extent; it noted that the publications involved in each of these
cases contained, inter alia, flagellatory sequences, which were described so
vividly and in such a detailed fashion that they necessarily appealed to
morbid or shameful interests in sex. 718 No attempt was made to state in
general terms the extent to which the relevant statute regulated materials
designed for deviant tastes. Moreover, even if the court had made such a
general determination, it is questionable whether it would be relevant to
Ward's case. Neither DeVilbiss nor Geraci involved section 11-20; rather,
715. For a similar argument, see Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). For a
consideration of how the Supreme Court responded to that argument, see notes 737-741 and

accompanying text infra.
716. 41 Ill. 2d 135, 242 N.E.2d 761 (1969).
717. 46 Ill. 2d 576, 264 N.E.2d 153 (1970).
718. See 41 Ill. 2d at 142, 242 N.E.2d at 765; 46 Ill. 2d at 582-83, 264 N.E.2d at 157.
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they concerned local municipal ordinances that resembled the state law to a
greater or lesser extent.71
Thus, the prior interpretations cited by Justice White are, on closer
examination, not persuasively authoritative. Merely because the state supreme court found three publications, Lust Campus, Passion Bride and
Crossroads of Lust, to be obscene does not mean that it provided an
interpretation that would guide Wesley Ward in determining whether he
would suffer criminal liability for disseminating Bizarre World and Illustrated Case Histories:A Study of Sado-Masochism. Considered separately
from Miller, the general rationale underlying the void-for-vagueness rule is
that a law must be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties." 7 20 Thus,
"[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what
the state commands or forbids.'"721 It is certainly not clear that, as a result of
Sikora, Ward was not required to speculate as to the extent to which section
11-20 proscribed the dissemination of sado-masochistic publications.
719. The court in DeVilbiss noted that the city ordinance of Blue Island involved therein
was identical to section 11-20(b). 41111. 2d at 137, 242 N.E.2d at 762. Geraci, however, involved
a Chicago ordinance that defined "obscene" by relying on language from Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 276 (1957): "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
46 11.2d at 578, 264 N.E.2d at 155.
720. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925). Cf. Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972), in which the three vices of vagueness were described as:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is lo be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related,
where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment Freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to "'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' .
than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) ("The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a ctiminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is
that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably
understand to be proscribed.")
721. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). Accord, United States v. Cardiff,
344 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1952); Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1941); McBoyle v.
United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
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Apart from these difficulties, it is necessary to confront the larger
question raised by Justice Stevens. Even assuming that the Illinois court had
held that materials identical to those distributed by Ward were prohibited by
section 11-20, would this fact have any relevance to the issue of vagueness?
He pointed out that the materials involved in Miller were similar to others
that had been the subject of state prosecutions in the past, but this had not
caused the Miller Court to refuse to remand the suit for further consideration
by the California courts on the specificity requirement with respect to that
state's penal code. 722 Justice Stevens' point is well-taken. The fact that
similar publications were the subject of prior prosecutions tells a person
nothing about whether the subsequent distribution of his publications will
expose him to criminal liability. Indeed, a similar point was made in
Hamling v. United States. 723 In that case, the petitioner made two related
arguments. First, that because materials similar to those at issue were
available on newsstands throughout the country, they should be admissible
on the issue of nonobscenity. Second, because materials allegedly similar to
those at issue had been deemed nonobscene by other courts construing the
same statute, those judgments were probative on the issue of obscenity vel
non. To these contentions, the Court replied, first, that the mere fact that
similar publications are for sale elsewhere does not make those publications
"witnesses of virtue" 724 and, second, that "[a] judicial determination that
particular matters are not obscene does not necessarily make them relevant
to the determination of the obscenity of other materials ....
,,25 Similarly, one could argue that the mere fact that the Illinois court in Sikora found
certain publications that contained masochistic elements obscene did not
provide Ward with any relevant information regarding the potential obscenity of his publications. Only a determination that section 11-20 proscribed
deviant materials in general would have supplied sufficient notice to future
distributors, and the Sikora court carefully refrained from making any such
broad-gauged assertion. Thus, under the logic of Hamling, the prior decisions of the Illinois courts did not provide guidelines that would be dispositive in later cases.
(2) Sado-Masochism and the Miller Examples
It is certainly true that sado-masochism is not among the types of
representations referred to by the Court in Miller when it explained part (b)
722. 431 U.S. at 780-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
JJ.).
723. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). See notes 47-53 and accompanying text supra.

724. Id. at 126 (quoting United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 320 (9th Cir. 1973)).
725. 418 U.S. at 126-27.
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of its tripartite definition of obscenity. 726 The problem is to what extent the
depictions listed in that explication were intended to be all-inclusive. The
Court in Miller referred to these as merely a "few plain examples of what a
state statute could define for regulation ....
"727 This language would
suggest that Justice White was correct in assuming that the mere fact that the
Court in 1973 provided a few instances of what it regarded as "hard core
pornography" does not mean that the definition of that term will be forever
fixed by those examples.
This interpretation, however, would appear to conflict with footnote
seven of United States v. Twelve 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film.728 In that
case, the Court noted that existing federal obscenity laws would be
construed as "limiting regulated materials to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard core' sexual conduct given as
examples in Miller v. California.
... 729 If this language were construed
literally, it would seem that the Miller examples were meant to be allinclusive in federal obscenity prosecutions. This interpretation, however,
would seem to be belied by the Court's later decision in Hamling v. United
States,7 30 another federal case. The majority in that action reiterated the
substance of footnote seven of Twelve 200-ft. Reels, but then went on to
observe with respect to the Miller examples: "While the particular descriptions there contained were not intended to be exhaustive, they clearly
indicate that there is a limit beyond which neither legislative draftsmen nor
juries may go in concluding that particular material is 'patently offensive'
731
within the meaning of the obscenity test set forth in the Miller cases."
Similarly, in a companion case to Hamling, Jenkins v. Georgia,732 the
majority made the following observation about the instances of hard core
pornography discussed in Miller: "While this did not purport to be an
exhaustive catalog of what juries might find patently offensive, it was
certainly intended to fix substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from
the First Amendment, on the type of material subject to such a determination." ,733 The net effect of Hamling and Jenkins would seem to be that while
the Miller standards set a certain minimum limit on what types of depictions
may patently offend, states, and perhaps the federal government, can always
proscribe other, unspecified conduct falling above that minimum. There
726. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
727. Id. at 25 (1973).
728. 413 U.S. 123 (1973).

729.
730.
731.
732.
733.

Id. at 130 n.7 (emphasis added).
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
Id. at 114.
418 U.S. 153 (1974). See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
Id. at 160-61.
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nevertheless remains a problem with the use of the verb "limiting" in
Twelve 200-ft. Reels. It is a problem exacerbated by the Ward decision
itself. On the one hand, Justice White repeated the assertion in Hamling that
the Miller examples were never intended to be exhaustive; 734 on the other
hand, he analogized the action of the Illinois courts to what was done in
Hamling, where a federal obscenity law was said "to be limited to 'the sort
of' patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific hardcore sexual conduct given as examples in Miller. "73 Not only does this
sentence imply that the, verb "limit" signifies "limited to the kinds of
depictions specified" rather than "setting a minimum level of offensiveness
below which the state cannot regulate," but it also implies that this
construction constitutes an accurate description of the restrictions imposed
by Miller upon the states, something no previous decision had ever intimated.
Thus, regardless of Justice White's pat assertions, the extent to which
the examples in Miller were intended to be all-inclusive remains unsettled.
Indeed, a number of state courts have sustained obscenity statutes by
reading into their provisions only those definitions of specific sexual
conduct that appear in the Miller opinion. 736 On reflection, such a restrictive
approach seems unwarranted. The term "hard core pornography" would
seem to encompass a number of categories of conduct, including sadomasochism; the few examples enunciated in Miller are so obviously cursory
that their very incompleteness suggests that the states would be free to
supplement them as they wished. Thus, Justice White's broad assertion in
Ward that the Miller examples are in no way exhaustive has merit.
Mishkin v. New York 737 only underscores this point. In that case, the
738
Court upheld the validity of section 1141 of the New York Penal Law,
734.
735.
736.
255 Ark.

431 U.S. at 773.
Id. at 776.
See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 292 Ala. 473,478,296 So. 2d 218,222(1974); Gibbs v. State,
997, 1007,504 S.W.2d 719,725-26 (1974); Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 81,

545 P.2d 229, 235, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 323 (1976); Mangum v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors'

273 Md. 176, 188, 328 A.2d 283, 289-90 (1974); State v. Welke, 298 Minn. 402, 409,216 N.W.2d
641, 648-49 (1974); State v. De Santis, 65 N.J. 462, 471-72, 323 A.2d 489, 495 (1974); State v.
Bryant, 285 N.C. 27, 40, 203 S.E.2d 27, 35-36 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974); State v.
Watkins, 262 S.C. 178, 182, 203 S.E.2d 429, 432 (1973), appeal dismissed, 418 U.S. 911 (1974);

West v. State, 514 S.W.2d 433, 441 (Tex.Cr. App. 1974); State v. J-R Distrib., Inc., 82 Wash.
2d 584, 601,512 P.2d 1049, 1060 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974); State ex rel. Chobot v.
Circuit Court, 61 Wis. 2d 354, 372, 212 N.W.2d 690, 697 (1973).
737. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
738. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1967):

1. A person who. . . has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute...
any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, masochistic or disgusting
book. . . or who. . . prints, utters, publishes, or in any matter manufactures, or
prepares any such book. . . or who
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which proscribed the dissemination of, inter alia, sado-masochistic publications. Mishkin argued that his works would not appeal to the prurient
interests of the average "normal" person. To this, the Court responded:
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated
to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at
large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied
if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
the prurient interest in sex of members of that group. The reference to the "average" or "normal" person in Roth. . . does not
foreclose this holding. In regard to the prurient-appeal requirement, the concept of the "average" or "normal" person was
employed in Roth to serve the essentially negative purpose of
expressing our rejection of that aspect of the Hicklin test, Regina
v. Hicklin, [1868] L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, that made the impact on the
most susceptible person determinative. We adjust the prurientappeal requirement to social realities by permitting the appeal of
this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests
of its intended and probable recipient group; and since our holding
requires that the recipient group be defined with more specificity
than in terms of sexually immature persons, it also avoids the
inadequacy
of the most-susceptible-person facet of the Hicklin
731

test.

On this basis, the Court held that New York could proscribe the distribution
of books depicting deviant sexual practices, including fetishism, flagellation
and lesbianism. 74° As a result, the Court ruled that such materials are
permissible subjects of regulation.
Unfortunately, Justice White's citation to Mishkin in Ward raises
some problems. The Mishkin decision dealt only with the "prurient interest" test of Roth because the New York courts xead a similarly stringent test
into section 1141.741 Thus, there was some question as to the extent to which
2. In any manner, hires, employs, uses or permits any person to do or assist in
doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, or any of them, Is guilty of a
misdeameanor ...
739. 383 U.S. at 508-09.
740. Id. at 509-10.
741. See People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681,686,
216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 376-77 (1960), in which the court noted:

It [obscene material under section 1141] focuses predominantly upon what is sexually
morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre, without any artistic or scientific purpose or

justification. Recognizable "by the insult it offers invariably, to sex, and to the human
spirit". . . it is to be differentiated from the bawdy and the ribald. Depicting dirt for
dirt's sake, the obscene is the vile, rather than the coarse, the blow to sense, not

merely to sensibility. It smacks, at times, of fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness and represents, according to one thoughtful scholar, "a debauchery
of the sexual faculty."
Cf. People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 123, 192 N.E.2d 713,716, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1963) (section
1141 proscribes only "hard core pornography"). The trial court in Mishkin had noted that the

terms "sadistic" and "masochistic" are "synonymous with 'obscene.'" State v. Mishkin, 26
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Mishkin survived Miller and its tripartite definition of obscenity. The
Miller Court did state that as a result of the vagueness inherent in many
obscenity laws, it would "confine the permissible scope of such regulation
to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.' '742 One could argue that
representations of flagellation or torture that do not culmininate in the
performance of ultimate sexual acts do not depict "sexual conduct," but
rather depict only violence per se, albeit violence from which certain
individuals will derive prurient gratification. But this argument would seem
to be foreclosed by the Miller Court's citation to the Oregon and Hawaii
obscenity statutes. 743 The former included a provision defining proscribed
"sado-masochistic abuse" as "flagellation or torture by or upon a person
who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or
the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on
the part of one so clothed,"744 whereas the latter simply defined the same
term as "flagellation or torture by or upon a person as an act of sexual
745
stimulation or gratification."
Under Miller then, "sexual conduct" can include torture not culminating in an ultimate sexual act. Indeed, later in the same opinion, the Court
cited Mishkin's variable standard with respect to deviant groups without
criticizing that earlier holding. 746 Similarly, in Hamling v. United States,747
the Court, quoting Mishkin at length, upheld an instruction, which required
jurors to decide the issue of prurient interest by taking into account the
extent to which the materials in question appealed to the tastes of a deviant
group as well as to those of the average person. 74s But these references only
disclose a problem inherent in the Mishkin case: that decision referred only
to that aspect of the obscenity definition dealing with prurient appeal, and
later discussions by the Court were similarly restricted. This suggests that
the patent offensiveness component of that definition will still be judged by
reference to the attitudes of the average "normal" person, even in a case
involving materials directed to deviates. This sounds sensible; it would be
absurd to try to determine what will or will not offend the average member
of the recipient deviant group in such a case. Indeed, if such a determination
Misc. 2d 152, 154, 207 N.Y.S.2d 390, 393 (1960), aff'd, 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234 N.Y.S.2d 342
(1962), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 671,204 N.E.2d 209, 255 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1964), remittituramended, 15
N.Y.2d 724, 205 N.E.2d 201, 256 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1965).

742. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
743. Id. at n.6.

744. OR. REv. STAT. § 167.060(9) (1977).
745. HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1210(9) (1976).
746. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973).
747. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).

748. Id.at 128-29.
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were to be made, it would militate against the point raised by the petitioner
in Ward. If the instances of hard core pornography given in Miller only
exemplified what the average "normal" person considered patently offensive, one would have to posit a set of unmentioned, alternative types of
conduct that would offend the average fetishist, the average sadist, the
average masochist and so on. As a result, the Miller examples would by
definition be .underinclusive and inherently subject to supplementation,
depending upon the circumstances of each prosecution. But such an assertion assumes that Miller made the task of the trier of fact in all obscenity
cases involving deviant materials well-nigh impossible. It assumes that the
variable standard of Mishkin will encompass those elements of the Miller
test, prurient interest and patent offensiveness, that are innately subjective in
nature. Certainly, Mishkin did not mandate such an interpretation; it specifically limited its discussion to the prurient interest test. 74 9 By utilizing
Mishkin to rebut a point made regarding the patent offensiveness element of
the Miller criteria, however, Ward creates unnecessary problems in determining how Mishkin is to be applied after Miller.
(3) Obscenity Vel Non
After conducting a presumably independent review of the record and
the materials in question on this issue, the Court found no reason to differ
with the determination of the Illinois courts that those materials were
obscene. In so doing, however, it seemed to acknowledge that Ward is a
Mishkin-type case, wherein the prurient interest aspect of the tripartite
Miller test would have to be measured according to the sensibilities of the
average member of the deviant group. 750 Clearly, sado-masochism is a
legitimate category of deviance. But in order to show appeal to the prurient
interest of the individuals falling within that category, the state should
present expert psychiatric or other testimony on this issue. Certainly, the
trial judge in Ward could not be expected to know independently whether
sadists and masochists found prurient appeal in the publications in question.
749. Indeed, in the other leading case involving variable obscene materials directed to a

specified group, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Court upheld a state law that
incorporated a modified version of the tripartite test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.

413 (1966). See note 23 and accompanying text supra. That law, which was intended to regulate
the dissemination of sexually-oriented materials to minors, proscribed the distribution of
materials that (a) predominantly appeal to the prurient interest of minors, (b) are patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for minors and (c) are utterly without redeeming social importance to minors.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1967). It is worth noting that even under
this modified standard, the test of patent offensiveness is measured not by the tastes of the

recipient group but by the criteria of the community as a whole.
750. See 431 U.S. at 773.
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Yet, as the intermediate state appellate court inthis case pointed out, the
only evidence presented by the state to establish violation of the statute were
the magazines themselves, unaccompanied by any kind of opinion testimony. 751 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court simply concluded that
"the average person applying contemporary community standards would
consider that, taken as a whole, the sole appeal of the two publications is to
the prurient interest and that' the dominant theme of the magazines is a
' 752
morbid interest in nudity and sex.
If, as 'Justice White contends, the obscenity vel non of these materials
was foreclosed by the decision in Mishkin, it can be. argued that the Illinois
courts failed to apply some of the corollaries flowing from the holding in
that case. One corollary would seem to be that the state must demonstrate by
some relevant testimony that the publications Bizarre World and Illustrated
Case Histories, A Study in Sado-Masochism in fact appealed to the prurient
interest of the average member of the probably deviant recipient group,
something it failed to do in Ward. Indeed, the Court in Mishkin pointed to
the testimony of the authors as to how the books involved therein were
conceived and marketed, as well as to the publisher's explicit reliance on
sourcebooks of deviant behavior in order to determine how to merchandise
his product. 753 Nevertheless, despite this express reliance, the issue of the
necessary evidence to show prurient appeal to deviant groups has engendered considerable controversy and a wide spectrum of opinions on the part
of lower federal courts, both before and after Mishkin.
One extreme is represented by the Second Circuit's opinion in United
States v. Klaw.75 4 In that case, the materials in question were bondage
magazines; as in Ward, there was no evidence introduced into the trial
record to suggest whether the materials in question appealed to members of
the intended recipient deviant group, 755 assuming there was such a group.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, stating:
The state of the record gave the jurors impermissibly broad
freedom to convict just because, having no more informative
evidence than the material itself, they might think that the average
person would "recognize" that the material has prurient appeal.
But again, to whom? In this case the jury had insufficient evidence even to "recognize" that the material appealed to the prurient interest of the average person. It had absolutely no evidentiary basis from which to "recognize" any appeal to the prurient
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.

People v. Ward, 25 Il.App. 3d 1045, 1046, 324 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1975).
People v. Ward, 63 Ill.
2d 437, 442, 349 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1976).
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509-10 (1966).
350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965).
Id. at 166.
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interest of the deviate
75 6 or the typical recipient-a class never
defined in the record.
An opposite extreme is represented by the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Wild. 757 The materials in question in that case consisted of
photographic slides depicting nude males masturbating themselves or fellating each other. The court of appeals noted that no expert testimony on the
issue of prurient appeal was necessary, because this was "hard core pornography" that spoke for itself.75 8 The opinions in other cases tend to take a
middle road on this issue. In United States v. Ewing,75 9 the Tenth Circuit
was confronted with a prosecution for the distribution of various books such
as Madame Sado Meets Mrs. Meso, Torture Bare-Bottom, Degraded in
Bondage and Whipping Lez. It distinguished Klaw by pointing out that:
Both the class of recipients and the nature of its prurient interests
were well defined by expert testimony. A professional psychiatrist
examined the exhibits, described the groups to whom various
exhibits would hold some appeal, and testified that the dominant
theme of the exhibits when taken as a whole appealed to the
prurient interest in sex of the sado-masochist type.',"
Similarly, in United States v. 56 Cartons Containing 19,500 Copies of a
Magazine Entitled "Hellenic Sun, ",761 the Fourth Circuit found sufficient
evidence as to the prurient appeal of a magazine consisting almost entirely
of photographs of nude adolescent males. It pointed to expert testimony by a
psychiatrist that the magazine would appeal to pedophiles and male
homosexuals, and to the fact that the distributors' brochures indicated that
the intended purchasers would, in fact, be male homosexuals. 762 On the
other hand, when confronted with a prosecution for publications depicting
the conduct of lesbians and male homosexuals, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Manarite763 stated that the prurient interest test would be satisfied
merely by a showing that the "probable recipient group" consisted of
deviates. Such a showing was said to be made whenever the material in
question is obviously "designed for a clearly defined deviant sexual
group.' ,764
756. Id. at 167-68.
757. 422 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971).
758. 422 F.2d at 36. Accord, Young v. United States, 465 F.2d. 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1972).
759. 445 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated on othergrounds, 413 U.S. 913 (1973).
760. 445 F.2d at 948 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d 1155,
1158-59 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1973),
aff'd, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).

761. 373 F.2d 635 (4th Cir.), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Potomac News Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967).
762. 373 F.2d at 640.

763. 448 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 947 (1971).
764. 448 F.2d at 592. Of course, it is permissible to instruct the jury that a given publication
is aimed at both deviates and "normal" persons, if in fact there are discrete recipient groups.
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The facts in Ward most resemble those of Klaw and Wild. Not only
was there no identification in the record of the deviant group who
constituted the intended recipients of the materials in question, but no
evidence was adduced as to whether those materials appealed to that group.
These omissions create significant problems to the extent that Ward 'is
viewed as a Mishkin-type case. It is not surprising that the Illinois appellate
courts ignored these problems; neither of them even cited Mishkin. But the
Supreme Court did so. Not only did it cite that earlier decision, but it also
asserted that Mishkin apparently applied in the instant case. In spite of this
assertion, the Court found no reversible error in the determination of
obscenity made by the lower courts in Ward. This suggests that the Supreme Court tacitly adopted the rule of Wild that on the issue of prurient
interest, hard core pornography speaks for itself, even when the prurient
interest in question is that of a deviant group. 765 If this assessment is
accurate, the Court undermined Mishkin in Ward. Mishkin required a
specific definition of the intended recipient, and based its holding on a
review of voluminous evidence concerning the intentions of the publisher.
In so doing, the Court made the point that all this evidence distinguished
Mishkin from the Klaw case. 766 Ward, however, appears to hold that a
specific definition is no longer required and that judicial presumptions can
now serve as a substitute for opinion testimony.
Ward goes beyond this point as well. As noted earlier, the Illinois
Supreme Court phrased the prurient interest consideration solely in terms of
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 129-30 (1974); United States v. Pinkus, 551 F.2d
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1977). It is also apparent that to the extent that a judge frames an instruction
based on appeal to a deviant group, he must frame the prurient appeal requirement to the typical
constituent of that group. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,509 (1966); United States v.
Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975).

765. This development is somewhat surprising. In Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 56 n.6 (1973), the Court said:
This [proof of obscenity] is not a subject that lends itself to the traditional use of
expert testimony. Such testimony is usually admitted for-the purpose of explaining to
lay jurors what they otherwise could not understand. .

.

. No such assistance is

needed by jurors in obscenity cases; indeed the "expert witness" practices employed
in these cases have often made a mockery out of the otherwise sound concept of
expert testimony ....
"Simply stated, hard core pornography can and does speak for
itself." UnitedStates v. Wild, 422 F.2d 34, 36 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986
(1971). We reserve judgment, however, on the extreme case, not presented here,
where contested materials are directed at such a bizarre deviant group that the
experience of the trier of fact would be plainly inadequate to judge whether the

material appeals to the prurient interest. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 50810, 86 S. Ct. 958, 963-64, 16 L.Ed. 2d 56 (1966); United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155,
167-68 (CA2 1965).

Thus, as late as 1973, it appeared as if the Supreme Court might still follow Kiaw.
766. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966).
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what the average person believed.7 67 Again, this is not surprising, because
that court perceived no Mishkin issue. 768 But, again, the same cannot be
said for the United States Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it approved the
action of the lower state tribunal. Yet, if this is a Mishkin-type case, the
prurient interest test should have been analyzed in light of the appeal to
typical members of the deviant recipient group, not in light of the appeal to
the average "normal" person. Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court
would have appeared to commit reversible error. By failing to find such
error, Justice White raises a significant issue about the current viability of
the Mishkin doctrine. Certainly, what was done in Ward conflicts squarely
with the teachings of the Court's 1966 decision, which the majority stated
"foreclosed" all points raised by the petitioner on the issue of obscenity vel
non in the instant case. Yet neither the majority nor the dissenters noticed
this problem. Thus, Ward's discussion of Mishkin raises far more questions
than it answers.
(4)

The Specificity Requirement of Miller
According to Justice White, the issue of specificity presented no
problem because the Illinois Supreme Court had cured that deficiency in the
769
state obscenity statute by means of its authoritative judicial constructions.
In order to analyze this assertion, it is necessary to consider in detail those
cases in which that state court discussed Miller.
The first of these decisions is People v. Ridens,770 decided in 1974.
There, the state court quoted the tripartite standard of Memoirs v. Massachusetts,771 then said:
We need not and do not attempt to analyze the changes from the
three-part Roth-Memoirs standard effected by the enunciation of
the three-part Miller standard. It suffices to, and we now construe
section 11-20 of the Criminal Code
772 . . . to incorporate parts (a)
and (b) of the Miller standards.
From the context of the quotation, it would appear that the court was
referring solely to part (b) of the Miller test and not to the examples given to
explicate that part. But this construction is not the only possible one; earlier
in the opinion in Ridens, the court had quoted Miller at length, including
767. People v. Ward, 63 Il. 2d 437, 442, 349 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1976).
768. But what is surprising is that the state courts failed to give effect to the variable

obscenity standard set forth in § 11-20(c), which permits the adjustment of the definition of
obscenity to the interests of the probable recipient group. See note 670 supra.
769. See 431 U.S. at 774.
770. 59 Il. 2d 362, 321 N.E.2d 264 (1974).

771. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
772. 59 Ill. 2d at 373, 321 N.E.2d at 270.
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both the language of the tripartite test and the explanatory examples. 773 One
could argue that by incorporating part (b) of that test into section 11-20, it
also meant to include the sample "hard core" depictions provided by the
United States Supreme Court.
In People v. Gould,774 decided in 1975, the Illinois court once again
quoted Miller at length, both as to its three-part test and as to the examples
for part (b).775 It then characterized its decision in Ridens as follows:
We construed our statute to incorporate parts of guidelines (a) and
(b) of the Miller standards (which are set out in the above quotation from Miller) and stated that under our statute the third question or guideline which must be considered in determining whether
the matter or work is obscene is whether it is "utterly without
redeeming social value." We explained that the more restrictive
guideline (c), or part (c), of the Miller.standard, i.e., whether "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or
76
social value" cannot be used.
Here, too, there is no direct indication that the court is reading the Miller
examples into section 11-20. But, unlike Ridens, the court in Gould said of
the materials in question, "[e]ach magazine taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest and depicts offensive conduct, including lewd exhibitions of
the genitals. ' ' 777 The emphasized phrase is a direct quotation from.the
second of the two Miller examples, 778 and thus does provide evidence that
the Illinois court incorporated them sub silentio.779 The opinion of the state
supreme court in the Ward case itself undermines this construction, however. There it was stated:
The defendant argues that we erred in Ridens. . .in our interpretation of Miller and that Miller requires obscenity statutes to be
much more specific in defining the type of material which will be
considered obscene. We see no reason to reconsider our decision
in Ridens . . .It is extremely difficult to define the term "obscenity" with a fine degree of precision. We again express our opinion
that Illinois' statutory definition
is sufficiently clear to withstand
7°
constitutional objections. 8
The import of this language is that the state court never attempted to define
"obscenity" with any great degree of precision, but instead merely ex773. Id. at 366-67, 321 N.E.2d at 266.
774. 60 Ill.
2d 159, 324 N.E.2d 412 (1975).
775. Id. at 163-64, 324 N.E.2d at 414-15.

776. Id. at 164, 324 N.E.2d at 415.
777. Id. at 165, 324 N.E.2d at 415 (emphasis added).
778. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
779. After Gould, the state supreme court also decided People v. Hume, Inc., 60 Ill.
2d 397,
327 N.E.2d 329 (1975). It quoted its holding in Ridens, but offered no further substantive
discussion on the issue of specificity. Id. at 399, 327 N.E.2d at 331.
780. People v. Ward, 63 Ill.
2d 437, 442, 349 N.E.2d 47, 49 (1976).
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pressed the "opinion" that section 11-20 was constitutional. In summary,
then, Ridens was susceptible to two varying interpretations: either that the
Illinois court had incorporated only the language of part (b) of the Miller
test into the state statute, or that it had incorporated both part (b) and the
United States Supreme Court's descriptions of depictions exemplifying that
part's strictures. Language in Gould seemed to favor the latter interpretation. But language in the state supreme court's decision in Ward seemed to
imply that the court had yet to even attempt to define "obscenity" with any
measure of specificity. Thus, what Justice White terms a "needlessly
technical and wholly unwarranted" reading of Ridens and Gould may well
be compelled by the Illinois Supreme Court's statement in Ward itself, a
statement that he pointedly ignored.
One might well ask whether the state statute would then be unconstitutionally vague, assuming that the state courts incorporated part (b) of the
Miller test but not the examples illustrating that part into section 11-20. A
three-judge district court in Eagle Books, Inc. v. Reinhard"1 convincingly
answered this question in the affirmative:
An incorporation of the Miller tripartite standard cannot
alone satisfy Miller's specificity requirement. Miller explicitly
reserved for the states the specification itself. Not every state will
seek to regulate all, or even the same subset of that material which
can be constitutionally treated as obscene. Indeed, the Supreme
Court of the United States expressly avoided demanding the use
of its particular examples as a standard or proposed regulatory
scheme. Ridens . . . might have explicitly included the Miller
examples as its own, by construction, as did the Supreme Court in
Hamling [v. United States], but Ridens . . . did not. It remained
after Ridens . . . for section 11-20 to be amended either legislatively or by state judicial construction to supply the wanting
specificity so that the nature of the possible obscene materials
being regulated, and their distinction from protected materials,
could be adequately defined. That definition is as essential to law
enforcement officials who are chargedwith carryingout the law, as
it is to juries like the one782in Jenkins [v. Georgia],who must apply
the law to a set of facts.
In support of this proposition, the three-judge district court cited the statute
involved in Miller v. California,783 which was extremely similar to section
781.

418 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. Ill. 1976), vacated and remanded, 432 U.S. 902 (1977).

782. 418 F. Supp. at 349-50 (emphasis in original). At least one other federal district court
before Ward had concluded, however, that Ridens did provide the Illinois statute with sufficient specificity. United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 400 F. Supp. 353,
355 (N.D. Ill. 1975). Accord, Weissbaun v. Harmon, 439 F. Supp. 873, $80 (N.D. IIl. 1977);
People v. Glass, 41 Ill. App. 3d 43, 52, 353 N.E.2d 214, 221 (1976).

783. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The statute is CAL. PENAL CODE §.311(a) (West 1970) (amended
1978). See note 36 supra.
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11-20 of the Illinois Criminal Code. It reasoned that if the former statute had

784
to be construed in light of the Miller examples, then so should the latter.
The United States Supreme Court in Ward did not dispute that proposition.
It admitted that had the Illinois Supreme Court failed to incorporate the
Miller examples into section 11-20, its omission would have created a
"fatal flaw" in the statute. 785 Thus, the majority in Ward simply disagreed
with Reinhard'sinterpretation of what the Illinois Supreme Court had done
in Ridens and Gould.
Because the majority in Ward assumed that the Illinois court had
incorporated the Miller examples, and thus differentiated among the kinds
of sexual conduct the depiction of which could be subject to regulation, it
was able to dismiss an overbreadth challenge quite cursorily. In Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville,786 the Court struck down as overbroad a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the showing of any motion picture depicting bare
buttocks, breasts or pubic areas, if such a film was visible from any public
street or thoroughfare. The Court stated:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively
to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that
they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly

limits its power. .

.

.Such selective restrictions have been up-

held only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical
for the unwil77
ling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. 8
Thus, nonobscene speech is surrounded by constitutional protections against
governmental interference and, in light of Erznoznik and Miller, "[t]here
may not be any room.

. .

for suppression of anything other than hard-core

pornography, regardless of context.' '788 Since Erznoznik prohibits regulation of speech solely on the basis of content, any overbreadth claim in the
obscenity area must be rebutted by a showing that the law in question
distinguishes carefully and explicitly between obscene and nonobscene
representations of sexual conduct. 7 9 Ward eases the state's task in making
784.
785.
786.
787.

418
431
422
Id.

F. Supp. at 350.
U.S. at 775.
U.S. 205 (1975).
at 209 (citations omitted). But cf. Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427

U.S. 50, 69-70 (1976) (suggesting that the state may accord speech differential treatment based
on the content of that speech). For a discussion of Young's effect on Erznoznik, see notes 410413 and accompanying text supra.
788. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 94. But see Schauer, The Return of Variable Obscenity?,28
HASTINGS L. J.1275, 1286 (1977).

789. It is not entirely clear that the holding in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976), erodes Erznoznik's overbreadth analysis. The Court in Erznoznik noted that
none of the alleged justifications for the Jacksonville ordinance i.e., that it protected the
privacy of citizens, that it was an implementation of the state's police power to protect children,
that it constituted a traffic regulation, had any merit. See 422 U.S. at 208-17. In contrast, the
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such a rebuttal, because the majority in that case evinces a willingness to
ascertain such a distinction not only in the explicit language of the statute

itself or in an authoritative judicial construction of it, but also in the
presumption that the state court making such a construction of an obscenity

law would not create a fatal flaw in its own decision and so must have drawn
the distinction sub silentio between obscene and nonobscene depictions of
sex and nudity. 7" If presumptions about what a state court meant to do are
now to serve as surrogates for an explicit holding by such a court, overbreadth challenges to any but the most loosely-drafted obscenity laws may
well have become a thing of the past.
Even if one assumes the majority in Ward is right about the Illinois
Supreme Court's intent to incorporate the Miller examples into section 1120, one must then confront the question raised by Justice Stevens in his
dissent: is that tactic sufficient to preclude a vagueness challenge? The
problem of vagueness in obscenity cases is tied into the specificity requirement in Miller; the latter remedy was intended to cure the former disease.
While the majority in Ward acknowledged this crucial aspect of the Miller
holding, 79 1 it virtually ignored a corollary to that holding emphasized by
Justice Stevens. The specificity requirement, if it is to have any significance

at all, must provide a potential defendant with fair notice of the types of
depictions the distribution of which will create criminal liability. Thus, the

Court in Miller said:
Court found that the Detroit zoning ordinance at issue in Young did have a legitimate purpose in
that it was directed at ameliorating the problem of the deterioration of neighborhoods and urban
crime. 427 U.S. at 71 & n.34. So the cases are ostensibly distinguishable. Moreover, Erznoznik's overbreadth analysis appears to state accurately the relevant doctrines. The Court cited
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973), to the effect that the challenged statute's
deterrence of speech must be real and substantial. 422 U.S. at 216. It then noted that the
possibility of a limiting construction would be "remote," especially in light of the precise terms
of the municipal regulation. Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded, "[i]n these circumstances,
particularly where as here appellee offers several distinct justifications for the ordinance in its
broadest terms, there is no reason to assume that the ordinance can or will be decisively
narrowed." Id. at 217. In Young, the Court appeared to follow this general level of analysis,
although it arrived at a different result. It noted that the only possibly overbroad portion of the
Detroit zoning ordinance was that under the regulation, an "adult theater" was defined as one
"distinguished or characterized by an emphasis" on sexually-oriented material. DETRorr,
MICH., OmCIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 32.0007 (1972). But it noted that any doubt
on this issue could be settled by a state court construction narrowing the coverage of the
ordinance. 427 U.S. at 60. The overbreadth doctrine of Erznoznik thus appears to have
survived Young.
790. In this respect, the Court in Ward merely did what the Court in Erznoznik declined to
do, make an assumption that the challenged law could be and was construed in a restrictive,
constitutional manner. See note 789 supra.
791. See 431 U.S. at 774.
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Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject
to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless
these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core"
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as
written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials792that his
public and commercial activities may bring prosecution.
In light of this passage, one may well ask, is the recognition of "the
limitations on the kinds of sexual conduct which may not be represented or
depicted" under a state obscenity law equivalent to a specific definition for
the purposes of fulfilling the fair notice prerequisite? If so, does such a
recognition "give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed and mark
'.. . boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the law?' ,79
The majority in Ward assumed that judicial incorporation of the Miller
examples into the obscenity law in question provided that law with sufficient
specificity for purposes of fair notice. One can very well argue a contrary
position, as Justice Stevens does. While incorporation of the Miller examples may define specifically some proscribed conduct the depiction of which
is patently offensive, such an incorporation, without more, does not limit
the potential reach of the statute being construed to fall only within those
examples. As a result, some activities that do not fall within the literal
meaning of the exemplifications of hard core pornography offered in Miller
can still be prosecuted. The majority in Ward argued that such an incorporation was equivalent to the Supreme Court's own post-Miller construction of
federal obscenity statutes and cited Hamling v. United States.7 4 But, as
Justice Stevens pointed out, Hamling appeared to limit expressly the generic
terms of one of those statutes to the types of depictions offered as examples
in Miller.795 As was observed earlier, however, there are intimations in
Hamling that, even in the context of federal laws, those examples were
never meant to be "exhaustive.' ' 796 Nevertheless, at least with respect to
section 1461 of Title eighteen of the United States Code, 797 the Court in
Hamling was able to say that, even before 1973, that statute had been
"authoritatively construed in a manner consistent with Miller."798 Thus,
the Court in Hamling could point to the following passage from Justice
792. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973).
793. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 7 (1947)).
794. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
795. Id. at 114.
796. Id. See notes 730-731 and accompanying text supra.

797. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). See note 8 supra.
798. 418 U.S. at 112.
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Harlan's opinion in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,7 " a 1962 decision
sustaining section 1461 against a vagueness challenge in a manner that
anticipated the "hard core pornography" limitation subsequently fashioned
by Miller:
The words of § 1461, "obscene, lewd, lascivious,indecent,
filthy or vile," connote something that is portrayed in a manner so
offensive as to make it unacceptable under current community
mores. While in common usage the words have different shades of
meaning, the statute since its inception has always been taken as
aimed at obnoxiously debasing portrayals of sex. Although the
statute condemns such material irrespective of the effect it may
have upon those into whose hands it falls, the early case of United
States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. 1093 [(S.D.N.Y. 1879)] (No.
14571), put a limiting gloss upon the statutory language: the statute
reaches only indecent material which, as now expressed in Roth
v. United States, [354 U.S. ' '8476, 489 (1957)], "taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. 00
The same argument cannot be made about the Illinois statute in Ward,
which was harmonized with Miller, if at all, by the Ridens and Gould
decisions, rendered in 1974 and 1975 respectively. While prior Illinois cases
had construed the reach of the statute, they had not upheld it against a
vagueness challenge in a manner similar to what was done by the Supreme
Court in the ManualEnterprisescase. Indeed, when the state supreme court
in Ridens came to consider a vagueness challenge to section 11-20, it could
not cite its own prior decisions construing that statute. Instead, it had to
argue from analogy, relying on its decision in People v. Raby, 80 1 which held
that the Illinois laws prohibiting public disorders 802 were not void for
vagueness. In so doing, the court in Ridens quoted the following passage
from Raby:
It is true that section 26-1(a) does not attempt to particularize
all of the myriad kinds of conduct that may fall within the statute.
The legislature deliberately chose to frame the provision in general
terms, prompted by the futility of an effort to anticipate and
enumerate all of the methods of disrupting public order that fertile
minds might devise. 80 3
As Justice Stevens noted caustically, "[t]his may be true for other vagueness attacks, but does not square with the special Miller requirement that
799. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
800. 370 U.S. at 482-84 (opinion of Harlan, J., joined by Clark, J.) (emphasis in original)
(footnotes omitted), quoted in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 112 (1974).
801. 40 Ill. 2d 392, 240 N.E.2d 595 (1968).

802. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 26-1(a), 31-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
803. 40 111. 2d at 396, 240 N.E.2d at 598, quoted in People v. Ridens, 59 Ill. 2d 362,372,321
N.E.2d 264, 269 (1974).
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conduct be specifically defined.' '804 Thus, the attempt by the majority in
Ward to analogize what the Illinois courts did in regard to section 11-20 of
that state's criminal code with what the Supreme Court did in regard to
federal obscenity laws collapses. The two situations simply are not comparable, and any attempt to compare them only engenders further confusion.
One is then left with the conclusion reached by Justice Stevens that there
does not appear to be anything in the Illinois decisions that would preclude
the state from prosecuting forms of obscenity not specifically defined by the
text of the applicable law itself or by prior judicial interpretation.
If what was done in Ward does not comport with Miller's assurance of
fair notice to dealers in potentially proscribed materials, what will? Justice
Stevens, unfortunately, never provides an answer. But that does not mean
that some answer could not be suggested. Indeed, the Court in Miller
profferred some useful guidelines. It cited "as examples of state laws
directed at depiction of defined physical conduct, as opposed to expression''805 the Oregon and Hawaii obscenity statutes. Both contain sections
defining specifically the terms that are thereafter used in the substantive
provisions proscribing sale or distribution of obscene materials. The Oregon
law has a section containing eleven definitions, including those of "nudity," "obscene performance," "obscenities," "sado-masochistic abuse,"
"sexual conduct" and "sexual excitement.'806 The relevant definition of
"sexual conduct" in the statute reads as follows:
"Sexual conduct" means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of
the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether
alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between
humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or
gratification. 8("
The Hawaii penal code has a section containing nine definitions;8 08 it is, on
the whole, less detailed that its Oregon counterpart, but it does provide a
fairly succinct summary of what is meant by the term "sexual conduct":
"Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, homosexuality,
lesbianism, bestiality, sexual intercourse or physical contact with
a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or
the breast or breasts of a female for9 the purpose of sexual stimulation, gratification, or perversion 8
804. 431 U.S. at 780 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
1i.)
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 n.6 (1973).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 167.060(5), (6), (9), (10), (11) (1977).
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.060(10) (1977).
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 712-1210(1)-(9) (1976).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1210(7) (1976).
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When compared with the Miller examples,8 10 these statutory definitions would seem to provide a needed specificity. Miller's reference to
"ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted" is somewhat nebulous and
could encompass a wide range of conduct. The Oregon and Hawaii statutes
erase a good deal of that nebulousness by naming explicitly the prohibitable
conduct. In contrast, section 11-20, as written, is thoroughly obscure, with
its arcane references to a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex and
excretion." 8 11 And the Illinois Supreme Court in the Ward case seemed
clearly hesitant to do what the Hawaii and Oregon legislatures had done,
that is, to define hard core pornography with some precision. While it is true
that the Court in Miller, in citing these statutes, did "not wish to be
understood as approving of them in all other respects nor as establishing
their limits as the extent of state power,' '812 it did apparently intend to cite
these laws as guidelines for the type of specificity that it deemed necessary.
This type of specificity was nowhere present in Ward, so it is accurate to
say that this case apparently relaxes the stringent implications of Miller.
At this juncture, one could simply observe that while it is all very well
to have legislatures draft detailed definitions, courts of law cannot be
expected to do so. Indeed, Miller made this point when the majority said,
"[w]e emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes
for the states. That must await their concrete legislative efforts." 813 Consequently, a number of courts have refused judicially to cure the vagueness
inherent in state obscenity laws, preferring instead to leave that task to the
legislatures. 814 Others have simply incorporated the Miller examples verbatim into the challenged statute, 815 whereas still others have sustained
obscenity laws by concluding that previous judicial constructions had already provided the specificity now mandated by Miller.s16 A few courts,
810. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,25 (1973). See note 37 and accompanying text supra.

811. See note 670. and accompanying text supra.
812. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 n.6 (1973).
813. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Some legislatures have responded to Miller by providing
more exact obscenity statutes. See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE. § 1364(2) (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE §
18-4105 (Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106 (1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00
(McKinney 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(c) (Supp. 1975). Where the Miller examples are

incorporated into the text of the law itself, the requisite specificity has been held to exist.
DeSalvo v. Codd, 386 F. Supp. 1293, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
814. See, e.g., People v. Tabron, - Colo. -,-,
544 P.2d 372,379 (1976); Stroud v. State,
261 Ind. 58, 60, 300 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1973); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652,656-57 (Iowa

1973); State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So. 2d 464, 470 (La. 1974); Commonwealth
v. Horton, 365 Mass. 164, 171-72, 310 N.E.2d 316, 322 (1974); ABC Interstate Theaters, Inc. v.
State, 325 So. 2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1976); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 452, 347
A.2d 290, 299 (1975); Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State, 510 S.W.2d 258, 260-61 (Tenn. 1974).

815. See cases cited note 736 supra.
816. See, e.g., People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 908-09, 109 Cal. Rptr. 433, 438-39
(1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 937 (1974); Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351, 355-56 (Fla. 1973);
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however, like those of Illinois, "have done little more than pay lip service to
the specificity requirement in Miller." 817 For example, in B & A Co. v.
State, 818 a Maryland appellate court upheld an obscenity law which had
been construed to permit state tribunals to apply whatever definition of the
819
term "obscene" was established by the United States Supreme Court.
The court of appeals remarked airily, "[w]hile a more specific statutory
definition may have been preferred by the Miller Court, it was not mandated. "820 In State v. Little Art Corp. ,821 the statute in question prohibited
dissemination of "obscene, lewd, indecent, or lascivious materials";822 the
standard for applying those adjectives was defined as one of dominant
appeal to a prurient interest, and "prurient" itself was explained as "tending to excite lasciviousness.' '8 Confronted with this model of circular
reasoning, the Nebraska Supreme Court nevertheless found it well within
the strictures of Miller.824 A similar result was reached by an Ohio appellate
8 5 which upheld a law826
court in State ex rel. Keating v. "Vixen",
prohibiting the display of a motion picture depicting sexual intercourse in
such a way that the "cumulative effect" of the film would consist of a
tendency to appeal to prurient interest, without more. 827 Prior to Ward, one
might have assumed that these decisions were simply irresponsible; after
that case, however, it may well be that such irreverent treatment of Miller's
specificity requirement will not constitute reversible error.
Certainly, few courts have attempted to incorporate detailed and exhaustive definitions of hard core pornography into challenged obscenity
laws. It can be done, however, and a good example is provided by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in State v. Harding.828 There it was
said:
Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 728, 199 S.E.2d 183, 184-85 (1973), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Hall v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 166, 168

(Ky. 1974); State ex rel. Wampler v. Bird, 499 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. 1973); People v. Heller, 33
N.Y.2d 314, 327, 307 N.E.2d 805, 814, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 613 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Heller v.
New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973); Price v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 490, 493-94, 201 S.E.2d 798,
800-01 (1974).
817. SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 167.
818. 24 Md. App. 367, 330 A.2d 701 (1975).
819. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 418 (1976).
820. 24 Md. App. at 372, 330 A.2d at 704.
821. 191 Neb. 448, 215 N.W.2d 853 (1974).
822. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-921 (1974) (repealed 1974).
823. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-926.07 (1974) (repealed 1974).
824. 191 Neb. at 452, 215 N.W.2d at 856.
825. 35 Ohio St. 2d 215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973).
826. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2905-34, 2905-35 (Page 1953), superseded by OHIO REV.
CODE § 2907.01 (Page 1975).
827. 35 Ohio St. 2d at 219, 301 N.E.2d at 882.
828. 114 N.H. 335, 320 A.2d 646 (1974).
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While it is possible to give some meaningful content to these
words ["nudity," "excretion"], the crucial word "sex" and the
related phrase "sexual conduct" cannot be so easily packaged.
These words are loosely used in contemporary vernacular to describe conduct ranging from actual intercourse to nonphysical
interpersonal relations, such as a seductive smile or the use of an
alluring perfume. In attempting to tailor their meaning to the
context of the obscenity statute, it is important to bear in mind
that the Miller Court expressly stated that prosecutions will be
limited to representation or depictions of "patently offensive
'hard core' sexual conduct."

. The Court gave two examples

.

of the type of activity falling within this phrase: (1) "Patently
offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated" and; (2) "Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory
functions, and lewd exhibitions of the genitals.". . . It is true that
the qualifying phrases "patently offensive" and "lewd" do not
precisely describe the activities banned by such examples ...
Nevertheless, the thrust of the opinion is addressed to graphic
representations or descriptions of (1) all forms of actual or
simulated intercourse between humans or humans and animals in
which the genitalis [sic] of one party is inserted into an orifice of
another; (2) oral contact with the genitalia or manual contact with
genitalia in a turgid state; (3) the insertion of any instrument or
other device into the genital or anal passage in the course of
activity designed to arouse or excite the genitalia; (4) the use of
instruments or other devices by one party to inflict pain on
another in the course of activity designed to arouse or excite the
genitalia; or (5) the use of excrement or excretory functions in the
course of activity designed to arouse or excite the genitalia; or (6)
the genitalia in a turgid state. .

.

. In our view these enumerated

categories are sufficiently concrete to describe patently offensive
"sex" or "sexual conduct" and to provide fair warning under
Miller as to the scope of RSA 571-A:1 (Supp. 1972).829
Harding offers no panacea in this area; one can argue that its six criteria
may still exclude types of sexual conduct, such as fetishism, necrophilia,
voyeurism or analingus, the depiction of which ought properly to be regulated. But Hardingexemplifies what courts can do to meet the specificity
requirement of Miller, and its detailed analysis only underscores what was
missing in Ward: a list of depictions sufficiently precise and so fixed that an
829. Id. at 341-42, 320 A.2d at 651 (citations omitted). The statute in question says material
is obscene
if (a) considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a
shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and (b) it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters, and (c)
it is utterly without redeeming social importance. Predominant appeal shall be judged
with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material
or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially
susceptible audience.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 650:1 (1974).
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individual has fair notice of what types of materials will be subject to
subsequent regulation by the state.
The Supreme Court in Ward does not require Harding's level of
specificity and, as a result, it is undermining the very concept of fair notice
that it deemed necessary in Miller. Consequently, as Justice Stevens observed, the cornerstone of the Miller test is quietly being abandoned by the
30
five Justices responsible for formulating that test in the first place.8
Because he feels such an abandonment presages the "ultimate downfall" of
Miller, Justice Stevens characterized the majority opinion in Ward as a
"mixed blessing.''831 On reflection, however, one cannot be so sanguine
about what is happening. The Court during this term has indicated clearly
that Miller is still vital, controlling law and will presumably remain so for
the foreseeable future. But by eviscerating that decision's specificity requirement in Ward, and by sharply limiting the scope of independent
appellate review in Smith v. United States,832 the five Justices responsible
for Miller have effectively managed to adulterate the principles upon which
that earlier decision was said to rest without at the same time overruling it.
The net result is that after these most recent decisions, the Miller ruling may
now have a far different significance than it seemed to have when it was first
promulgated in 1973. In light of the many difficulties raised by the Miller
ruling as originally constituted, one can safely predict that the reformulation
of Miller effected by Smith and Ward can only increase those difficulties
exponentially.
830. 431 U.S. at 777 (Stevens, J.,dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart and Marshall,
JJ.).

831. Id. at 782.
832. 431 U.S. 291 (1977). See notes 417-666 and accompanying text supra.
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Speech

Silence as ProtectedSpeech: The New ConstitutionalDoctrine of
Wooley v. Maynard
Perhaps the most far-reaching speech case decided by the Court during
its 1976-1977 term was that of Wooley v. Maynard.1 In this ruling, the
Court heralded a number of important developments. First, it announced a
new, and to some extent unprecedented, exception to the principles of
equitable restraint set forth in Younger v. Harris.2Second, it suggested new
substantive limitations on the doctrine of symbolic speech utilized in a
number of previous Supreme Court cases. 3 Third, and most importantly, the
Court created a new constitutional right of silence that may have wide
ramifications in future cases.
1.

a.

The Decision

Section 262:27-c of the New Hampshire revised statutes makes it a
criminal offense knowingly to obscure "the figures or letters" on license
plates attached to any motor vehicle. 4 In 1972, the state's supreme court
construed the term "letters" used in the statute to include the state motto
printed on license registration plates. 5 Between 1957 and 1970, all plates
issued by the state simply bore the legend "Scenic New Hampshire.''6 In
1969, however, legislation was enacted requiring noncommercial registration plates to bear the state motto "Live Free or Die." 7 Plates embossed
1. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
2. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a detailed description of this case, see note 20 infra.
3. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (exhibition of an
American flag with a peace symbol attached to it is a permissible communication of pacifistic
sentiments); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-14 (1969) (wearing of black
armbands conveyed a constitutionally-safeguarded message about the war in Vietnam); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-82 (1968) (assuming the burning of one's draft card is
symbolic speech, it was held that the government's interest in prohibiting that form of
communication prevailed); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (found the display
of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government to be constitutionally protected
expression). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 79-86 (1970);

Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in irst
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1091 (1968).
4. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262:27-c (Supp. 1975).

5. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 334, 295 A.2d 454, 456 (1972).
6. Id. at 333, 295 A.2d at 455.
7. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (Supp. 1975). Display of the license plates so embossed
is required by the same statute. The motto is derived from the words of Major General John
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with that motto began to be issued in 1971.8
George Maynard and his wife Maxine were both practicing Jehovah's
Witnesses. Each of them deemed the motto of New Hampshire repugnant
not only to their religious convictions, but also to their political philosophy. 9
As a consequence, they found it objectionable to disseminate the message
conveyed in that motto by displaying it on either of the two automobiles they
owned. Therefore, in March or April of 1974, George Maynard began
tampering with the registration plates issued to him. He initially snipped the
words "or Die" from his plates and concealed both the resultant hole and
the words "Live Free" with red reflective tape. On subsequent occasions,
10
he simply taped over the entire motto.
Because of these actions, Maynard was subjected to three criminal
prosecutions within a period of two months. His first citation for violating
section 262:27-c was issued on November 27, 1974. Maynard, appearing
pro se, entered a plea of not guilty in a district court in Lebanon, New
Hampshire and proceeded to justify his conduct on the basis of his religious
beliefs. The trial judge, deeming himself bound by a 1972 decision of
the New Hampshire Supreme Court upholding the validity of section
262:27-c, 1 ' imposed a twenty-five dollar fine, which he then suspended
during the continuance of the defendant's "good behavior." On December
28, 1974, a second citation was issued to Maynard. He was again found
guilty, and was fined fifty dollars and sentenced to six months in jail. The
penalty of incarceration was suspended, but Maynard was required to remit
the twenty-five dollar fine previously assessed against him. When he inStark, reputed to have been written in 1809 as part of a toast in a letter to a former comrade-atarms: "Live Free or Die; death is not the worst of evils." W. MOORE, A LIFE OF GENERAL JOHN
STARK OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 500 (1949).
8. See Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1383 n.1 (D.N.H. 1976).
The Supreme Court noted that categories of vehicles not required to bear license plates
embossed with the motto in question are numerous. They include "trailers, agricultural vehicles, car dealers, antique automobiles, the Governor of New Hampshire, its Congressional
Representatives, its Attorney General, Justices of the State Supreme Court, veterans, chaplains
of the State Legislature, sheriffs, and others." 430 U.S. at 707 n.I.
9. In an affidavit, Maynard claimed
[B]y religious training and belief, I believe my "government"-Jehovah's Kingdomoffers everlasting life. It would be contrary to that belief to give up my life for the
state, even if it meant living in bondage. Although I obey all laws of the State not in
conflict with my conscience, this slogan is directly at odds with my deeply held

religious convictions.
I also disagree with the motto on political grounds. I believe life is'more
precious than freedom.
430 U.S. at 707 n.2. Maxine Maynard testified that she shared her husband's views. Maynard v.
Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1383 n.3 (D.N.H. 1976).
10. 430 U.S. at 708 n.4; Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1976).
11. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972).
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formed the court that he could not, as a matter of conscience, comply with
this requirement he was sentenced to and served fifteen days in jail. Prior to
trial on the second offense, a third citation was issued to Maynard on
January 3, 1975. He appeared to answer this complaint on the same day as

for the second offense, and was again adjudged guilty; this third conviction
was "continued for sentencing" so that Maynard received no punishment in
addition to the fifteen days of confinement previously imposed against

him.

12

On March 4, 1975, both Maynard and his wife brought an action in
federal district court pursuant to section 1983 of Title forty-two of the

United States Code.13 They sought both an injunction against future criminal
prosecutions for violation of section 262:27-c and an injunction decreeing
that in future years they be issued license plates not embossed with the
state's motto. 14 Declaratory relief was also requested.1 5 A three-judge district court 6 ruled that Maynard had engaged in symbolic speech fully
protected by the First Amendment; 17 it therefore enjoined'the state from
making any further attempts to arrest and try him for violating section
8
262:27-c.1
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In his opinion

for the majority, 19 Chief Justice Burger began by noting that the district
court had correctly assumed that the principles of equitable restraint did not
bar it from hearing this case on its merits. The Court said that in Younger v.
12. For narrations of these series of events, see 430 U.S. at 708; Maynard v. Wooley, 406
F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects. . . any citizen of the United
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress."
14. 430 U.S. at 709 n.5. On March 11, 1975, a single district judge issued a temporary
restraining order against any further arrest and prosecution of the May nards. Id. at 709.
15. Id.
16. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) because the
appellees had sought an injunction against a state statute on grounds of unconstitutionality.
This three-judge court provision has since been repealed. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
17. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.N.H. 1976). For a more detailed
discussion of this portion of the district court's opinion, see notes 91-118 and accompanying
text infra.
18. Id. at 1389.
19. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Powell and
Stevens. Justice White also joined in the majority opinion, with the exception of its determination of the property of injunctive relief. 430 U.S. at 717-19 (White, J., dissenting, joined by
Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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Harris,20 it was recognized that concepts of "judicial economy, as well as
proper state-federal relations, preclude federal courts from exercising equitable jurisdiction to enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. "21 But Chief Justice
Burger then observed that there are two well-established qualifications of
the Younger doctrine. First, when a genuine threat of prosecution exists, a
litigant may seek redress in a federal forum for the alleged infringement of
his constitutional rights; 22 second, a litigant is always entitled to gain access
20. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In Younger, a three-judge federal district court enjoined the state
from proceeding with a prosecution for violation of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act,
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970). Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507,517 (C.D.
Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that Congress had
severely limited the power of federal courts to stay proceedings in state tribunals. Id. at 43
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)). Apart from three exceptions specifically mentioned in that
statute, i.e., where there is express authorization by congress to issue injunctions, where a stay
is necessary to aid the jurisdiction of a federal court and where a stay is necessary to effectuate
the judgment of a federal court, the Court in Younger acknowledged that a judicial exception
had also been created to cover situations where irreparable hardship would ensue were an
injunction not issued. Id. at 43. The Court concluded, however, that none of those exceptions
applied:
It is sufficient for purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face" does not in itself justify an injunction
against good faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has failed to make
any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would
call for equitable relief.
Id. at 54. In so holding, the Court in Younger was able to distinguish Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965). Dombrowski had upheld an injunction against the enforcement of state
criminal statutes. There, however, the Court was presented with allegations of a series of
systematic efforts by law enforcement authorities to harass blacks and civil rights workers in
Louisiana. Id. at 482. For discussion of Younger, see Geltner, Some Thoughts on the Limiting
of Younger v. Harris, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 744 (1971); Maraist, Federal Intervention in State
Criminal Proceedings:Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 1324 (1972);
Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View from Without and Within, 1972 Wis. L.
REV. 1. For discussion of post Younger developments, see Kanowitz, Deciding FederalLaw
Issues in Civil Proceedings: State Versus Federal Trial Courts, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141
(1976); Whitten, FederalDeclaratoryand Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings:
The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C.L. REV. 591 (1975);
Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of EquitableRestraint:A CriticalAnalysis,
1976 DUKE L.J. 523.
21. 430 U.S. at 710 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971)).
22. Id. at 710 (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)). In Steffel, the petitioners
were individuals who attempted to disseminate leaflets protesting the Vietnam war on an
exterior sidewalk of a municipal shopping center. One of them, threatened with arrest on
charges of criminal trespass, sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the Georgia law
enforcement officials in question. A district court dismissed the complaint, finding no averment
of bad faith on the part of the officials, and, hence, no case or controversy. Becker v.
Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386, 1389-90 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972),
rev'd sub nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). On an appeal from the denial of
declaratory relief, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the "test of bad faith harassment is
prerequisite. . . for declaratory relief in a threatened prosecution." Becker v. Thompson, 459
F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). The
Supreme Court reversed. It said that when no state proceeding is actually pending, a request for
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to a federal forum in order to preserve his rights by means of lodging an
action pursuant to section 1983.23
To this pair of contentions, the state responded that under the ruling of
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. ,24 "a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a
party in appellee's posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before
seeking relief in the District Court . . . . 25 Because Maynard had not
appealed any of his convictions, 26 the state argued that federal courts were
restrained from intervening in this situation. The Supreme Court disagreed.
'It distinguished Huffman by pointing out that it involved factual circumstances wherein federal intervention was sought to bar enforcement of a
judgment issued by a state court. 27 In contrast, Maynard was not seeking
similar relief; he had already served his jail sentence. 28 The redress he
declaratory relief may be considered independently of one for injunctive redress. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). It therefore held that "federal declaratory relief is not
precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine
threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute, whether the attack is made on the
constitutionality of the statute on its face or as applied." Id. at 475. Cf. Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-31 (1975) (preliminary injunction). Steffel is thus distinguishable from
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971), which held that federal courts cannot issue
declaratory judgments against a pending, as opposed to a merely threatened, state criminal
prosecution.
23. 430 U.S. at710 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,609-10 n.21 (1975)). The
Court in Huffman reaffirmed the rule of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), that one
seeking redress under section 1983 need not first initiate state court proceedings based on
related state causes of action. 420 U.S. at 609 n.21. Moreover, section 1983 has been held by the
Court to be a congressional exception to the anti-injunction principles expressed in section 2283
of Title twenty-eight of the United States Code. Mitchum v. Foster. 407 U.S. 225, 242-43
(1972). See also Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend. Co., 433 U.S. 623, 630-41 (1977) (provision of the
Clayton Act authorizing injunctions to prevent violations of federal antitrust laws held not to be
an express congressional exception to the principles of section 2283).
24. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman, an Ohio court in a nuisance proceeding had, after
determining that a particular theater had illegally exhibited obscene films, entered a judgment
ordering the theater closed and the personalty used in the course of its operations seized.
Rather than appealing this judgment through the state court system, the successor in interest of
the losing party filed a section 1983 action requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against
the enforcement of the nuisance statute. The Supreme Court held that "Younger standards
must be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding as to which a losing
litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies." Id. at 609. Nevertheless, despite this
broad language, the scope of the Court's holding was clearly limited to the circumstances
presented by the case, namely an attempt to enjoin "a state proceeding which in important
respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases." Id. at 604. Consequently, the Court made no effort to determine to what extent Younger would apply in other
types of civil proceedings. Id. at 607.
25. Id. at 608.
26. The deadline for Maynard to file an appeal expired seven days before he initiated his
suit in federal court. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 n.4 (D.N.H. 1976).
27. 430 U.S. at 710-11. See note 24 supra.
28. The conviction arising from the citation issued on January 3, 1975, which had been
"continued for sentencing," did not alter this conclusion: "No collateral consequences will

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

sought was "wholly prospective to preclude further prosecution under a
statute alleged to violate [his] constitutional rights.'"29 Therefore, the Court
held that the principles of Younger did not bar federal jurisdiction in this
30
case.
The Court next considered the appropriateness of the district court's
conferral of injunctive relief. Chief Justice Burger first noted that injunctive
and declaratory relief may have virtually an identical practical effect. 31 He
then observed that the Court has expressed a strong reluctance to invalidate
criminal statutes even though they are unconstitutional, because "[s]uch a
result seriously impairs the State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws,
and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger. '"32 Such a reluctance could only be overcome by a showing that
injunctive relief was fully necessary to protect a constitutional right. 33 The
Court concluded that Maynard had made such a showing: "[t]he threat of
repeated prosecutions in the future against both him and his wife, and the
effect of such a continuing threat on their ability to perform the ordinary
tasks of daily life which require an automobile, is sufficient to justify
injunctive relief." 34 Consequently, the Chief Justice found that the injunctive remedy granted by the district court was proper.
The Court then proceeded to consider the merits of the case. It did not
rely on the symbolic speech doctrine that had been utilized by the district
court. Instead, the Court focused on what it deemed to be the "essence" of
Maynard's objection, "whether the state may constitutionally require an
individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by
displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose
attach as a result of it unless Mr. Maynard is arrested and prosecuted for the violation of
NHRSA 262:27-c at some time in the future." Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1384
(D.N.H. 1976).
29. 430 U.S. at 711.
30. Id.
31. Id. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
32. 430 U.S. at 712 (quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,931(1975)). Accord,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163
(1943); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44

(1926).
33. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 442-44 (1977); Kugler v. Helifant, 421
U.S. 117, 124-25 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1943); Williams v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 599, 599 (1942); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 400 (1941); Beal v. Missouri
Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95
(1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-47

(1908).
34. 430 U.S. at 712.
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that it be observed and read by the public." 35 Chief Justice Burger reasoned
that the First Amendment embraces both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all: "[a] system which secures the right to
proselytize, religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee
the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts.' '36 Relying on
language in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,37 a case that
invalidated the practice of compelling school children to engage in a daily
salute to the American flag, he concluded that both the right of speech and
the right of silence are constituent parts of the much broader concept of
"individual freedom of mind.' '38 Of course, compulsory flag salutes could
not be equated precisely with having to display the motto of "Live Free or
Die" on one's license plates. But the difference was said to be one of degree
rather than one of kind. "Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state
measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed
constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable." ' 3 9 Thus, the Court found that the Maynards' interests did merit First
Amendment protection.
The Court next balanced the individuals' interests against those of the
state. New Hampshire offered two justifications. First, the state asserted that
the inclusion of the motto on passenger vehicle license plates facilitated the
task of police officers in distinguishing between passenger and commercial
vehicles, the latter of which bore plates not containing such a legend.
Second, it argued that the inclusion of the motto promoted "appreciation of
history, individualism, and state pride. "40 In regard to the first contention,
the majority observed that commercial plates were distinguishable without
reference to the motto, because of differing configurations of letters and
numbers. 41 Moreover, even if this attempted justification was deemed cred42
ible, the state could achieve its goal by means of a less drastic alternative.
Regarding the second contention, the Court claimed that the state's motto
was not ideologically neutral. It was an attempt to express an "official
35. Id. at 713.
36. Id. at 714.

37. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). For further discussion of this case, see notes 120-23 and
accompanying text infra.
38. 430 U.S. at 714 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637

(1943)).
39. Id. at 715.
40. Id. at 716.
41. Id. New Hampshire license plates for passenger vehicles consist of two letters
followed by four numbers. No other registration plate category displays such a combination.
However, of 325,000 passenger plates in the state, 9,999, used mainly by state governmental

officials, display only numbers not preceded by letters. Id. at 716 n.13.
42. Id. at 716.
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view" concerning individualism and state pride. 43 Thus, "where the State's
interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some,
such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message. "44 Accordingly, the majority
voted to affirm the judgment of the district court.
Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, dissented
in part. His objections were addressed to that portion of the majority's
opinion dealing with the doctrine of equitable restraint. He pointed out that a
declaratory judgment could be obtained against a state statute where the
45
agents of the state threatened to initiate proceedings to enforce its terms.
But the same could not be said for the granting of injunctive relief. As early
as 1943, in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,46 the Court had recognized that
federal courts could not enjoin threatened state criminal prosecutions, even
though the underlying law furnishing a basis for those prosecutions had been
invalidated by prior judical ruling. 47 The one exception to this rule would be
the presence of "unusual circumstances"; but
[h]ere the State's enforcement of its statute prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality by the Federal court would appear to be
no more than the performance of their duty by the State's law
enforcment officers. If doing this much prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality amounts to unusual circumstances sufficent to
warrant4 an injunction, the standard is obviously seriously
eroded.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, also dissented; but he
addressed the First Amendment issue. He found no evidence that the
Maynards were being compelled to affirm an ideological view abhorrent to
them: they "have not been forced to affirm or reject [New Hampshire's]
motto; they are simply required by the State, under its police power, to carry
49
a state auto license tag for identification and registration purposes."
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist found no compulsory advocacy in this case5"
because the Maynards were never placed in the position of either apparently
or actually asserting the validity of the motto embossed on their license
43. Id. at 717.
44. Id.
45. Id. (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.) (citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974)). See note 22 supra. Steffel expressly left open the question of
whether an injunction should be issued under the same circumstances. Id. at 453. Accord,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
46. 319 U.S. 157 (1943). For further discussion of this case, see notes 82-87 and accompanying text infra.
47. Id. at 163-64.
48. 430 U.S. at 719.
49. Id. at 720 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.).
50. Id. at 722.
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plates. At all times, the appellees could express their disagreement with that
motto, as long as in so doing they refrained from mutilating or obscuring the
letters or figures on their registration plates. Because the majority's premise
about the applicability of the First Amendment to Maynard's conduct was
faulty, Justice Rehnquist indicated that he would accord much more deference to New Hampshire's claimed justifications of vehicle identification and
51
tourist promotion.
b. Analysis
In order best to consider the problems raised by Wooley v. Maynard, it
is necessary to scrutinize the impact of the decision on three distinct areas of
the law: the doctrine of equitable restraint, the concept of symbolic speech
and the concept of a constitutional right to refrain from speaking.
(1)

EquitableRestraint
The holding of Wooley on this issue may be summarized quite succinctly: a federal court is empowered to issue a permanent injunction against
potential future prosecutions for violation of a state criminal law, even
though the party seeking injunctive relief has failed to exhaust his remedies
in state court with respect to prior prosecutions for transgressions of that
same law. The obvious question is whether this holding about the permissibility of injunctions having purely prospective effect is consistent with prior
cases.
Certainly, Wooley is not directly controlled by Younger v. Harris.5 2
Younger involved an attempt to enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding.
The Court therein identified two rationales underlying the doctrine that
federal courts should not use their equity powers to restrain state actions.
The first was the fundamental concept that equitable relief is improper when
the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer
irreparable injury if denied such relief. 53 The second rationale was that
federal courts are bound by the concept of comity:
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the
fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
left free
to perform their separate functions in their separate
54
ways.
51. Id.
52. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See note 20 supra.

53. Id. at 43-44.
54. Id. at 44. Accord, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,
422 U.S. 922, 927-28 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975).
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Based on this line of reasoning, the Court in Younger adhered to the
traditional view that, absent a showing of irreparable injury, an ongoing
state criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined by a federal judge.55 But, as
the majority in Wooley pointed out, that case involved no ongoing prosecution. 56 Maynard's three prior convictions were final and irrevocable; he
sought injunctive relief against potential future prosecutions yet to be initiated against him. Therefore, Younger could be, and was, easily distinguished by Chief Justice Burger in Wooley.
The harder problem is to what degree cases subsequent to Younger
have extended the principles reaffirmed in that decision to other types of
factual situations more similar to that encountered in Wooley. There are two
relevant rulings by the Supreme Court. In Steffel v. Thompson, 57 the Court
held that the principles of Younger did not preclude a federal court from
affording a plaintiff declaratory relief against threatened state criminal
prosecutions.58 It indicated that the concepts of comity and "Our Federalism" could not be utilized to justify too stringent restrictions on the equity
powers of federal courts:
In the instant case, principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Requiring the federal
courts totally to step aside when no state criminal prosecution is
pending against the federal plaintiff would turn federalism on its
head. When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
: . .- as they are here-we have not required exhaustion of state
judicial or administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount
role Congress has assigned to the federal courts to protect
constitutional rights. 59
This same rationale can be used to explain the result in Wooley. Like
Steffel, it involved a section 1983 proceeding lodged to deter future official
action by agents of the state. Like the plaintiff in Steffel, Maynard was
presented with the Hobson's choice of intentionally violating state law or
abandoning what he sincerely believed to be a constitutionally protected
course of conduct in order to avoid becoming embroiled in another criminal
prosecution. Unlike Steffel, however, Wooley involved the conferral of
injunctive, rather than declaratory, relief. This differentiating factor may be
insignificant; because the Court has admitted on other occasions that the
55. 401 U.S. at 54.
56. 430 U.S. at 711.

57. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). See note 22 supra.
58. Id. at 475.
59. Id. at 472-73. Accord, Hochman v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 1094, 1096 (3d Cir.
1976); Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1975); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357,
364-65 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp.

946, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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practical effect of either remedy may be identical, 6° one could perhaps argue
that the distinction between Wooley and Steffel in this respect is de
minimis. In fact, however, Steffel itself rebuts such an assertion; the Court
therein expressly left open the question of whether or not an injunction
should issue under similar circumstances. 61 The effect of such a caveat is to
suggest that injunctive and declaratory relief are measurably different forms
of redress, the availability of which is to be determined by separable
criteria.62 Indeed, this suggestion is the whole point of Justice White's
dissent in Wooley. 63 Thus, though Steffel is helpful precedent, it necessarily
is distinguishable from Wooley in at least one crucial respect. 64
60. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,931(1975); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66, 73 (1971).
61. 415 U.S. at 463. Cf. Dempsey v. McQueeney, 387 F. Supp. 333, 339 (D.R.I. 1975)
(declines to decide whether Steffel should apply when injunctive relief is sought).
62. The Court in Steffel underscored this distinction by engaging in a lengthy analysis of
the purposes underlying the creation of the remedy of a declaratory judgment. It noted that the
congressional history of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970),
indicated that its express purpose was to serve as an alternative to injunctive relief. 415 U.S. at
466-68. See H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934); S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-3, 6 (1934). Moreover, the Court observed that different considerations enter into the
granting of a declaratory judgment than those needed to be considered for the issuance of an
injunction. First, declaratory relief is likely to have a less intrusive effect on the operation of
state criminal laws; second, engrafting upon the Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that
traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction be satisfied before the
issuance of a declaratory judgment is considered would defy Congress' intent to make declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction would be inappropriate. 415 U.S. at 469-71. See
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 115-16, 121-26 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part, joined by Marshall and White, JJ.). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-55
(1967). These different considerations are ignored only where principles of federalism militate
altogether against federal intervention; the Court found that Steffel was not such a case. 415
U.S. at 472. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
63. See 430 U.S. at 717-18 (White, J., dissenting in part, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.).
64. One might ask, since Wooley was a section 1983 case, why the principles of Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), see note 23 supra, were not relied upon. Mitchum held that
section 1983 was an authorized exception to the anti-injunction principle of 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970). See note 20 supra. But the Court has never said to what extent this recognition of the
special status of the Civil Rights Act may be used to create an exception to the equitable
restraint doctrine of Younger. Indeed, Younger expressly avoided relying on section 2283.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). It has been suggested by dissenting justices in later
cases extending Younger that the equitable restraint doctrine has been utilized to undermine the
acknowledgment in Mitchum of the legislative purpose underlying the enactment of section
1983. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 344-45 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 618 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting,
joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.). Wooley's failure to even mention Mitchum is therefore
consistent with prior rulings.
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A much closer case is presented by Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 65 That
litigation involved a section 1983 action challenging the validity of a
municipal ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners to permit waitresses,
barmaids or entertainers to appear topless in their establishments. The
plaintiffs were three corporations, M&L Restaurant, Inc., Salem Inn, Inc.
and Tim-Rob Bar, Inc. All three sought a preliminary injunction and
declaratory relief against the enforcement of the ordinance. Pending the
judgment by the federal court, the latter two establishments complied with
the enactment by issuing bikini tops to their go-go dancers. For a time,
M&L Restaurant did the same, but it eventually decided to flout the local
law and, as a result, was issued a number of summonses. The district court
thereafter granted a temporary injunction pending its decision on the merits.
It included M&L Restaurant within the coverage of its order, saying that a
contrary result would be anomalous. 66 The Second Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the interest of avoiding contradictory outcomes, of conserving judicial energy and of clarifying procedure militated in favor of granting
67
identical relief to all three appellees.
The Supreme Court disagreed in part. It noted that because a prosecution was pending against M&L Restaurant, disposition of that party's claim
was governed by Younger, which barred equitable intervention. 6 Salem
Inn and Tim-Rob were in a different situation. Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, noted that each of these plaintiffs could have secured a
declaratory judgment under Steffel; he then concluded that in the circumstances of this case, "the issuance of a preliminary injunction is not subject
to the restrictions of Younger. "69 In so holding, he pointedly observed:
At the conclusion of a successful federal challenge to a state
statute or local ordinance, a district court can generally protect the
interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment,
65. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
66. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 364F. Supp. 478,481-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 18
(2d Cir. 1974), aff'd in partand rev'd in partsub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922

(1975).
67. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1974), aff'd in partand rev'd inpart

sub noma.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). After the Second Circuit's opinion,
there were further proceedings in this litigation. The municipal ordinance in question was
amended and the district court once again temporarily enjoined its enforcement. Salem Inn,
Inc. v. Frank, 381 F. Supp. 859, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 522 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1975).
Subsequently, the district court refused to enjoin preliminarily an action by the New York State

Liquor Authority to withdraw Salem Inn's license, noting that the state's interest under the
Twenty-First Amendment restricted equitable relief. Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 408 F. Supp.
852, 856 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Inturri v. Healy, 426 F. Supp. 543, 546-49 (D. Conn.
1977).
68. 422 U.S. at 929.
69. Id. at 930.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will be unnecessary. But prior to final judgment there is no established declaratory remedy comparable to a preliminary injunction; unless preliminary relief is available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in
some situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable harm. Moreover, neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can
directly interfere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and
70
the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute.
Based on this language in Doran, one can argue that Wooley was
wrongly decided. While it is true that the permanent injunction in Wooley,
like the temporary one issued in Doran, only deprived the state of the
capacity to prosecute a particular group of federal plaintiffs,7 1 the latter case
points out that although in its final order of relief a federal court can always
choose between injunctive and declaratory remedies, the same is not the
case in an intermediate order of relief, where a preliminary injunction is the
only option available. Wooley did not involve such an intermediate order;
there, the district court issued a permanent injunction. Moreover, it had a
choice of which remedy to grant, because the Maynards initially sought
either injunctive or declaratory relief.7 2 Thus, as Justice White points out, in
both Steffel and Doran, the Court engaged in a conscious attempt to balance
the interests of federalism against the need to provide a federal plaintiff with
a meaningful remedy to prevent his victimization by state courts. 73 In
contrast, the majority in Wooley cites Steffel and Doran in support of the
proposition that a plaintiff threatened by the state with prosecution is entitled
to resort to a federal forum to seek redress for an alleged deprivation of
federal rights and disposes cursorily of Younger by making the same
argument advanced in Steffel, that the doctrines of equitable restraint do not
bar the conferral of purely prospective federal relief. But neither Doran nor
Steffel mandates such a conclusion. Indeed, both cases eschewed reliance
on lawmaking by ipse dixit in favor of a relatively careful analysis of the
procedural practicalities inherent in each case. Wooley seems to evince a
more expansive approach by foregoing any attempt at such balancing. It
70. Id. at 931. For cases applying the doctrines of Doran, see, e.g., International Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness v. New York Port Auth., 425 F. Supp 681, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Tedesco v. O'Sullivan, 420 F. Supp. 194, 196 (D. Conn. 1976); Notey v. Hynes, 418 F. Supp.
1320, 1326 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Saxe v. Brennan, 416 F. Supp. 892, 894-95 ,E.D. Wis. 1976); Cobb
v. Beame, 401 F. Supp. 19,23-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brown v. Brannan, 399 F. Supp. 133, 146-47
(M.D.N.C. 1975). All these cases have retained Doran's distinction between pending and
threatened prosecutions.
71. See Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D.N.H. 1976).
72. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.

73. See 430 U.S. at 717-18 (White J., dissenting in part joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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adopts without qualification the thesis that federal intervention in situations
involving threatened state prosecutions is always permissible, provided the
threat is a genuine one.
Once one overlooks the discrepancy between the caution of Steffel and
Doran and the boldness of Wooley, it is comparatively easy to dispose of,
the state's counterargument. New Hampshire contended that under Younger
an aggrieved party must exhaust all his remedies in a state court proceeding
before seeking federal intervention. 74 This is accurate, but, as the Court
points out, Younger involved a challenge to a pending prosecution. Maynard never contested the validity of his three prior convictiong. He was
challenging the right of the state to initiate future prosecutions against him.
Thus, the reasons underlying Younger's exhaustion prerequisite simply
were not present in Wooley. Even if one assumes otherwise, however, it
would not make an appreciable difference to the result reached on this point
by both the lower court and the Supreme Court. Only George Maynard had
been prosecuted. His wife Maxine, a co-plaintiff, had never been convicted
for violating section 262:27-c. Thus, she could seek federal relief independently of her husband and not be concerned with Younger's exhaustion
requirement because she had never been involved in a prior state proceeding
in which there were further remedies to be exhausted. Any argument to the
contrary would deprive her of the right to file a section 1983 action, a
deprivation that the Court refused to countenance. 75 Of course, one might
claim that the Maynards as a couple would be covered by the qualification
broached in Doran that they constituted an instance "in which legally
distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the
Younger considerations which govern any one of them . ...76 This
argument could be rebutted by pointing out, as was noted earlier, that the
Younger doctrine of exhaustion did not apply to either of the Maynards.
Even if one assumed otherwise, however, the Doran test was still not met.
In that case, the Court concluded that M&L Restaurant, Salem Inn and TimRob Bar, though they were represented by the same counsel and had similar
business activities and difficulties, were not related "in terms of ownership,
control, and management" and thus were separable entities. 77 Similarly,
there was no evidence adduced that Maxine Maynard's religious and political views were anything other than the product of her own independently
held moral precepts. It was not shown that she controlled her husband's
74. Id. at 710. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975).
75. 430 U.S. at 712 n.9. See also Maguin v. Miller, 433 F. Supp. 223, 228 (D. Kan. 1977).
76. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975). Cf. Wisconsin Socialist Workers
1976 Campaign Comm'n v. McCann, 433 F. Supp. 540, 546 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (test is whether the
plaintiffs are "legally separate parties").
77. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975).
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conduct or vice versa. 78 Thus, the state's counter-argument was meritless in
all respects.
The final procedural issue left was whether the district court had
appropriately granted a permanent injunction in this case. As noted earlier, 79
it could have restricted its order to the conferral of declaratory relief, which
was also requested; it simply declined to choose that alternative. The
Supreme Court affirmed the propriety of its election. It noted that although
in most instances a declaratory judgment will suffice to protect the rights of
a federal plaintiff, this may not be true where unusual circumstances are
presented. 80 Such circumstances were said to exist in Wooley because the
threat of future prosecutions for violations of section 262:27-c would hinder
the Maynards from performing all those diurnal tasks for which the use of an
automobile is vitally necessary. 81 In support of this statement, the majority
cited only one case, Douglas v. City of Jeannette.82
Jeannette involved a municipal ordinance that prohibited anyone from
soliciting orders for merchandise without first procuring a license from city
authorities and paying a license tax. That ordinance was held unconstitutional in a companion case decided by the Court, Murdock v. Pennsylvania.83In
Jeannette, various Jehovah's Witnesses had been arrested in April, 1939,
for distributing sectarian literature without a permit. After being convicted
and serving their sentences, they initiated a suit in federal district court
requesting injunctive relief against further enforcement of the ordinance.
After a trial, the district court held the law invalid in that it deprived the
petitioners of their First Amendment rights and granted them a permanent
78. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (D.N.H. 1976). The district court noted

that Maxine and George Maynard were really in a situation similar to that of the petitioners in
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). See note 22 supra. In Steffel, there were two antiwar protesters. Both were threatened with prosecution for criminal trespass. One desisted in his
activity. The other did not, and was arrested and charged. Id. at 455-56. One point noted by the
district court is that the state might have claimed that Maynard's prior convictions would bar relitigation of the federal constitutional issues. 406 F. Supp. at 1385 n.6. The district court noted,
however, that the First Circuit has rejected any collateral estoppel effect in a section 1983
action where the constitutional issue was never actually litigated at the state trial. See Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1260 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). Accord,
Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631,637 (2d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325,
327 (7th Cir. 1972); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846
(1970); Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft v. Brennan, 383 F. Supp. 978, 982-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931, 941 (D. Minn. 1973); Moran v. Mitchell, 354"F. Supp. 86,
89 (E.D. Va. 1973).
79. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
80. 430 U.S. at 712.
81. Id.
82. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
83. 319 U.S. 105, 116-17 (1943).
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injunction." The Third Circuit sustained the jurisdiction of the trial court,
but reversed on the merits. 85 The Supreme Court found that there was a
statutory conferral of jurisdiction to dispose of the merits of the case, but
also found a want of equitable jurisdiction to order injunctive relief. As in
Wooley, the Court in Jeannette said federal tribunals may enjoin threatened
state criminal prosecutions only upon a showing of irreparable injury. 86 It
then went on to observe:
The trial court found that respondents had prosecuted certain of
petitioners and other Jehovah's Witnessess for distributing the
literature described in the complaint without having obtained the
license required by the ordinance, and had declared their intention
further to enforce the ordinance against petitioners and other
Jehovah's Witnesses. But the court made no finding of threatened
irreparable injury to petitioners or others, and we cannot say that
the declared intention to institute other prosecutions is sufficient
to establish irreparable injury in the circumstances of this case.
Before the present suit was begun, convictions had been
obtained in the state courts in cases Nos. 480-87, Murdock et. al.
v. Pennsylvania, . . .which were then pending on appeal and
which were brought to this Court for review by certiorari contemporaneously with the present case. It does not appear from the
record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other
than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully
and in good faith, or that a federal court of equity by withdrawing
the determination of guilt from the state courts could rightly
afford petitioners any protection which they could not secure by
prompt trial and appeal pursued to this Court. In these respects
the case differs from Hague v. C.LO., [307 U.S. 496, 501-02
(1939)], where local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the
complainants and in many instances forcibly deported them from
the state without trial.
There is no allegation here and no proof that respondents
would not, nor can we assume that they will not, acquiesce in the
decision of this Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional, petitioners could not complain of penalties which
would have been but consequence of their violation of a valid state
law.Y7
Younger reiterates this view, noting that a showing of irreparable injury will
be credited only if one can demonstrate harassment, bad faith on the part of
law enforcement officials or the prospect of prosecution under a law
"'[f]lagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions
84. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 39 F. Supp. 32, 33 (W.D. Pa. 1941) (citing Reid v.
Borough of Brookville, 39 F. Supp. 30, 32 (W.D. Pa. 1941)).

85. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 130 F.2d 652, 659 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 157
(1943).
86. 319 U.S. at 163-64.
87. Id.at 164-65.
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in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.' -88
Wooley presented no such unusual circumstances. Neither the trial
court nor the Supreme Court purported to find bad faith or harassment. Nor
was section 262:27-c deemed facially invalid. The district court limited its
enforcement solely as applied to the plaintiffs. 8 9 Wooley, in fact, most
resembles Jeannette. In the latter case, future good-faith prosecutions were
threatened, but the Court claimed this prospect did not qualify as an
irreparable injury. Moreover, in Wooley, no showing was made that New
Hampshire officials would not acquiesce in the final judgment by the
Supreme Court on the constitutionally of their actions. The officials were
not attempting to enforce a law that they knew had been declared invalid.
While it is true that Jeannette did not involve a statute creating a deterrent
effect on the use of one's own automobile, that fact should be irrelevant.
The Maynards objected to section 262:27-c because it purportedly required
them to engage in a course of conduct they deemed morally abhorrent.
Certainly the Jehovah's Witnesses in Jeannette objected to paying the state a
license tax on similar grounds, but the Court rejected any effort to grant
them injunctive relief. Under the logic of Jeannette and Younger, George
Maynard would have had to subject himself to one more criminal prosecution, suffered a fourth conviction and then appealed that conviction in an
orderly manner to the United States Supreme Court. By not requiring him to
do so, the majority in Wooley has, as Justice White observed, diluted the
criterion of unusual circumstances to the point of meaninglessness. 90 Accordingly, Wooley may very well ease the access of aggrieved parties to
federal courts, thus undermining the entire concept of equitable restraint, at
least in situations where intervention is not sought in a pending state
prosecution.
"88. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387,
402 (1941)). For other cases to the same effect, see note 33 supra. For cases where unusual

circumstances were said to exist, see, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1965)
(raids on plaintiff's files by state police, arrest of plaintiffs without probable cause, threatened

prosecutions); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1939) (wrongful denial of forums for
meetings, eviction of undersirables from the locality, discriminatory enforcement of antipamphleteering law, deportation from the state, unlawful searches and seizures, threatened
arrests); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1927) (multiple filings of criminal and

civil suits and existing imposition of substantial pecuniary losses); Terrace v. Thompson, 263
U.S. 197, 215-16 (1923) (threat to deprive lessor of his right to lease, threat to deprive lessee of

right to pursue his occupation as a farmer); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149, 165 (1908)
(threatened prosecution entailing great expense and threatening railroad with financial

calamity).
89. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D.N.H. 1976).

90. 430 U.S. at 719 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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(2) Symbolic Speech
The district court in Wooley concluded that the Maynards, by covering
the motto embossed on their license plates, were engaging in symbolic
speech. Its reasoning merits detailed consideration. The court noted that the
conduct of George Maynard was not capricious or whimsical, but was
instead "motivated by deeply held, fundamentalist religious beliefs that
death is an unreality for a follower of Christ and, to a lesser extent, that it is
wrong to give up one's earthy [sic] life for the state, even if the alternative is
living in bondage." 91 By that conduct, Maynard accomplished two objectives. He relieved himself of the onus of displaying an offensive message
and he also indicated his disagreement with the implications of that message. These objectives could be established by considering Maynard's own
92
affidavit regarding his motivations.
One aspect of the concept of symbolic speech is that the speaker must
not only intend to communicate an idea, but he must also be perceived by
others as making such a communication. 93 The case of Spence v. Washington,94 decided in 1974, illustrates the difficulty. The petitioner therein was a
college student prosecuted for displaying an American flag with a peace
symbol affixed to it. He did so on May 10, 1970, at the height of the
Cambodian invasion and right after several students had been killed by
national guardsmen at Kent State University. The Court found that the
nature of appellant's activity, combined with the actual context and environment in which it was undertaken, led to the conclusion that he had engaged
in a form of protected expression. 95 In so finding, the Court observed that
"[a] flag bearing a peace symbol and displayed upside down by a student
today might be interpreted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it
91. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D.N.H. 1976).

92. See note 9 supra.
93. [Ihe following criteria seem helpful in defining the symbolic conduct. First, the
conduct should be assertive in nature. This will generally mean that the conduct is a
departure from the actor's normal activities and cannot adequately be explained unless
a desire to communicate is presumed. Second, the actor must have reason to expect
that his audience will recognize his conduct as communication. Third, communicative
value does not depend on whether the idea sought to be expressed can be verbalized.

The symbolism or mediuii may be an idea in itself.
Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1117 (1968). See generally Nimmer, The
Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the FirstAmendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29, 37 (1973);
Comment, Flag Desecrationas ConstitutionallyProtectedSymbolic Speech, 56 IowA L. REV.
614, 620-21 (1971).

94. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
95. Id. at 409-10. Prior to Wooley, federal courts had primarily applied the teachings of

Spence to other flag desecration cases. See, e.g., Cline v. Rockingham County Superior Court,
502 F.2d 789, 790 (1st Cir. 1974); Royal v. Superior Court, 397 F. Supp. 260, 262-63 (D.N.H.
1975); United States ex rel. Radich v. Criminal Court, 385 F. Supp. 165, 173-75 (S.D.N.Y.

1974).
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would have been difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift
of appellant's point at the time that he made it.' ' 96 The district court in
Wooley also examined the problem of context and decided that most people
would recognize that the Maynards were engaging in symbolic communication. It based this decision on two factors. First, it observed that the New
Hampshire motto possessed intrinsic political and philosophical significance:
Although the vast majority of, if not all other, state mottos seem
to lack ideological content, "Live Free or Die" has obvious political and philosophical significance for many. The New Hampshire
motto may not be as politically charged as other slogans that might
be placed on license plates, e.g., "Amnesty Now," but we can
conceive of no neutral principle which would97 permit us to distinguish "Live Free or Die" from such others.
Because of this significance, it was said that the plaintiffs could show not
only that they intended to convey a message by their act, but that the
message was likely to be understood. 98 Second, the district court noted
evidence in the record that residents of New Hampshire were aware that the
conduct of people like the Maynards was engaged in for the purpose of
communicating "their opposition to the motto's implication that political
freedom is the greatest good." 99
Having found symbolic speech to be involved, the district court then
identified the countervailing interests of the state, namely, identification of
passenger vehicles and promotion of tourism and state pride. 100 It then
engaged in the weighing process mandated by the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. O'Brien. 1 1 In O'Brien, which upheld a conviction for
draft-card burning, it was stated:
96. 418 U.S. at 410.
97. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 n. 10 (D.N.H. 1976). Actually, the mottos
of a number of other states do bear at least as much ideological content as that of New
Hampshire. A representative sampling includes the following: Alabama ("We Dare Defend Our
Rights"); Arizona ("Ditat Deus," or, "God Enriches"); Colorado ("Nil Sine Numine," or,
"Nothing without the Deity"); Florida ("In God we Trust"); Hawaii ("Ua Mau Ke Ea 0 Ka
Aina I Ka Pono," or, "The Life of the land is Perpetuated in Righteousness"); Iowa ("Our
Liberties We Prize and Our Rights We Will Maintain"); Mississippi ("Virtute et Armis," or,
"By valor and arms"); Missouri ("Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto," or, "Let the welfare of
the people be the supreme law"); Nebraska ("Equality Before the Law"); Nevada ("All For
Our Country"); North Dakota ("Liberty and Union, Now and Forever, One and Inseparable");

South Dakota ("Under God the People Rule"); Virginia ("Sic Semper Tyrannis," or, "Thus
ever to tyrants"); West Virginia ("Montani Semper Liberi, " or, "Mountaineers are always
freemen"); and Wyoming ("Equal Rights").
98. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D.N.H. 1976)
99. Id. at 1387 n. 11.

100. Id. at 1386.
101.

391 U.S. 367 (1968). See generally Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The

Draft Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. Cr. REV. 1.
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This court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest
which must appear, the Court has employed a wide variety of
descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these
terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 1 2
The district court found that the defacement statute failed to meet two of the
four components of the O'Brien test. The interest in promoting state pride
was said to be related directly to the suppression of speech.103 The court
cited Spence for the lesson that the governmental interest in preventing
individuals from interfering with the communication of a state-sponsored
message by engaging in symbolic speech is not an interest that meets the
third part of the O'Brien standard. 10 4 Thus,
[i]n Spence the Court indicated that the state interest in preventing
interruption of the set of messages conveyed by the flag was
directly related to the suppression of free expression .

.

.. The

fact that plaintiffs' act, unlike that of the defendant in Spence, is
the only practical alternative to displaying the motto indicates that
the statute and the suppression of freedom of expression 05
are even
more closely related in the present case than in Spence.1
As for the state's interest in identifying passenger vehicles, it was said that
this concern flouted the fourth component of the O'Brien test, because New
Hampshire had alternative means that would "more precisely and narrowly" facilitate vehicle identification. 106 Moreover, the district court indicated
that this asserted justification may have been a spurious one, since only
noncommercial passenger vehicles were required to bear the state's
motto. 107
There are two problems with the trial court's analysis of symbolic
speech. First, while it is undeniably true that the Maynards intended to
communicate an idea by reason of their conduct, there seemed to be
102. 391 U.S. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
103. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1388 (D.N.H. 1976).

104. Id. See Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancingin FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1506-08 (1975).
105. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1388 (D.N.H. 1976).

106. Id.
107. Id.
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insufficient proof that others would perceive them as engaging in such
communication. The court cited evidence that ever since the 1972 decision
by the state supreme court upholding section 262:27-c against a similar
challenge as that presented by the Maynards, 10 8 New Hampshire residents
were aware that some persons like the plaintiffs were concealing the state's
motto on their license plates as an act of ideological protest. 109 Nowhere is it
stated how many residents were the beneficiaries of such an awareness or
how many had even heard of the state court's ruling on the validity of the
defacement statute. Certainly, that ruling would not seem to be as publicized
an event as the Cambodian invasion or the Kent State University killings
were said to be in Spence.1 10 Hence, one wonders exactly to what extent
citizens of New Hampshire were aware of how the Jehovah's Witnesses felt
about the motto "Live Free or Die." Even if one assumes otherwise and
concedes that the citizenry knew that some classes of persons objected to the
motto on philosophical grounds, how could they possibly know that the
Maynards were members of such a class? An average bystander might have
equally well assumed that George Maynard taped over the motto on his
registration plate as a whimsical act or because he liked the decorative
properities of red reflective tape. The context of Maynard's conduct was not
clear enough to eradicate all the ambiguity inherent in his action. Unlike
Spence, the situation was not one where it "would have been difficult for
the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of [the communicator's] point
at the time that he made it." 1 1
The district court appeared to recognize this fact, because it placed its
primary emphasis on the point that "Live Free or Die" is an aphorism
possessing inherent political and philosophical significance. Abstractly, this
may be true. This case, however, is not one where abstractions are relevant;
the issue is what those witnessing the symbolic conduct in question actually
perceived.112 It could be argued, as the state did, that the importance of the
words "Live Free or Die" was not that they expressed a specific Weltanschauung, but rather that they were uttered by General John Stark, one
of the state's heroes during the Revolutionary War."3 Thus, the import of
this motto to many citizens of New Hampshire may have been primarily
historical, rather than ideological; they may have viewed the words solely as
a reminder of the state's origins rather than as an expression of a particular
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972).
Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 n.II (D.N.H. 1976).
See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410, 414 n.10 (1974).
Id.at 410.
See note 93 supra.
See note 7 supra.
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philosophical viewpoint. 114 If so, it seems unlikely that they would perceive
the Maynards' conduct as a political or religious protest and thus that
conduct might be extremely difficult to classify as symbolic speech. The
district court ignored these problems by assuming that the motto expressed
an ideology of which everyone was aware. In so doing, it substituted a
presumption for actual evidence, something neither O'Brien nor Spence
authorizes.
There is also a problem with the district court's analysis of New
Hampshire's asserted justification that it desired to foster state pride. The
court relied on Spence for the proposition that the governmental interest in
precluding interference with one of its own promotional messages suppresses free speech and thus violates one of the O'Brien criteria. In Spence,
however, the State 6f Washington asserted an interest in preserving the
national flag as an unalloyed symbol of the country.I" The Supreme Court
said
[i]f this interest is valid, we note that it is directly related to
expression in the context of activity like that undertaken by appellant. For that reason and because no other governmental interest
unrelated to expression has been advanced or can be supported on
analysis of UnitedStates v. O'Brien...
this record, the1four-step
16
is inapplicable.
Although in Wooley the separate interest of registration identification was
advanced, it could not be supported on the record; in light of this fact, the
district court probably erred in applying the O'Brien test in the first place.
As a matter of fact, it noted that O'Brien was not necessarily dispositive of
the statute's invalidity. It found implicit in its discussion of O'Brien,
however, the assumption that neither interest asserted by New Hampshire
was "sufficiently weighty" to justify an infringement of the Maynards'
First Amendment rights. 117 Thus, the disposition of the First Amendment
issue by the district court in Wooley was quite cursory. In Spence, although
the Court did not apply O'Brien, it did scrutinize a variety of factors,
including the fact that Spence was prosecuted for displaying his own flag on
his own property, that no breach of the peace occurred and that Washington,
unlike New Hampshire, had conceded that the communication of an idea
was taking place."18 By contrast, the district court in Wooley, after admit114. Indeed, the state actually made such a contention. See Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F.
Supp. 1381, 1386 n.10 (D.N.H. 1976).
115. See State v. Spence, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 799, 506 P.2d 293, 300 (1973).
116. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1974). See Ely, Flag Desecration:A

Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496-97 (1975).
117. Maynard v. Wooley, 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 n.14 (D.N.H. 1976).
118. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1974).
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ting that O'Brien may have been inapposite, simply deemed that point
irrelevant and refidered a judgment unfavorable to the state without further
analysis. Thus, the district court's opinion in Wooley construes the teachings of Spence rather loosely.
In sum, there is much to criticize about that portion of the district
court's opinion dealing with the concept of symbolic speech. The Supreme
Court, however, managed to avoid the entire issue. It said:
We note that appellees' claim of symbolic expression is substantially undermined by their prayer in District Court for issuance of
special license plates not bearing the state motto . . . . This is
hardly consistent with the stated intent to communicate affirmative opposition to the motto. Whether or not we view appellees'
present practice of covering the motto with tape as sufficiently
communicative to sustain a claim of symbolic expression, display
of the "expurgated" plates requested by appellees would surely
not satisfy that standard.1 9
This observation adds something new to the symbolic speech doctrine.
George Maynard asserted that a federal court should intervene and bar
enforcement of section 262:27-c because he intended to continue taping
over the state motto and thus would be subject to future prosecutions. The
district court rightly considered only what Maynard intended to say and
what his audience would perceive him as saying in order to define whether
or not his conduct constituted symbolic speech. The Supreme Court said a
third factor had to be considered, the type of relief requested. Because
Maynard also asked for the issuance of plates to him not bearing the state's
motto, his claim of symbolic speech was said to be destroyed, even though
the district court specifically declined to grant this request. This is a novel
addition to the symbolic speech doctrine; neither Spence nor O'Brien
adverted to such a requirement and it is therefore an innovation espoused
unilaterally by the majority in Wooley. As such, it offers a warning to
plaintiffs making symbolic speech claims that they must exercise great care
in framing their prayers for relief because the content of those prayers may
have a hitherto unsuspected estoppel effect that will cause their underlying
claim to be repudiated. In so doing, the Court obfuscates the very concept of
symbolic speech. Conduct that should be determined solely by reference to
the intent of the communicator and the perceptions of his audience in a given
context may now be determined with reference to the content of a prayer for
relief unconnected with and appearing long after the occurrence of the
allegedly communicative act.
119. 430 U.S. at 713 n.10.
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(3) The Right to Refrain from Speaking
In lieu of the symbolic speech doctrine, the majority in Wooley relied
on the concept of a constitutional right to refrain from speaking. It cited only
one case to support this basis for its opinion: West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.120 That case involved a challenge by Jehovah's
Witnesses to an administrative regulation that required schoolchildren on
each day that they attended school to salute the flag by "[keeping] the right
hand raised with palm turned up while the following is repeated: 'I pledge
allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic
for which it stands; one Nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all.' -121 The Jehovah's Witnesses claimed that it violated the precepts of
their religion to pay homage to any "graven image," which they deemed to
include the flag. 122 The Court found the regulation unconstitutional, saying:
It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and pledge
requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. It is not
clear whether the regulation contemplates that pupils forego any
contrary convictions of their own and become unwilling converts
to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they
simulate assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of
meaning. It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppresion
of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only
when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action
of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would
seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on
even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. But here
the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that
remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and
present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. To sustain the compulsory flag salute we are required to say
that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his
own mind, left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter
what is not in his mind. 12
This the Court declined to do.
The majority in Wooley said that the difference between being compelled to salute a flag and utter an oath of allegiance and being compelled to
display a registration plate bearing the motto "Live Free or Die" is "essentially one of degree." 124 This is simply untrue. The Maynards were never
compelled to affirm the philosophy expressed on their license plates; they
were merely deprived of the right to evince their disagreement with whatever appeared on those plates by means of defacement. Thus, Maynard could
affix a bumper sticker to his car expressing his disagreement with the state's
120. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
121.

Id. at 628-29.

122. Id. at 629.
123. Id. at 633-34.
124. 430 U.S. at 715.
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motto, or he could even express his sentiments by attaching a message to the
plate itself, so long as no words or letters were thereby obscured. The
fallacy committed by the Court in Wooley was its assumption that compulsory display of a registration tag bearing a motto may be equated with
affirmance of that motto. This presumption incorrectly suggests that others
will perceive the display of a license plate on one's vehicle to be an
endorsement of the sentiments embossed on that plate. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court had noted, the opposite is true:
[W]e think that viewers do not regard the uniform words or devices upon registration plates as the craftsmanship of the registrants. They are known to be offically designed and required by
the State of origin. The hard fact that a registrant must display the
plates which the State furnished to him if he would operate his
vehicle is common knowledge. Nothing in the statutes of this State
preclude him from displaying his disagreement with what appears
thereon1 provided the methods used do not obscure the number
plates.
This situation may be usefully contrasted with that in Barnette. A casual
observer watching a schoolchild salute the flag could not know whether that
child sincerely believed what he or she was uttering. Nevertheless, the
child's act is one of affirmance and ostensibily, at least, can only be
construed as such. Moreover, during the commission of that act, the pupil
has no opportunity to express his or her disagreement; failure to comply
fully with the requirements of the ceremony imposed was insubordination
punishable by expulsion from school. 126 In Wooley, however, the act of
displaying license plates is ambiguous; the observer cannot know whether
125. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 336-37, 295 A.2d 454, 457 (1972). Cf. Lathrop v.

Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 858-59 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). Lathrop involved a challenge to
the bylaws of the Wisconsin State Bar that authorized compulsory annual dues of fifteen
dollars. The petitioner argued that because the bar could use such funds to subsidize activities
of which the payor disapproved, this practice amounted to the type of compulsory affirmation
prohibited by Barnette. Justice Harlan disagreed:
In Barnette there was a governmental purpose of requiring expression of a view in
order to encourage adoption of that view, much the same as when a school teacher
requires a student to write a message of self-correction on the blackboard one hundred
times. In the present case there is no indication of a governmental purpose to further
the expression of any particular views. More than that, the State Bar's purpose of
furthering expression of views is unconnected with any desire to induce belief or
conviction by the device of forcing a person to identify himself with the expression of
such views. True, purpose may not be controlling when the identification is intimate
between the person who wishes to remain silent and the beliefs foisted upon him. But
no such situation exists here where the connection between the payment of an
individual's dues and the views to which he objects is factually so remote. Surely the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is right when it says that petitioner can be expected to
realize that "everyone understands or should understand" that the views expressed
are those "of the State Bar as an entity separate and distinct from each individual."
Id. (quoting In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 623, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1958)).
126. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 629 (1943).
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the owner of a vehicle bearing such plates believes in the sentiments
expressed on them. More importantly, that act does not even ostensibly
appear to be one of affirmation. Furthermore, in Wooley, unlike Barnette,
during the very act of display, the owner has the option of advertising his
disagreement with the state's motto so as to apprise observers of what he
really believes and thus correct any misconstructions that might be derived
from his compliance with the motor vehicle registration laws of the state.
Thus, Barnette in no way requires or supports the doctrine espoused in
Wooley.
The implications of the Wooley doctrine are disturbing. If the state
cannot compel a person to display anything bearing an offensive motto,
serious anomalies will result. For instance, as Justice Rehnquist noted, there
is a federal law that says:
Whoever mutilates, cuts, defaces, disfigures, or perforates, or
unites or cements together, or does any other thing to any'bank
bill, draft, note, or other evidence of debt issued by any national
banking association, or Federal Reserve bank, or the Federal
Reserve System, with intent to render such bank bill, draft, note,
or other evidence of debt unfit to be reissued, shall be fined not
more than $100 or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both. 127
Under this law one could prosecute an atheist who mutilated federal currency by, for example, scissoring the words "In God We Trust. ' 128 Wooley
would seem to require that such a person be exempted from criminal
sanctions because he is engaging in protected conduct. The majority tried to
distinguish this situation, saying that money passes from hand to hand, and
is not associated with its owner as are automobiles. It also said currency is
29
usually carried in one's purse or pocket and thus is not displayed publicly. 1
That the Court needs to make such feeble distinctions suggests the problems
that will arise. One can always retort that conceptual difficulties will exist
where a Jehovah's Witness tapes over the motto on the license plate of a car
he has rented from a commercial agency. One can also point out that money,
like an automobile, is displayed only when it is used for its intended
purpose. In the case of an automobile, that purpose is conveyance from
place to place; in the case of money, that purpose is use as a means of
payment in commercial transactions. Thus, merely because one stores
127. 18 U.S.C. § 33 (1970).
128. Courts have noted that references to the Deity on currency, or on public buildings or
in an anthem do not offend the First Amendment's establishment clause. See, e.g., Abingdon
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale,

370 U.S. 421, 440 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring); Lincoln v. Page, 109 N.H. 30, 32, 241
A.2d 799, 800 (1968); Opinion of the Justices, 108 N.H. 97, 102, 228 A.2d 161, 164 (1967).
129. 430 U.S. at 717 n.15.
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money in one's purse or pocket where it is out of sight is immaterial; the
same can be said when one stores one's car in a garage. When currency is
being used for its intended purpose, it is displayed and, furthermore, it is
associated with its possessor to the extent that he exhibits it to others and
thereby disseminates whatever message is printed upon it. Thus, the
majority is simply making a distinction without a difference, and the fact
that it was compelled to do so augurs the conceptual problems likely to flow
from Wooley.
The doctrine announced by Wooley was, however, subjected to certain
substantive limitations. First, the Court found that the right to refrain from
speaking, like that of speech itself, will be balanced against countervailing
governmental interests. 13 0 Consequently, the majority cited United States v.
3 and its fourfold
O'Brien"'
criteria for identifying a compelling justification
for regulating speech combined with nonspeech elements. The Court thus
appeared to conclude that the justifying interests asserted by New Hampshire vehicle identification and tourist promotions, did not meet the fourth
part of the O'Brien test because they could have been achieved by less
drastic means. 132 Second, the majority observed that:
Some states require that certain documents bear the seal of the
State or some other official stamp for purposes of recordation.
Such seal might contain, albeit obscurely, a symbol or motto
having political or philosophical implications. The purpose of such
seal, however, is not to advertise the message it bears but simply
to authenticate the document by showing the authority of its

origin. 133

Implicit in this statement is the concept that the Court will scrutinize the
purpose for which display of a purportedly objectionable motto is required.
If that purpose is one of authentication or some other neutral, routinized
procedure, it may pass consitutional muster. If, however, the purpose is one
of promotion or advertisement, it is unlikely to be permitted, absent some
compelling governmental justification. Applying this thesis, if the New
130. Id. at 716.
131. 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See notes 101-02 and accompanying text supra.
132. 430 U.S. at 716-17. See also Davis v. Norman, 555 F.2d 189, 191 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977). In
Davis, the plaintiff kept a wrecked car in his front yard as a symbolic means of protesting police
brutality. He was served with notice to remove that wreck, pursuant to a county ordinance
prohibiting the unenclosed storage of inoperable motor vehicles for longer than fifteen days.
The court of appeals distinguished Wooley by pointing out that
[t]he ordinance in question neither requires an individual to endorse a particular belief
nor represses his freedom of expression. In addition, the interests advanced by New
Hampshire in support of its statue could be achieved by less restrictive means,
whereas the interests furthered by the ordinance cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means than enclosed storage.
Id.
133. 430 U.S. at 715 n. 11.
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Hampshire seal with the words "Live Free or Die" were embossed on all
license plates solely in order to authenticate their issuance by the state's
commissioner of Motor Vehicles, that purpose might be deemed sufficient
to permit application of criminal sanctions for defacement of those plates to
all persons, including Jehovah's Witnesses.
Thus, the teaching of Wooley is that the constitutional right to refrain
from speaking encompasses those situations where the state is not compelling an individual to make an affirmation. That new constitutional right may
well prove to be a source of continuing difficulty for the United States
Supreme Court. It will require the Court to draw nebulous distinctions in
hard cases, such as the one involving defacement of federal currency. More
significantly, the substantive limitation relating to consideration of the
reason for which display of an ideological statement is mandated will
compel the Court to extend the technique of scrutiny of legislative purpose
to types of cases where it has heretofore not been required.
2. Speech and Public Employees
a. First Amendment Rights and the Exclusivity Doctrine: City of Madison JointSchool
DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
In the case of City of Madison JointSchool DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission,' the Supreme Court was confronted
with a difficult question: to what extent is the exclusivity doctrine,' that is,
the concept that a duly elected collective bargaining representative is to be
the exclusive agent for the members of the collective bargaining unit,
limited by the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and equal
access to public forums? The Court avoided direct consideration of this
problem. Nevertheless, its apotheosis of the rights of free speech and fair
access to a public forum suggests, at least with respect to public employees,
that states may be restricted in the extent to which they can fashion regulatory policies intended to further the exclusivity rule that also impinge upon
First Amendment freedoms.
1. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
2. For discussions of the exclusivity doctrine, see generally Cox, The Right to Engagein
Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 331-32 (1951); Craver, Minority Action versus Union
Exclusivity: The Need to Harmonize NLRA and Title VII Policies, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33-39
(1974); Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor
RelationsAct, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1242-48 (1967); Gould, The Status of Unauthorizedand
"Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672, 678-80
(1967); Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual
Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 897-919 (1975); Smith, The
Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1065, 10981106 (1941); Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 556, 556-64
(1945).
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(1)

The Decision
The facts of the case are comparatively complex. 3 Madison Teachers
Incorporated (MTI) is a labor organization that was, at all relevant times, the
exclusive collective bargaining agent of public school teachers practicing
their profession within the geographical boundaries of Joint School District
No. 8, which is comprised of the City of Madison, Wisconsin and various
contiguous villages and towns. 4 The district operated the educational
facilities in those localities through its agent, the Board of Education
(Board). The Board and MTI concluded a collective bargaining agreement
for the calendar year of 1971 that covered wages, hours and conditions of
employment for all constituents of the bargaining unit, including teachers.
The agreement was due to expire on December 31, 1971. Accordingly, on
January 25, 1971, MTI submitted for the Board's consideration a proposed
contract, which was to take effect on January 1, 1972. Included in this
proposal was a "fair share" provision, that is, a requirement that all
teachers pay full union dues even though they were not members of MTI.
The theory underlying such a provision is that since a union bargains on
behalf of all employees within the represented unit, those employees not
affiliated with the union but nevertheless acquiring benefits because of its
5
efforts ought to pay their "fair share" of the costs of collective bargaining.
A similar clause had been proposed by MTI during negotiations preceding
the signing of the 1971 agreement, but had been rejected by the Board. The
Board's initial response to the January 25th proposal was to object strenuously to the fair share clause on the ground that it was illegal.
On November 11, 1971, however, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a
statute permitting inclusion of a fair share provision in collective bargaining
agreements involving municipal employees. 6 MTI once more submitted a
3. Except where otherwise noted, this summary of facts is taken from the opinion of the
state supreme court. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 203-09, 231 N.W.2d 206, 208-11 (1975).
4. MTI was certified as the majority collective bargaining representative of all teachers
in the district on July 6, 1966. 429 U.S. at 169 n.1.
5. A fair share provision typifies that type of arrangement known as an "agency shop,"
under which all employees are required as a condition of employment to pay dues to the union
and possibly even a union initiation fee, but need not become union members. This arrangement
is distinguishable from that of the "closed shop," in which the employee, as a prerequisite to
obtaining a position, must join a union. For discussion of the concept of the agency shop, see
Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 478, 478-92 (1964); Rosenthal, The
National Labor Relations Act and Compulsory Unionism, 1954 Wis. L. REV. 53, 57-64;
Comment, Impact of the Agency Shop on LaborRelations in the PublicSector, 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 547, 549-54 (1970).
6. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1l1.70(1)(h) (West 1974).
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fair share proposal conforming to the new law; again, the Board rejected it.
In addition to this controversy, the Board and MTI also disagreed about one
other major issue: whether to include a clause providing binding arbitration
for nonrenewal of teacher contracts and teacher dismissals. Throughout
negotiations, the official stance of the Board had been one of adamant
opposition to the inclusion of such a provision in the 1972 contract. In order
to avoid a stalemate, the chairman of the Board's negotiators decided to
offer a compromise. In October or November of 1971, he unofficially
informed MTI negotiators that the Board would accept a fair share clause if
the union desisted in demanding a compulsory arbitration provision. This
offer placed the union in a difficult position. As subsequent testimony
disclosed, the hierarchy of MTI did not really desire a fair share clause; it
had included such a clause in its proposals solely in order to secure a
bargaining chip useful in trading for what it actually wanted, an arbitration
provision.
On November 14, 1971, Ralph Reed and Albert Holmquist, teachers
employed by Joint School District No 8, but not affiliated with MTI, issued
a communiqu6 opposing the fair share clause. The substance of this letter
was that the authors opposed the creation of an agency shop as contemplated
by the fair share proposal, and wished the addressees to express their
viewpoints on the issue. Two hundred responses, most of them opposing the
fair share clause, were received. A meeting of some of these teachers
occurred on December 2, 1971. Fourteen instructors attended, half of whom
were union members. Those attending prepared a form letter accompanied
by a petition supporting a one year deferral of any consideration of the fair
share proposal. 7 On December 6, 1971, this letter and petition were cir7. The text of the form letter was as follows:
Dear Fellow Madisonian Educator,
E.C.-O.L.O.G.Y.

Educator's Choice-Obligatory Leadership Or Gover[n]ance by You
1.

SAVE FREEDOM OF CHOICE
A Closed Shop (agency shop) Removes This Freedom
Does an organization which represents the best interests of teachers and pupils

NEED mandatory membership deductions?
2.

Need relationships between administrators and teachers be further strained by

LEGALLY providing for mandatory adversary camps?
3. Should minority voices be mandatorily SILENCED?
4.

Could elimination of outside dissent produce NON-RESPONSIVENESS to

5.

change?
And...
isn't this lack of FREEDOM OF CHOICE undemocratic?
SUPPORTFREEDOM OF CHOICE-

OPPOSE AGENCY SHOP
I wish to maintain freedom of choice:
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culated in various schools within the district. Reed and Holmquist intended
to present the results of the petition to both MTI and the Board at the latter's
regular public meeting on the evening of December 6th. Pursuant to state
law, this meeting was open to all who wished to attend. 8
By December 6th, the negotiations between MTI and the Board had
reached an impasse. The union had arranged to have the meeting hall
surrounded by pickets that evening and to have three to four hundred
teachers in attendance at the auditorium. John Mathews, a member of MTI's
negotiating team, accosted Reed and Holmquist before they reached the
auditorium and twice attempted to dissuade them from presenting their
petition to the Board, claiming that the negotiations were at a delicate stage
and that their conduct might cause the union "to lose the whole ball game."
Neither of his attempts met with success. Mathews then spoke with a person
named Yelinek, who was one of the Board's members, and asked him to
intercede with Reed and Holmquist. Yelinek promised that he "would take
care of it." In fact, he did nothing. Once within the auditorium, Holmquist
I oppose agency shop on principle
I oppose agency shop and would sign

a petition stating so
I oppose agency shop and would work

actively to maintain freedom of choice
Let us hear from YOU
Al Holmquist Is!
Al Holmquist
Ralph Reed Isl
Ralph Reed

E.C.-O.L.O.G.Y.
P.O. Box 5184
Madison, WI 53705

Teacher co-chairmen
The text of the petition was as follows:

December 6, 1971
Madison Board of Education
Madison Teachers, Incorporated
We the undersigned ask that the fair-share proposal (agency shop) being negotiated by
Madison Teachers, Incorporated and the Madison Board of Education be deferred this
year. We propose the following:
1) The fair-share concept being negotiated be thoroughly studied by an impartial
committee composed of representatives from all concerned groups.
To:

2) The findings of this study be made public.

3) This impartial committee will ballot (written) all persons affected by the contract
agreement for their opinion on the fair-share proposal.
4) The results of this written ballot be made public.

8. Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 19.81(2) (West Supp. 1977-1978). One exception to this law was

found by the state's attorney general, who ruled that bargaining on wages could be conducted in
closed sessions, so long as the final action was taken in public. 54 Op. Wis. Artry. GEN. vi

(1965). The state supreme court subsequently adopted this position. Board of School Directors
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 653, 168 N.W.2d 92, 99-100
(1969).
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filled out a registration form indicating his desire to address the assembly.
He did not specify the topic of his address.
After a number of persons, including the president of MTI, made
speeches, Holmquist was allowed to speak. He claimed to represent "an
informal committee" of seventy-two teachers in forty-nine schools. After
reading the contents of the petition that had been circulated earlier that day,
he then said:
We feel this study necessary because neither the board's
negotiators who have placed entirely too much emphasis on this
one point nor Madison Teachers, Inc., which speaks euphemistically about the 'whole package' and therefore is not issue specific
. . .Neither has properly addressed the serious issue of fair-share
and agency shop. We find much confusion in the proposal as it
stands and even more on the part of teachers' interpretations of it.
For evidence, 417 teachers from the 31 schools which represents 53% of the total number of these faculties of these schools
who have called in to this hour have signed the petition on the
first day it was taken into their schools. Due to this confusion, we
wish to take no stand on the proposal itself, but ask only that all
alternatives be presented clearly to all teachers and more importantly to the general public to whom we are all responsible. We
ask simply for communication, not confrontation. 9
The president of the Board asked Holmquist if he intended to communicate
the petitions to the Board. Although he indicated that he did so intend, no
further communications between the two ever occurred.
After the public meeting, the Board went into executive session and
adopted the following resolution: "It was moved and seconded to accept the
total package as presented including arbitration for dismissal of non-probationary and not including agency shop; if the MTI does not accept this as a
total package, the offer of arbitration is withdrawn." 10 The following day,
the Board's representatives opened a negotiating session by reading the
above-quoted resolution and saying "[Tihis is the deal." After some discussion, MTI capitulated. An agreement containing only an arbitration clause
was signed on December 14, 1971.
In January 1972, MTI filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (Commission), an administrative body entrusted with the responsibilty of implementing statutory policy with respect to
public and private employees. The union alleged that the Board had
committed an unfair labor practice in violation of section 111.70 of the
state's Municipal Employment Relations Act by negotiating with someone
9. City of Madison Joint School. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 69
Wis. 2d 200, 207, 231 N.W:2d 206, 210 (1975).
10. Id. (emphasis in original).
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other than the exclusive collective bargaining representative, MTI. 11 The
Commission concluded that the Board had violated its duty to bargain in
good faith with MTI and thus had interfered with the rights of workers represented by that organization to bargain collectively through intermediaries of
their own choosing. As part of its judgment, the Commission ordered that
the Board "[s]hall immediately cease and desist from permitting employes,
other than representatives from Madison Teachers, Inc., to appear and speak
at meetings of the Board of Education, on matters subject to collective
bargaining between it and Madison Teachers, Inc."1 2 The Board petitioned
the circuit court of Dane County for review; that court upheld the Comnmission's order. The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. It found that Holmquist and the Board had been negotiating with each other 13 and that the
abridgement of their speech was necessary to "avoid the dangers attendant
upon relative chaos in labor management relations." 14 The state supreme
court also found that the Commission's order was not unconstitutionally
15
vague.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Burger,

writing for a majority consisting of himself and Justices White, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens, disagreed with the lower court's finding
that the record presented evidence of a "clear and present danger" justifying the curtailment of speech. First, he noted that:
11. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(3)(a) (West 1974):
It is a prohibited practice for a municipal employer individually or in concert with
others:
1. To interfere with, restrain or coerce municipal employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed in sub.(2). [One of these being the right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing] ...
4. To refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of a majority of its
employes in an appropriate collective bargaining unit. Such refusal shall include action
by the employer to issue or seek to obtain contracts, including those provided for by
statute, with individuals in the collective bargaining unit while collective bargaining,
mediation or fact-finding concerning the terms and conditions of a new collective
bargaining agreement is in progress, unless such individual contracts contain express
language providing that the contract is subject to amendment by a subsequent collective bargaining agreement.
12. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 209, 231 N.W.2d 206, 211 (1975). The Commission previously had
been held to have substantial powers to fashion remedies to effectuate the purpose of peaceful
negotiation and settlement of municipal labor disputes. Board of Educ. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 52 Wis. 2d 625, 635, 191 N.W.2d 242, 247 (1971); General Drivers &
Helpers Union, Local 662 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 21 Wis. 2d 242,249-50, 124
N.W.2d 123, 127 (1963); Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 267 Wis.
316, 326, 64 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1954). Thus, the order was well within its delegated authority.
13. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 215, 231 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1975).
14. Id. at 212, 231 N.W.2d at 213.
15. Id. at 216, 231 N.W.2d at 215.
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Holmquist did not seek to bargain or offer to enter into any
bargain with the board, nor does it appear that he was authorized
by any other teachers to enter into any agreement on their behalf.
Although his views were not consistent with those of MTI,
communicating such views to the employer could not change the
fact that MTI alone was 1authorized
to negotiate and to enter into a
6
contract with the board.
Moreover, the Chief Justice pointed out that Holmquist addressed the Board
as a concerned citizen.1 7 Any member of the public could presumably have
uttered with impunity statements identical to those made by Holmquist.
Thus, he was being denied the right to speak because of his status as a public
employee. The Court found this denial unacceptable; it cited Pickering v.
Board of Education1 8 for the proposition that teachers may not be "compelled to relinquish the First Amendment right they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection with the
operation of the public schools in which they work." 19 Finally, the Court
observed that to allow one side in a public debate monopolistic access to a
particular forum is the antithesis of the guarantee of free speech afforded by
the First Amendment. 20 The effect of the Commission's order was to
discriminate among speakers on the basis of their employment and the
content of their speech. This effect the Court deemed impermissible:
Surely no one would question the absolute right of the nonunion
teachers to consult among themselves, hold meetings, reduce their
views to writing, and communicate those views to the public
generally in pamphlets, letters, or expressions carried by the news
media. It would strain First Amendment concepts extraordinarily
to hold that dissident teachers could not communicate those views
16. 429 U.S. at 174.

17. Id. at 175.
18. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). For a further discussion of this case, see notes 29-40 and
accompanying text infra.
19. Id. at 568, quoted in 429 U.S. at 175. For similar expressions regarding public

employees in general, see, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
100 (1947). The question raised at this juncture was whether the Board could assert Holmquist's

right. The Court disposed of this question by pointing out that the right of Holmquist to speak
was inextricably intertwined with the right of the Board to hear and, in that context, there was

no issue of lack of standing. 429 U.S. at 175 n.7 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 409
(1974)). But Procunierestablished the proposition that the potential listener could assert that his
own rights were bring infringed. Thus, the argument in that case that censorship of prisoners'
letters to their wives and others could be justified by certain assumptions about the legal status
of inmates was rejected because the interests of those addressee spouses were also being
impinged upon. In contrast, in Madison the Court used Procunierto support the argument that
the Board could assert, at least in part, Holmquist's rights in his behalf. In so doing, it avoided a
rather perplexing jus tertii problem.

20. 429 U.S. at 175-76.
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directly to the very decisionmaking body charged by law with
making the choices raised by the contract renewal demands. 21
The Court also deemed the Commission's order to be unconstitutionally vague. That order prohibited speech by teachers "on matters subject to
collective bargaining."22 The effect of this language was said to preclude
speech by teachers on virtually every subject concerning the operation of a
school system; not only would it unduly hamper the Board's governance of
that system, but because it proscribed future conduct, its terms constituted
"the essence of prior restraint."'23 Therefore, the judgment of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court was reversed.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred. He noted that
the Court had left open the issue of the extent to which true contract
negotiations could be regulated. 2 4 Examining a number of decisions unrelated to the field of labor negotiations,2 5 Justice Brennan concluded that the
state supreme court "was correct in stating that there is nothing unconstitutional about legislation commanding that in closed bargaining sessions a
government body may admit, hear the views of, and respond only to the
designated representatives of a union selected by the majority of its employees." 26 But in this case, the meeting was open to the public by statutory
command. The effect of the Commission's order was to exclude persons
from a public forum primarily on the basis of the content of their speech.
Thus,
[o]bedience to that order requires that the board, regardless of any
other circumstances, not allow Holmquist or other citizens to
speak at a meeting required . . .to be open and dedicated to
expressions of views by citizens generally on such subjects, even
though the subject upon which they wish to speak may be ad21. Id. at 176 n.10.
22. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.

23. 429 U.S. at 177.
24. Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
25. Justice Brennan cited the cases of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (case
involving the refusal of newsmen to disclose their sources of information to grand juries;
dictum to the effect that the Court's "own conferences [and] the meetings of other official
bodies gathered in executive session" may be constitutionally closed to the public); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966) (case involving student demonstration on jailhouse grounds;
held, First Amendment does not command "that people who want to [voice] their views have a
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they please"); Bi-Metallic
Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (case involving action of
administrative agency increasing property tax valuations without an individual notice and
hearing; held, "the Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or
an assembly of the whole").
26. 429 U.S. at 178. Actually, the majority did not dispute the proposition that the
bargaining sessions could be closed to the public and limited to certain speakers on certain
subjects. See id. at 175 n.8, 176 n.9.
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dressed by union representatives, and even though they are part of
the "public" to which the forum is otherwise open. The order is
therefore wholly void. The State could no more prevent Holmquist from speaking at this public forum than it could prevent him
from publishing the same views in a newspaper or proclaiming
them from a soapbox. 27
Justice Stewart's brief concurrence made two points. He asserted, first,
that mere expression of ideas concerning a matter subject to collective
bargaining posed no threat to the doctrine of exclusivity, and second, that
the majority's opinion offered no consideration of what constitutional limitations may be imposed upon a governmental unit's authority to structure
discussion at public meetings.28
(2) Analysis
For purposes of convenience, the analysis of this case will be bisected.
The first section will scrutinize the First Amendment principles applied by
the Supreme Court; the second will deal with the impact of that opinion on
the exclusivity doctrine.
(a) Speech Issues
The Supreme Court based its holding on a number of grounds, each of
which merits examination. The first ground was that the Commission denied
Holmquist and his colleagues the right to speak freely because of their status
as public employees. This was said to be impermissible because a person
does not trade his constitutional rights for municipal employment. The
Court supported this statement with a citation to Pickering v. Board of
Education.29 But a closer examination of Pickeringreveals some problems.
27. Id. at 179. See Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist., 555 F.2d 1309, 131718 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit therein read Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (accepted a trial court's judgment that a teacher's criticism of a
school board was protected by the First Amendment because that latter entity's "reaction to his

communications to the radio station was [nothing] more than an ad hoc response to Doyle's
action in making [his critical] memorandum public"); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 598
(1972) ("For this Court has held that a teacher's public criticism of his superiors on matters of
public concern may be constitutionally protected and may, therefore, be an impermissible basis
for termination of his employment"); and Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968)
("the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to

public debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public") as establishing the proposition that private expression by a
public employee is not constitutionally protected. The circuit court also cited the quoted

language from Justice Brennan's concurrence in Madison to corroborate this assertion. 555
F.2d at 1318.
28. 429 U.S. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

Pickering involved a situation where a teacher wrote a letter to a local
paper criticizing the manner in which his employer, the school district, had
handled a bond issue for the erection of two new schools and had allocated
its financial resources between educational and athletic programs in the
schools. 30 The letter contained clear falsehoods. 3 1 Pickering was promptly
dismissed for publishing this document and an administrative hearing approved the dismissal. 32 The Illinois Supreme Court rejected his First
Amendment claim by concluding that his acceptance of a teaching position
obliged him to refrain from uttering statements "which in the absence of
such position he would have an undoubted right to engage in." 33 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a teacher's exercise of his right to
speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment." 34 The Court did, however, surround
this general rule with six qualifications. First, it observed that Pickering's
statements were not directed against anyone with whom he would be in daily
contact as a result of his job. "Thus no question of maintaining either
discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among coworkers is presented here." 3 5 Second, the Court remarked that the petitioner's dealings
with the members of the board of education did not constitute "the kind of
close working relationships for which it can persuasively be claimed that
personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper functioning. "36 Third, the Court cautioned that it was not being asked to deal with a
30. Id. at 566.
31. Id. at 570.
32. Id. at 566-67.
33. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 36 Ill.
2d 568, 577, 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1967).
34. 391 U.S. at 574. More recently, the Court has held that a dismissed public employee
must show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that it constituted the "motivating factor" in the decision to dismiss him. If that burden is met, then his former employer must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have discharged him anyway, without
regard to the protected conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977). See also Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 578
(7th Cir. 1975); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1245 (10th Cir. 1975);
Abeyta v. Town of Taos, 499 F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1974); Endicott v. Van Petten, 330 F.
Supp. 878, 882 (D. Kan. 1971).
35. 391 U.S. at 570. For cases distinguishing Pickeringon this point, see, e.g., Kannisto v.
City & County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841,843 (9th Cir. 1976); Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of
Pennsylvania, 520 F.2d 1364, 1368-69 (3d Cir. 1975); Knarr v. Board of School Trustees, 452
F.2d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 1971); Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 406 F. Supp. 781,787
(D. Wyo. 1976); Bowles v. Robbins, 359 F. Supp. 249, 255 (D. Vt. 1973); Bean v. Darr, 354 F.
Supp. 1157, 1161 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp. 613,621
(E.D. Mo. 1972); Tygrett v. Washington, 346 F. Supp. 1247, 1250-51 (D.D.C. 1972).
36. 391 U.S. at 570. For cases distinguishing Pickeringon this point, see, e.g., Fuentes v.
Roher, 519 F.2d 379, 389 (2d Cir. 1975); Simard v. Board of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 992 (2d Cir.
1973); Fisher v. Walker, 464 F.2d 1147, 1152-53 (10th Cir. 1972); Gould v. Walker, 356 F. Supp.
421, 425-26 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
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situation where the position from which the petitioner was discharged was
such that "the need for confidentiality is so great that even completely
correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal. ",37 Fourth, it was noted that Pickering had not communicated falsehoods
"about matters so closely related to the day-to-day operations of the schools
that any harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter because
of the teacher's presumed greater access to the real facts." 38 Fifth, the
school system had no existing grievance procedures requiring complaints
about its operations to be submitted to superiors for consideration before
they could be disclosed to the general public. 39 Sixth, and finally, the Court
said the case did not present a situation where the misleading statements
uttered were so egregiously false as to call into question the utterer's
competence to perform his assigned duties. 4 Thus, the doctrine of Pickering is one that any court must apply with great care and with careful
41
attention to the facts of the case before it.
The Court in Madison did not exercise this caution. It simply assumed
that the teachings of Pickering could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the
case before it. None of the six qualifications adverted to earlier were ever
mentioned by Chief Justice Burger. After citing Pickering, he merely
observed that the Commission was improperly discriminating against speakers on the basis of their status as public employees. 42 It is therefore arguable
that the Court's assumption concerning the applicability of Pickering is not
justified.
Several of the six qualifications mentioned in Pickering obviously had
no bearing on what occurred in Madison. Holmquist's position as a teacher
was not cloaked with an aura of confidentiality, the breach of which would
automatically subject him to the deprivation of the right of access to a public
forum. His speech before the Board contained no egregious falsehoods, but
43
was merely a statement of opinion, which cannot be labelled true or false.
37. 391 U.S. at 570 n.3.
38. Id. at 572. Cf. Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1973) (criticism of
course counseling and course content not a matter of ongoing public concern meriting First
Amendment protection); Long v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 1058, 1059-60 (8th Cir. 1972)
(dismissal upheld where a teacher, without being authorized, issued a statement falsely appearing to have the support of the local board of education).
39. See 391 U.S. at 572 n.4.
40. Id. at 573 n.5.
41. One might argue that Picketing should be applied only in dismissal cases and that
therefore it has no bearing in a situation like Madison, in which Holmquist and his colleagues
were never discharged for their conduct. This is a valid reason for distinguishing Picketing from
Madison, but the Court in the latter case apparently elected not to do so.
42. 429 U.S. at 175.
43. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
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Moreover, the contents of that speech had no bearing on his competence to
be allowed future access to Board meetings to discuss subjects relating to
collective bargaining. Similarly, there was no problem about the possibility
that his statements might impair the operations of the school system because
of the error inherent in them. Thus, three of the caveats in Pickering may be
summarily disposed of as inapplicable to Madison.
The others, however, present difficulties. Holmquist was publicly
criticizing the bargaining strategies of both the Board and the Union. Since
he was not a member of the latter, it is doubtful that he would have been
allowed to air his grievances before representatives of the union hierarchy
prior to engaging in public attacks. Those whom he represented certainly
included persons affiliated with MTI, however, and some of them could
have attempted to meet with union officials before proceeding unilaterally.
Moreover, if Holmquist objected as a teacher to the Board's conduct during
contract negotiations, he could easily have filed a grievance and advised the
agents of the Board of his position before publicizing it. By not doing so and
by airing publicly the dissension and discontent among the ranks of the
district's teachers, he only succeeded in embarrassing the union, showing
lack of confidence in the Board and further complicating negotiations that
were already quite complex. In addition, while it may well be that Holmquist had no close working relationship with members of the Board, the
same could not be assumed of members of the union. The Court in Madison
never concerned itself with whether Holmquist's immediate superiors were
staunch unionists who might view his conduct as an act of betrayal and
disloyalty and whether daily operations within the facility where Holmquist
worked might thereby be disrupted. Finally, one might argue that the same
problem could arise with coworkers of Holmquist who were also members
of MTI; they, too, might feel so angered by the threat he had created to
union solidarity that the result would be disharmony among employees
sufficient to require, if not dismissal, at least quick action to ensure that
further disunifying speeches at Board meetings would not take place. Obviously, the foregoing criticisms are based on speculation; the record was
silent on the repercussions of Holmquist's act on his co-workers and
superiors. The point, however, is that a conscientious application of the
principles of Pickering to Madison would have attempted to take into
account the caveats mentioned in the former opinion. As it stands, the Court
in Madison simply cited Pickering's language on the First Amendment
rights of public workers, ruled that those rights were being violated in this
case because the Commission's order denied access to a public forum on the
basis of an employee's status and never mentioned Pickering's numerous
qualifications concerning the extent to which the free speech of municipal
workers could be properly impinged upon.
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An independent ground for the Court's ruling in Madison was that the
Commission's order discriminated on the basis of content. The one case
cited in support of this proposition was Police Department v. Mosley,'
which held that a municipal ordinance permitting peaceful picketing relating
to school labor-management disputes but disallowing all other types of
peaceful picketing, 45 violated the First Amendment because it distinguished
permissible from impermissible speech solely on the basis of the message
appearing on the picket sign. In the course of so holding, the following
statement was made:
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to
mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use of it to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth
discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of
status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all points
of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened
up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not
prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what
they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may
not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. 46
The very language of this statement indicates how Mosley can be differentiated from Madison. In the former case, exclusion from a forum was
based solely on content. Any picketer intending to communicate a message
unrelated to a dispute between labor and management in schools was denied
access to the sidewalks in front of educational facilities. By contrast, in the
Madison case, the Commission did not prohibit all speakers from talking
about collective bargaining subjects at Board meetings; only municipal
employees were barred. Thus, Madison, unlike Mosley, does not represent
44. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
45. The ordinance prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of any primary or secondary
school building while the school was in session, one-half hour before it opened or one-half hour
after it closed. Id. at 92-93.
46. Id. at 96. Accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,388-89 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937). Professor
Kalven has observed that:

[The equal protection clause] is likely to provide a second line of defense for vigorous
users of the public forum. If some groups are exempted from a prohibition on parades

and pickets, the rationale for regulation is fatally impeached. The objection can then
no longer be keyed to interferences with other uses of the public places, but would
appear to implicate the kind of message that the groups were transmitting. The

regulation would thus slip from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a
concern about content. The result is that equal-protection analysis in the area of
speech issues would merge with considerations of censorship.
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 29.
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a situation where exclusions "are based on content alone." The focus of the
Commission's order was primarily on the status of the speaker, not the
substance of the message he sought to convey.
Even if one assumes otherwise, however, the Mosley doctrine has
subsequently been limited by the Court. The key case in this respect is
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc. ,47 which upheld a Detroit zoning
ordinance placing geographic limitations on the location of adult cinemas.
The plurality opinion4 8 in that case said of the language from Mosley quoted
above:
This statement, and others to the same effect, read literally
and without regard for the facts of the case in which it was made,
would absolutely preclude any regulation of expressive activity
predicated in whole or in part on the content of the communication. But we learned long ago that broad statements of principle,
no matter how correct in the context in which they are made, are
sometimes qualified by contrary decisions before the absolute
limit of the stated principle is reached. When we review this
Court's actual adjudications in the First Amendment area, we find
this to have been the case with the stated principle that there may
be no restriction
whatever on expressive activity because of its
49
content.
As examples corroborating this statement, the plurality pointed out that the
distinction between lawful advocacy and incitment to crime often depends
upon exactly what the speaker had to say, 50 that the content of an epithet is
what the Court will rely upon in order to determine whether it constitutes
unprotected "fighting words," 51 and that the publication of the sailing dates
of troop transports or the number and location of soldiers could always be
restricted solely on the basis of content.5 2 Similarly, it observed that the
content of a libelous statement would determine the standard of proof to be
utilized in determining the extent of liability arising from publication of that
statement, 53 that commercial speech could be regulated on the basis of its
47. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
48. The plurality consisted of Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
White and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 52.
49. Id. at 65-66. Justice Powell, in his separate concurrence, also said that content-based

discrimination against speech could be justified where it is necessary to achieve an overriding
governmental interest; such an interest was not involved in Mosley. Id. at 82 n.6 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Cf. DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910, 913-14 (D. Conn. 1977) (Mosley and
Young permit classifications based on content if precisely tailored to serve a substantial state

interest).
50. 427 U.S. at 66 n.23 (citing Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1966); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 99-101 (1948)).

51. Id. at 66 n.24 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)).
52. Id. at 66 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931)).
53. Id. at 66 & n.25. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (con-

sidering whether a publication concerns matters of general interest to determine if the actual
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substance54 and that sexually oriented materials purveyed to minors that are
not legally obscene could be subject to more stringent controls because of
the message, or lack of it, conveyed therein. 55 Thus, even if the Commis-.
sion's order did discriminate on the basis of content, the Court in Madison
erred by assuming that such a finding terminated its inquiry. The next step
should have been a canvassing of the relevant precedent cited by Young to
see whether the directive of the Commission could fall within any potential
classification where discriminatory treatment on the basis of content has
been permitted. Consequently, on this issue also, the Court in Madison
gave too cursory an analysis to what was a somewhat perplexing problem.
The third issue raised by the Court was that of vagueness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had claimed that the Commission's order was not
impermissibly vague because the appellant's conduct fell squarely within
the "hard core" of the proscription contained in that order,5 6 citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma.57 The United States Supreme Court repudiated this
analysis on two separate grounds. First, it observed that the doctrine of
Broadrick was not apt because that case had involved a challenge to a law
proscribing past conduct, whereas the order in Madison was directed at
future action. 58 Second, it observed that the language of the order regarding
"matters of collective bargaining" was so nebulous that it could not be
59
defined with any useful precision.
It is certainly true that Broadrick is distinguishable on its facts. But the
Wisconsin court did not rely primarily on that case. It also made two related
points. First, it observed that the phrase "subjects of collective bargaining"
had traditionally been defined as "wages, hours and conditions of employment.' "60 While this phrase is not entirely self-explanatory, it has been used
malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), applies in private
defamation cases).
54. 427 U.S. at 68. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974)
(product advertising accepted on public transit vehicles although political cards were not);

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (in labor election, employer can
communicate with employees so long as the communication contains no threat); Jacob Siegel
Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-12 (1946) (FTC can regulate false advertising).

55. 429 U.S. at 69 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968)).
56. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 216, 231 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1975).
57. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). Broadrick upheld a charge by the Oklahoma State Personnel

Board against public employees who had engaged in partisan political activities on behalf of
their superior. The Court found that the law on which the charge was based was not overbroad.

Id. at 618.
58. 429 U.S. at 177.
59. Id. at 176-77.
60. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 215, 231 N.W.2d 206, 215 (1975).
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in the National Labor Relations Act to describe the matters about whfch
bargaining may take place. 6t Thus, the state court's construction of that
language would seem to have provided a sufficiently limiting interpretation
to avoid the proscription of vagueness. The state court also relied on the case
of United States Civil Service Commission v. NationalAssociation of Letter
Carriers.62 The Letter Carriersdecision involved a constitutional challenge
to a provision of the Hatch Act, which prohibits public employees from
taking part in political campaigns. 63 Among the objections raised to this
legislation were that certain key phrases or words utilized in regulations
implementing it, 64 such as "active part in managing," "actively participating in. . .fund-raising" or "partisan" candidate, were inherently vague.
In response to this challenge, the United States Supreme Court replied,
There might be quibbles about the meaning of taking an "active
part in managing" or about "actively participating in. . .fundraising" or about the meaning of becoming a "partisan" candidate
for office; but there are limitations in the English language with
respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems
to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on
finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary
person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest.
"[T]he general class of offenses to which. . .[the provisions are]
directed is plainly within [their] terms, . . . [and they] will not be
struck as vague, even though marginal cases could be put down
where doubts might arise." 65
One can only wonder why the same type of analysis was not used in
dealing with the vagueness challenge in Madison. Certainly the language of
61.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(9), 159(a) (1970).

62. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
64. 5 C.F.R. § 733.122 (1977):
(a) An employee may not take an active part in political management or in a
political campaign, except as permitted by this subpart.
(b) Activities prohibited by paragraph (a) of this section include but are not
limited to (4)

Organizing, selling tickets to, promoting, or actively participating in a fund-

raising activity of a candidate in a partisan election...;
(5) Taking an active part in managing the political campaign of a candidate for
public office [or] for political party office;

(6) Becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public
office in a partisan election.
65. 413 U.S. at 577-79 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954)). Letter

Carriers has since been characterized as a case where subordination of First Amendment
activity was necessary to safeguard individual belief and association. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 371 (1976). Those interests are arguably at stake in Madison because the Commission's
order was purportedly issued to protect the associational interests of those who had chosen

MTI as their union.
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the Commission's order was no more vague than that of the challenged
words and phrases in the regulations implementing the Hatch Act. Moreover, the latter law imposed at least as significant a burden on First Amendment rights as did the directive of the Commission in Madison. Yet the
Court in Madison never even considered the potential applicability of Letter
Carriers, even though that case also involved the issue of the extent to
which the government may permissibly abridge First Amendment freedoms.
Thus, the net effect of the decision in Madison is to foster a far more
protective attitude toward the First Amendment rights of public employees
than was evinced by previous decisions of the Court. The opinion of the
majority suggests that the Court is more likely in such cases to presume an
abridgement of constitutional guarantees, especially when the state regulation in question appears to constitute a prior restraint. Perhaps most surprising is the majority's failure to balance carefully the interests of Holmquist
and those similarly situated with those of the state of Wisconsin. This failure
is especially interesting in light of the countervailing concern asserted by the
66
state, the exclusivity doctrine.
(b) The First Amendment and the Exclusivity Doctrine
In the context of federal labor legislation, the importance of the exclusivity doctrine has been consistently recognized by federal courts. Thus,
in Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40,67 the Supreme
Court, construing an exclusivity principle embodied in the Railway Labor
Act of 1926,68 found that an employer has two legal duties: to negotiate with
the majority collective bargaining representative of his employees and to
refrain from negotiating with anyone else. 69 The Court accorded a similar
construction to the exclusivity language located in section 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act 70 in the case of Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
66. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
67. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970). See id. at § 152.

69. 300 U.S. at 548-49. Accord, Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944).
70. U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the

majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collec-

tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and
to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representatives, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collectivebargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Providedfurther,.That the bargaining
representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
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NLRB, 7 1 wherein it was said:
That it is a violation of the essential principle of collective
bargaining and an infringement of the Act for the employer to
disregard the bargaining representative by negotiating with individual employees, whether a majority or a minority, with respect
to wages, hours and working conditions [has been] recognized by
this Court. .

. The statute guarantees to all employees the right

to bargain collectively through their chosen representatives. Bargaining carried on by the employer directly with the employees,
whether a minority or a majority, who have not revoked their
designation of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the
mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained, as
the Board, the expert body in this field, has found. .

.

. There is

no necessity for us to determine the extent to which or the periods
for which the employees, having designated a bargaining representative, may be foreclosed from revoking their designation, if at all,
or the formalities, if any, necessary for such a revocation ....
But orderly collective bargaining requires that the employer be not
permitted to go behind the designated representatives, in order to
bargain
72 with the employees themselves, prior to such a revocation.
Of course, the rights of the minority employee are not completely
foreclosed. Under section 9(a), a minority employee can independently
adjust grievances with his employer, provided that the result of such an
adjustment is consistent with the existing collective bargaining agreement
and that the bargaining representative is afforded an opportunity to be
present at the adjustment. 73 An even more potent protective mechanism is
the doctrine of fair representation. 74 As early as 1944, in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. ,7 the Court, in construing the Railway Labor
Act's principle of exclusivity, claimed that principle imposed a correlative
duty on the collective bargaining agent to represent fairly all employees
within its unit. 76 In a companion decision, Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,77 the
71. 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
72. Id. at 684-85. Accord, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org.,
420 U.S. 50, 62-64 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944).

73. See note 70 supra. See generally Dunau, Employee Participationin the Grievance
Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 751-54 (1950).
74. See generally Aaron, Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of FairRepresentation, 22
OHIO ST. L.J. 39, 39-42 (1961); Blumrosen, Legal Protection Against Exclusion From Union
Activities, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 21, 22-26 (1961); Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation:A
TheoreticalStructure, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1119, 1119-22 (1973); Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 151-59 (1957); Murphy, The Duty ofFairRepresentation UnderTaftHartley, 30 Mo. L. REV. 373, 373-90 (1965); Rosen, FairRepresentation,ContractBreach and

Fiduciary Obligations: Unions, Union Officials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15
HASTINGS L.J. 391, 395-409 (1964); Wellington, Union Democracy and FairRepresentation:
FederalResponsibility in a FederalSystem, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1331-39 (1958).
75. 232 U.S. 192 (1944).
76. Id. at 200.

77. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
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same policy was adopted with respect to section 8(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act. 78 It has since been applied rather extensively by the National
Labor Relations Board to remedy racial and other types of discrimination
within the bargaining unit's ranks. 79 Nevertheless, even this duty has its
limitations. Thus, in Vaca v. Sipes,8° it was held that the duty of fair
representation was not breached because a union settled an employee's
grievance short of arbitration.81 In Vaca, the Court reaffirmed the principle
that
[t]he federal labor laws seek to promote industrial peace and the
improvement of wages and working conditions by fostering a
system of employee organization and collective bargaining ....
The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and
administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests
of an individual employee
8 2 to the collective interests of all employees in a bargaining unit.
In the context of bargaining between an employer and a representative,
the leading cases applying the exclusivity principle are InternationalEnvelope Corp.8 3 and NationalLabor Relations Board v. DraperCorp.84 In
International Envelope, employees included within the coverage of a
collective bargaining agreement left their assigned positions during working
hours to request their employer to make certain changes in wage schedules.
This conduct was done without the sanction of the union. As a result, the
employees in question were discharged. The National Labor Relations
Board said:
When the Union was unable to effectuate their desires, the discharged employees decided to take matters into their own hands.
The Union, as the authorized representative of all the employees,
disapproved of the action of the minority group. .

.

. Under such

circumstances, when a dissident minority group takes action
contrary to the terms of an existing contract and contrary to the
wishes of the duly designated representative . . . disciplinary
action by the employer. . . is clearly justified. To rule otherwise
78. Id. at 255. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(3) (1970).
79. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1581, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 489 F.2d 635, 637 (5th
Cir. 1974); Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312,314-15 (1964), enf'd, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.D.
897, 899 (1964), enf'd, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 1,

Independent Metal Workers, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1575 (1964); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181, 185 (1962), enf't deniedon othergrounds,326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1965). All of these decisions

except Miranda Fuel involved racial discrimination.
80. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
81. Id. at 192. See Note, Individual Control Over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v.
Sipes, 77 YALE L.J. 559 (1968).

82. 386 U.S. at 182.
83. 34 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1941).
84. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
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would be to permit self-appointed dissenting ggroups within a
union to ignore or to defy the legally designated representative, to
take matters into their own hands, to destroy the collective agreements negotiated by majority organizations,
and to undermine the
85
process of collective bargaining itself.
In Draper, the employer appeared to be deliberately delaying the
negotiating process. As a result, a group of employees, acting without the
knowledge of the bargaining representative, engaged in a peaceful work
stoppage to compel their employer to begin negotiating seriously. The court
sustained their consequent discharges, saying:
Minority groups must acquiesce in the action of the majority and
the bargaining agent they have chosen; and, just as a minority has
no right to enter into separate bargaining arrangements with the
employer, so it has no right to take independent action to interfere
with the course of bargaining which is being carried on" by the duly
authorized bargaining agent chosen by the majority.
The Draper rule, which has been followed by other circuits, 87 supports a
doctrine of non-intervention even where minority action is meant to support
the position of the union. Some courts have attempted to limit the logic of
that case to situations where dissident action is antipathetic to the wishes of
the collective bargaining representative's hierarchy, 88 but this limiting
construction has been questioned 89 and certainly is not a majority view. At
least in the context of federal labor legislation, Draper and International
Envelope represent the governing law.
The situation in Wisconsin is similar. Section 111.70 of the Wisconsin
statutes, 9° which concerns generally the right of municipal employees to
organize and join labor unions, does not mention the concept of exclusivity.
But that requirement was read into the statute by the state supreme court in
Board of School Directorsof the City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employ85. 34 N.L.R.B. at 1283.
86. 145 F.2d at 203.
87. See Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Tanner

Motor Livery, Ltd. 419 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1969); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. NLRB, 413
F.2d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755, 761 (5th Cir.
1966); NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661, 662 (7th Cir. 1963); Plasti-Line, Inc. v.
NLRB, 278 F.2d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224, 226 (9th

Cir. 1954); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 1953).
88. See NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1964); Western Contracting
Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893, 896-98 (10th Cir. 1963).

89. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 1974); Western
Addition Community Organization v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds sub noma. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50 (1975); Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Shop

Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786,790-91 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419
F.2d 216, 221 (9th Cir. 1969).
90. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (West 1974).
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ment Relations Commission.91 Thus, when the Wisconsin court in Madison
came to consider the problem, it had a body of federal and state precedent on
which to rely. The court began its analysis by saying that any abridgement of
92
free speech must be justified by the assertion of a compelling state interest.
It then cited its decision in Milwaukee, 93 acknowledging that state laws
relating to municipal employees incorporate the principle of exclusivity.
The considerations inherent in that principle were explained 94 by citations to
the language of Vaca v. Sipes 95 and Medo Photo Supply Corp.v. National
Labor Relations Board,96 quoted earlier. 97 Having thus stated the general
doctrine, the question that then needed to be answered was whether Holmquist and his colleagues had attempted to negotiate with the Board. In
Milwaukee, the state court had defined "negotiating" as" 'to communicate
or confer with another so as to arrive at the settlement of some matter: meet
with another so as to arrive through discussion at some kind of agreement or
compromise about something: come to terms [especially] in state matters by
meetings and discussions.' "98 In that case, the school board and a majority
union were also in the midst of negotiations. At a public meeting of the
Board, a minority union representative sought to speak on subjects of
collective bargaining; the Board denied him permission to do so. The state
supreme court upheld this denial, placing emphasis on the statutory requirement that no final action should be taken in employment negotiations until
the negotiated matters are discussed in a public meeting. 99 Thus, the court in
Milwaukee said that such an "open meeting is the necessary and final step
in the 'negotiation' process between the school board and the majority
teachers' union.'100 In light of this language, one could argue that Holmquist had also been engaged in negotiation when he delivered his statement
before the Board. The court in Milwaukee had, however, made one remark
that undermined the viability of such an argument; it had said "[i]f this case
91. 42 Wis. 2d 637, 645-46, 168 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (1969). Accord, Board of Educ. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 52 Wis. 2d 625, 633, 191 N.W.2d 242, 246 (1971);

LaCrosse County Institution Employees Local 227 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 52 Wis. 2d 295, 300, 190 N.W.2d 204, 207 (1971).
92. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employmert Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 211, 231 N.W.2d 206, 212 (1975).

93. Id. at 208-09, 231 N.W.2d at 212.
94. Id. at 212, 231 N.W.2d at 213.
95. 321 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1944).
96. 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).

97. See notes 72, 82 and accompanying text supra.
98. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 42 Wis. 2d 637,652, 168 N.W.2d 92,99 (1969) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1961)).
99. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
100. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 42 Wis. 2d 637, 653, 168 N.W.2d 92, 100 (1969).
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involved solely the giving of a position statement at an ordinary meeting of a
public body, we would have some difficulty in labeling the conduct
'negotiating.' "101 One reply to this contention is that the convocation of the
Board was not an "ordinary meeting" but a step in the negotiation process.
But the state supreme court in Madison went even further in explaining why
the statement in Milwaukee had no application to the instant case:
We agree with the trial court that this was in fact negotiating and
one need only read the Holmquist statement to see that the "information" that was being imparted was a request that the whole fairshare issue be deferred along with a counter proposal as to how
the issue should be handled for possible future consideration. It
also criticized MTI's handling of the negotiations in this respect.
The statement given by Mr. Holmquist was more than a mere
statement of a position; it was an argument for it. Furthermore,
though Mr. Holmquist was not speaking for a minority union, as in
the case of [Milwaukee], it is obvious he was speaking for an ad
hoc group which was opposed to including a fair-share agreement
in any contract being negotiated at that time.102
Thus, the state court did find that negotiation had occurred, and this
finding triggered its application of the exclusivity doctrine. The United
States Supreme Court noted the lower tribunal's holdings on this point,"0 3
but did not deal with them. It never discussed the exclusivity doctrine, but
simply asserted that the state had established no compelling justification for
its abridgement of speech. In so doing, it appeared to suggest that the
exclusivity doctrine, deemed compelling in cases like Medo Photo, Vaca
and Draper, where employment dismissals for engaging in a free speech
were condoned, would not control in a case like Madison, where the effect
of engaging in free speech was solely a denial of further access to speak at
one particular forum on a set of given subjects. If this is an accurate
assessment of Madison, one then confronts a further question: how is that
ruling to be reconciled with the Court's other key opinion handed down this
term on the First Amendment rights of municipal employees, Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education?10 4

b. First Amendment Rights and the Agency Shop in the Public Sector:
Abood v. DetroitBoard of Education
In City of Madison Joint School DistrictNo. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,10 5 the Court seemed to imply that the First
101. Id. at 652, 168 N.W.2d at 99.
102. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 69 Wis.2d 200, 215, 231 N.W.2d 206, 214 (1975).
103. 429 U.S. at 173-74.

104. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
105. 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See notes 1-104 and accompanying text supra.
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Amendment protections afforded public employees might be greater than
those accorded to workers in the private sector. Soon after that ruling,
however, the Court-decided Abood v. DetroitBoard ofEducation,'06 which
indicated that five of the justices would be willing to place both classes of
employees on an equal footing, at least with respect to the potential remedies available to them for incursions upon their constitutional rights caused
by an agency shop.
(1) The Decision

Under the National Labor Relations Act," ° regulation of municipal or
state employees is left to the states themselves.1" 8 Michigan adopted a
regulatory scheme quite similar in some respects to the federal model.1°9
Under that scheme, employees of local governmental units are permitted to
organize themselves, 110 to elect their negotiating representative by secret
ballot"'I and to bargain collectively. 112 An elected bargaining agent who has
obtained the support of a majority of employees within a bargaining unit is
statutorily deemed to be the exclusive representative of all such employees 113 and owes each of them a correlative duty of fair representation. 114 It is
106. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
108. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
109. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Board of Educ., 393 Mich. 616,635-36,227 N.W.2d 736,744-45
(1975), appeal dismissed sub nom. Crestwood Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 427 U.S. 901
(1976); Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n v. Reeths-Puffer School Dist., 391 Mich. 253,
260 & n.ll, 215 N.W.2d 672, 675 & n.l1 (1974); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Detroit, 391
Mich. 44, 53, 214 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 (1974). Nevertheless, there are some differences, the
most notable being that Michigan public employees are forbidden from striking. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (1970). The National Labor Relations Act contains no similar prohibition.
110. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.209 (1970). For federal analogues, see 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1970).
111. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.215 (1970). For federal analogues, see 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1970).
112. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.212 (1970). For federal analogues, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(e)(1) (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970).
113. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.211 (1970):
Representatives designated or selected for purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the public employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the public employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, and shall be so recognized by the public employer: Provided, That any individual employee at any time may present grievances to his
employer and have the grievances adjusted without intervention of the bargaining
representative, if the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective
bargaining contract or agreement then in effect, provided that the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
For a federal analogue, see 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). For consideration of the exclusivity
doctrine by the Supreme Court, see notes 67-104 and accompanying text supra.
114. See, e.g., Lowe v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 705, 389 Mich. 123, 145-52,
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in light of this general background that the Abood case arose.
In 1967, the Detroit Federation of Teachers (Union) was certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all instructors employed by the Detroit Board of Education (Board). Thereafter, the Union and the Board
entered into a contract effective from July 1, 1969 to July 1, 1971. Among
the provisions of that contract was an agency shop clause, which required
every teacher who had not joined the Union within either sixty days after
being hired or sixty days after January 26, 1970, the effective date of the
clause, to remit to that organization a "service charge" equivalent to the
regular dues paid by union members. Failure to make such a remittance was
a ground for dismissal. Nothing in the contract required the teacher either to
join the union or to participate in its affairs.
On November 7, 1969, Christine Warczak and other teachers filed a
class action in state court against the Board, the Union and certain officers
of the latter. The plaintiffs were either unwilling or had refused to pay dues
and objected to collective bargaining in the public sector. They further
alleged that the union engaged:
in a number and variety of activities and programs which are
economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature
of which Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no
voice, and which are not and will not be collective bargaining
activities, i.e., the negotiation and administration of contracts
with Defendant Board, and that a substantial part of the sums
required to be paid under said Agency Shop Clause are used and
will continue to be used for the support of such activities and
programs, and not solely for the purpose of defraying the cost of
such activities and programs, and not solely for the purpose of
defraying the cost of Defendarit Federation of its activities 16as
bargaining agent for teachers employed by Defendant Board.1
The complaint requested that the agency shop clause be declared invalid
under state law and under the federal Constitution. A Michigan trial court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, 117 and an appeal was
promptly taken.
During this period, a number of independent but relevant occurrences
took place. A second action instituted by D. Louis Abood was filed in the
same trial court; the substance of the complaint was identical to that
presented in Warczak, and similar relief was requested. This suit was held

205 N.W.2d 167, 177-80 (1973); Wayne County Community College Fed'n of Teachers Local

2000 v. Poe, 1976 Mich. Emp. Relations Comm'n 347, 350-53; AFSCME Local 836 v. Solomon,
1976 Mich. Emp. Relations Comm'n 84, 89.
115. The following factual narrative is taken from the Supreme Court's opinion, 431 U.S. at
211-16, except where otherwise noted.

116. Id. at 213 (footnote omitted).
117. Warsczak v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970).
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in abeyance pending disposition of the Warczak case on appeal. Moreover,
although a number of Michigan trial courts in this period had upheld agency
shops in the public sector," ls the state's supreme court ruled in one of these
cases, Smigel v. Southgate Community School District,119 that such arrangements violated Michigan law. 120 Accordingly, the judgment in Warczak's case was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Smigel.
On remand, it was consolidated with Abood's action. At this juncture, the
1 21
state legislature enacted section 423.210(l)(c) of the Michigan laws
which in effect overruled Smigel and permitted the inclusion of agency shop

provisions in contracts involving public employees. Consequently, when the
trial judge in the newly-consolidated Abood and Warczak cases was again
asked to render a summary judgment for the defendants he did so, applying

retroactively the principle announced in section 423.210(1)(c). A Michigan
appellate court reversed this ruling. Although the court of appeals concluded
that compulsory contribution of service fees to a collective bargaining

representative might abridge First Amendment freedoms, it found that the
appellants had no legitimate claim because they had never made their
objections to specific expenditures known to the Union. 22 Nevertheless, the
appellate court reversed the judgment against Abood and Warczak, finding
that the trial judge had erred in giving retrospective application to section
123
423.210(1)(c).
The United States Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the state's
appellate court. 12 4 Justice Stewart's majority opinion, in which Justices
118. See, e.g., Grand Rapids v. AFSCME Local 1061, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2259-61 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1969); Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362,2364 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969) (endorsed validity
of agency shop, but only if agency fee reflected a prorated share of the costs of collective
bargaining); Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 70 L.R.R.M. 2042,2043 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1968); City of Warren v. Firefighters Local 1383, 68 L.R.R.M. 2977, 2978 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1968). See generally Note, Impact of the Agency Shop on LaborRelations in the Public Sector,
55 CORNELL L. REv. 547, 653-65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Impact of Agency Shop].
119. 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972).
120. d. at 543, 202 N.W.2d at 308.
121. MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210(1)(c) (1973):
[N]othing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from
making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative as defined in section
I1 to require as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit
pay to the exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount
of dues uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative.
122. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 102, 230 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1975).
123. Id.
124. The Michigan Supreme Court had denied appellants any review and they had appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1970), which authorizes
direct appeal whenever the constitutionality of a state law is in question. The Court noted that
the appellate tribunal's remand could only have been "for a ministerial purpose, such as the
correction of language in the trial court's judgment." 431 U.S. at 216 n.8. In light of this fact,
the ruling of the court of appeals could be deemed "final" for purposes of section 1257(2). Id.
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Brennan, White, Marshall, Rehnquist and Stevens joined, said that the
disposition of the case was, to a great extent, governed by two prior rulings
of the Court: Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson'25 and International Association of Machinists v. Street. 2 6 Both these cases involved
challenges to section 152, Eleventh, of Title forty-five of the United States
Code,12 7 a provision of the Railway Labor Act of 1926,128 which authorizes
railway carriers to enter into contracts with railway workers' unions containing agency shop clauses almost identical to the one at issue in Abood. In
Hanson, a group of employees sought to enjoin enforcement of a union shop
clause1 29 inserted in a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to section
152, Eleventh. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the enforcement of
See, e.g., Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379,382 (1953); Republic Natural Gas
Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1948); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
329 U.S. 69, 72-74 (1946). There was also a mootness problem, since the contract which both
Warczak and Abood complained of expired on July 1, 1971, well before the case reached the
Supreme Court. But the Court observed that a successor agreement reached between the Union
and the Board in 1973 also contained an agency shop clause and that the constitutional claims of
the appellants were such that they survived the expiration of the original contract. 431 U.S. at
216 n.9.
125. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
126. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
127. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970):
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of
the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as
defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated
and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter shall be permitted(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that
within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of
such agreements, whichever is the latter, all employees shall become members of the
labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement
shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom
membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally
applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom membership
was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and
penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.
For a similar provision in the National Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
128. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
129. A union shop is one wherein an employee must both pay dues and become a full union
member. Impact of Agency Shop, supra note 13, at 547 n.2. In the federal context, the
distinction is minimized: "It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but
membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned
only upon payment of fees and dues." NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742
(1963). Nevertheless, in some contexts the distinction would seem to be meaningful. See id. at
744. See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 828 (1961). This would seemingly be true in a
case like Abood where compulsory membership, to the extent that it requires full participation
in union affairs, would seem to present an even more egregious infringement of freedom of
association than the requirements of agency shop.
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the clause should be enjoined because employees who disagreed with the
purposes to which their dues payments were put were thus being deprived of
the right of association guaranteed them by the First Amendment. 130 The
United States Supreme Court reversed. While it acknowledged the presence
of constitutional issues, 131 it found that nothing in the record indicated that
assessments were being used for any purpose other than the defrayment of
collective bargaining costs. 132 Absent such evidence that the imposition of
union dues resulted in a situation where persons are compelled to support
political, ideological or religious causes which they disagree with, the Court
in Hanson held that "the requirement for financial support of the collectivebargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work. . . does not
violate . . .the First Amendmen[t].'1 33 Indeed, the Court therein found
that section 152, Eleventh, could be fully justified as an effort by Congress
to promote peaceful labor relations between interstate carriers and their
workers. 134 In Street, the record did contain findings that dues exacted
under a union shop clause were being expended for political and ideological
objectives. 135 The Court construed the relevant legislative history as signifying that Congress only intended to permit such assessments to the extent that
they were utilized to defray the costs of bargaining. 136 Thus, use of compulsory union dues to finance political campaigns and the like was said to
violate the Railway Labor Act itself. 137 The Court in Abood noted that both
Hanson and Street thus recognized the compelling need for the doctrine of
exclusivity in the field of labor representation. 138 If a bargaining unit is
130. Hanson v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 160 Neb. 669, 671, 71 N.W.2d 526, 545-46 (1955).
Section 152, Eleventh is permissive, not mandatory. But the United States Supreme Court in
Hanson held that if a private contract entered into between a carrier and a collective-bargaining
representative incorporated a union shop clause, any inconsistent state law would fall by the
wayside. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956). In contrast, the

parallel provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), has been
held to be limited by section 14(b) of that act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970), and thus does not
supersede conflicting state law. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 757
(1963). See Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410 (10th Cir. 1971).
131. 351 U.S. at 231-32.
132. See id. at 238.

133. Id.
134. See id. at 235.
135. Specific findings of fact to this effect were made by the trial court. See 367 U.S. at
744-45 n.2. That court therefore issued a decree enjoining enforcement of the union shop clause
in question; the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decree. International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 47, 108 S.E.2d 796, 809 (1959).

136. See 367 U.S. at 750-64.
137. See id. at 768-69.
138. Accord, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 62-63 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); Medo Photo
Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1944); Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40,
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served by only one agent elected by a majority of the constituents of that
unit, then employees are saved from the confusion resulting from an attempt
to enforce two different contracts, employers can avoid having to confront
contrasting and perhaps conflicting demands presented by two distinct
representatives and the possibility of inter-union rivalries endangering both
the administration of negotiated contracts and the very advantages conferred
by employee collectivization in the first place are minimized. 13 9 But since
the duties of an exclusive representative are so great, the costs attendant to
the performance of those duties are also substantial. In light of this fact, both
Street and Hanson were said to have acknowledged the desirability of
counteracting the incentive of employees to become "free riders," individuals who reaped the benefits of union representation but refused to contribute
their fair share of the expenses attendant to such representation. 14 Justice
Stewart admitted that "[t]o be required to help finance the union as a
collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in
some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement of
ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit.' 141 Nevertheless, he
claimed that both Street and Hanson had deemed such an infringement
"constitutionally justified" by the determination of Congress that the union
shop was vitally necessary to a stable system of labor-management rela-

tions. 142
The majority then declared that similar considerations had prompted
the Michigan legislature to enact section 423.210(1)(c) in 1973:
The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers'
unions, holding quite different views as to the proper class hours,
class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance procedures, each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no
different in kind from the evils that the exclusivity rule in the
Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. 143
Under this logic, the service charge imposed by the union in Abood could
be upheld as long as the sums thereby accrued were used to finance
disbursements by the union concerning collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment. But the appellants sought to distin300 U.S. 515, 545-49 (1937). For further discussion of this doctrine, see notes 67-104 and
accompanying text supra.
139. 431 U.S. at 220-21. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1975).

140. 431 U.S. at 221-22. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S.
407, 415-16 (1976); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-63 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (1956); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).

141. 431 U.S. at 222 (footnote omitted).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 224
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guish their case from Hanson and Street on two grounds. First, they
asserted that their suit involved a situation where the state rather than a
private firm served as the employer, thus implicating directly certain
constitutional guarantees that were involved only tangentially in the Court's
prior decisions; and second, they argued that collective bargaining in the
public sector is itself inherently "political," so that compulsory financial
yields the imposed "ideological conformsupport of such a goal necessarily
144
Hanson.
in
missing
found
ity"
Justice Stewart rejected both contentions. He found the argument
premised on the fact of state employment irrelevant. The union shop upheld
in Hanson had also been found to be the product of governmental action, so
the claims of the plaintiff in that case had been repudiated not for lack of
official sanction, but rather for lack of any violation of the First Amendment. 145 As for the second contention, Justice Stewart admitted that differences exist between the private and public employer.1 A private employer
is guided by the profit motive and the dictates of the market system and is
more likely to evince great discretion in bargaining with unions over items
to be included in a contemplated contract. Such an employer makes decisions in collective-bargaining situations that are governed by the precept of
self-interest. Conversely, a public employer renders unpriced services that
are price inelastic because they fall into the category of necessities. He is
less likely to act as a cohesive unit with other such employers because the
public sector consists of a bureaucratic hierarchy that limits severely both
the range of options available in negotiations with unions and the scope of
144. Id. at 226.
145. The Court in Hanson had noted that "[t~he enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates,
though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction." Railway Employes' Dept.
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956). With respect to the parallel provision of the National
Labor Relations Act, see note 127 supra, there is a division of opinion on the issue of state
action. Compare Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 16-17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 872 (1971) and Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (9th Cir. 1970)
(finding state action) with Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d
305, 309-10 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974) and Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
443 F.2d 408, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1971) (finding no state action or declining to rule on the issue).
See also Wellington, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70

YALE L. J. 345, 354-59 (1961).
146. 431 U.S. at 227-28. For discussion of these differences, see, e.g., H. WELLINGTON &
R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 117-64 (1971); Shaw & Clark, The Practical
Differences Between Publicand PrivateSector Collective Bargaining, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 867,
868-83 (1972); Smith, State and LocalAdvisory Reports on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A ComparativeAnalysis, 67 MICH. L. REV. 891,898-929 (1969); Summers, PublicEmployee Bargaining:A PoliticalPerspective, 83 YALE L. J. 1156, 1172-99 (1974); Project, Collective
Bargainingand Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 887, 963-1009 (1972).
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authority of the one negotiating on behalf of the employer. He makes
decisions that, because of his ultimate accountability to the electorate, are
inherently "political," that is, gauged with reference to voters' sentiments
about unionism, tax increases and the quality and importance of the service
that is the subject of negotiations. 147 Thus, unions dealing with public
employers do confront strategic and tactical problems quite distinguishable
from those of unions dealing with private employers. One can therefore
legitimately question the appropriateness of applying a model of labor law
developed in the private sector to the public bargaining situation. But Justice
Stewart reasoned that the Court need not concern itself with questions of
appropriateness; the Michigan legislature had already performed that
task.148 Thus, the only constitutional inquiry left was "whether a public
employee has a weightier First Amendment interest than a private employee
in not being compelled to contribute to the costs of exclusive union repre49
sentation." 1
To this question, the majority provided a negative response. It noted
that workers in the private and public sectors possess similar skills, have
similar needs and seek similar advantages. " 'The uniqueness of public
employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed; the
uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.' "!1o A worker who
disagrees with the policies espoused by his union can always express his
dissatisfaction through the manner in which he casts his ballot in a union
election or through expressions of opinion communicated either through the
media or at forums dedicated to the public. 151 The majority admitted that
unions of public employees engage in political activities to the extent that
they attempt to influence governmental decisionmaking.15 2 However,it also
observed that political speech is fully protected by the First Amendment, so
that affixing the label "political" to a given act of expression in no way
predetermines the outcome of the basic constitutional inquiry.' 5 3 The Court
147. 431 U.S. at 227-29.

148. Id. at 229. See id. at 224-25 & n.20.
149. Id. at 229.
150. Id. at 230 (quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining:Problems of Governmental
Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 669, 670 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Summers]).
151. Id. at 230 (citing City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174 (1976)).
152. Id. at 231.

153. Id. at 232. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (the First Amendment "secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes"); Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (recognizing that the First Amendment
protects society's greater interest in "untrammeled political debate"); NAACP v. Alabama ex

rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be
advanced. . . pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters"); Board of Educ. v.
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therefore held that Hanson and Street were fully applicable to the facts
presented in Abood, at least to the extent the sums exacted were used to pay
the costs of collective bargaining. 154
The Michigan court of appeals had ruled that state law "sanctions the
use of nonunion members' fees for purposes other than collective bargaining."1 55 Thus, the Court in Abood was compelled to do something not done
in Street: discuss the constitutional, as opposed to statutory, permissibility
of such a practice. Justice Stewart recognized two basic principles:156 first,
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to associate for
the purposes of advancing beliefs and ideas' 57 and second, that public
employment may not be conditioned upon the surrender of a constitutional
right. 158 Included among such rights is the freedom to contribute to an
organization advancing a cause in which one believes; any limitations upon
such a freedom "implicate fundamental First Amendment interests." 159 In
Abood, however, individuals were compelled to contribute, rather than
prohibited from doing so. Nevertheless, the Court observed that "at the
heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free
to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped
by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the state." 160 This
principle was said to prohibit the appellees from requiring a person, as a
condition of public employment, to contribute to the support of causes that
he opposes. 16 1 Thus, the Court said:
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend funds
for the expression of political views, on behalf of political candidates, or toward the advancement of other ideological causes not
germane to its duties as collective-bargaining representative.
Rather, the Constitution requires only that such expenditures be
financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by employees
who do not object to advancing those ideas and who are not
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be

orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion").
154. 431 U.S. at 232.
155. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 99, 230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1975).
156. 431 U.S. at 233-34.

157. Accord, Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1976); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477, 487 (1975);Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
430 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
158. Accord, Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1976); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
159. 431 U.S. at 234 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976)).

160. Id. at 234-35. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,356-57 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
161.

431 U.S. at 235.
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coerced into doing so against
162 their will by the threat of loss of
governmental employment.
The word "germane" admittedly presented some difficulties because the
line between unrelated and related activities in the public sector might be
rather difficult to draw. "The process of establishing a written collectivebargaining agreement prescribing the terms and conditions of public employment may require not merely concord at the bargaining table, but
subsequent approval by other public authorities; related budgeting and

appropriations decisions might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining
process." 163 The Court declined to address this problem, however, because
the case came before it by way of a judgment on the pleadings, so that the
164
underlying evidentiary record was inadequate.
The Court next proceeded to consider the problem of an appropriate

remedy. In Street, the relief of an injunction prohibiting the union from
165
expending any dues for political purposes had been deemed improper;
conversely, the Michigan appellate court's denial of any redress whatsoever
in Abood was "unduly restrictive." 166 Street had sketched two potential
remedies: "an injunction against expenditure for political causes opposed
by each complaining employee of a sum, from those moneys to be spent by

the union for political purposes, which is so much of the moneys exacted
from him as is the proportion of the union's total expenditures made for such
political activities to the union's total budget" 1 67 or restitution of a prorated
share of dues paid equal to the fraction of total union expenditures that were
made for political purposes opposed by the employee. 161 In Brotherhoodof
Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 169 the Court had suggested a
162. Id. at 235-36 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 236.
164. Id.
165. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 771-73 (1961). The Court
relied on the policy of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1970), which is against
the use of labor injunctions. Ordering the union to make political expenditures only out of those
sums paid by a nondissenter would also not suffice:
But even if all collections from nonmembers must be directly committed to paying
bargaining costs, this fact is of bookkeeping significance only rather than a matter of
real substance. It must be remembered that the service fee is admittedly the exact
equal of membership initiation fees and monthly dues. . . .If the union's total budget
is divided between collective bargaining and institutional expenses and if nonmember
payments, equal to those of a member, go entirely for collective bargaining costs, the
nonmember will pay more of these expenses than his pro rata share. The member will
pay less and to that extent a portion of his fees and dues is available to pay institutional
expenses.
Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753-54 (1963).
166. 431 U.S. at 240
167. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774-75 (1961).
168. Id. at 775.
169. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
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practical remedial decree consisting of "(1) the refund to [the employee] of
a portion of the exacted funds in the same proportion that union political
expenditures bear to total union expenditures, and (2) a reduction of future
such exactions from him by the same proportion." 71 0 Justice Stewart found
that such a decree could, if necessary, 17 1 be utilized in Abood. 172 As for the
fact that the appellants had not objected to specific expenditures, the Court
simply remarked that Allen obviated the necessity for such a requirement. 173
It thus vacated the judgment of the Michigan court of appeals.
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
issued an elaborate concurrence. The essence of his argument was that the
majority opinion did not go far enough in protecting the rights of public
employees. He first contended that Hanson and Street were inapplicable. 174
He noted that both decisions explicitly rested on the construction of the
Railway Labor Act, not on analysis of constitutional issues. 175 Because of
the narrowness of the holdings in these cases, Justice Powell found that they
left three issues undecided: first, whether the withholding of financial
support from a union's political activities is speech protected by the First
Amendment; 176 second, whether, assuming constitutional interests were
implicated, "Congress might go further in approving private arrangements
that would interfere with those interests than it could in commanding such
arrangements";177 third, whether, assuming infringement of First Amendment rights had occurred, that infringement could be justified by a compelling governmental interest.178
According to Justice Powell, the misplaced reliance by the majority on
Hanson and Street necessitated the erroneous conclusion that a state can
170. Id. at 122.

171. The union had adopted a plan whereby a dissenter who gave notice at the beginning of
each school year would be refunded a prorated share of his service charge to-reflect that portion
of the charge spent for political purposes. 431 U.S. at 240 n.41. Similar intra-union schemes
have been held to satisfy the requirements of Street and Allen. See, e.g., Reid v. United Auto
Workers Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir.),cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973); Seay v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371 F. Supp. 754, 763 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on this point, 533 F.2d

1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit in Seay ruled that the plaintiffs had presented
legitimate issues about the suitability of the intra-union remedy being offered. They had
contended that the remedy required them personally to challenge the amount the union claims it
spends on political activities and that the union would not fairly and honestly determine the

amount of the rebate to which they were entitled. 533 F.2d at 1131-32.
172. 431 U.S. at 240.

173. Id. at 241.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 245 (Powell J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).
Id. at 246-48.
Id. at 248.
Id.

178. Id. at 249-50.
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require of its own employees exactly what it can permit private employers to
demand. 179 He believed that the converse is true, that the state is required to
present a greater justification for its impingements upon constitutional
rights. Thus,
[t]he state in this case has not merely authorized agency-shop
agreements between willing parties; it has negotiated and adopted
such an agreement itself. Acting through the Detroit Board of
Education, the state has undertaken to compel employees to pay
full fees to a union as a condition of employment. Accordingly,
the Board's collective-bargaining agreement, like any other enactment of state law, is fully subject to the constraints that the
Constitution imposes on coercive governmental regulation.I18
The majority's approach, on the other hand, led to the conclusion that
compulsory financing of a union's ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining is violative per se of that First Amendment regardless of any
asserted governmental justification, whereas involuntary subsidization of
union activity related to bargaining is permissible per se, because it is
presumptively relevant to a compelling state concern. Moreover, under the
majority's approach, the burden of proof of distinguishing between the two
fell squarely on the shoulders of the aggrieved employee.
Justice Powell noted that Buckley v. Valeo 181 had held that making a
contribution is part and parcel of the general right of association protected
by the First Amendment. 1 82 Like the majority, he drew the same conclusion
with respect to the refusal to contribute. 183 The only question left was
whether the fact that the case arose in the public sector required different
considerations. Justice Powell concluded that it did not. A public employee
union, like a political party, is primarily concerned with influencing "public
decisionmaking in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its
membership." 184 While he admitted that the Detroit Federation of Teachers,
unlike a political party, was composed of individuals sharing similar
economic interests and possibly similar professional perspectives on a certain range of policy issues, he found no reason for this consensus to be the
basis on which such individuals could be denied constitutional protections
179. Id.at 250.
180. Id. at 253. See also Blumrosen, Group Interests inLabor Law.13 RUTGERS L. REV.
432, 482-83 (1959); Summers, supra note 150, at 670; Symposium, Individual Rights inIndustrial Self-Government-A "State Action " Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 4, 19-30 (1968).
181. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Buckley invalidated various provisions of the amended Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), as amended by Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974), one of

which limited the amounts that individual could contribute to federal election campaigns.
182. 424 U.S. at 22.
183. 431 U.S. at 256.

184. Id.
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afforded to other citizens.18 5 Nor could he find any ground on which to
distinguish "collective bargaining activities" from "political activities"; in
the public sector the two simply merge. 186
In order to apply the usual First Amendment analysis, it thus became
necessary to identify the allegedly compelling state interests asserted by
Michigan in this case. There were three: the exclusivity doctrine, the
deterrence of "free riders" and the promotion of stable labor relations. Of
these, Justice Powell said, "[w]hile these interests may well justify encouraging agency-shop arrangements in the private sector, there is far less
reason to believe they justify the intrusion upon First Amendment rights that
results from compelled support for a union as a condition of government
employment." 18 7 He noted that in the Madison case188 the Court had
reserved judgment on the constitutional validity of the exclusivity doctrine
in the public sector, but in Abood that very doctrine was used by the
majority to justify infringement of a First Amendment right. 189 As a result,
the dissident employee "is excluded in theory only from engaging in a
meaningful dialogue with his employer on the subjects of collective bargaining, a dialogue that is reserved to the union."190 Justice Powell admitted that
the state might have proven the necessity for such a limitation on the speech
of dissenters; but it had not done so in the context of this case, where no
evidentiary record had ever been compiled. 191 Thus, by presuming the
existence of a sufficient justification, the majority ignored "the importance
of avoiding unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions." 192 The same
criticism was levelled at the "free rider" and "promotion of labor harmony" rationales. 193 The concurring justices saw no reason to replace the
state's usual burden of proof with presumptions having no foundation in the
record.
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence also noted the discrepancy alluded to
by Justice Powell, but he claimed that Michigan's asserted interests fell
within the category of those sufficiently important to justify impingements
185. Id. at 256-57.
186. Id. at 257.

187. Id. at 260-61.
188. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). See notes 67-104 and accompanying text supra.
189. See 431 U.S. at 262.
190. Id.
191.

Id.

192. Id. (quoting the majority opinion, 431 U.S. at 236-37). See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 503 (1961); Parker v. County of Los Angeles, 338 U.S. 327, 333 (1949); Electric Bond &
Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 303 U.S. 419, 443'(1938); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,concurring).
193. 431 U.S. at 262-63.
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on constitutional rights. He thus joined the opinion of the majority. 194 So did
Justice Stevens; in his separate concurrence, he merely noted that any
decision regarding the appropriate remedy would have to await the full
development of the facts at trial. 195
(2) Analysis
Consideration of the problems raised by Abood may best proceed by
analyzing the issues broached explicitly or implicitly by Justice Powell's
concurrence. These issues may be categorized under three broad headings:
(1) the applicability of Hanson and Street, (2) the applicability of the
remedy devised in Allen and (3) the implications of the majority's decision
with regard to the First Amendment analysis to be used in cases involving
public employees.
(a) Applicability of Hanson and Street
The majority, as Justice Powell points out, misused the doctrines
enunciated in these two decisions. This conclusion is borne out by a
consideration of those cases. Hanson analyzed briefly the relevant legislative history of section 152, Eleventh.196 The Court noted that, prior to 1951,
the Railway Labor Act prohibited union shop provisions, ostensibly because
such clauses were used by employers to establish and maintain company
unions. But by 1950, this practice had disappeared and, as a result, there
was a significant "free rider" problem that Congress sought to eliminate.
The Court observed that the federal government "has authority to adopt all
appropriate measures to 'facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes which
threaten the service of the necessary agencies of interstate transportation.' "197 Thus, the statute was a legitimate exercise of the power of
194. Id. at 424-44 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). As Justice Rehnquist pointedly observes, the
position taken by Justice Powell in his concurrence in Abood seems to conflict with that taken
in his dissent in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod invalidated the system of patronage
politics practiced in Cook County, Illinois, where a non-civil service public employee had to
join the political party of his superior in order to retain his job. Justice Powell's dissent in that
case observed that because the patronage system stabilizes political parties, stimulates partisan
activity and ensures that the party organization will function meaningfully on the local level, it
thus served sufficiently important governmental interests to withstand a constitutional challange. Id. at 87 (Powell, J.,
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.)
One can only
question why, if these interests are deemed vital to the state, furtherance of the exclusivity
doctrine is not. But this may be reading too much into Justice Powell's concurrence in Abood.
He may be suggesting that, given a sufficiently detailed record, he would be willing to uphold
the Michigan law in question.
195. 431 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J.,concurring).
196. See Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (1956).

197. Id. at 233 (quoting Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930)).
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Congress over interstate commerce. The Court in Hanson admitted that
there might be better alternatives for achieving stability in labor relations
than the union shop, but it concluded that it was not the function of the
judiciary to make such basic policy choices. 198 As for First Amendment
considerations, the Court found none. On the basis of the record presented,
no impairment of freedom of speech or freedom of association could be
discerned.199 But it warned that:
Congress endeavored to safeguard against [the possibility of such
impairment] by making explicit that no conditions to membership
may be imposed except as respects "periodic dues, initiation fees,
or assessments." If other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the
exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover
for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention
of the First Amendment,
this judgment will not prejudice the
2
decision in that case. 00
Implicit in this language was the suggestion that a future case involving
more egregious facts would be judged under usual First Amendment standards rather than on the basis of a construction of the Railway Labor Act.
Street, however, confounded one's expectations in this respect. In that
case, there were findings of fact by the trial court that assessments had been
used to finance partisan political campaigns and to propagate political and
economic doctrines with which the appellees disagreed. 20 1 The Court admitted that the case was thus distinguishable from Hanson, but concluded
that its reading of the relevant statute precluded any necessity for reviewing
the "correctness of the constitutional determinations" made by the lower
courts. 2°2 It then conducted a detailed exegesis of the history underlying the
enactment of section 152, Eleventh.2 0 3 This retrospective analysis yielded
certain important facts. The railroad industry had a tradition of voluntary
unionism. In 1934, when the issue of railway union security was first
presented to Congress, only the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen maintained "percentage" contracts, requiring that in certain categories of represented workers, a specific percentage of them had to be union members. 2°
The unions asked Congress for the right to include security clauses in
198. Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1956).
199. Id. at 238.

200. Id.
201. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 n.2 (1961).
202. Id. at 750. The Georgia Supreme Court in Street had held that "[olne who is compelled
to contribute the fruits of his labor to support or promote political or economic programs or

candidates for public office is just as much deprived of his freedom of speech as if he were
compelled to give his vocal support to doctrines he opposes." International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 46, 108 S.E.2d 796, 808 (1959).
203. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750-68 (1961).

204. Id. at 751.
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contracts if they so wished; while the House deferred to this request, the
Senate refused to do so.2"5 The resulting legislation, section 152, Fifth,
prohibited both the closed shop and the "yellow dog" contract. 2°6 Renewed
agitation for the right to draft security clauses was undertaken by nonoperating unions during World War II. A Presidential Emergency Board denied a
request for permission to include such clauses in contracts, relying on an
opinion by the Attorney General ruling that the Railway Labor Act precluded the creation of the closed shop. 20 7 The issue was again placed before
Congress in 1950. That body acknowledged that in the railway industry, the
federal government "consistently adhered to a regulatory policy which
places the responsibility squarely upon the carriers and the unions mutually
to work out settlements of all aspects of the labor relationship' ;208 indeed,
the Railway Labor Act of 1926 was virtually written by labor and management and subsequently endorsed by Congress. 20 9 The 1934 amendments
were said to have been enacted solely in order to further this policy of selfadjustment. 2 10 Thus,
[i]n sum, in prescribing collective bargaining as the method of
settling railway disputes, in conferring upon the unions the status
of exclusive representatives in the negotiation and administration
of collective agreements, and in giving them representation on the
statutory board to adjudicate grievances, Congress has given the
unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in effectuating
the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations in the
industry. "It is fair to say that every stage in the evolution of this
railroad labor code was progressively infused with the purpose of
securing self-adjustment between the effectively organized railroads and the equally effective railroad unions, and, to that end,
of establishing facilities for such self-adjustment by the railroad
community of its own industrial controversies. . . . The assumption as well as the aim of that Act [of 1934] is a process of
permanent conference and negotiation between the carriers on the
one hand and the employees through their unions on the other.' '211
205. Id. at 752-53.
206. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fifth (1970):

No carrier, its officers, or agents shall require any person seeking employment to sign
any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization; and if
any such contract has been enforced prior to the effective date of this chapter, then
such carrier shall notify the employees by an appropriate order that such contract has
been discarded and is no longer binding on them in any way.
207. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,754 (1961). See 40 Op. ATTy.
GEN. 254 (1942).
208. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 757 (1961).
209. Id. at 758.
210. Id. at 759.
211. Id. at 760 (quoting Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 352 U.S. 711,752 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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This unique role for railway laborers' unions caused them to incur great
expenses. Because of this fact, those unions sought the right to bargain for
closed shop clauses, in order to avoid having to benefit "free riders."
Congress accepted this argument and enacted section 152, Eleventh, in
1951.212 Those who voted for the legislation were aware that its provisions
might be abused in order to impair free speech. To counteract this objection,
the unions had proposed a proviso that employees could not be discharged
for lack of union membership if they lost such membership for any reason
other than failure to pay dues or fees. 2 13 The final version enacted by
Congress incorporated both the language of this proviso and further amendments indicating that "fees" meant "initiation fees" and that failure to
remit did not encompass nonpayment of fines and penalties. 214 A Presidential Emergency Board said of the result:
Indeed, Congress gave very concrete evidence that it carefully
considered the claims of the individual to be free of arbitrary or
unreasonable restrictions resulting from compulsory unionism. It
did not give a blanket approval to union-shop agreements. Instead
it enacted a precise and carefully drawn limitation on the kind of
union-shop agreements which might be made. The obvious purpose of this careful prescription was to strike a balance between
the interests pressed by the unions and the considerations which
the Carriers have urged. By providing that a worker should not be
discharged if he was denied or if he lost his union membership for
any reason other than nonpayment of dues, initiation fees, or
assessments, Congress definitely indicated that it had weighed
carefully and given
2 15 effect to the policy of the arguments against
the union shop.
Thus, the plurality in Street disposed of the speech issue on statutory, not
constitutional grounds. It did so in stark contrast to Justice Douglas' separate concurrence, which dealt with the constitutional issues raised 216 and
Justice Black's dissent, which found a clear-cut denial of First Amendment
rights .217
The holding in Street was therefore based upon: (1) the precise legislative history underlying the enactment of section 152, Eleventh, (2) the
policy evinced by Congress toward the efforts at self-adjustment engaged in
212. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-62 (1961).
213. ProposedAmendments to the Railway LaborAct: Hearingson H.R. 7789 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 247 (1950).
214. Id. at 257.
215. REPORT OF PRESIDENTIAL EMERGENCY BD. No. 98 at 6 (1951), quoted in International

Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 767-68 (1961).
216. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,775-79(1961) (Douglas,

J., concurring).
217. Id. at 788-91 (Black, J., dissenting).
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by labor and management within the railway industry, and (3) the historical
circumstances that caused railroad laborers' unions to acquire a great degree
of responsibility with regard to bargaining and negotiation within the industry. One could argue that these factors militate against applying the doctrine
of Street to other contexts. In fact, however, courts have shown little
hesitancy in doing so. Thus, a number of federal decisions have indicated
that Street might be applied by analogy to cases arising under the union
shop provision of the National Labor Relations Act. 2 18 Similarly, in Lathrop
v. Donohue,2 19 four justices of the Supreme Court believed that the doctrine
of Hanson could be extended to uphold a Wisconsin statute creating an
integrated bar to which all practicing attorneys within the state must pay
dues; they never reached the applicability of Street because of the absence
of a sufficiently detailed factual record. 220 But here, Justice Douglas, the
"swing vote" in Street, broke ranks, describing Hanson "as a narrow
exception to be closely confined.' '221 Actually, this restrictive view, which
appears to coincide with that of Justice Powell in Abood, 222 is too narrow.
The doctrines of Street are susceptible to extension, but surely they ought to
be extended only if factual circumstances similar to those present in that
case are shown to exist.
Such a showing was not made in Abood. The Court noted that Michigan law was, to some extent, cut from the federal template, 223 but it neither
demonstrated that the responsibilities of municipal employees' unions are as
218. See, e.g., Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126, 1128 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976);
Evans v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 309 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408,411,412-13 (10th
Cir. 1971). Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14,16-17 (1stCir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1971); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1970). Indeed, the logic
of Street has been utilized to defeat claims arising in unrelated statutor, contexts. See, e.g.,
Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1974) (cited Street to reject a
religious discrimination claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Marker v. Schultz, 485 F.2d
1003, 1004-05 (D.C. Cir. 1973), aff'g Marker v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 1301, 1303-04 (D.D.C.
1972) (relied on Street to reject a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code granting tax exemptions to labor unions using dues to finance partisan political campaigns); Jensen v. Yonamine, 437 F. Supp. 368, 374-76 (D.Hawaii 1977) (relied on Abood and
Street to reject a constitutional challenge to state municipal employees regulatory laws); Lohr
v. Association of Catholic Teachers, Local 1776,416 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (used
Street to reject a claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)).
219. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
220. Id. at 843.
221. Id. at 884 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). The other four justices also reached the merits of
the constitutional issue presented. Three of them would have upheld the validity of the statute.
See id. at 848 (Harlan J.,concurring, joined by Frankfurter, J.); id. at 865 (Whittaker, J.,
concurring). The other justice would not. See id. at 865 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
222. See 431 U.S. at 245-50 (Powell, J.,concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun,
223. See id. at 223-24. See notes 109-114 and accompanying text supra.

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

extensive as those of railway laborers' bargaining representatives, nor did it
show that such unions and municipalities have historically worked in behalf
of a policy of self-adjustment. More importantly, the legislative history of
section 423.210(1)(c) was never even discussed. Rather, it was said that
"[t]he same important government interests recognized in the Hanson and
Street cases presumptively support the impingement upon associational
freedom created by the agency shop here at issue." 224 The Court in Street
did not rely upon presumptions; it occupied eighteen pages with an analysis
of the history preceeding the enactment of section 152, Eleventh, 225 before
arriving at any conclusions. By failing to engage in any similar scrutiny, the
Court in Abood endorsed an irresponsible extension of Street.
As for the defendants' feeble attempts to distinguish Abood from
Hanson and Street, the Court's abrupt rejection of them is understandable.
As noted earlier, 226 governmental action was clearly involved in Hanson, so
the prior case may not be differentiated on that ground. As for the argument
that collective bargaining in the public sector is inherently "political," this
is a legitimate contention, but it is one more relevant to the objection against
applying the remedy advanced by Street rather than to that against establishing the applicability vel non of Street's limited recognition of the union
shop.
(b) Applicability of the Street Remedy
The Michigan court of appeals in Abood declined to apply the doctrine
of Street, saying "[iln the case at bar the plaintiffs made no allegation that
any of them specifically protested the expenditure of their funds for political
purposes to which they object. Therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to
relief on this basis." 227 This sentiment seems to be supported by language in
Street itself:
Any remedies, however, would properly be granted only to employees who have made known to the union officials that they do
not desire their funds to be used for political causes to which they
object. The safeguards of [section 152], Eleventh were added for
the protection of dissenters' interest, but dissent is not to be
presumed-it must affirmatively be made known to the union by
the dissenting employee. The union receiving money exacted from
an employee under a union-shop agreement should not in fairness
be subjected to sanctions in favor of an employee who makes no
complaint of the use of his money for such activities. From these
considerations, it follows that the present action is not a true class
224. Id. at 225.
225. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750-68 (1961).
226. See note 145 and accompanying text supra.
227. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 60 Mich. App. 92, 102, 230 N.W.2d 322, 327 (1975).
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action, for there is no attempt to prove the existence of a class of
workers who had specifically objected to the exaction of dues for
political purposes. .... Thus we think that only those who have
identified themselves as opposed to
228 political uses of their funds
are entitled to relief in this action.

Under this logic, two requirements would seem necessary: a showing that
the plaintiffs put the union on notice about their objections to its use of their
contributions and a showing that they objected to specific expenditures for
political purposes.
But this thesis is undermined by Brotherhoodof Railway & Steamship
Clerks v. Allen.229 There, it was said:
Respondents' amended complaint alleges that sums exacted under
the [union shop clause in question] "have been and are and will be
regularly and continually used by the defendant unions to carry
on, finance and pay for political activities directly at cross-purposes with the free will and choice of the plaintiffs." This allegation sufficiently states a cause of action. It would be impracticable
to require a dissenting employee to allege and prove each distinct
union political expenditure to which he objects; it is enough that
he manifests his opposition to any political expenditures by the
union. But we made clear in Street that "dissent is not to be
presumed-it must affirmatively be made known to the union by
the dissenting employee." . . . At trial, only 14 of the respond-

ents testified that they objected to the use of exacted sums for
political causes. No respondent who does not in the course of the
further proceedings in this case prove that he objects to such use
will be entitled to relief. This is not and cannot be a class action. 0
Allen liberalized considerably the rule of Street.23 1 Under Allen, specific
allegations need not be made; mere general objections would suffice.
Moreover, as the Allen Court observed in a footnote, a dissident's protests
would be adequate if the union was first informed of them in the plaintiffs'
complaint. 232 The appellants in Abood could certainly claim the benefits of
Allen's relaxation of the doctrine of Street. Thus, though they failed to
228. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,774 (1961). Accord, Hostetler v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 294 F.2d 666, 667 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
955 (1962).
229. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
230. Id. at 118-19.
231. There is, however, a question about the extent to which the doctrine of Allen applies

outside its statutory context. Thus, in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), see notes 219221 and accompanying text supra, the plurality applying Street and Hanson said the issues
raised by those cases were not ripe for decision because "[n]owhere are we clearly apprised as

to the views of the appellant on any particular legislative issues on which the State Bar has
taken a position.
... Id. at 845-46. The Court in Allen dismissed this statement, saying it
"was made in the context of constitutionaladjudication, not statutory as here." 373 U.S. at 119
n.5 (emphasis in original). In Abood, the Court simply ignored this definite qualification placed
upon the doctrine of Street.
232. 373 U.S. at 119 n.6.

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

specify the expenditures they disliked, Warczak and Abood could always
cure that deficiency during further trial proceedings. Similarly, while at
least some of the appellants communicated their displeasure to the union
prior to instituting the lawsuit in question, 233 those that failed to do so would
not, under Allen, be precluded from obtaining redress as long as their
protests were incorporated in the language of the complaint. There was,
however, one other problem. Warczak lodged a class action in the state
court. When the Michigan trial court granted a summary judgment against
her, it never addressed the propriety of her attempt to seek class relief. The
Supreme Court noted this fact, but said it had "no occasion to address the
question whether an individual employee who is not a named plaintiff but
merely a member of the plaintiff class is, without more, entitled to relief
under Street and Allen as a matter of federal law. '"Z 4 But after Street and
Allen, there would not seem to be any question left on this subject. Both
cases indicate that these types of suits, by their very nature, cannot be class
actions, at least to the extent that relief is sought for persons, other than the
named plaintiffs, who had not objected generally to the use to which the
union put the compulsory assessments in question. By characterizing the
problem as something left undecided by Street and Allen, the Court suggests that the remedial aspects of those two decisions might be broadened
even further.
But the discussion in Abood implies an even more profound problem.
Is the type of practical decree endorsed by Street and Allen useful in cases
involving public employee unions? Implementation of such a decree would
require a court to do what was not done in Abood, that is, draw the line
between "political" and "nonpolitical" expenditures. The Supreme Court
admitted that in the public sector such a line may be "somewhat hazy. "235
One notable effort at line-drawing in a case arising in the private sector has
been made by Judge Harry Pregerson in Seay v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. :236
Now, based upon my consideration of [the union security
provision in the National Labor Relations Act] and of Street and
Allen and of other relevant court decisions, this is where I am
thinking of drawing the line. Dissenting employees in an agency
fee situation should not be required to support financially union
expenditures as follows:
One, for payments to or on behalf of any candidate for public
office in connection with his campaign for election to such public
office, or
233.
234.
235.
236.
1976).

See 431 U.S. at 212 n.2.
Id. at 242 n.43.
Id. at 236.
371 F. Supp. 754 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir.
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Two, for payments to or on behalf of any political party or
organization, or
Three, for the holding of any meeting or the printing or
distribution of any literature or documents in support of any such
candidate or political party or organization.
Now, as to expenditures for other purposes, regardless of
their political nature, if that is the proper characterization, I feel
that they are sufficiently germane to collective bargaining to require dissenting employees who are subject to union shop
or
7
agency fee agreements to bear their share of that burden.2
Judge Pregerson's statement illustrates the practical difficulties in applying the Street doctrine. He acknowledges that some "political" expenditures are so relevant to collective bargaining that a dissident may be compelled to support them, but he says that subsidies to candidates or parties are
simply too political or ideological for the purposes of compulsory assessments from non-affiliated members of an agency shop. However, the distinction falls apart when a particular candidate endorses changes in labor
laws beneficial to the union's bargaining position but his opponent does not,
or where a particular political party is identified with the interests of
organized labor but others espouse platforms or policies inimical to those
interests. Justice Frankfurter states the point forcefully in his dissent in
Street:
When one runs down the detailed list of national and international
problems on which the AFL-CIO speaks, it seems rather naive for
a court to conclude-as did the trial court-that the union expenditures were "not reasonably necessary to collective bargaining or
to maintaining the existence and position of said union defendants
as effective bargaining agents." The notion that economic and
political concerns are separable is pre-Victorian. Presidents of the
United States and Committees of Congress invite views of labor
on matters not immediately concerned with wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. And the Court accepts briefs as amici
from the AFL-CIO on issues that cannot be called industrial, in
any circumscribed sense. It is not true in life that political protection is irrelevant to, and insulated from, economic interests. It is
not true for industry or finance. Neither is it true for labor. It
disrespects the wise, hard-headed men who were the authors of
our Constitution' and our Bill of Rights to conclude that their
scheme of government requires what the facts of life reject. As
Mr. Justice Rutledge stated: "To say that labor unions as such
have nothing of value to contribute to that process [the electoral
process] and no vital or legitmate interest in it is to ignore the
obvious facts of political and economic life and of their increasing
inter-relationship in modern society." United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106, 129, 144 [1948] (concurring opinion joined in by Black,
237. 371 1. Supp. at 761 n.7 (quoting statement from the bench, June 9, 1972).
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Is it any more consonant with
Douglas, and Murphy, J.J.) ....
the facts of life today . . . to say that the tax policies of the
National Government-the scheme of rates and exemptionshave no close relation to the wages of workers; that legislative
developments like the Tennessee Valley Authority do not intimately touch the lives of workers within their respective regions;
that national measures furthering health and education do not
directly bear on the lives of industrial workers; that candidates
who support these movements do not stand in different relation to
labor's narrowest economic interests than avowed opponents of
these measures? Is it respectful to the modes of thought of Madison and Jefferson projected into our day to attribute to them the
view that the First Amendment must be construed to bar unions
from concluding, by due procedural steps, that civil-rights legislation conduces to their interest, thereby prohibiting union funds to
be expended to promote passage of such measures?238
Justice Frankfurter's basic point is sound: in today's society, one cannot
readily distinguish between political and apolitical expenditures. One cannot
say that the costs of collective bargaining do not include those expenses
necessary to ensure that the candidate more congenial to the interests of
labor is elected to office or that a particular piece of legislation favoring
unionism is enacted. The ideological, political and economic interests of
labor in industrialized nations are inseparable and any attempt to cut the
Gordian knot binding them requires a return to a pre-Victorian concept of
society that courts cannot afford to make.
Justice Frankfurter's comments about private-sector unions are even
more accurate with respect to the collective bargaining representatives of
public employees. These representatives have to deal with elected or appointed officials entrusted with the task of making political decisions, with
officials accountable to the electorate for any decision actually made.
Hence, it may be vital for collective bargaining purposes to ensure that an
official hostile to the union is not re-elected or that a party that opposes the
withdrawal of the right to strike from public employees has its candidates
voted into office. Because the employer is the state, the costs of fostering
pro-union public sentiment or ensuring that the elected level of the bureaucratic hierarchy is composed of persons amenable to granting public employees contractual benefits similar to those enjoyed by workers in the
private sector may be even more necessary than the costs associated with
negotiating or administering a collective bargaining agreement. Both the
majority and Justice Powell's concurrence in Abood admit that such bargaining in the public sector is inherently political or ideological. 239 The
238. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814-16 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
239. See 431 U.S. 266-28; id. at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and

Blackmun, J.). The majority in Abood did note that constitutional inquiry does not turn on the
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problem with the former's analysis is that if the line is to be drawn between
what is and what is not "germane" to collective bargaining before an
appropriate remedy can be devised, courts may be compelled to accomplish
that task by resorting to the type of unsatisfactorily conclusory distinctions
used by Judge Pregerson in the Seay case.
Of course, one could avoid such problems by circumscribing the scope
of the adjective "germane" so that it encompasses only those expenses
directly related to negotiation and administration of a given contract. But the
majority evinced no inclination to define the term so restrictively. Although
it refused to engage in the task of line-drawing on the basis of the scanty
record before it, it did assert that "[t]he process of establishing a written
collective-bargaining agreement prescribing the terms and conditions of
public employment may require not merely concord at the bargaining table,
but subsequent approval by other public authorities; related budgetary and
appropriations decisions might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining
4
process.' '2
The net effect of Abood is to complicate severely the judicial
task of line-drawing and thus make the fashioning of an appropriate remedy
based on the results achieved by engaging in that task all the more difficult.
As a consequence of this complication, the Court suggests that perhaps the
more optimal resolution of the entire problem will emanate from the unions
themselves rather than from the judiciary. Indeed, the majority in Abood
rather sanguinely observed that it could avoid anticipating constitutional
questions in the case because the Detroit Federation of Teachers had adopted
its own internal remedy, which might possibly eliminate further controversy. 24 1 This optimism is premature. As the Court also noted, if dissidents
label "political." Id. at 231-32. It did so despite the fact that Street, which it relied on, does

focus on that label. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 &
n. 17. (1961). Instead, the majority in Abood substitutes for the adjective "political" the more
nebulous concept of "ideological." See 431 U.S. at 236. Although Justice Powell would
disagree, see id. at 254 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.),
the semantic alteration does not appear to have effected any great change in the doctrine of

Street.
240. 431 U.S. at 236.

241. Id. at 240 n.41. See note 171 supra. There is the distinct possibility that the Court in
Abood is interpolating into the Street type of case the requirement heretofore recognized

generally in suits involving claims of denial of fair representation by a union, that all internal
union remedies must be exhausted before a complainant can sue in federal court. See, e.g.,
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213-14 (1944); Brady v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87, 104 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Foy v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 377 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1967); Neal v. System Bd. of
Adjustment, 348 F. 2d 722,726 (8th Cir. 1965); Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286
F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1960); Fingar v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co.,

277 F.2d 698, 700-701 (5th Cir. 1960); Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 275 F.2d
342, 345 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 811 (1960). If so, this would be a significant devel-

opment, for limitations on the doctrine of fair representation have heretofore been thought not
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found the union's remedy constitutionally deficient, they could always raise
a challenge to it through the judicial system. 24 2 Thus, it is probably accurate
to predict that unless judges totally abdicate their duties and defer to the
union's judgment about the propriety of its own means of redress, they will
soon find themselves lost in the thorny constitutional thicket sown by the
decision in Abood.
(c) First Amendment Implications
As Justice Powell noted, the majority, by applying Hanson and Street,
eschewed any attempt to utilize the analysis traditionally applied to public
employees' claims that retention of their jobs is contingent upon acquiescing
to an abridgment of their First Amendment rights. The traditional analysis
was stated succinctly by the plurality opinion in Elrod v. Burns,243 which
held that the First Amendment was violated when a non-civil service
employee of a county sheriff's office was discharged for refusing to affiliate
himself with the newly-elected sheriff's political party:
It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First
Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny. . . . "This
type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the
exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct
government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable
result of the government's conduct. . .. '"Buckley v. Valeo, [424
U.S. 1], at 65. Thus encroachment "cannot be justified upon a
mere showing of a legitimate state interest." Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. [51, 58 (1973)]. The interest advanced must be
paramount, one of vital importance, and the burdeh is on the
government to show the existence of such an interest ...
Moreover, it is not enough that the means chosen in furtherance of
the interest be rationally related to that end. . . . The gain to the
subordinating interest provided by the means must outweigh the
incurred loss of protected rights . . . and the Government must
"emplo[y] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement. . . ." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 25. "[A] State may not
choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protectto apply in the Street type of case. See Browne v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 69 Wis.
2d 169, 180-81, 230 N.W.2d 704, 710 (1975). It should be noted that the union's adoption of an
internal remedy after litigation had begun did not make the case moot. See United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 533 F.2d 1126,
1130 (9th Cir. 1976).

242. 431 U.S. at 242 n.45. This has happened. See note 171 supra.
243. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The plurality in this case consisted of Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall. The decisive votes were provided by the separate concurrence of Justice

Stewart, joined by Justice Blackmun, who said: "[t]he single substantive question involved in
this case is whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the
sole ground of his political beliefs. I agree with the plurality that he cannot." Id. at 375

(Stewart, J, concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.)
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ed liberty. 'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an
area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.' If the State
has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the
exercise of fundamental personal liberties." Kusper v. Pontikes,
supra, at 59 (citations omitted). 2"4
By not following such an analysis in Abood, the majority did several
important things. First, as Justice Powell observed, 24 5 the burden of proof
was shifted from the state to the complainant. By presuming that Michigan
intended to preserve stable labor relations and further the doctrine of exclusivity when its legislature enacted section 423.210(1)(c), the majority
obviated any necessity for the state to assert an interest of vital importance.
Thus, the burden of proof usually imposed upon the government to justify
its infringement of a First Amendment right disappears. In lieu of it, the
plaintiff, pursuant to Street and Allen, must not only prove that he objects
to use of the sums exacted from him for political or ideological purposes,
but he must also prove that the union in fact expended some monies for
reasons unrelated to collective bargaining, although he need not demonstrate
that his specific payments were part of those monies. 246 This shift of the
burden of proof is not as dramatic as Justice Powell implies. He suggests
that it is novel for the nonunion employee to have to initiate a lawsuit to
vindicate his rights, 247 but even under the usual First Amendment analysis,
it is the aggrieved individual who generally files a complaint to which the
state raises a defense. Moreover, as Allen indicates, the complainant objecting to compulsory assessments by a union can avoid stringent problems of
proof if he drafts his pleadings with even minimal care. 248 Second, under the
majority's analysis, the state can pass a law authorizing contractual provisions for the closed shop without having to concern itself about establishing
justifiably compelling interests in the legislative record. This is so because
the Court in Abood indicates that it is willing, of its own accord, to
conclude that the doctrine of exclusivity is, by definition, a paramount
244. Id. at 362-63. On the need to show the existence of a compelling state interest in First
Amendment cases, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438, 444 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 464-66 (1958); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). On the need for the
state to choose the least restrictive alternative in regulating speech, see United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965); Aptheker v.

Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See
generally Note, Less DrasticMeans and the FirstAmendment, 78 YALE L. J. 464 (1969).
245. 431 U.S. at 263-64 (Powell, J.,concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.)

246. Id. at 241. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961).
247. See 431 U.S. at 263-64 (Powell, J.,concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun,

J.)
248. See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118-19 (1963).
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interest. 249 This alacrity demonstrated by the majority in Abood contrasts
sharply with the Court's reluctance in Madison250 to find that the exclusivity
principle cannot be used to justify the denial to a public employee of the
right to speak on a certain subject at a public forum." Thus, as Justice
Powell observes, there is a distinct tension between the two decisions that is
simply not acknowledged by the majority in Abood.352 Third, and most
problematic, is the majority's conclusion that a dissident employee is not
barred from engaging in a meaningful dialogue with his employer on the
subjects of collective bargaining through other means, such as the franchise,
or politics or statements to the public. In light of the broad doctrine in
Elrod, it seems anomalous to conclude that it is permissible to infringe the
freedom of speech of an individual in one respect because that individual has
alternative channels of communicatinn available to him.253 Indeed, if this
argument is controlling in Abood, one wonders why it failed to prove
decisive in Madison, where the employees denied access to a public forum
could have sought to express their views through letters to newspapers, or
through public service statements on radio or the like. The clear implication
of Madison is that a claimed abridgement of constitutional rights may not be
dismissed by saying that the abridgement was less than absolute and did not
foreclose all opportunities to exercise those rights.
One is thus left with a basic question: how can Madison and Abood be
reconciled with respect to their differing concepts of how the principle of
exclusivity limits the guarantees of the First Amendment? One approach
may be to consider the level of abridgement involved in each case. Madison
concerned what was essentially a prior restraint on speech; 2-4 Abood in249. See 431 U.S. at 225.
250. City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations

Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
251. See notes 67-104 and accompanying text supra.
252. See 431 U.S. at 261 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.)

253. Indeed, some abridgements justified by reference to the logic of Street may be
characterized as involving situations where the employee has no meaningful alternative. This is
particularly true where courts have refused to accept claims that union shops permitted by
federal labor legislation violate the rights of employees whose religious scruples prevent them

from either joining or paying fees to unions. See, e.g., Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 501
F.2d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1974); Hammond v. United Papermakers & Paper-Workers Union, 462
F.2d 174, 175 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1973); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,
440 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.
Co., 429 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); CIBA-Giegy
Corp. v. Local No. 2548, United Textile Workers, 391 F. Supp. 287,300 (D.R.I. 1975). In these
cases, the alternatives for a minority employee are few indeed. Either he must find employment

where no union shop exists, which may often be impossible, or he must surrender his right to
practice his religion freely as a condition of retaining his job.
254. See City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 177 (1976).
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volved a far less drastic infringement. Moreover, the Court in Abood was
able to arrive at the very decision it reached because of Madison. It
reasoned that since Madison assured dissident members of a union access to
public forums, the relatively lesser restriction involved in Abood could be
accepted in the interests of preserving stable labor conditions, since the
dissident would never be totally deprived of a platform from which to state
his views.2 5 In conclusion, the effect of Abood is to extend further the
exception to the traditional First Amendment analysis created by Street and
to suggest very definite limits to the libertarian philosophy espoused in
Madison.
3. Commercial Speech
a. The First Amendment and Self-Regulation of Professions: Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona
In 1976, the Supreme Court unveiled a new doctrine when it held, in
2
Virginia State Board of Pharmacyv. VirginiaCitizens ConsumerCouncil,
that commercial speech was entitled to some protection under the First
Amendment. The exact scope of the rule announced in that case was not
well-defined; indeed, the Court surrounded the rule with many qualifica255. 431 U.S. at 230.
1. This innovation had been adumbrated by the Court's decision in Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975). That decision struck down a Virginia law proscribing the advertisement of
abortions. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960). In so holding, the Court said:
We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their assumption that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection and that appellant
Bigelow had no legitimate First Amendment interest. We need not decide in this case
the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that
is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.
421 U.S. at 825. See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 389 (1973) (ordinance prohibiting newspapers from carrying help-wanted advertisements in gender-designated columns except where based on a bona fide occupational exemption
upheld; Court noted that any "First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising
an ordinary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest
supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and
the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity"); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (advertisement containing factually
erroneous defamatory content held entitled to the same degree of protection as that accorded
ordinary speech; the fact "[tihat the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as
immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold").
2. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See generally Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial
Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 792-97 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Status]; Note, FirstAmendment Protectionfor CommercialAdvertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 205, 215-22 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New Constitutional
Doctrine].
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tions, acknowledging that commercial speech is distinguishable from other3
types of expression. But in its decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
the Court added a number of refinements to the doctrine of Virginia
Pharmacy Board which may have the distinct effect of expanding that
doctrine considerably.
(1) The Decision
John Bates and Van O'Steen are attorneys licensed to practice law in
the State of Arizona. Consequently, they are members of the integrated bar
of that state.4 From 1972 to mid-1974, they worked as counsel for the
Maricopa County Legal Aid Society. In March of the latter year, however,
they left the Society and opened their own legal clinic in Phoenix. Their
stated aim was to "provide legal services at modest fees to persons of
moderate income who did not qualify for governmental legal aid." 5 In order
to effectuate this aim, they decided to accept only "routine" legal matters,
such as uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, formal filings of
bankruptcy and proceedings to legally change one's name. They deliberately set their rates at a level at which they would not earn much return per
individual case. Therefore, the success of their clinic depended both upon a
low overhead, maintained by the extensive use of paralegals, automatic
typewriters and standardized forms and office procedure, and their ability to
attract a volume business. After two years, the appellants concluded that
their practice could not survive unless they resorted to advertising. Consequently, on February 22, 1976, they placed an advertisement in the Arizona
Republic, a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Phoenix metropolitan area. That commercial solicitation promised legal services at
"very reasonable fees" and included the following price schedule:
Divorce or legal separation-uncontested [both spouses sign
papers]
$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
3. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
4. See ARiz. Sup. Cr. R. 27(a), 17A ARIZ. REv. STAT. 84-85 (1973):
1. In order to advance the administration of justice according to law, ... the
Supreme Court of Arizona does hereby perpetuate, create and continue under the
direction and control of this Court an organization known as the State Bar of Arizona,
and all persons now or hereafter licensed in this state to engage in the practice of law

shall be members of the State Bar of Arizona in accordance with the rules of this
Court. ...
3. No person shall practice law in this state or hold himself out as one who may
practice law in this state unless he is an active member of the bar.
5. 97 S. Ct. at 2694.
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* Preparation of all court papers and instructions on how to do
your own simple uncontested divorce
$100.00
• Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publication cost
• Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual
$250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband
$300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
& Change of name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
6
Information regarding other types of cases furnished on request.

This act by appellants concededly violated the American Bar Association Rule 2-101(B), 7 which had been adopted by the Supreme Court of
Arizona. 8 That rule prohibits an attorney from publicizing or authorizing
another to publicize himself or other lawyers. The president of the state bar
promptly filed a complaint. A hearing was held before a three-member
Special Local Administrative Committee, which recommended that each of
the appellants be suspended from practice for six months or more. 9 On
review, the Board of Governors of the State Bar, convinced that Bates and
6. Id. at 2710. After the appearance of this advertisement, business did increase, although it is unclear whether this was due to the advertisement itself or the news stories
generated by it. Id. at 2694 n.4.
7. ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 2-101(B) (1976):

A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the city telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or
permit others to do so in his behalf. However, a lawyer recommended by, paid by, or
whose legal services are furnished by, a qualified legal assistance organization may
authorize or permit or assist such organization to use means of dignified commercial
publicity, which does not identify any lawyer by name, to describe the availability or
nature of its legal services or legal service benefits. This rule does not prohibit limited
and dignified identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name:
(1) In political advertisements when his professional status is germane to the political
campaign or to a political issue.
(2) In public notices when the name and profession of a lawyer are required or
authorized by law or are reasonably pertinent for a purpose other than the attraction of
potential clients.
(3) In routine reports and announcements of a bona fide business, civic, professional, or political organization in which he serves as a director or officer.
(4) In and on legal documents prepared by him.
(5) In and on legal textbooks, treatises, and other legal publications, and in dignified
advertisements thereof.
(6) In communications by a qualified legal assistance program, along with the biographical information permitted under DR 2-102(A)(6) [see note 25 infra] directed to a
member or beneficiary of such organization.
8. ARIZ. SUP. Cr. R. 29(a), 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. 84-85 (1973).

9. 97 S.Ct. at 2695.
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O'Steen undertook "an earnest challenge to the validity of a rule they
conscientiously believed to be invalid,"1 0 reduced the potential sanction to a
one-week suspension for each man, the penalties to run consecutively. On
appeal, three of the five justices on the state supreme court rejected antitrust,
First Amendment, equal protection, vagueness and due process challenges
to the rule in question.II
The United States Supreme Court reversed in part. Speaking for the
majority, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall

and Stevens first rejected the contention that any justiciable antitrust claim
was presented by this case. 2 He then went on to analyze the First Amendment issues at stake. In this regard, Justice Blackmun asserted that "the
conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flow a fortiori"'13 from the Court's previous decision
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council. 14
That case had involved a state law declaring that a pharmacist was
guilty of "unprofessional conduct" if he advertised prescription drug
prices.1 5 A federal district court struck down the law on First Amendment
10. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 396, 555 P.2d 640, 642 (1976).
1I.See id. at 397-400, 555 P.2d at 643-46 (Cameron, C.J., joined by Struckmeyer, V.C.J.);
id. at 401-02, 555 P.2d at 647-48 (Gordon, J.,concurring).
12. The plurality opinion in the state supreme court had found that the rule in question was
"an activity of the state of Arizona acting as sovereign." Id. at 397, 555 P.2d at 643. The
plurality therefore applied the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 352 (1943), which held that restraints on trade imposed by an act of government are
exempt from regulation under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1970). On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court also applied Parker. In doing so, however, it had to distinguish two prior
rulings. The first was Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which had held that a
minimum attorney fee schedule implemented by two county bar associations violated section
one of the Sherman Act. The Court in Goldfarb never reached the exemption problem, noting
that it did not need to "inquire further into the state action question because it cannot fairly be
said that the State of Virginia through its Supreme Court Rules required the anti-competitive
activities of either respondent." Id. at 790. The Court in Bates noted that the same was
obviously not true in the case of Arizona. 97 S.Ct. at 2697. See note 8 and accompanying text
supra. The second distinguished case was Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
There, an electric utility distributed free light bulbs to its residential customers and included the
costs of this service in its state-regulated utility rates. The Court held that a private entity in
such circumstances could not rely on the exemption of Parker.Id. at 594-95. But, unlike Bates,
the Court in Cantoremphasized (1) that the claim was directed against a private party, not the
state, id. at 585-92, 600-01, and (2) that the state had no independent regulatory interest in the
market for light bulbs, id. at 584-85. Neither of these factors were said to be present in Bates.
97 S.Ct. at 2697-98. See generally Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal
Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 475 (1977); Note, The State
Anti-trust Exemption: The Confinement of the Parker Doctrine within the Emerging Cantor
Formula, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 211 (1977).

13. 97 S.Ct. at 2700.
14. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974).
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grounds, concluding that it infringed the consumer's right to receive information necessary to decisions concerning how to preserve his health. 16 On
appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. Discrediting prior cases that had
suggested that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment, 17 the Court ruled that the guarantee of freedom of speech does
safeguard the right to advertise drug prices. 18 Merely because an advertisement proposed a mundane commercial transaction did not mean that it was
unprotected. Not only had previous decisions indicated that such expressions were shielded by the Constitution, 19 but also the consumer's interest in
receiving such a communication and thus being able to make those intelligent decisions necessary to the functioning of a free enterprise economy
required the extension of First Amendment safeguards to such speech. 20 In
response to this argument, the State of Virginia proffered a number of
16. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 686 (E.D. Va. 1974). The case was thus distinguished from an earlier decision in a suit
brought by a drug company where the statute had been upheld against a constitutional challenge. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821, 825 (W.D. Va. 1969). Indeed, later
decisions applying the new commercial speech doctrine have relied extensively on the public's
right to be informed. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,
92 (1977); Louisiana Consumer's League v. Louisiana State Bd. of Optometry Examiners, 557
F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 1977); Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F.
Supp. 506, 520 (E.D. Va. 1976); American Meat Institute v. Ball, 424 F. Supp. 758, 768-69
(W.D. Mich. 1976); Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267,
272 (E.D. Va. 1976); Terminal-Hudson Electronics, Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs,
407 F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 368-69, 562 P.2d
1327, 1337, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77, 83-84 (1977).
17. The most important case in this respect is Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). There, the Court sustained a municipal ordinance that had been interpreted to ban the
dissemination of a handbill advertising the exhibition of a submarine. It noted that while the
First Amendment restricts abridgement of expression of opinion, "[w]e are equally clear that
the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial
speech." Id. at 54. See also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642-44 (1951); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943); Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); New York State Broadcasters Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
414 F.2d 990, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405
F.2d 1082, 1099-1103 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC,
396 U.S. 842 (1969); Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 132 (N.D. Ind.
1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974); Jenness v. Forbes, 351 F. Supp. 88, 96-97 (D.R.I.
1972); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). See generally
ConstitutionalStatus, supra note 1, at 763-92; New ConstitutionalDoctrine, supra note 1, at
207-13.
18. 425 U.S. at 773.
19. See note I supra. See 425 U.S. at 759-60.
20. Id. at 763-65. For discussions on the right to receive information in this context, see
generally Comment, The Right to Receive and the CommercialSpeech Doctrine:New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975); Comment, Advertising of Professional Fees:
Does the ConsumerHave a Right to Know? 21 S.D.L. REV. 310 (1976).
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justifications for its policy. It argued that advertising would foster a
competitiveness that might cause pharmacists to delete those extra professional services, such as quality-controlled packaging or supplemental prescriptive advice, as an economizing measure. The state also asserted that
advertising would induce consumers to shop around, thus precluding them
from patronizing one pharmacist who would be familiar with their normal
intake of drugs and their possible allergic reactions to certain chemicals.
Finally, the state urged that advertising would undermine the profession's
prestige. 2 1 The Court deemed these justifications inadequate. High professional standards were assured by the totality of the state's regulatory
scheme, and the Virginia legislature's belief that citizens could be best
protected by ensuring their ignorance was said to represent a far too "paternalistic" approach at odds with the logic of the First Amendment. 2 2
Having summarized Virginia PharmacyBoard in such a fashion, the
Court in Bates catalogued those issues not presented by the case. First, it
noted that no questions were presented relating to the quality of legal
services. Justice Blackmun admitted that "[s]uch claims are not susceptible
to precise measurement or verification and, under some circumstances,
might well be deceptive or misleading to the public, or even false.' '23
Second, the Court observed that no issue was tendered with respect to inperson solicitation of clients. "Activity of that kind might well pose dangers
of overreaching and misrepresentation not encountered in newspaper announcement advertising.' '24 Third, Justice Blackmun remarked that the
appellee's criticism of attorney advertising did not apply to the publicizing
of basic factual information in reputable law lists or legal directories, as is
permitted by the American Bar Association's disciplinary rule 2102(A)(6).21
21. 425 U.S. at 766-68.
22. Id. at 768-70.

23. 97 S. Ct. at 2700.
24. Id.
25. Id. The rule in question states that the following information is permitted:
The published data may include only the following: name, including name of law firm

and names of professional associates; addresses and telephone numbers; one or more
fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm concentrates, to the extent not prohibited
by the authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject; a statement that
practice is limited to one or more fields of law, to the extent not prohibited by the

authority having jurisdiction under state law over the subject of limitation of practice
by lawyers; a statement that the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of
law or law practice, to the extent permitted by the authority having jurisdiction under

state law over the subject of specialization by lawyers and in accordance with rules
prescribed by that authority; date and place of birth; date and place of admission to the
bar of state and federal courts; schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and

other scholastic distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; military service; posts of
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Thus, the crux of the problem confronting the Court was that of the
permissibility of price advertising. The state offered six justifications for its
regulatory scheme, all of which the majority in Bates rejected. The first
proffered justification was that advertising would lead to commercialization
of the legal profession, which in turn would undermine an attorney's sense
of dignity and self-esteem. But Justice Blackmun observed that the public is
undoubtedly well aware that lawyers are not altruistic, that they offer their
services for payment. 26 Indeed, in light of the fact that the American Bar
Association advises an attorney to settle financial arrangements with a new
client as soon as possible, 27 one could hardly expect that the public would be
ignorant of the commercial aspects of the practice of law. 28 As for the
argument that advertising would reduce an attorney's self-esteem, the Court
noted that other professions advertise, 29 and that "cynicism with regard to
the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed
advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his
social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential
clients.' '30 In sum, the ban on attorney advertising was dismissed "as a rule
'31
of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics."
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships, offices, committee

assignments, and section memberships in bar associations; memberships and offices in
legal fraternities and legal societies; technical and professional licenses; memberships

in scientific, technical and professional associations and societies; foreign language
ability; names and addresses of references and, with their consent, names of clients
regularly represented; whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;

offices and other hours of availability; a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services; provided, all such published data shall be
disseminated only to the extent and in such format and language uniformly applicable
to all lawyers, as prescribed by the authority having jurisdiction by state law over the

subject. This proviso is not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by
such authority in that state.
ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 2-102(A)(6) (1976).
26. 97 S. Ct. at 2701. See also B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS 152-53 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTENSEN].

27. ABA
(1976).

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

ETHICAL CONSIDERATION No.

2-19

28. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
29. Id. See also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 26, at 151-52; Note, Advertising Solicitation
and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal CounselAvailable, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1190 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as Profession'sDuty].
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2702. Indeed, the Court noted that many people do not obtain counsel
because of the feared price of services, see ABA REVISED HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL
SERVICES 26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA HANDBOOK]; E. Koos, THE FAMILY & THE LAW 7
(1948); P. MURPHY & S. WALKOWSKI, COMPILATION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS ON PREPAID
LEGAL SERVICES 2-3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MURPHY & WALKOWSKI], or because they
believe they will not obtain competent services, see B. CURRAN & F. SP.xLDING, THE LEGAL

NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 96 (1974). 97 S. Ct. at 2702 & nn.22 & 23.

31. 97 S. Ct. at 2702.
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Second, Arizona argued that advertising by lawyers is inherently misleading (a) because legal services are so individualized as to prevent meaningful comparison by reference to an advertisement, (b) because the
consumer of such services is unable to predetermine his needs and (c)
because such advertising will highlight everything but the relevant factor of
skill. Justice Blackmun retorted that only routine services would ever be
publicized. 32 "Although the precise service demanded in each task may
vary slightly, and although legal services are not fungible, these facts do not
make advertising misleading so long as the attorney does the necessary work
at the advertised price." 3 3 Indeed, until 1975, the Maricopa County Bar
Association and the state bar's legal service program maintained schedules
of standardized rates. 34 As for the diagnostic aspect of the state's argument,
the Court observed tartly that most people visit attorneys in order to have a
specific legal task done, not to merely "ascertain if they have a clean bill of
legal health." ' 35 Finally, with respect to the contention that advertising
provides an incomplete foundation on which to select an attorney, the Court
concluded that preclusion of any dissemination of price information only
exacerbates consumer ignorance and that the public is intelligent enough to
36
recognize the limitations of advertising.
Third, the state claimed that publicity would have the undesirable
effect of fomenting litigation. To counter this contention, the majority
pointed out that advertising would prevent the underutilization of lawyers
and ensure that more people would have greater access to the courts. 3 7 This
32. Indeed, unique services would probably never be advertised at fixed prices. See

generally Morgan, The Evolving Concept of ProfessionalResponsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702,
741 (1977); Profession'sDuty, supra note 29, at 1203.

33. 97 S. Ct. at 2703.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2704.

36. Id. The Court also rejected the contention that advertising provides an unwholesome
substitute for reputational information. It said that such "word of mouth" referrals simply do

not provide a basis for selection in today's heterogeneous, urbanized cities. Id. n.3 1. See also
supra note 26, at 128-35; Note, BarRestrictionson DisseminationofInformation
about Legal Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 483,500 (1974); Note, Sherman Act Scrutiny of Bar
Restraintson Advertising and Solicitationby Attorneys, 62 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1156-57 (1976).
37. For evidence that many Americans never utilize attorneys, see ABA HANDBOOK,
supra note 30, at 2; MURPHY & WALKOWSKI, supra note 30, at 1; Meserve, Our Forgotten
Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A.J. 1092, 1092-95 (1971). Indeed, the Court had
previously held that collective activity undertaken to facilitate access to the courts is protected
by the First Amendment. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576,585
(1971) (First and Fourteenth Amendment permit a union to solicit damage suits from members);
United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-24 (1967) (First
and Fourteenth Amendments give unions the right to hire attorneys on a salaried basis to assist
union members in asserting their legal rights); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State
CHRISTENSEN,
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underutilization was said to be due mainly to an inability to locate a suitable
attorney. 38 Consequently,
[a]dvertising can help solve this acknowledged problem: advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a
supplier to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and
terms of exchange. The disciplinary rule at issue likely has served
to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quitepoor and unknowledgeable. A rule allowing restrained advertising
would be in accord with the bar's obligation to "facilitate the
process of intelligent selection of law ers, and to assist is [sic]
making legal services fully available. '"
Fourth, Arizona argued that advertising would increase overhead costs,
which in turn would be passed on to the consumer. Moreover, these
additional costs were said to create another barrier to entry for young
attorneys. The Court responded by arguing that the published evidence,
40
inconclusive as it was, suggested that advertising would reduce prices.
Moreover, to the extent that publicizing price information furthers competition, it might cause prices to fall, yet there would be no resultant loss of
Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of union
members, through their brotherhood, to operate a program for advising injured members to
obtain legal advice from recommended attorneys); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-40
(1963) (First and Fourteenth Amendments protect NAACP's solicitation of civil rights suits for
its attorneys, who were paid solely by the Association). From these cases one commentator has
derived the conclusion that the Court focused:
not on the right of attorneys to advertise and solicit but rather on the importance of
assuring that those aggrieved receive information regarding their legal rights and the
appropriate means of effectuating them. . . .Viewed in such a context, advertising
and solicitation conducted by private attorneys deserves, if anything, more protection
than that by attorneys affiliated with organizations like the NAACP or the United
Mine Workers. Potential clients who are so dispersed, disorganized, and powerless
that they cannot organize their own litigation programs would seem to be in even
greater need of information regarding their legal rights than those who at least possess
the strength required to generate their own litigation activities.
Profession'sDuty, supra note 29, at 1186. See Freeman & Bass, P.A. '. State of New Jersey
Comm'n of Investigation, 359 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D.N.J.), vacated on othergrounds, 486 F.2d
176 (3d Cir. 1973); Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 375, 562 P.2d 1326, 1337, 138 Cal. Rptr.
77, 87-88 (1977). See also Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession:Attorneys
and Advertising, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS--C.R. C.L. REV. 77, 87 (1973).
38. See note 30 supra.
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RES'ONSIBILITY, ETHICAL
CONSIDERATION No. 2-1 (1976)).
40. 97 S. Ct. at 2706. See J. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING & COMPErON: THE CASE
OF RETAIL DRUGS (1976); Benham, The Effect ofAdvertising on the Priceof Eyeglasses, 15 J. L.
& EcoN. 337 (1972). See also Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729 (1974);
Nelson, Advertising and ConsumerBehavior, 79 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970). But see Comanor &
Wilson, AdvertisingMarket Structure & Performance, 49 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 423,437
(1967); Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 1, 26 (1950)
(both suggesting that advertising, to the extent it creates brand loyalties, encourages oligopoly
profit-taking).
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income to attorneys because the overall volume of business would increase.4 1 As for the putative barrier to entry, Justice Blackmun noted that,
absent advertising, an attorney must rely on communal contacts developed
over time, a factor which would serve to perpetuate the predominant market
4
position of established lawyers. i
Fifth, the state claimed that to the extent that advertising will detail a
"package" of services at a set price, attorneys will be inclined to provide
that package, regardless of a client's actual needs. But the Court said shoddy
43
work could not be effectively deterred by restrictions on publicity.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun remarked that standardized services, such as
those offered by Bates and O'Steen, might very well improve the quality of
44
the legal services rendered by minimizing the likelihood of error.
Finally, the state contended that enforcement of restrictions only
against deceptive or misleading attorney advertising would be unfeasibly
difficult. Ex post facto action by a consumer might not provide a pragmatic
restraint because a layman might find it difficult to appraise the competency
of the services rendered to him. However, the Court noted that this justification depended on the fallacious assumption that most attorneys would
engage in overreaching. It adopted a contrary presumption and claimed that
the majority of honest lawyers would be diligent in disciplining their less
ethical colleagues. 45 Thus, none of the state's proffered justifications passed
constitutional muster.
But the problem remained that the appellants had deliberately violated
the law. Nevertheless, under the doctrine of overbreadth developed in other
First Amendment cases, a plaintiff could challenge the validity of a law by
demonstrating that it had a chilling effect on protected speech, even though
his conduct was not protected. 46 The Court noted, however, that:
the justification for the application of overbreadth analysis applies
weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context. As was noted
41. See Frierson, Legal Advertising, 2 BARRISTER 6, 8 (1975); Wilson, Madison Avenue,
Meet the Bar, 61 A.B.A.J. 586, 588 (1975).
42. 97 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. 97 S. Ct. at 2707. Accord, Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n,
427 F. Supp. 506, 519-20 (E.D. Va. 1976).
46. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-16 (1975); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-21 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Coates
v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,616 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963). See generally Note, The First Amendment
OverbreadthDoctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 847-48 (1970). As such, the doctrine represents a
departure from the traditional rules of standing. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 59 n.17 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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in Virginia PharmacyBoard v. Virginia Consumer Council...
there are "commonsense differences" between commercial
speech and other varieties. . .

Since advertising is linked to

commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation. .

.

. Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the

scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a product or service that he provides, and
presumably he can determine more readily than others whether his
speech is truthful and protected. .

.

. Since overbreadth has been

described by this Court as "strong medicine," which "has been
employed . . . sparingly and only as a last resort," . . . we

decline to apply it to professional advertising, a context where it is
not necessary to further its intended objective. 47
Was, then, the appellants' advertisement outside the scope of First Amendment protection? The state contended that Bates and O'Steen had engaged in
deceptive practices in three respects: (a) they never defined the term "legal
clinic," (b) their "very reasonable price" for an uncontested divorce was,
in fact, excessive and (c) the consumer was never informed that a name
change could be obtained without the services of an attorney. 48 In reply,
Justice Blackmun observed that the public probably knew what a "legal
clinic" generally meant (i.e., an operation geared to providing standardized
services); that because the price of an uncontested divorce ranged between
$150 and $300 in the Phoenix metropolitan area, the total quoted sum of
$195 was reasonable; and that while most services performed by an attorney
can be done by the layman himself, the latter may, in light of the procedural
complexities involved, nevertheless desire expert assistance. 49 Thus, the
Court concluded that the advertisement in question could not be suppressed.50
In so concluding, however, Justice Blackmun cautioned that attorney
advertising could always be subject to some regulation. Thus, false or
deceptive publicizations could be controlled. 5 ' So could advertising relating
47. 97 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
48. Id. at 2708.
49. Id. On the last point, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812-34 (1975) (reaffirm-

ing right of accused defendant in a criminal prosecution to represent himself); ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICAL CONSIDERATION No. 3-7 (1976).

50. 97 S. Ct. at 2708.
51. Id. Accord, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758-60
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (upheld FTC order requiring makers of Listerine mouth%ash to disclose in its
advertisements that the product will not cure sore throats caused by the common cold); J.B.

Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884,891 (6th Cir. 1967) (upheld FTC order requiring manufacturers of Geritol to disclose that their product will relieve symptoms of weariness only in persons
suffering from iron deficiency anemia, a relatively rare malady); Feil v. IFTC, 285 F.2d 879, 89698 (9th Cir. 1960) (upheld FTC order requiring makers of an anti-bedwetting device to disclose

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

to claims of quality, which are unverifiable, or in-person solicitation, where
the potential for overreaching is more pronounced. 5 2 The Court even observed that the state might require that advertisements such as that prepared by
Bates and O'Steen be supplemented by a disclaimer cautioning the unwary
or unsophisticated. 53 Finally, it left open the possibilities for restraint with
respect to time, place and manner; 54 to advertisements of illegal transactions;55 and to advertisements disseminated through the electronic broadcast
56
media.
Chief Justice Burger dissented in part, claiming that the doctrine of
Virginia Pharmacy Board should be limited to its factual context, the
advertisement of a prepackaged, standardized product.5 7 In contrast, he
believed that "standardized" legal services are a fiction because a potential
58
client can never gauge beforehand what assistance he will require.
Moreover, he concluded that the difficulties of enforcement created by the
majority's ruling would unduly tax the resources of integrated bars. 59 Thus,
that it would be of no value in cases caused by organic defects or diseases); Ward Laboratories,
Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960) (upheld FTC order
requiring sellers of treatment for baldness to disclose that the treatment would be useless with
respect to alopecia caused by heredity, age or endocrinal imbalances); Keele Hair & Scalp
Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23 (5th Cir. 1960) (same). See generally Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protectionand the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977);
Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the FederalTrade Commission, 85 HARV. L. REV.
477 (1971).
52. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
53. Id.
54. Id. Accord, Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,700 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). For the
Court's most extensive discussion of the meaning of the time, place and manner exception, see
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92-94 (1977). See notes 155-304
and accompanying text infra.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. Accord, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1976). See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 (1973); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty,
Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973) (upheld statute prohibiting
blockbusting, i.e., the initiation and encouragement of rumors that blacks are moving into a
given area so that market values of residences in that area will decline); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972) (upheld statute prohibiting the publication of a racially discriminatory notice relating to the sale or rental of a dwelling).
56. 97 S. Ct. at 2709. Accord, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,773 (1976). See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-03
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Tobacco Institute, Inc. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)
(affirmed FCC ruling requiring cigarette advertisers on radio and television to disclose that
smoking may be a health hazard); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Attorney Gen., 405 U.S. 1000
(1972) (upheld federal law banning all cigarette advertising in the electronic media).
57. 97 S. Ct. at 2710 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 2711.
59. Id.
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Chief Justice Burger said that the twin goals of informing the public and
policing the profession "can best be served by permitting the organized bar
to experiment with and perfect programs which would announce to the
public the probable range of fees for specifically defined services and thus
give putative clients some idea of potential cost liability when seeking out
legal assistance.'"10 Justice Rehnquist also dissented in part, reiterating his
view, expressed previously in the Virginia Pharmacy Board case, 61 that
62
commercial speech does not merit constitutional protection.
The remaining and most elaborate partial dissent was that of Justice
Powell, joined by Justice Stewart. He too argued that Virginia Pharmacy
Board had left unresolved the constitutional permissibility of restraints on
professional advertising. He further argued that, unlike product advertising,
such publicization is far more susceptible to abuse and far more difficult to
police. 63 Like the Chief Justice, Justice Powell said legal services are rarely
"routine" or "standardized"; the type of advice and assistance rendered
will usually vary with the needs of the client. 64 Moreover, he criticized the
majority's view that the reasonableness of a fee is to be judged solely by
reference to prices charged in the locality for similar services. 65 The American Bar Association does not employ such a simplistic analysis,6 and its
reluctance to do so is proper: $195 might be "reasonable" for one divorce,
but not for another, depending upon the level of services actually rendered.
Justice Powell also contended that the bar is ill-equipped to monitor attorney
advertising in order to determine its truthfulness. He said that in view of the
fact that there are 400,000 lawyers in this country, the most feasible means
of policing the profession was that traditionally utilized, namely, "discipli60. Id. (emphasis in original).
61. Virginia State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
781-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 97 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. at 2713 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stewart, J.).
64. Id. at 2713-14.
65. Id. at 2714-15.
66. See ABA DISCIPLINARY RULE No. 2-106(B) (1976), which lists the following factors to
be taken into account when setting a fee:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the Client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitation imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the service.

(8)

Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
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nary proceedings conducted initially by voluntary bar committees subject to
judicial review." 67 Moreover, the very concept of "misleading" professional advertising is not one capable of being tested empirically, as might be
the case with false claims about a product:
But there is simply no way to test "empirically" the claims made
in appellants' advertisement of legal services. These are serious
difficulties in determining whether the advertised services fall
within the Court's undefined category of "routine services";
whether they are described accurately and understandably; and
whether appellants' claim as to reasonableness of the fees is
accurate. These are not factual questions for which there are
"truthful" answers; in most instances, the answers would turn on
relatively subjective judgments as to which there could be wide
differences of opinion. These difficulties with appellants' advertisement will inhere in any comparable price advertisement of
specific legal services. Even if public agencies were established to
oversee professional price advertising, adequate protection of the
public from deception, and of ethical lawyers from unfair competition, could prove to be a wholly intractable problem.6
Additionally, Justice Powell noted that integrated bars and the American
Bar Association itself had not been deaf to pleas for relaxing regulations on
attorney advertising. The integrated bars had introduced or endorsed a
variety of programs to improve public access to capable lawyers, including
group legal service plans, state-operated lawyer referral programs, barsponsored legal clinics, public service law firms and group insurance legal
plans. 69 The American Bar Association had amended rule 2-102(A)(6) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility to permit far more information to be
printed in law directories.7 0 In light of these difficulties, Justice Powell
asserted that he would place great emphasis on the qualifications to the
general ban against regulation of advertising announced by the majority. 7
Nevertheless, he concluded:
In this context, the Court's imposition of hard and fast
constitutional rules as to price advertising is neither required by
precedent nor likely to serve the public interest. One of the great
virtues of federalism is the opportunity it affords for experimentation and innovation, with freedom to discard or amend that which
proves unsuccessful or detrimental to the public good. The
constitutionalizing-indeed the affirmative encouraging-of
67. 97 S. Ct. at 2715.
68. Id.at 2716.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2716-17. See note 25 supra. It should be noted that on August 10, 1977, the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association promulgated new rules permitting only
that advertising allowed by 2-102(A)(6) and the sort of price publicity deemed protected by

Bates. See 46 U.S.L.W. 1-12 (Aug. 23, 1977).
71. 97 S. Ct. at 2717-18.
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competitive price advertising of specified legal services will substantially inhibit the experimentation that has been underway and
also will limit the control heretofore exercised over lawyers by the
respective States. 72
(2) Analysis
In order best to scrutinize some of the problems raised by Bates, it will
be useful to bifurcate the analysis of that case. Thus, the first section that
follows will discuss to what extent Bates is inconsistent with Virginia
PharmacyBoard. The second section will deal with the problems created by
Bates with respect to the commercial speech doctrine in general.
(a) Consistency with Precedent
The Arizona Supreme Court in Bates dealt with the First Amendment
in an extremely cursory fashion. It did so because of its perception that the
problem had been resolved by dicta in the United States Supreme Court's
two leading decisions on commercial speech, Bigelow v. Virginia73 and
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council.74 In the former case, the Court observed that merely because it
held that some advertising was constitutionally protected, "[o]ur decision
also is in no way inconsistent with our holdings in the Fourteenth Amendment cases that concern the regulation of professional activity." 75 It then
cited a series of rulings beginning with Semler v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners ,76 which affirmed the broad powers of the state to
regulate professional activity, including professional advertising. 7 7 A simi72. Id. at 2718-19.
73. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See note I supra.
74. 425 U.S. at 748 (1976). See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
75. 421 U.S. at 825 n.10.

76. 294 U.S. 608 (1935). The Court in Semler upheld an Oregon statute which prohibited
various types of advertising by dentists. In doing so, it said "[t]he legislature was entitled to

consider the general effects of the practices which it described, and if these effects were
injurious in facilitating unwarranted and misleading claims, to counteract them by a general
rule, even though in particular instances there might be no actual deception or misstatement."
Id. 'at 613.
77. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156, 164-66 (1973) (state law requiring one who operates a pharmacy to be either a
pharmacist in good standing or a corporation owned by pharmacists in good standing held not to

violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1963) (right of a state to restrict advertising by optometrists
through the electronic media upheld against a federal pre-emption challenge); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955) (law prohibiting solicitation of the sale of optical
appliances and requiring only licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists to fit or duplicate
lenses sustained against due process and equal protection claims); Barsky v. Board of Regents,
'347 U.S. 442, 456 (1954) (law requiring disciplinary action against a physician convicted for
contempt of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, upheld, finding no due process
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lar restraint seemed to be evinced by the Court in Virginia Pharmacy
Board. The final footnote in the majority opinion of that case is as follows:
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of
commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no
opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and
functional, between professions, may require consideration of
quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do
not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent
enhanced possibility for confusion and78deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising.
Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in the Virginia PharmacyBoard
case amplified this point:
As the Court notes. . . quite different factors would govern were
we faced with a law regulating or even prohibiting advertising by
the traditional learned professions of medicine or law. "The interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since
lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of
administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the
courts.' ". . . Attorneys and physicians are engaged primarily in
providing services in which professional judgment is a large
component, a matter very different79 from the retail sale of labeled
drugs already prepared by others.
After quoting these passages, the Arizona court claimed it could find no
constitutional violation in the rule in question.8 0 This reliance was misplaced. While Chief Justice Burger was clearly willing, even in 1976, to
permit regulation of attorney fee advertising, the language in the majority's
footnote suggests that only specific subcategories of such advertising may
be subject to restriction. st Thus, Bates does not exactly conflict with the
letter of VirginiaPharmacy Board.
But it may conflict with the spirit of that prior case. As noted earlier,
Virginia Pharmacy Board announced several exceptions to the generality
that commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment. 82 One of these
was contained in its assertion that governmental regulation of false or
misleading publicization was always permissible. 83 The question then revi6lation). For per curiam decisions applying Semler, see, e.g., Toole v. Michigan State Bd. of
Dentistry, 316 U.S. 648 (1942); Orwitz v. Board of Dental Examiners, 313 U.S. 546 (1941),

Brown v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 504 (1939).
78. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 774 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
80. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 397-99, 555 P.2d 640, 643-45 (1976).
81. Accord, Consumers Union of the United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp.
506, 518 (E.D. Va. 1976); Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 403, 555 P.2d 640, 649 (1976)
(Holohan, J., dissenting).
82. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
83. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976).
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mains, is the advertisement of Bates and O'Steen sufficiently deceptive to
be subject to control? If so, then the state's attempt at suppression in this
case might very well be justifiable under the teachings of Virginia Pharmacy Board. The evidence on this subject was inconclusive. The quoted total
price of $195 for an uncontested divorce was not the lowest quotation
possible, but it was also not so excessive as to be unreasonable. 84 The other
items were more troublesome. One was the fact that the clinic's advertisement failed to advise the reader that he could legally change his name by
himself. The Supreme Court did not find this fact troublesome, however; it
noted that there was a possibility that the complexity of the necessary
procedures might deter a layman from acting on his own, and that one of the
appellants had claimed that in the simplest of cases, he frequently would
send the client to effect the change himself.8 5
But these observations are largely irrelevant. While it may be true that
an individual can perform many legal services himself without great difficulty, how many laymen realize this fact without being so informed? There
is a great difference between what one can do and what one knows he can
do. Justice Gordon, who concurred specially in the state court's decision in
Bates, underscored this issue. As he pointed out, the appellants offered an
uncontested adoption for $225 plus $10 in publication costs, but pursuant to
Arizona law, the county attorney, upon application, is required to process
such an adoption without expense to the petitioner. 86 The clinic's advertisement neglects to disclose this vital information. Indeed, the appellant quoted
by Justice Blackmun in his opinion admitted candidly that "it's not my job
to inform a prospective client that he needn't employ a lawyer to handle his
work." '8 7 The cumulative effect of these nondisclosures is to raise a serious
84. 97 S.Ct. at 2708.
85. Id. Actually, the process of changing one's name in Arizona isrelatively simple:

A.

When a person desires to change either his christian or surname or both, and to

adopt another name, he may file an application in the superior court of the county of
his residence, setting forth reasons for the change of name and the name he wishes to
adopt. The court may enter judgment that the adopted name of the party be substituted

for the original name.
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 12-601(A) (West 1956).
86. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 401, 555 P.2d 640, 647 (1976) (Gordon, J., concurring).

See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-127 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78):
The county attorney of the county in which the petitioner resides, shall, upon application of the person or persons seeking adoption, prepare the petition therefore and act

as attorney without expense to the petitioner, but in the event the petition is contested
the county attorney may, with the consent of the court, withdraw from further
representation of any party to the proceeding and the petitioner shall at his own
expense employ counsel. A filing fee of twenty dollars shall be paid to the clerk of the
court in adoption proceedings. Any person contesting any adoption proceeding shall
pay a fee of ten dollars to the clerk of the court.
87. 97 S. Ct. at 2708 n.36.

Winter 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

issue about whether or not the advertisement in question was, if not false, at
least misleading. As the Court noted, the misleading character of advertising
is generally ascertained with references to the sophistication of the audience
which it reaches. 88 The intended audience for Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement was that composed of middle-income laymen, the very group that
the Court acknowledges all too rarely seeks legal advice. 8 9 How are such
people to know that they do not need an attorney to effectuate a name
change, or that the county will process an uncontested severance proceeding
without charge? Obviously, they are not likely to know these facts of their
own accord, and their ignorance in this respect accentuates the fact that the
Court gave inadequate consideration to the argument that the advertisement
in question fell within the deception exception stated in VirginiaPharmacy
Board, because it failed to consider the many effects such publicity might
have upon those who are exposed to it.
Beyond this narrow difficulty, there looms a larger problem, adverted
to by both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Bates.90 That problem
may be summarized as follows: legal fee advertising is inherently deceptive,
because it purports to present a fixed price for services that are, by necessity, variable in nature and dependent upon the particularized needs of the
individual client. The majority in Bates sidesteps this criticism by saying
that the only services capable of being advertised are routine ones, such as
the uncontested divorce or bankruptcy. 9 1 But, again, the question remains,
how routine is a routine service? As Justice Powell says,
This definitional problem is well illustrated by appellants' advertised willingness to obtain uncontested divorces for $195 each. A
potential client can be grievously misled if he reads the advertised
service as embracing all of his possible needs. A host of problems
are implicated by divorce. They include alimony; support and
maintenance for children; child custody; visitation rights; interests
in life insurance, community property, tax refunds and tax
liabilities; and the disposition of other property rights. The processing of the court papers-apparently the only service appellants provide for $195-is usually the most straightforward and
least demanding aspect of the lawyer's responsibility in a divorce
case. More important from the viewpoint of the client is the
diagnostic and advisory function: the pursuit of relevant inquiries
88. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); Fell v. FTC, 285
F.2d 879, 897 (9th Cir. 1960); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d

Cir. 1944); Stanley Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 388, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1943); Aronberg v.
FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942); D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942);

Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
89. See 97 S. Ct. at 2705.
90. See id. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part); id. at 2713-15 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stewart, J.).
91. Id. at 2703.
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of which the client would otherwise be unavare, and advice with
respect to alternative arrangements that might prevent irreparable
dissolution of the marriage or otherwise resolve the client's problem. Although those professional functions are not included within appellants' packaged routine divorce, they frequently fall within the concept of "advice" with which the lay person properly is
concerned when he or she seeks legal counsel. The average lay
person simply has no feeling for which services are included in the
packaged divorce, and thus no capacity to judge the nature of the
advertised product. As a result, the type of advertisement before
us inescapably will mislead many who respond to it. 92
An equally pointed criticism is made by Judge Warriner in his dissent in
Consumers Union of the United States v. American BarAssociation.9 The
majority in that case, prior to the decision in Bates, struck down as
overbroad a Virginia disciplinary provision also incorporating the proscriptions contained in the American Bar Association's rule 2-10I(B). 94 Judge
Warriner argued that fee schedules for anything other than an attorney's
initial consultation were inherently deceptive.
It is true that a standard residential deed ought to cost about $20. It
is not true, however, that the client shopping for a lawyer on the
basis of his fee necessarily knows what a "standard residential
deed" is. Further, a lawyer. doesn't know, in advertising his fee,
whether the client will furnish the lawyer with the old deed so that
he can sit at his desk and dictate the new deed, or whether the
client is simply going to tell him that it was the house he inherited
from his Uncle Josh Johnson who died in 1937-necessitating the
lawyer going to the clerk's office to get the description and derivation of title. There should be a difference in the fee charged in the
two instances and yet the product in each case is nothing but a
"standard residential deed." I have drawn deeds where working
out the derivation of title has taken hours. I added a surcharge for
the time. Yet the product was a standard residential deed.
Even when a lawyer painstakingly explains to a client the
variables that will be considered in arriving at a fee but nevertheless gives him an approximation of what the lawyer thinks the fee
will be, the thing the client remembers is the figure mentioned.
The client generally does not remember that the lawyer told him
92. Id. at 2713-14 (footnotes omitted) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Stewart, J.).
93. 427 F. Supp. 506, 525-31 (E.D. Va. 1976).
94. See note 7 supra. Unlike Bates, however, the challenge in this case was initiated by a
consumer organization interested in publishing a directory detailing, inter alia, the fees and
billing practices of the attorneys of Arlington County. 427 F.Supp. at 509-10. The court, relying
on Virginia Pharmacy Board, found the rule violative of First Amendment rights. See id. at
518-20. It therefore ordered that a ban on non-fee information, i.e.. data on professional
reputation and expertise, would only rarely be justified. Id. at 521-22. As for fee information,
the court noted that some items, e.g., hourly rates, billing and credit practices, would not be
inherently deceptive if publicized, although others, e.g., fixed fees for unique work, might be.
Id. at 522. But the provision containing 2-101(B) failed to distinguish between those two
categories of information and thus was struck down as overbroad. Id. at 523.
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that it was an approximation and that he told him that the variables
might increase the fee substantially. How much more will the
client be misled and become distrustful of the law and lawyers
when the lawyer charges more for his service than he advertised in
black and white?
If one can casually conjure up examples where the standard
residential deed can't be standardized, how much more
troublesome is the problem in the areas of uncontested divorce,
change of name, uncontested adoption and the like? In my experience there simply isn't any such thing as a "standard" service.
Even after a lawyer has heard a client's explanation of the service
desired, most lawyers are hesitant in quoting a flat fee. Most
prefer to quote a range within which the fee is likely to fall. They
do this not to be obscure or to mislead, but because experience has
taught them that only when you have performed the service can
you know for sure what it is worth. 95
Two related arguments are presented by Justice Powell and Judge
Warriner. The first is that, unlike a prepackaged drug, legal services are not
capable of being standardized; thus, any attempt to quote one fixed fee is
likely to deceive the layman. This assertion is something of an overstatement. Apart from initial consultations or hourly fees, there would seem to be
a variety of legal tasks that could be routinized to the extent that a specific
sum will cover the costs incurred in servicing every client who is willing to
accept minimal, standardized performance on the part of the attorney. In
fact, the Supreme Court emphasized that it is limiting its discussion of fee
advertising to this very type of routinized task. 96 But by doing so, it raises
the second question advanced by Justice Powell and Judge Warriner: how
does the consumer know what the advertiser means by a label like an
"uncontested divorce?" The consumer might expect that the $195 divorce
fee quoted in the Arizona Republic would include all those diagnostic and
counselling services to which Justice Powell referred. But Bates and
O'Steen defined the term more narrowly; they expected to do no more than
the minimal paperwork and appearances necessary to have the divorce made
final. 97 If a client desired more, he would be undoubtedly told to take his
business elsewhere. The problem is that what the attorney means by the
label used in his advertisement and what the client perceives that label to
signify may very well be two entirely different things. As a result, it is easy
to visualize how an attorney could take advantage of a potential client's
misperception; he could advertise his services for a divorce at an extremely
low sum, lure people into his office and then tell them that if they desired a
full range of diagnostic services, there would have to be innumerable
95. 427 F. Supp. at 528 (Warriner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
in original).
96. See 97 S. Ct. at 2703.
97. Id. at 2694.
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surcharges added to the figure quoted in the advertisement. There is no
suggestion that Bates and O'Steen committed such practices; nevertheless,
one can only wonder how many people who responded to the advertisement
in the Arizona Republic fully realized what level of services they would be
getting for their money.
Justice Blackmun was not insensitive to this problem. But he suggested
that the bar could always compel the advertiser to define the exact nature of
the service being rendered. 98 Moreover, any misunderstanding would undoubtedly be exposed at the initial consultation, at which time the potential
client could withdraw his patronage and be dunned only a nominal charge
for the time spent, or accept a higher price after negotiating with the
attorney. 99 But, as Judge Warriner suggests, how does this help the credibility of the profession? Either way, the client is likely to feel that a lawyer has
used the power of advertising as a means to lull the former's suspicions,
cajole him into the latter's office and present him with the Hobson's choice
of no services at all, services unsuited to the client's needs or suitable
services rendered at a cost above that which the advertisement led the client
to expect. The potential result of any appreciable number of such transactions would probably be the exacerbation of the cynical assumption shared
by many laymen that lawyering is a ruthlessly mercenary profession.
This analysis raises a related concern. In Jacoby v. State Bar," the
California Supreme Court was presented with a case where the petitioners
opened a low cost legal clinic that attracted the attention of the news
media. 10 1 Disciplinary proceedings were instituted against petitioners as a
result of various interviews they gave to journalists, which had the predictable effect of publicizing their activities. 102 In rejecting the claim that the
petitioners were guilty of solicitation, 10 3 and in finding that their activities
were shielded by the First Amendment, the court said:
98. Id. at 2703-04 n.28.
99. Id. at 2704 n.28.
100. 19 Cal. 3d 359, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977).

101. Indeed, unlike the appellants in Bates, Jacoby and Meyers distributed leaflets describing their clinic as the source of "high quality," low cost legal services. Id. at 382, 562 P.2d at
1341, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 92. (Richardson, J., dissenting). Thus, their advertisement went beyond
that authored by Bates and O'Steen. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in Jacoby never
decided the advertising issue. Id. at 380, 562 P.2d at 1340, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
102. These activities included interviews with journalists and an open house at the clinic,
sponsored by a statewide consumer organization, to which members of the news media were
invited. Id. at 363-65, 562 P.2d at 1329-30, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 80-81.
103. In so doing, the court gave a rather strained construction to its previous ruling in Belli
v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974). In that case, disciplinary

proceedings were instituted against Melvin Belli for endorsing a brand of liquor, disseminating
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It can readily be seen, however, that such concerns [the
potential for inherently misleading advertising and deliberate exaggeration through commercial speech] relate at most to paid
advertisements written by or at the direction of the attorney himself, and to direct solicitation of clients by the attorney. The
danger is not necessarily inherent in an attorney's cooperation
with the publication of a news story. In order for an attorney
intentionally to mislead the public through a bona fide news article
it would be necessary for him first to convince reporters and
editors that he is newsworthy, then induce them to print what he
relates without verification and hope the public accepts the tale at
face value. To project this scenario as likely to occur requires a
cynical view of both journalistic integrity and public gullibility. 104
Jacoby suggests that a key criterion in cases involving attorney advertising
should be identifying the author of the publicity at issue, and according
more exacting scrutiny to those cases, like Bates, where the author is the
attorney himself.
The Supreme Court never took this factor into account in weighing the
merits of Arizona's claim regarding the "regulation of deceptive publicity"
exception announced in Virginia Pharmacy Board. But the point would
seem to be a vital one, both with respect to this exception and to the
contention raised by the state regarding the unfeasibility of policing the
profession. If the content of fee advertising is prescribed by the state itself
or by an impartial third party, the dangers of self-aggrandizement by
unscrupulous attorneys would be minimized, and the inherently misleading
nature of such advertising could be efficaciously counteracted. 105 Indeed,
publicity praising his own talents in fulsome terms, seeking lecture dates and television time and
conducting the so-called "Belli seminars" for laymen. The court said in that case:
when the bar seeks to discipline an attorney for a communication incident to protected
speech, in addition to showing that the attorney intended by his communication to

generate business for his law practice

. . .

it must demonstrate that the communica-

tion or a part thereof was principally directed toward this end. We [advance a] belief

that the speech interest prevails over the desire of the bar to minimize solicitation of
legal business both because the former is anchored in the federal constitution and
because it is properly accorded a fundamental position within that document.
Id. at 833, 519 P.2d at 581-82, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34 (footnote omitted). In Jacoby, the court

redefined the Belli rule in light of the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases and thus said:
we synthesize Belli and Bigelow [v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)] by concluding that a
communication is not "primarily directed" toward solicitation unless, viewed in its
entirety, it serves no discernible purpose other than the attraction of clients. If a
legitimate purpose appears on the face of the publication or in the demonstrated
motivation of the attorney, the publication must receive at least prima facie First

Amendment protection.
19 Cal. 3d at 371, 562 P.2d at 1134, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 85. As Justice Richardson noted, this is a
"precipitous retreat" from Belli. Id. at 387, 562 P.2d at 1344, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Richardson,

J., dissenting).
104.

19 Cal. 3d at 378, 562 P.2d at 1339, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 90.

105. Courts have struck down restrictions on professional fee advertisements where the
party raising the challenge is a disinterested, independent consumer organization. See Consum-
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the majority in Bates seemed to be implying just such a possibility. It noted
that the slate could compel the attorney-advertiser to insert suitable disclaimers, the language of which would presumably be formulated by the
state itself, in his advertising copy 0 6 or could itself generate definitions of
standardized services to be used in all fee advertisements.107 The import of
these statements is that the Court recognized the difficulties of enforcement
and the possibility of abuse when a lawyer is writing his own publicity and,
in effect, invited the bar to intervene and propose model advertising copy
that attorneys could use for themselves. In sum, the Court's answer to the
contention that Bates' and O'Steen's item in the Arizona Republic
constituted deceptive advertising within the meaning of the exception
created by Virginia Pharmacy Board was to decline to probe deeply the
problems presented and instead hint that state bars might be given considerable latitude to prescribe prophylactic measures that would curtail the
potential for deception.
Another area of regulation mentioned in VirginiaPharmacyBoard and
acknowledged by Bates is the time, place and manner restriction. Such a
restriction must meet three prerequisities. It must (a) be justified without
reference to the content of the regulated expression, (b) serve a significant
government interest and (c) allow ample opportunity for access to alternative channels of communication.108 A very sound argument could be made
that 2-101(B) falls within the ambit of this exception. To date, that argument
has been best presented by Judge Warriner's dissent in Consumers Union of
09
United States v. American Bar Association:1
I believe that DR 2-101, insofar as it regulates the advertising
of fees, is a time, manner and place restriction. Accordingly, the
balancing process should focus on the reasonableness of the restrictions in this context. I gleaned earlier from [ Virginia Pharmacy Board] that prohibiting of lawyers' fees (other than an initial
consultation) in order to prevent confusion and deception would
be constitutionally permissible provided, (1) the regulation is the
only feasible means of preventing the confusion or deception, (2)
the consequence to the public of failure to so regulate would be
severe, (3) alternative areas of communication of the desired
information are not totally precluded, and (4) in addition to the
ers Union of the United States v. American Bar Ass'n, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976); see
note 94 supra; Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D.

Va. 1976); see note 141 infra.
106. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.

107. Id. at 2703-04 n.28.
108. Virginia State Ed. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976). See also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1977).
109. 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976). See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
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391

above, the regulation is reasonable
or justifiable in light of First
110
Amendment considerations.
In light of his prior discussion concerning the inherently confusing nature of

n and the acknowledged consequences of decepattorney fee advertisement 11
tive advertising, Judge Warriner said that the first two prerequisites were
fulfilled.112 As for alternative channels of communication, two options were

presented. First, the potential client could always resort to an in-person
consultation with an attorney.1 13 Second, the language of 2-101(B) creates a
restraint only upon attorneys; independent consumer groups could always
114
compile and disseminate price information with complete immunity.
Thus, alternative channels of communication were present. As for the

justifiability of the regulation, Judge Warriner observed that by reducing the
possibility of misleading communications, the state was ensuring that the
public's ignorance was not -being exploited by unscrupulous professionals. 115 He also observed that unlike VirginiaPharmacyBoard, where aban
on advertising did not affect professional standards because the advertisement in question concerned the sale of a product, "where a truly professional service is being rendered the quality thereof will have to suffer when the
price through advertising is driven below a certain margin. And, unlike the
substitution of ingredients in a drug, the shoddy will be difficult to ferret
out."' 116 Moreover, where the ban is imposed on the advertisement of
virtually identical products, the preclusion of competition may be undesirable because the only variable is that of cost; "[b]ut where the product is an
intricate and complicated professional service, allowing price advertising
destroys the more important existing competition of quality without substituting a fair alternative measure with which to choose a lawyer." 1 17 Thus,
the state's interest in regulation was a significant one.
Judge Warriner's points are well-taken. Certainly the state in Bates did
not seek to regulate with reference to content. Indeed, it had adopted the
American Bar Association's rule 2-102(A)(6), which permitted ceffain types
of fee advertising in legal directories. 1 It is clear that regulations "clearly
directed not at any commercial aspect of the prohibited advertising but at the
ideas conveyed and form of expression" 1 19 are unconstitutional. But the law
110. Id. at 529 (Warriner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
112. 427 F. Supp. at 529.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 530.
115. See id.at 530-31.

116. Id.at 531.
117. Id.
118. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.

119. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, Inc., 431 U.S. 678, 701 n.28 (1977). Carey ruled that a
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in Bates was clearly directed at the manner rather than the substance of the
speech in question; indeed, section 2-101(B) rather carefully outlines six
exceptions where it is permissible to identify a lawyer by his profession as
well as his name in the course of commercial announcements. 120 The
governmental interest in regulating professional conduct was also not seriously disputed by the majority in Bates, which recognized the potential for
confusion and deception in attorney fee advertising and indicated that the
state did have considerable discretion in selecting a method by which to
121
combat those problems.
There is thus left the matter of alternative modes of communication. Inperson consultation may not suffice. As the Court has noted elsewhere, "in
a society in which each individual has but limited time and resources...
he relies necessarily upon the press to bring him in convenient form the
facts.", 122 Many persons might thus find it difficult to question attorneys
individually. But there are other alternatives, such as the publicizing efforts
of impartial consumer groups, the many referral and group service legal
plans suggested by Justice Powel1123 and the option provided by 2102(A)(6), which permits attorneys to provide potential clients with individualized estimates of the cost of proposed legal services. 124 The Court in
Bates never mentioned the suitability of the former two alternatives. The
third was rather risibly dismissed with the observation that "an advertising
diet limited to such spartan fare would provide scant nourishment." ' 125 In
light of the fact that 2-102(A)(6) permits publicity with respect to twenty
discrete items of information, 126 including the availability of fee schedules,
this statement is rather fatuous. Indeed, the total failure of the Court even to
consider the time, place and manner exception created by Virginia Pharmacy Board makes one wonder whether the balancing process engaged in by
the majority in Bates was undertaken with any conscientiousness.
state law criminalizing the advertisement of contraceptives unconstitutionally abridged
commercial speech.
120. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text supra.
122. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975). Accord, Health Sys.
Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267, 273 (E.D. Va. 1976). As the court
in the latter case points out, the presence of the alternative does not extinguish a First

Amendment right, see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939), but it is a factor that must
be weighed in the balancing process, see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,765 (1972). 424 F.
Supp. at 273.
123. 97 S. Ct. at 2716 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by

Stewart, J.).
124.

See note 25 supra.

125. 97 S. Ct. at 2701. See also Consumers Union of United States v. American Bar Ass'n,
427 F. Supp. 506, 521 (E.D. Va. 1976).

126. See note 25 supra.
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Moreover, the Court in Bates ignored one other element, the speech
interests of the state of Arizona. According to Bigelow v. Virginia,127 the
state "may seek to disseminate information so as to enable its citizens to
make better informed decisions" 1 28 about matters affecting their health and
welfare. In Bates, unlike Virginia PharmacyBoard, the state and the bar
were not merely suppressing information; they were also communicating
facts to the public through authorized channels, through reputable law
directories, bar-operated referral services, state-sponsored legal programs
and so on. 129 The effect of Bates' and O'Steen's advertisement, then, was to
interfere with the state's own speech activities by disseminating a type of
information that the state deemed contrary both to the interests of the legal
profession and to the goals of its own limited price advertising efforts.
To date, this possibility has been recognized by one case in this
context, American Meat Institute v. Ball. 130 That decision upheld a Michigan statute requiring grocers and restauranteurs who sell meat or meat
products that do not meet the standards set by the state for similar items
produced and sold solely within its borders, to notify customers of that fact
in a prescribed manner.13 1 The court said:
The source of a state's right of free speech may be threefoldsovereignty, and related to this, reserved powers under the Tenth
Amendment, and finally, the First Amendment. The Bill of
Rights, of course, was enacted at the insistence of the states as a
guarantee of restraints on the federal government. While normally
we think of the Bill of Rights as protection for individuals, there is
no reason that at least some of these rights should not also apply to
governmental units as well. For example, the federal government
cannot take state property without due process.
The Fourteenth Amendment, by incorporating the First
Amendment, provides a vehicle for citizens to assert free speech
rights against the state, but this does not mean that the state
cannot also exercise rights of its own so long as they do not
conflict with those of the people. When a state operates a public
broadcasting facility, for example, it is acting in an area where
freedom of expression is traditionally necessary and protected by
the First Amendment. . . . This example is offered simply as one
illustration of how states may exercise "free speech" rights. The
opportunity for a state to communicate information to benefit the
health and welfare of its citizen-consumers132is a fundamental justification for the existence of such a right.
127. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).

128.
129.
in part,
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 824.
See 97 S. Ct. at 2703; id. at 2716-17 & n.9 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
joined by Stewart, J.).
424 F. Supp. 758 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
MICH. Co3W'. LAWS ANN. § 289.584a (Supp. 1977).
424 F. Supp. at 770.
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Under this logic, Arizona was exercising its right of expression and, in
doing so, came into conflict with the rights of Bates and O'Steen. At that
juncture, since both interests emanate from the provisions of the First
Amendment, the Court should have utilized a careful balancing process, one
which would have analyzed both Arizona's constitutional interest in disseminating its own prescribed information on attorneys and the extent to
which the alleged misinformation promulgated by the appellants infringed
that interest. Instead, the Court assumed that the only speech rights at stake
were those of the appellants, and thus cast the state in a defensive position
from the beginning. In light of Arizona's own concern in providing accurate
information to its citizen-consumers, the majority's omission seems
anomalous.
(b) Implications of Bates
In one key respect, Bates differs from VirginiaPharmacyBoard. In
the latter case, the complainants consisted of consumers and nonprofit
organizations representing the interests of consumers; in the former case,
however, the complainants were the advertisers themselves. Clearly, both
groups have vital interests; "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a
reciprocal right to receive the advertising . ... 133 Nevertheless, the
Court in Virginia PharmacyBoard identified "commonsense" differences
between commercial speech and other types of expression:
Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete suppression
by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of
protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. The truth of
commercial speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by
its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.
Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds.
Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there
is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
foregone entirely.34
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board used this assertion to buttress its
conclusion that commercial expression might be accorded distinctive treatment; the state could tolerate fewer inaccuracies in such speech, 135 could
133. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
757 (1976).
134. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
135. See, e.g., Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inic., 486 F.2d 25, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 985 (1974); Oberman v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 460 F.2d 1381, 1383-84 (7th
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require an advertiser to insert disclaimers in his advertising copy 136 and
137
could impose prior restraints.
Because the complainants in Bates were advertisers themselves, the
Court reached an issue not discussed in Virginia Pharmacy Board: the
applicability of the overbreadth doctrine. It ruled that this doctrine applies
weakly, if at all, in commercial speech cases because of the comparative
durability of such speech and because the disseminator of such speech is
more likely to know whether his expression is permissible. 138 This may be
true with respect to Bates and O'Steen; they knew that they were breaking
the law. But facial overbreadth claims have been upheld not only where the
regulation in question could have been tailored more precisely so that
protected speech would be uninfringed. 139 Such claims have also been said
to exist where the law in question only purports to regulate the time, place
and manner of communicative conduct or where it confers upon functionaries standardless discretionary power to approve or reject publication of
a given item of speech. 14°
In these situations, it hardly seems that the durability of commercial
expression will make much difference. While advertising may be the sine
qua non of a mercantile system, it can be crushed if the state controls the
media through which it must be transmitted. If an administrator delegated
standardless powers can foreclose the major channels of communication to a
given advertiser and thus undermine his ability to compete, it seems dubious
to say that the law conferring such powers may not be challenged on
Cir. 1972); Kansas Elec. Supply Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 438 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 898 (1971). All these cases were defamation actions arising from false
statements in credit reports. In each case, the court held that because commercial speech was at
issue, the actual malice standard of liability for defamation announced in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), would not govern.
136. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
137. See, e.g., Donaldson v. Reed Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-91 (1948) (enforcement of
order by postmaster general requiring the return to the sender of mail and money orders sent in
response to advertisement for a puzzle contest); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112,
120 (1937) (upheld cease and desist order directed against fictitious testimonials and recommendations used in advertising encyclopedias); E.F. Drew & Co., Inc., v. FrC, 235 F.2d 735,
739-40 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957) (upheld cease and desist order directed
against use of certain phrases in advertisements for oleomargarine).
138. 97 S. Ct. at 2707-08. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
139. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 59-60 n.17 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,11418 (1972); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617-19 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
249-50 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-05 (1940).
140. See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,59-60 n.17 (1976); Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,
155-59 (1969); Cox v. City of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 553-58 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938).
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overbreadth grounds. Similarly, where the statute in question confers such
untrammeled authority to censor or purports to concern itself only with the
time, place and manner of expression, the greater verifiability of what is
being advertised is irrelevant. Confronted with such a statute, the advertiser
receives scant solace from being told that he is in a better position to know
the truth of what he is saying, because the criterion of regulation utilized by
the state has, at least ostensibly, nothing to do with truth or falsity. Thus,
Bates was only one type of overbreadth case. Yet based on the facts of that
case, the Court foreclosed the general applicability of the overbreadth
doctrine in commercial speech suits by relying on rationales that might not
be germane to other types of overbreadth claims.
Indeed, prior to Bates, a number of courts struck down legislation
restricting commercial speech on overbreadth grounds. In Health Systems
Agency v. VirginiaState Board of Medicine, 1 a district court ruled that a
state law prohibiting fee advertisement by physicians constituted an unnecessarily broad encroachment on First Amendment rights. 4 2 Similarly, in
Consumers Union of the United States v. American Bar Association, 143 a
disciplinary rule for attorneys identical to that involved in Bates was
invalidated as overly broad. 144 The rather tenuous line of demarcation
between commercial and noncommercial speech for purposes of overbreadth analysis is well demonstrated by the case of Person v. Association
of the Bar of the City of New York. 145 At issue in that case was a New York
disciplinary rule prohibiting attorney foe advertising. The plaintiff, the
director of a paralegal institute purportedly handling antitrust, securities and
civil rights actions, argued that the law in question hindered him from
advertising "public interest" and "politically expressive" services, which,
141. 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Va. 1976). This case involved a challenge by a consumer
agency to a state law banning advertisement by physicians. The court approved a directory
compiled by the agency purporting to list, inter alia, a doctor's "'charge for a standard office

visit, or his fee or range of fees for specific types of services, provided disclosure is made of the
variable and other pertinent factors affecting the amount of the fee specified.' " Id. at 274-75
(footnote omitted). Thus, the solution arrived at in this case bears a resemblance to that
suggested by Chief Justice Burger in Bates. See 97 S. Ct. at 2711 (Burger, C.J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
142. See 424 F. Supp. at 273-74.

143. 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976). See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
144. Id. at 523.
145. 414 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). In a separate proceeding, Person also challenged

the American Bar Association's Rule 7-109(c), which prohibits contingent fees for witnesses.
The district court enjoined enforcement of this rule, saying it constituted a violation of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Person v. Association of the Bar, 414 F.
Supp. 144, 146-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding 7-109(c) to
be a legitimate exercise of the state's police powers that affected no fundamental right and
created no suspect classification. Person v. Association of the Bar, 554 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.

1977).
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presumably, the legal establishment frowned upon. 1 The district court
found a substantial constitutional question, citing Bigelow v. Virginia'47 for
the proposition that merely because speech is designated as "commercial"
does not mean that it forfeits the protections of the First Amendment. 141 The
implication of this case is that some avowedly commercial speech is also
political or ideological, when viewed in context. The essence of Person's
claim was that the rule against advertising developed by the organized bar
had the effect of chilling litigation in certain areas and thus foreclosed some
plaintiffs from becoming aware of their opportunity to gain access to the
courts in order to institute "politically expressive" litigation. Thus, the
Court in Bates accorded far too cursory a consideration to the problem of
how the overbreadth doctrine applies in commercial speech cases, both
because it ignored the fact that that doctrine encompasses differing types of
claims and because it was too quick to assume that the advertisement of
legal services is purely commercial speech without any political or ideological aspects.
Beyond the overbreadth issue, there is the larger problem of what effect
Bates has on the decision in Virginia PharmacyBoard. A useful harbinger
of future developments is provided by the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Louisiana
Consumer's League v. Louisiana State Board of Optometry Examiners.149
That case involved a challenge to statutes prohibiting the price advertising of
prescription eyeglasses, lenses, or the frames or fittings thereof. 150 The trial
court denied a preliminary injunction, observing that the Court in Virginia
Pharmacy Board had restricted its ruling to the sale of a prepackaged
product like prescription drugs."'5 The Fifth Circuit reversed. After citing
Bates, it said that "[t]he only services at issue before this court are those
involved in filling a prescription for eyeglasses. The as yet unchallenged
expert testimony describes that process as one of mechanical tasks and
choices no less routine than the judgment required in processing an uncontested divorce or a simple personal bankruptcy." 152 Under Bates, it was
said that the plaintiffs need only demonstrate that filling a prescription for
eyeglasses was not such a unique service that fixed rates could not be
146. See 414 F. Supp. at 137.
147. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See note 1 supra.
148. Id. at 826, cited in 414 F. Supp. at 138. However, the district court granted a stay of
action pending the decision of the Supreme Court in Virginia PharmacyBoard. 414 F. Supp. at
139.
149. 557 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1977).
150. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1063(9), 37:1065 (1974).
151. 557 F.2d at 474.

152. Id. at 475.
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established. 153 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the lower
court with a direction to grant the requested relief. It observed:
Defendants may attempt to discredit plaintiffs' description of the
process of filling eyeglasses prescriptions. We note that unless
that attempt enables the district court to conclude, which it now
cannot, that plaintiffs have failed to establish that the services in
question are no less routine than such legal services as processing
an uncontested divorce or a simple personal bankruptcy, the certainty of plaintiffs' ultimate success on the merits will remain
absolute.154
Louisiana Consumer'sLeague unhesitatingly suggests that the logic of
Bates will be extended to price advertising of routine tasks in all professions. In a way, this is no surprise. Bates presented the most difficult of
cases, in which the service in question was highly judgmental. Therefore, it
could very easily be applied to the less troublesome cases where the
routinized task in question involves less judgment and discretion. In effect,
Bates sounds the death knell for that series of rulings wherein the Court
indicated that the state had wide discretion to regulate the advertising
practices of the members of various professions. More importantly, in light
of the Court's failure to address the many issues raised by the exceptions to
the coverage of the Virginia Pharmacy Board doctrine, the decision in
Bates suggests that the burden on the state to justify flat bans on professional price advertising may very well be impossible to meet. Thus, the effect of
Bates is to compel states to protect their consumer-citizens by engaging in
greater and more discriminating professional regulation than they had
heretofore been willing to do.
b. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech: LinmarkAssociates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro
The second major decision handed down by the Court during the 197677 term in the area of commercial speech was Linmark Associates, Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro. 155 In that case, the Court was concerned primarily with the extent to which a governmental authority may place time, place
or manner restrictions on the dissemination of commercial speech. The
Court's analysis in Linmark suggests that this exception to the commercial
speech doctrine, which was explicitly acknowledged in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 5 6 may be one
153. Id.
154. Id. at 476.
155. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
156. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
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on which a governmental authority may only rarely rely as a justification for
the regulation of this form of expression.
The Decision
The facts of this case are comparatively complex and subject to differ157
ing interpretations, as the opinion of the court of appeals demonstrates.
The township of Willingboro is a residential community located in southern
New Jersey, near the military installations of Fort Dix and McGuire Air
Force Base and the offices of several corporations transacting nationwide
business. 158 Beginning in the late 1950's, the residential development of this
community was undertaken by William Levitt & Sons, Inc., which
constructed middle-income dwellings on the "part system." Under this
scheme, ten distinct areas (parts) were sequentially developed. 159 By the
time of this litigation, the development was virtually complete. Levitt
initially refused to sell homes to members of minority groups, but this
practice was enjoined by the state supreme court in 1960.160
Thereafter, a Human Relations Commission (HRC) was formed by the
township in order to promote full racial integration. The community also
joined National Neighbors, a nationwide organization dedicated to the
elimination of discriminatory housing practices. 161 During the decade of the
1960's, population growth within Willingboro was dramatic. The total
number of white residents increased by nearly 350%, from 11,801 to 38,326
by 1970.162 The influx of nonwhite residents was also substantial: their
numbers increased from sixty to 5,088 during the same period. As a result,
while the nonwhite composition of Willingboro's population accounted for
only 5.0% in 1960, it rose to 11.7% by 1970.163 In the period between 1970
and 1973, the demographic data evinced a different trend. During those
years, the white population declined by 1,841 members; in contrast, the
nonwhite population increased by 3,034 members, so that by 1973, nonwhites accounted for 18.2% of the populace of the township. 164 Despite this
increase in the number of nonwhites, there was no ghetto in Willingboro;

(1)

157. Compare Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786,797, 804
(3d Cir. 1976) (opinion of Markey, C.J., joined by Weis, J.) with id. at 806, 816 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
158. 431 U.S. at 87.
159. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1976).
160. See Levitt and Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination in State Dept. of Educ.,
31 N.J. 514, 536, 158 A.2d 177, 188-89 (1960), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
161. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1976).,
162. See id. at 807 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 5

members of racial minorities were distributed throughout all ten parts of the
community. 165
Because of its location, the population of the township was transient in
nature and the sale and resale of residences were recurrent. Consequently,
the community was serviced by eighty-two realtors, all of whom belonged
to the Multiple Listing Service of Burlington County (MLSBC).16 6 A general result of these conditions was that many "Sold" or "For Sale" signs
would appear on residential lawns within a very limited area. Many members of the community believed that these signs were creating a "fear
psychology" among white residents, causing them to flee before a greater
influx of nonwhites came to Willingboro, which in turn would depress
property values. 167 Council member William J. Kearns, Jr. testified at trial
that the leaders in the community were concerned primarily about preventing the growth of panic selling, and correcting the belief of many that the
community was unstable. 168 The concern that the number of nonwhites in
the township might increase to twenty or twenty-five percent of the total
population was said not to be important; the community officials believed
that such a percentage approached the norm for towns situated within the
69
Delaware Valley.1
In light of these sentiments, the Council began searching for a method
to counteract this "fear psychology." It investigated the approaches of other
165. I'd. at 789 (opinion of Markey, C.J., joined by Weis, J.). As the Third Circuit pointed
out, this pattern of evenly distributed integration is rare. Willingboro had registered a 60%
increase in its nonwhite population between 1970 and 1973; the usual experience that accom-

panies such an influx of minority residents is that whites flee the affected neighborhood and it
becomes a nonwhite enclave. Id. at 789 n.1 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGmTS, TwENTY
YEARs AFrER BROWN-EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 119 (1975)).
166. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786. 790 (3d Cir. 1976).
167. See id. This fear psychology is related to the concept of "blockbusting," which has

been defined as a process through which individuals stimulate and prey "on racial bigotry and
fear by initiating and encouraging rumors that negroes. . . [are] about to move into a given
area, that all non-negroes.

.

. [will] leave, and that the market values of properties.

.

. [will]

descend to 'panic prices' with residence in the area becoming undesirable and unsafe for nonnegroes." Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill.
1969). Accord, Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Ill.2d 530. 533-34, 224 N.E.2d
793, 797 (1967); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 551,251 A.2d 761,762-63 (1969).
See also Comment, Blockbusting: Judicial and Legislative Response to Real Estate Dealers'

Excesses, 22 DE PAUL L. REV. 818, 819-22 (1973) [hereinafter cited as JudicalResponse]. For
an analysis of the "fear psychology" adverted to by the Third Circuit, see Note, Blockbusting:
A Novel StatutoryApproach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB.
538, 541-45 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Novel Approach.]
168. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786,790 (3d Cir. 1976).
He described the concern as one where people sensed "a lack of stability or a large turnover in

the community, and that this large turnover was resulting in a substantial influx of minority
groups into the community beyond what could be sustained without the community itself
turning into a ghetto within the county." Id.
169. Id.
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cities1 70 and also asked the advice of the HRC. The latter organization
recommended the enactment of an ordinance banning "For Sale" or
"Sold" signs on residential property. 17 1 Alexander W. Porter, a member of
the commission, indicated that the recommendation was motivated by a
desire to produce a "harmonious" community, one in which people would
not have to sell their homes unless they wished to do so. 72 The entire
question became an issue in the 1973 councilmanic elections where the
collective sentiment of the community appeared to be that some measure
173
had to be taken before Willingboro declined irreversibly.
Normally, one public meeting precedes the adoption of an ordinance.
With respect to the proposal to ban "For Sale" signs, two were held, one
before and one after the drafting of the ordinance in question. 74 Some
residents at both of the meetings complained about panic selling and receiving unsolicited requests by realtors to put their homes up for sale.175 Real
estate brokers, however, objected to the adoption of the ordinance, which
they said would curtail one of the more valuable tools of their trade, and
claimed that the proposed enactment was a transparent attempt to prevent
more nonwhites from coming to live in the township.176 Yet among those
supporting the proposed law were a number of civil rights organizations,
including the NAACP. 177 But, on the whole, the thrust of the discussion at
both sessions appeared to be focused upon aesthetic considerations and on
the effects of the signs on property values; 178 the racial aspects of the
170. in particular, the Council noted the approach of Shaker Heights, Ohio, which had also
passed an ordinance banning residential sale signs. Although the real estate brokers in that
community balked initially at the measure, they eventually complied peacefully. Id. As a matter
of fact, such bans are not uncommon and, prior to Linmark, had been upheld. See, e.g., Barrick
Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 136 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 161 (7th
Cir. 1974); Burk v. Municipal Ct. of Whittier, 229 Cal. App. 2d 696, 702-03, 40 Cal. Rptr. 425,
428-29 (1964). Cf. Leet v. City of Eastlake, 7 Ohio App.2d 218,223,220 N.E.2d 121, 124 (1966)

(suggested that some aspects of a ban on "For Sale" signs might be permissible, but invalidated
the ban in question on vagueness grounds).
171. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 1976).
172. Id. at 791.
173. See id. (opinion of Markey, C.J. and Weis, J.); id. at 808 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 791 (opinion of Markey, C.J. and Weis, J.).
175. Id.
176. Id. Testimony at the hearings also disclosed (a) that a study of township home sales

conducted in 1973 revealed a turnover rate of approximately 111%, (b) that in February, 1974-a
typical month-there were 230 "For Sale" signs posted among Willingboro's 11,000 houses and
(c) that the property values within the township were still comparatively high. 431 U.S. at 89. A
number of agents who testified also claimed that 30-35% of their business emanated from such
signs; at least one also claimed that selling realty without signs takes twice as much time as it
would otherwise take. Id.

177. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 793 n.6 (3d Cir.
1976).
178. 431 U.S. at 90. But the Third Circuit argued that aesthetic considerations were not the
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proposed regulation were not addressed by the proponents of the suggested
law. 179
Ordinance No. 5-1974 was passed unanimously by the council on
March 18, 1974.180 In order to understand its effect, it is necessary to
consider the state of the law prior to its passage. Section 17-2 of the
township's revised general ordinances bans the erection or maintenance of
all signs within Willingboro;181 section 17-6 listed five exceptions to this
ban with respect to property zoned for residential use. 18 2 One of these
exceptions embodied in section 17-6.5 was for "[s]igns pertaining to the
lease, rental or sale of the premises on which they appear." 1 3 The effect of
Ordinance No. 5-1974 was to repeal only this exception. The practical, as
opposed to the legal, effect of this repeal is more troublesome to ascertain.
In the nine months that elapsed between its passage and the beginning of
trial in the Linmark case, the number of people who sold their homes
because of racial fears did decline. 184 However, the absolute number of
homes sold remained the same;18 5 the primary benefit of the law appeared to
be that at least some in-town realtors increased their share of the total sales,
whereas certain out-of-town brokers not affiliated with the MLSBC may not
have gained any business. 186 At least one realtor reported that the racial
composition of his clientele remained unchanged. 187
"primary public interest" sought to be served by the enactment of the ordinance. Linmark
Assocs., Inc, v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 797 n.13 (3d Cir. 1976).

179. 431 U.S. at 90.
180. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1976).
181. WILLINGBORO, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES ch. XVII § 17-2 (19-), quoted in Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 805 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,

dissenting).
182. WILLINGBORO, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES ch. XVII § 17-6.1 to 6.5 (19-). The other
exceptions consisted of "Identification Signs," "Professional Signs," "'Non-Business Usage

Signs" and "Specific Recreational Activities Signs." Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 805 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
183. WILLINGBORO, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES ch. XVII §17-6.5 (19-), quoted in Linmark

Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 805 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting).
184. 431 U.S. at 90.
185. Id.

186. The principal testimony in this regard was that of Donald Evans, a Willingboro-based
realtor. He said that his business increased 25% due to the fact that out-of-town brokers were

unable to display their signs. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786,
810 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). But as the majority opinion of the Third Circuit
pointed out, there was no evidence adduced that out-of-town brokers lost any business; Evans'
increases may have been won at the expense of other brokers situated within Willingboro.
Moreover, co-plaintiff Mellman, an out-of-town realtor affiliated with the MLSBC, apparently
worked closely with Evans during this period. See id. at 794 n.7 (opinion of Markey, C.J.,
joined by Weis, J.). Thus, economic loss was simply not proven.
187. 431 U.S. at 90.
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At trial in federal district court, the issue was raised whether Ordinance
No. 5-1974 was racially discriminatory. Members of the township's council
and of the HRC testified that they were solely interested in preventing panic
selling, not in "freezing" nonwhites at a level of about twenty to twentyfive percent of the total population.18 8 Nevertheless, they also admitted that
the sentiments of many members of the community were that the proliferation of sale signs indicated that too many blacks were moving into Willingboro or that the residents of the township were being exploited because of
their community's efforts to achieve balanced integration. 189 Indeed, one
realtor not affiliated with local authorities testified that the purpose underlying the enactment of the ordinance was to maintain a twenty percent quota
for nonwhites and thus arrest their tendency to increase their overall repre190
sentation in the local populace.
Based on these facts, the district court was able to distinguish the case
from a prior ruling of the Seventh Circuit, Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of
Gary,19 1 in which the court of appeals had upheld a local ordinance almost
identical in effect to the one enacted by Willingboro. 19 It noted that in
Barrick, the ordinance was intended to halt resegregration, 193 while the law
in Linmark was meant "to promote a racial balance or more properly, a
racial imbalance to perpetuate existing racial lines." 194 In light of the fact
that one realtor had testified that thirty percent of his sales emanated from
signs being posted on residences, the court found a serious abridgement of
the constitutional right of property owners to communicate their intention to
188. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 798-99 (3d Cir.
1976).
189. See id. at 808-09 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). As the passages quoted by Judge Gibbons
show, however, the witnesses merely reported what they heard within the community. There
was no evidence that the sentiments expressed by others mirrored their own views.
190. See id. at 810-11. This testimony was that of Donald Evans. See note 186 supra. He
appeared to be speaking about brokers in general when he made his statements. Yet, as the

majority opinion noted, Evans' views could not be imputed to the members of the township's
council. Id. at 798 n.15 (opinion of Markey, C.J., joined by Weis, J.).
191. 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). For discussions

of this case, see DeVore & Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access to the Press, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 745, 769-70, 773 (1975); Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761, 781-82 (1976).
192. Gary, Ind., Ordinance 4685 (July 25, 1972), quoted in 354 F. Supp. at 128-29 n.1. The

Gary ordinance prohibited signs reading "For Sale," "Sold," "Open House," "New House,"
"Home Inspection," "Visitors Invited," "Installed By" or "Built By."
193. In Gary, there was a segregated housing pattern that the local authorities were trying

to counteract. Coupled with this problem was that of white flight. In the 1960's, the city's white
population decreased by 24.9%, while its nonwhite population increased by 34.9%. 354 F.
Supp. at 134.

194. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 792 n.5 (3d Cir.
1976). The unreported opinion of the district court is reprinted in its entirety in this footnote.
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sell. 195 Moreover, the trial court also observed that the ordinance infringed
the prospective purchaser's rights because it limited his choice of a potential
residence to those shown to him by the broker. The latter is thus empowered
to "arbitrarily regulate the racial and ethnic development of a particular
residential area"; 196 as a result, the fundamental right to travel was being
97
abridged. 1
The Third Circuit reversed. On the right to travel issue, it simply noted

that no significant burden was imposed since seventy percent of all inquiries
came from sources other than signs and, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, the effect of the ban fell with equal force on whites and nonwhites. 198 Similarly, both with respect to the purpose and effect of the
ordinance, the court of appeal found no taint of discrimination. 199 Finally,
on the First Amendment issue, the court observed that the signs in question
were purely commercial speech; 200 moreover, the regulation imposed was
not one based on content, but solely a place and manner restriction. 20 ' The
Third Circuit recognized that, after Bigelow v. Virginia,202 even impinge-

ments upon commercial expression must be justified by a significant governmental interest. 20 3 But here that interest was easily identifiable: the
protection of "stable, racially integrated neighborhoods from the destructive
195. Id.
196. Id. at 792 n.5. See id. at 802-03 & n.25. The district court here was referring to the
concept of "steering." This term refers to the act of channeling a prospective buyer into or
away from an area because of his race. Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich.
1975). On this point, the Third Circuit in Linmark found no evidence to support this claim and
noted additionally that because nonwhites were distributed throughout all ten parts of Willingboro, there was no wholly nonwhite enclave to be steered to. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 804 (3d Cir. 1976).
197. Id. at 793 n.5. The district court's analysis in this respect has some difficulties. The
Supreme Court has held that the right to travel is a fundamental one, infringement of which may
only be justified by the assertion of a compelling state interest. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969). But
both decisions refer to attempts by a state to "penalize" the right to travel and the district court
in Linmark never adduced evidence of the penalty effect flowing from the township's act.
Morevoer, the Supreme Court has never extended this right to intrastate travel, which seemingly was all that was involved in Linmark; it explicitly refrained from answering that issue in
Maricopa County. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974). Other
courts have been less hesitant. See, e.g., Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.
Ariz. 1971); King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971).
198. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 804 (3d Cir. 1976).
199. See id.at 797-803.
200. Id.at 795-96.
201. See id.at 795.
202. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See note 1 supra.
203. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 796 (3d Cir.
1976).
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segregating effect of a panic selling psychology .... "204 Moreover, the
actual imposition upon brokers was said to be de minimis. The ordinance
served, at most, "to slow the pace of sales on the 30% of inquiries received
from signs to that of the other 70% received from other sources. Newspaper
ads, in-town window displays or other possible means of conveying the
desire to sell remain fully available to all. "205 Thus, no violation of the First
Amendment was said to exist. 20 6
In an unanimous opinion2 7 authored by Justice Marshall, the Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Third Circuit. The Court dealt solely with
the commercial speech issue and, for the purposes of its analysis, appeared
to assume that the ordinance in question was not enacted to further a racially
discriminatory purpose. After reviewing briefly its prior rulings in Bigelow
v. Virginia208 and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,20 9 Justice Marshall then sought to establish whether
Ordinance No. 5-1974 was distinguishable from the abortion and drug
advertisements involved in those cases.
He began by noting that the speakers and listeners in Linmark had
definite First Amendment interests at stake; the former wished to communicate their intention to sell a commodity and the latter desired to learn about
the availability of that commodity. 210 The fact that the item being advertised
2 11
was realty rather than prescription drugs was properly deemed irrelevant.
The respondents argued that, unlike the law involved in VirginiaPharmacy
Board, their ordinance did not suppress speech totally, but only restricted
one method of communication. The Court in Linmark admitted that "laws
regulating the time, place, or manner of speech stand on a different footing
from laws prohibiting speech altogether." 212 However, it dismissed as
unpersuasive the attempt by the township to defend its enactment on this
ground for two reasons. First, no satisfactory alternative channels of
204. Id. at 797.
205. Id.

206. See id.
207. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
208. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See note I supra.
209. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
210. 431 U.S. at 92.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 93. Indeed, the Court in Virginia PharmacyBoard had acknowledged that such
restraints on commercial speech are permissible provided they leave open alternative channels
of communication. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976). Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85-87 (1949) with
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558,
562 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (1940).
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communication were left open. Options such as newspaper advertisements
213
or multiple listings involved "more cost and less autonomy" than signs,
were "less likely to reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information" 2' 14 and "may be less effective media for communicating the message
that is conveyed by a 'For Sale' sign in front of the house to be sold." 215
Second, the Court noted that Willingboro was not genuinely concerned with
the place or manner of the speech in question. Not all signs placed on the
front lawns of residences were proscribed; there could be no argument that
the regulation was enacted to promote aesthetic or other values unrelated to
free expression2,16 or to protect the privacy of the passerby who might be
exposed to an objectionable message. 2 17 Nor had the township shown that
the place or manner of expression yielded a detrimental secondary effect to
218
society;
[riather, Willingboro has proscribed particular types of signs
based on their content because it fears their "primary" effectthat they will cause those receiving the information to act upon it.
That the proscription applies only to one mode of communication,
therefore,
does not transform this into a "time, place, or manner"
2 19
case.

The question remained whether the township had an independent interest in regulating the speech in question. The respondents contended that
such an interest was present: the need to promote stable, racially integrated
housing. Justice Marshall responded that the state in Virginia Pharmacy
Board had also established a significant interest in maintaining the professional standards of pharmacists.22 ° However, he observed,
we nevertheless found the Virginia' law unconstitutional because
we were unpersuaded that the law was necessary to achieve this
objective, and were convinced that in any event, the First Amendment disabled the State from achieving its goal by restricting the
free flow of truthful information. For the same reasons we
conclude that the Willingboro
ordinance at issue here is also
221
constitutionally infirm.
213. 431 U.S. at 93 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102-03 (1949) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)).
214. Id. at 93 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
215. Id. at 93 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971)).
216. Id. at 93-94 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
217. Id. at 94 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).
218. Id. at 94 (citing Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976)).
219. Id. at 94.
220. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 766 (1976).
221. 431 U.S. at 95.
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The record was said not to support a finding of panic selling and white
flight. Therefore, the fact that "For Sale" signs appeared in front of two
percent of the township's homes 222 was not necessarily the cause of the sales
that had occurred, and the prohibition of such signs would not thus necessarily reduce public concern over such sales. 2 3 More importantly, Ordinance
No. 5-1974 restricted the dissemination of facts important to the citizenconsumer:
That information, which pertains to sales activity in Willingboro,
is of vital interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on
one of the most important decisions they have a right to make:
where to live and raise their families. The Council has sought to
restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise
homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council
views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest
of the township: they will choose to leave town. The Council's
concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of "For Sale"
signs-with offerors communicating offers to offerees-but with
the substance of information communicated to Willingboro citizens. If dissemination of this information can be restricted, then
every locality in the country can suppress any facts that reflect
poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible claim can be made
that disclosure would cause the receipients of the information to
act "irrationally." Virginia Pharmacy Bd. denies government
such sweeping powers.
In invalidating Ordinance No. 5-1974, the Court noted that the authorities of Willingboro could always resort to other methods to combat
what they deemed to be panic selling. 225 For example, it could offer
inducements not to relocate or publicize how many whites chose to continue
to reside in the township. 6 The Court also observed that its ruling in no
way prevented the community from placing restraints on untruthful adver227
tising .
(2) Analysis
There are two major problems raised by the Supreme Court's discussion in Linmark. First, there is the issue of whether or not Ordinance No. 51974 was in fact classifiable as a time, place and manner restriction.
Second, there is the issue of whether or not the township's alleged justifica222. See note 176 supra.
223. 431 U.S. at 95-96. The Court at this juncture said it expressed no view as to whether or

not the case of Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd,
491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), see notes 191-193 and accompanying text supra, could "survive" Virginia PharmacyBoard. 431 U.S. at 95 n.9.
224. 431 U.S. at 96-97.
225. Id. at 97.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 98.
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tion was sufficient to support the restriction being imposed. Each of these
issues will be considered separately.
(a) Time, Place and Manner Restriction
It is apparent that the township council was not imposing any restraints
on the posting of signs because of the content of the message displayed on
them. That message, in the case of "For Sale" signs was simply that "The
owner is leaving this residence and wishes to market it." In case of "Sold"
signs, the message was merely that "The owner has left this residence."228
Nothing in the record indicates an intent to censor that message. Indeed, it
could be disseminated on billboards, in office window displays, in newspaper advertisements or on television. Moreover, by its terms, the ordinance
permitted the placement of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs in front of model
homes, where there would be no possibility of an underlying implication
that the occupant was fleeing the community. 22 9 In summary, then, the
enactment in question simply directed that the speech at issue could not be
disseminated at a certain place, i.e., in front of a residence or in a certain
manner, i.e., through the medium of a sign.
The Supreme Court nevertheless argued that the law could not be
supported because it left open no feasible alternative channels of communication. 230 But as the Third Circuit noted, the alternatives of newspaper or
television advertisement or window displays and the like were not foreclosed to realtors. 231 One could argue, as the dissent in the court of appeals
did, that merely because many persons respond to listings in newspapers or
in windows ignores the fact that the ordinance restricts the free flow of
information to those people who rely solely on signs. 232 But in order for this
argument to prevail, either the record or the pleadings should have indicated
that there was in fact a discrete class of such persons whose knowledge
would be totally foreclosed by the restraint in question. In the Virginia
PharmacyBoard233 case, the pleadings established that the plaintiffs represented, inter alia, aged or infirm persons physically incapable of acquiring
information about the prices of drugs through comparison shopping or the
other alternatives suggested in lieu of advertising. 234 The record in Linmark
228. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro; 535 F.2d 786, 795 (3d Cir.

1976).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 800.
431 U.S. at 93.
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 797 (3d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 816 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748

(1976). See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
234. See id. at 763-64 n.18. See also Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683, 684 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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was not as helpful. Presumably, if a large class of persons depended only
upon signs for their knowledge of residences on the market, then the total
number of sales should have decreased in the nine months between the
passage of the ordinance and the date that trial began. In fact, this did not
occur. The absolute number of sales made did not decline.2 35 Indeed, the
business of some realtors increased, 236 and no broker was able to establish
economic loss because of the enactment of the ordinance. 237 Thus, on the
basis of the record, the Supreme Court appeared to be concerned about the
right to receive information enjoyed by a hypothesized class of persons that
very possibly did not exist.
One is then left with the other objections raised by Justice Marshall:
that the ordinance compelled realtors to rely on alternative means of
communication, such as newspaper advertisements and multiple listings,
238
which were more costly, offered less autonomy and were less effective.
The points about cost and autonomy seem irrelevant. Merely because a state
regulation inconveniences the class of persons regulated ought not to be a
basis for invalidating it. Every restriction on commercial speech may inconvenience the one seeking to have his message communicated, but that fact
provides no independent ground for asserting that the restriction cannot
qualify as one of time, place and manner, at least not unless the alternative
channels of communication left open are so costly or so inadequate that the
persons subject to regulation would never be able to utilize them. As for the
putative lack of effectiveness, again the Court implicitly makes the unwarranted assumption that a significant class of persons acquires its sale information only from lawn signs. Indeed, even the plaintiffs in Linmark admitted that seventy percent of their business came from sources other than
signs 2 9 and that market turnover with respect to the remaining thirty percent
was slowed but not eliminated.2 40 Thus, the alternative channels of
communication left untouched by the township appear, at second glance, far
more adequate than Justice Marshall suggests.
But the Court goes on to observe that even if this were so, the
ordinance in question was really directed against the content of the message
displayed on the signs in question.2 4 1 But what message? Certainly not that
contained literally in the words "For Sale" or "Sold"; as noted earlier, that
235. 431 U.S. at 90.

236. Id. See note 186 supra.
237. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 794 & n.7 (3d Cir.
1976).
238. 431 U.S. at 93.
239. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 797 (3d Cir. 1976).

240. See id. at 793-94. See also 431 U.S. at 89.
241. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
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message could be freely disseminated in a variety of other manners and
contexts. The testimony given at trial was that the township's Council
sought to combat the perceived effect the placement of signs bearing the
words "Sold" or "For Sale" had on those who viewed them. 242 It did not
seek to interdict the information that a residence was once or is presently on
the market; it sought to counteract the impression created by a sign bearing
that information that something was amiss in Willingboro. In other words,
the ordinance attempted to dispel a belief about the community that may
very well have been unjustified by the content of the message on the lawn
signs themselves.
Justice Marshall observed that the regulation in question did not attempt to further aesthetic values, to protect the privacy of passersby or to
regulate a detrimental secondary effect on society. 243 The second part of this
trilogy was certainly not involved, but the same cannot be said for the first
and third parts. Testimony was taken at the Council hearings on the aesthetic
merits of banning the signs in question; 244 since Willingboro consisted
245
primarily of tract houses having sixty to seventy feet of street frontage,
the proliferation of lawn signs could prove to be an eyesore. But as the Third
Circuit noted, the township Council was not motivated by aesthetic
concerns. 2' Moreover, aesthetic interests would seemingly be best furthered by a flat ban on the display of all signs, not the selective proscription of
some types of signs, as was effectuated by Ordinance No. 5-1974.247
Moreover, if the concern of stable integration could not justify the prohibition encountered in Linmark, it is difficult to see how an asserted aesthetic
justification would fare any better if it interdicted the free flow of information to the citizen-consumer. 48
242. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 798-99 (3d Cir.
1976).

243. 431 U.S. at 93-94.
244. See id. at 90.
245. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 790 n.2 (3d Cir.
1976).
246. Id. at797n.13.
247. An analogy might be made at this juncture to the various cases that have held that the
total exclusion of all political posters from residential areas is invalid. See Ross v. Goshi, 351 F.
Supp. 949, 953-54 (D. Hawaii 1972); Farrell v. Township of Teaneck, 126 N.J. Super. 460,465,
315 A.2d 424,427 (1974); Pace v. Village of Walton Hills, 15 Ohio St. 2d 51,52,238 N.E. 2d 542,
543 (1968); Peltz v. City of South Euclid, I1 Ohio St. 2d 128, 132, 228 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1967);
Gibbons v. O'Reilly, 44 Misc. 2d 353, 357, 253 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Town of
Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 63 Misc. 2d 836, 840, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918, 922-23 (Dist. Ct.

1970). See generally Note, Architecture,Aesthetic Zoning, and the FirstAmendment, 28 STAN.
L. REV. 179, 194-95 (1975).

248. Nevertheless, some First Amendment challenges to aesthetic commercial billboard
regulations have been attempted and have foundered on the distinction between commercial
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But there remains the matter of "secondary effect." In Erznoznik v.
City of Jacksonville,249 the Court invalidated a municipal ordinance making
it a public nuisance for drive-in theaters to exhibit films containing scenes of
nudity where the motion picture screen was visible from a public thoroughfare.25 0 It ruled that the regulation in question discriminated among
films solely on the basis of content.251 Subsequently, in Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc. ,252 the Court was confronted with a set of Detroit
zoning ordinances prescribing that, absent a waiver, an adult movie theater
could not be located within one thousand feet of any other "regulated
use," 253 one of which was adult theaters generally, 254 and defining such2 55a
theater as one which presented material "characterized by an emphasis"
on "Specified Sexual Activities'256 or "Specified Anatomical Areas.''257
The Court upheld this ordinance and, in doing so, the main opinion25 8
distinguished Erznoznik as follows:
The [Detroit] City Council's determination was that a concentration of "adult" movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and
become a focus of crime, effects which are not attributable to
theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary effect
which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" speech. In contrast, in Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville . . . the justifications offered by the city rested
and noncommercial speech. See, e.g., Howard v. State Dept. of Highways, 478 F.2d 581, 585
(10th Cir. 1973); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 35, 429 P.2d 825, 827 (1967);

Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 439, 200 N.E.2d 328, 338 (1964);
Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,428-29,439 P.2d 248,262-63 (1968), appeal

dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). All these cases antedate the latest rulings on commercial
speech. Indeed, in Linmark, the Court cited Markham and Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d
1360, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1976) (permitted aesthetic size restrictions on political signs), and then
said it would leave the question of a ban on signs for aesthetic reasons until another day. 431
U.S. at 94 n.7.
249. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
250. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 330.313 (1972).

251. 422 U.S. at 211. Arguments that the ordinance was a traffic regulation were rejected
because it was said that motorists were likely to be distracted by any film, not simply one
showing nudity. Id. at 214-15.
252. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
253. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.000, as amended in 1972.
254. See DErRorr, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G (1972) (amending No.
390-G); DETROIr, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 743-G (1972) (amending Ch. 5, art.

2).
255. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 32.0007 (1972) (amending no. 390-G).
256. DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE No. 742-G, § 66.0101 (1972) (amending No. 390-

G).
257. DETROIT, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE No. 742-G, § 32.0007 (1972) (amending No. 390-

G).
258. The relevant portion'of which represented the views of Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist.
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primarily on the city's interest in protecting its citizens from
exposure to unwanted, "offensive" speech. The only secondary
effect relied on to support that ordinance was the impact on
traffic-an effect which might be caused by a distracting open-air
movie even if it did not exhibit nudity. 259
The situation in Willingboro appeared to resemble that of Detroit rather
than that of Jacksonville. The ordinance in Linmark did not attempt to
discriminate on the basis of content; it proscribed only those "For Sale" or
"Sold" notices appearing on signs placed in front of residences. Certainly,
there was never any suggestion that the township's council found those
words offensive; nor did it attempt to regulate the primary effect of those
words, the conveyance of the information that the homeowner intended to
sell or had sold his house. Rather, the Council was concerned with a
secondary effect of those signs, the tendency to foster panic selling. Justice
Marshall claimed that the ordinance's proscription was based on his definition of primary effect: that those viewing the signs would act upon the
information contained therein. 26° But the information contained therein is
the notice of sale. What the Council was concerned with was what it deemed
to be a wholly unjustified interpretation of such a notice that might arise in
the mind of the viewer, the interpretation that residency patterns in Willingboro were unstable and that therefore it was time to pack up and depart.
This interpretation would seem to constitute the classic example of the
"secondary" effect referred to in Young. Thus, in deciding Linmark, the
Court manages to misapply the very rule it purports to rely upon.
(b) The Township's Alleged Interest in Regulation
If one assumes that the township's Council had no intention of trying to
fix the racial proportions of the residents of Willingboro within its own
arbitrarily-devised quota, one then must confront the larger issue raised by
the case: was the announced purpose of the Council, the prevention of panic
selling, important enough to justify a restriction on commercial speech? In
order to answer this query,
[i]t is important first to define the problem of panic selling.
"Blockbusting," or "panic peddling," is not the same as panic
selling. Blockbusting refers to the practice of directly inducing or
persuading an individual to sell his home by representations as to
the entry into his neighborhood of blacks or other minority
groups. Panic selling is a broader problem which, although it may
be prompted by blockbusting practices, does not depend upon
direct inducements or face-to-face contact between people. Panic
259. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
260. 431 U.S. at 96.
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selling occurs when a resident who is otherwise disposed to remain in a neighborhood succumbs to any one or more of a number
of pressures to move out when it appears that a minority racial
group is beginning to enter. Among the fears of white residents as
non-whites begin to move into their neighborhood are rising crime
rates, overcrowded schools, declining property values, and a generally lower quality of life. As neighbors move away, there is also
the feeling of being left behind, giving rise to the commonlyexpressed fear, independent from any intrinsic hostility toward
the incoming racial group, of being "the last white family on the
block." Where these fears persist and intensify, panic selling
generally occurs on a wide scale.
The evidence

. . .

strongly supports the

. .

.

position, and

this court finds, that the proliferation of "for sale" signs in a
neighborhood aggravates the fears of white residents and has a
strong tendency to provoke panic selling. Admittedly, "for sale"
signs act upon the existing fears of white residents outlined above;
however, the mere fact that these underlying fears exist does not
. . . compel the conclusion that "for sale" signs do not themselves cause panic. The impact of "for sale" signs is best illustrated by their obvious relationship to the very real, concrete fear
of substantial pecuniary loss due to declining property values. A
proliferation of "for sale" signs not only intensifies this fear, but
also tends to transform it into reality by depressing prices. Many
white residents desire to remain in changing neighborhoods provided they can be maintained on a stable, integrated basis. The
evils they fear most-crime, overcrowding, depressed property
values, and being left behind-need not come to pass if stability
can be achieved. A steadily increasing number of "for sale" signs
tends, no less than overt blockbusting practices, to undermine any
hope of such stability. Once this hope is lost and complete racial
transformation appears inevitable,
even those desiring to remain
261
are virtually forced to sell.
The result of panic selling, then, is resegregation of neighborhoods. In
order to counteract this possibility, it is necessary to take steps before the
effect of panic selling reaches a "tipping point," or the percentage of the
concentration of nonwhites residing in a given locality that will cause white
residents to flee. 262 It has thus been said that
[tlhis gradual tendency of integrated areas to become more and
more Negro is accentuated by the popular belief-often transmitted into action-that the rate at which white families move out
rises with the percentage of Negroes in the area and, more important, that there exists a "tipping point"-a given percentage of
261. Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 134-35 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd,

491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). See notes 191-193 and accompanying text supra.
262. Otero v. New York Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1136 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1033 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304
F. Supp. 736, 739-40 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.

922 (1971).
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Negroes, after which the departure of whites from the areas will
be greatly accelerated.2 6
The members of Willingboro's Council felt it necessary to take remedial
steps before it was too late, before integrated neighborhoods began declining irreversibly. Justice Marshall claimed that the record did not indicate
that the "For Sale" signs were a major cause of panic selling or that the
prohibition of such signs would alleviate the problem. 264 But the printed
evidence suggests a contrary conclusion. Testimony at trial indicated that
the community in general believed that the "For Sale" signs were harbingers of trouble, and, furthermore, that this belief was inducing the action of
emigration.2 65 One realtor reported that both purchasers and sellers of homes
expressed to him the sentiments that the signs indicated that a street might be
"going black," in which case it was time for whites to leave. 266 Another
broker disclosed that eighty percent of those who sold their homes gave for
their decision to sell the assertion that "the whole town was for sale, and
they didn't want to be caught in any bind." ' 267 Furthermore, after the
passage of the ordinance, there was agreement that the number of persons
selling or considering the sale of their homes declined sharply. 268 Based on
these facts, it would seem that the "For Sale" signs did induce panic selling
and that the ordinance eliminated that inducement.
But was this asserted interest sufficient to justify an infringement of
speech? The key case prior to Linmark is BarrickRealty, Inc. v. City of
Gary.269 There, also, an ordinance prohibiting "For Sale" signs was enacted. 270 But, unlike Linmark, Barrick involved a segregated city where panic
selling was occurring in largely white neighborhoods which then became
black, thus perpetuating segregated housing patterns. 27 1 Moreover, in Barrick, some realtors actively encouraged resegregation by unlawfully inciting
263. Kaplan, EqualJustice in an Unequal World-Equalityfor the Negro-TheProblem of

Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 390 (1966). See also Navasky, The Benevolent
Housing Quota, 6 How. L.J. 30, 31-37 (1960); Note, Administrative Law-Urban RenewalHUD Has An Affirmative Duty to Consider Low Income Housing's Impact Upon Racial
Concentration,Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), 85 HARVX.
L. REV. 870, 875-76
(1972).

264. 431 U.S. at 95-96. Indeed, he cited evidence that the banning of "For Sale" signs
might exacerbate racial tension. See Laska & Hewitt, Are Laws Against "ForSale" Signs
Constitutional?SubstantiveDue ProcessRevisited, 4 REAL EsTATE L.J. 153, 160-62 (1975).
265. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786,808-09 (3d Cir. 1976)

(Gibbons, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 807.
267. 431 U.S. at 88.
268. Id. at 90.
269. 354 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974).
270. GARY, IND., ORDINANCE No. 4685 (July 25, 1972). See note 192 supra.
271. 491 F.2d at 163-64.
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whites to sell before the latter had black neighbors or depressed property
values.27 2 Finally, in Barrick, panic selling and its evils had already settled
on the city of Gary, 273 whereas Willingboro was a victim of what the Third
Circuit termed incipient panic selling. 274 The .first two differences are
probably de minimis. The effect of panic selling in an integrated neighborhood differs little from its effect on a wholly white enclave. 275 The district
court in Barrick never mentioned the premeditated conduct of some realtors, and the court of appeals remarked upon it only in passing, suggesting
that it was a factor of minor significance. The third distinction is more
troublesome; however, as the Third Circuit in Linmark noted,
[b]ut to forbid termination of a cause of panic selling until its
detrimental effects had burdened the community would be an
exaltation of form over substance. That approach would bar
combating at its inception the very problem now plaguing so many
urban areas where measures such as "busing" are now found
necessary. To force Willingboro to await the evils of segregation,
which it has so successfully avoided to date, so that the principle
of Barrick may thereafter be employed in an effort to fight back,
seems to us an approach devoid of common sense. 276
Thus, assuming Barrick is applicable to Linmark, what are the teachings of the former decision With respect to the First Amendment? The
district court in Barrick simply ruled that "reasonable regulations upon
communications of a purely commercial nature are not subject to scrutiny
under the First Amendment. "277 The Seventh Circuit was more circumspect. It found that a First Amendment challenge could not be avoided
merely because "For Sale" signs display a commercial message; some
balancing of interests had to occur.2 78 But the court of appeals chose to
accord the city's interests decisive weight, defining those interests as the
maintenance of restrictions on commercial activity in areas zoned for residential use279 and the need to ensure the continued existence of stable,
racially integrated neighborhoods.2 8 The district court's analysis is no
272. Id. at 164.
273. See 354 F. Supp. at 134. Between 1960 and 1970, the white population of Gary
decreased by 24.9%, while its nonwhite population increased by 34.9%. Id.
274. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786,799 (3d Cir. 1976).
275. See id.at 800.
276. Id.
277. 354 F. Supp. at 132.
278. 491 F.2d at 164-65.
279. Id. (citing City of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-97 (1926)).
280. 491 F.2d at 164-65. But cf. DeKalb Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Chairman & Bd. of
Comm'rs of Roads, 372 F. Supp. 748, 754-55 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (struck down ordinance prohibiting realtors, but not homeowners, from setting up "For Sale" signs; noted the logic of Barrick;
but said the discriminatory features of the ordinance in question violated the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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longer valid after the Virginia Pharmacy Board case. But the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning that balancing must occur is similar to that expressed in
Virginia Pharmacy Board28 1 and it was applied by the Third Circuit in
Linmark.28 2 Yet, Justice Marshall eschews balancing as an approach. His
conclusion seems to be that because the Council sought to restrict the free
flow of vital data and because it sought to adopt a "highly paternalistic"
28 3
approach, the ordinance embodying this approach was invalid per se.
If so, interesting consequences are implied. As noted earlier, 2 84 the
concept of panic selling is related to that of blockbusing,2 85 i.e., inducing
sales of property by making representations about the likely racial composition of the surrounding neighborhood. A number of state laws forbid the
practice of blockbusting286 and there are judicial decisions upholding the
validity of such regulations.2 87 Blockbusting is also prohibited by section
804(e) of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968,288 now codified at section
3604(e) of Title forty-two of the United States Code. 219 That provision
makes it unlawful "[f]or profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to
sell or rent any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of a person or persons of a particular race,
9
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' '2
One of the leading cases construing this provision is United States v.
281. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762-70 (1976).
282. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 796-97 (3d Cir.
1976).
283. 431 U.S. at 96-97.
284. See note 167 supra; see also note 261 and accompanying text supra.
285. For cases defining this term, see note 167 supra.
286. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 70-51 to -53 (Smith-Hurd 1978); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 56, § 230A (Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN. LAWN ANN. ch. 112, § 87AAA (Supp. 1970); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 564.203 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2)(4) (West Supp. 1978); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. §4112.02 (Page Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.22 kWest Supp. 1977); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 2296 (1975). See generally JudicialResponse, supra note 167, at 834-38;
Note Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 171-74 (1970) [hereinafter cited at Blockbusting];
Comment, The Constitutionalityof a Municipal OrdinanceProhibiting"ForSale, " "Sold, "or
"Open" Signs to Prevent Blockbusting, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 685, 697-717 (1970).
287. See, e.g., Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Il. 2d 530, 553, 224 N.E.2d
793, 807 (1967); Montgomery Citizens League v. Greenhalgh, 253 Md. 151, 162, 252 A.2d 242,
247 (1969); State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App. 413, 424, 291 A.2d 161, 166 (1972); Summer v.
Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 553-54, 251 A.2d 761, 764 (1969).
288. 42 U.S.C. 88 3601-3631 (1970).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (Supp. V 1975).
290. Id. Section 3604(e) has been found to be constitutional. See United States v. Bob
Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121-22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United
States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312-13 (D. Md. 1969); Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F.
Supp. 1236, 1240 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See generallyJudicialResponse, supra note 167, at 823-33;
Blockbusting, supra note 286, at 174-82.
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Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. ,291 decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1973. Lawrence involved a suit against five Atlanta realty firms whose agents, though
engaging in no blatantly impermissible conduct as individuals, undertook a
"group pattern" of harassment and racial representations that induced sales
of property in white neighborhoods.2 92 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that section 3604(e) did not violate the First Amendment because it "is
aimed at the commercial activities of those who would profiteer off the ills
of society, conduct that the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to
regulate." 2 93 Because the speech in question was purely commercial,
constitutional attack was thus foreclosed; any concomitant restraint on the
informational value of a statement violative of section 3604(e) was said to
be "clearly outweighed by the government's overriding interest in preventing blockbusting.''29 The Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Virginia,295 decided in 1975, cited Lawrence with approval as an example of one of those
cases where "there usually existed a clear relationship between the advertising in question and an activity that the government was legitimately regulating. "296 It therefore left open the possibility that Lawrence represented one
instance of a constitutional restriction on commercial expression.
Lawrence was a blockbusting case involving actual representations
made by realtors. But as the district court in Barrick noted, "[t]he only
difference between [federal anti-blockbusting] laws and the ordinance here
in question lies in the means employed to attack the problem of panic
selling. This court finds the prohibition of 'For Sale' signs no less rationally
related to this objective, or to the ultimate objectives of integration and
social and economic stability, than the prohibition of overt blockbusting
practices.'"297 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Linmark also indicated that the
township's ordinance could be analogized to section 3604(e). Thus, it
stated:
[n]o reason appears of record to indicate that the. . ordinance is
not even more constitutionally acceptable as reasonable means to
291. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
292. See United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006-07 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
293. 474 F.2d at 121. The Fifth Circuit relied on the First Amendment analysis undertaken
in United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972), which
upheld the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1974), a provision prohibiting the publication of discriminatory advertisements in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling.
Hunterheld that the Constitution does not shield commercial expression against governmental
restraint. 459 F.2d at 211.
294. 474 F.2d at 122.
295. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). See note I supra.
296. Id. at 825 n.10.
297. Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 135-36 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd,
491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974). See notes 191-193 and accompanying text supra.
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halt early panic-selling and its incipient segregation effects. The
federal Fair Housing Act prohibits the mere attempt to encourage
"white flight." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) . . . .The ordinance herein
being preventive in nature and constitutionally permissible, the
present case fits'298the adage, "an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure.
The Supreme Court in Linmark expressed no view about whether
Barrick survived Bigelow v. Virginia299 and the Virginia Pharmacy
Board30 0 ruling. But its holding in Linmark does suggest that if the record
evincing panic selling in that case would not create a justification for
abridging speech, then neither would the record in Barrick or even Lawrence. If this assessment is accurate, then the validity of prosecutions under
section 3604(e) in any but the most blatant cases may be in doubt and the
language in Bigelow about "legitimate regulation" may have been consigned to oblivion. However, this conclusion about the federal statute may be
premature. The Court in Linmark did speak of the fact that "Congress has
°
made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing"; 301
moreover, in Virginia Pharmacy Board itself, the Court noted that First
Amendment protection of commercial speech would not prevent governmental regulation of unlawful conduct, 302 citing in support of this statement
United States v. Hunter,30 3 a decision construing another provision of the
federal housing act, which Lawrence had relied on for its First Amendment
analysis. 3 4
But if the federal laws constitute legitimate regulation, it is difficult to
see why the same should not be said of Ordinance No. 5-1974, which is
directed at attaining a similar goal of stable, integrated housing. It is
difficult to understand why such an ordinance is invalid per se because it
restricts the free flow of information and evinces too paternalistic an attitude
if legislation like section 3604(e) is not subject to similar attacks. Perhaps
the distinguishing factor that may be relied on in later cases is the alleged
absence of evidence in Linmark; but in light of what the record actuaUy
disclosed, this factor only suggests that future governmental attempts to
298. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 535 F.2d 786, 800 (3d Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original).
299. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
300. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
301. 431 U.S. at 95. See also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir. 1977).
302. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772-73 (1976).
303. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
304. See note 293 supra.
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preclude panic selling will be invalidated in all but the most obvious cases.
As a result, the Court in Linmark binds the hands of municipal authorities,
telling them they cannot stem the tide of resegregation until it has already
occurred. The decision therefore marks a new limitation upon local efforts
to maintain racially integrated communities.

